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Debates on the relevance of national oil companies as a means for a state to 
adequately manage their petroleum resources has been put forward by some 
critics. Some critics argue that the traditional national oil company model is 
antiquated. At first, national oil companies were set up as agents of the 
governments primarily to exert control and ownership over the state’s petroleum 
resources. Developed Western governments did this. Recently, NOCs in petroleum 
developing states set up in line with government regulations and policies seek to 
convert the petroleum resources into valuable benefits for the people. This has 
not been the case in recent times, as the average citizen of these states barely 
benefits from the exploitation of petroleum resources. 
 
This research examined the theory of resource nationalism and the roles of NOCs 
in achieving government objectives. Further, the thesis examined the role of NOCs 
in the development of petroleum resources. NOCs have enormous potential to 
contribute to positive economic transformation in any country, especially countries 
that have an abundance of petroleum resources. Given the vast petroleum 
resources, economic development can be achieved provided that proper 
institutional and petroleum policy conditions are put in place.  
 
This thesis further reviews the roles NOCs play in the global petroleum industry, 
and in particular in their domestic petroleum industry. Furthermore, the thesis 
argues that for a petroleum-rich developing state that establishes a NOC, the 
extent of involvement of the NOC in the development of petroleum resources 
matters. Some NOCs take the backseat when it comes to the actual production of 
the petroleum resources. Further, they have been turned into rent collectors, as 
they barely engage in the production of the petroleum resources. Again, should 
the exploitation of the petroleum resources be left in the hands of the international 
oil companies, or should the public sector, preferably the NOC play a leading role 
in the production of these petroleum resources? 
 
 
Keywords: National Oil Companies, Resource Nationalism, Petroleum resource-
rich state, Petroleum resources, Government, Resource Curse, Rentier State, 
Norway, Nigeria, Ownership and Control. 
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction to the Research  
Natural resources are nature’s gifts to a country, and can be a source of social 
and economic development for the state, particularly concerning petroleum 
resources.1 The ability to control the petroleum industry of a state depends on the 
level of competence, and control by the government, usually achieved with the 
support of its National Oil Company (NOC).2 The regulatory framework of the 
industry generally reflects the government’s mastery of the industry. Further, it is 
possible to have ownership but little or no control over the petroleum industry. 
The government, through its NOC, cannot effectively exert control over the oil and 
gas industry if it does not have the human capacity and technical knowledge, 
backed by robust legal framework and policies. NOC’s can be the key to economic 
and social development in petroleum-rich states.3  
 
Petroleum resources when properly managed can lead to economic development 
for the country in which these resources are discovered, (for example, Norway  
and some OPEC countries like Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait). A robust petroleum 
 
1 In this study, 'petroleum' resources is used to refer to 'oil and gas' resources. Petroleum resources are 
predominantly defined as all liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons existing in their natural state below ground, as well 
as the associated substances with hydrocarbon resources. See, 'Petroleum' (Cambridge English Dictionary, 2020) 
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/petroleum> accessed 26 May 2020; National Society, 
'Petroleum' (National Geographic Society, 2020) 
<https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/petroleum/> accessed 26 May 2020 and Bernard 
Taverne, Petroleum, Industry And Governments (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2013) 1 – 5. See also, 'Petroleum | 
Energy, Products, & Facts' (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2018) <https://www.britannica.com/science/petroleum> 
accessed 3 December 2018; 'Petroleum - Schlumberger Oilfield Glossary' (Glossary.oilfield.slb.com, 2018) 
<http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/en/Terms/p/petroleum.aspx> accessed 3 May 2018; National Geographic 
Society, 'Petroleum' (National Geographic Society, 2018) 
<https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/petroleum/> accessed 3 December 2018; 'Oil: Crude And 
Petroleum Products - Energy Explained, Your Guide To Understanding Energy - Energy Information 
Administration' (Eia.gov, 2018) <https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.php?page=oil_home> accessed 3 
December 2018. 
2 After this, abbreviations and initialism will be used where necessary to avoid boring the reader. For example, 
instead of continually writing National Oil Companies and International Oil Companies, a simple use of the 
abbreviation NOC and IOC will be used.  
3 Petroleum-state can be defined as a state with large proven oil and gas reserves, and also with high level of crude 
production and exportation. See 'Oil Reserves Definition' (Investopedia, 2020) 
<https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/oil-reserves.asp> accessed 26 May 2020; 'Oil-Rich | Meaning Of Oil-
Rich' (Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, 2020) <https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/oil-rich> 
accessed 26 May 2020 and 'OPEC Share Of World Crude Oil Reserves' (OPEC, 2019) 
<https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm> accessed 26 May 2020. 
 2 
regulatory framework that promotes the involvement of their NOC in the 
development and production of the petroleum resources would assist the state in 
value creation through these resources. For a petroleum resource-rich country, 
whether a developed or developing country, the importance of their NOC in the 
effective utilization of their petroleum resources cannot be over-emphasised. 
Potentially, the beneficial utilization of these resources cannot be achieved without 
full control and ownership of the petroleum resources and the industry. For full 
control and ownership to be achieved, the importance of a robust petroleum 
regulation and policy cannot be exaggerated.   
 
It can be argued that leaving the exploration and production of oil and gas 
resources in the complete control of the private sector (international oil 
companies) could lead to results where the average citizen of a petroleum-rich 
country will not benefit from the exploitation of these petroleum resources. At the 
same time, it has also been argued that, generally governments, especially those 
from developing countries, are not capable of effectively regulating their 
petroleum industry.4 Therefore, strong knowledge and control of the industry can 
act as the best means for governments to learn about the industry. Thus, no 
government can effectively regulate an industry it does not comprehend.   
 
Therefore, this thesis seeks to argue that the formulation of a comprehensive 
petroleum resources legal framework is one of the most crucial steps to building 
a thriving upstream petroleum industry. Another is to create a regulatory entity 
to enforce the legal regime and a NOC to support government in achieving its 
policy goals and to assist in the implementation of the legal framework. While 
stressing the importance, and the vital role the NOC has to play in achieving a 
beneficial petroleum industry for the citizens of a petroleum resource-rich state. 
The policies and regulatory frameworks that would assist developing countries 
harness the benefits from the exploitation of its resources is what this study will 
deal with.5 For example, West Africa, at the beginning of the 21st century, saw a 
 
4 See Dawda Adams and others, 'Globalisation, Governance, Accountability And The Natural Resource ‘Curse’: 
Implications For Socio-Economic Growth Of Oil-Rich Developing Countries' (2019) 61 Resources Policy 128. 
See also, Oumarou Zallé, 'Natural Resources And Economic Growth In Africa: The Role Of Institutional 
Quality And Human Capital' (2019) 62 Resources Policy 616. 
5 Ustina Markus, Oil and Gas (Palgrave, Macmillan Education 2015) 274. 
 3 
burst of exploration activities in its oil fields.6 Also, according to its geology, further 
oil and gas fields are yet to be discovered. Major oil producing countries in Africa 
including Nigeria and Angola have benefited immensely from oil and gas 
discoveries and an increase in revenue from the petroleum resources, which 
however has led to high levels of corruption and a lack of accountability on the 
part of the government, and no benefits to the average citizen of these countries 
- a situation that can still be observed today.7 By way of demonstration, these 
threads of analysis between developed and developing petroleum-rich state 
(Norway and Nigeria respectively) will run through the thesis. 
 
1.2 Context of the Study 
It is generally observed that NOCs can play a crucial role in managing and 
controlling the petroleum resources in a country and in aiding a country that is 
endowed with petroleum resources to maximise the benefits of these resources. 
Today over 80% of the world's oil and gas reserves are controlled by NOCs.8 As a 
result, the importance of these government institutions to the global oil and gas 
industry cannot be exaggerated.9 It is arguable that since 1991 nearly 80% of the 
conventional crude oil reserves have been controlled by NOCs. Nevertheless, this 
control over the natural resources over this period has not led to operational 
efficiency, as the works of Eller et al. suggested.10 For some countries, it is yet to 
be substantiated whether the NOC has contributed to the developmental needs of 
the country that established it. This and more will be what this thesis will be 
concerned with, as the NOC will be at the heart of the thesis discussion. 




8 See, 'National Oil Companies (Nocs)' (Extractives Hub, 2020) 
<https://extractiveshub.org/servefile/getFile/id/4220> accessed 26 May 2020. 
9 Valérie Marcel and John V Mitchell,  Oil Titans: National Oil Companies In The Middle East (Chatham House 
2006) 1. See, 'The National Oil Company Database' (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2019) 
<https://resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/national-oil-company-database> accessed 7 January 
2020. See also, Anton Oussov, 'Are NOCs The New IOCs?' (KPMG, 2019) 
<https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2018/04/are-national-oil-companies-the-new-international-oil-
companies.html> accessed 7 January 2020 and Mark Thurber, 'NOCs And The Global Oil Market: Should We 
Worry' (Energy.stanford.edu, 2012) 
<https://energy.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj9971/f/thurber_energy_seminar_nocs_06feb2012_final_0.pdf> 
accessed 7 January 2020. 
10 Stacy L. Eller, Peter R. Hartley and Kenneth B. Medlock, 'Empirical Evidence on the Operational Efficiency 
of National Oil Companies' (2010) 40 Empirical Economics. See also, Peter Hartley and Kenneth B. Medlock, 'A 
Model Of The Operation And Development Of A National Oil Company' (2008) 30 Energy Economics 2460. 
 4 
global petroleum industry, because from the 1930s to 2000s, the struggle for 
control over petroleum resources was on going, and countries affirming their 
ownership and sovereignty over these resources, led to periods of 
nationalisation.11 The commonality between the reasoning of some states was the 
establishment of a NOC to be able to affirm the state’s independence and put 
national development before foreign interests.12 This affirms some claims that 
resource nationalism needed a NOC or government owned entity.13 Further, the 
study seeks to understand the meaning of resource nationalism and its concept of 
ownership and control. How the laws, policies and regulations of the upstream 
petroleum industry that mirror this concept help a state in actualising the goals 
set out by the government. Arguably, some resource-rich developing states do 
not have full control over their natural resources and the benefits are only limited 
to a group and not the people in general. The thesis will be seeking an explanation 
for the cause of these situations. The figure below illustrates the studies 
conceptual framework. 
Figure 1: Thesis Conceptual Framework  
 
Source: the author 
As shown in the above figure, petroleum resources often matter to NOCs. NOCs 
are usually set up to manage the petroleum resources of the state in question, 
but how effectively the NOCs carry out this duty is still unclear. Also, the NOC 
 
11 Christa N. Brunnschweiler and Steven Poelhekke, 'Pushing One's Luck: Petroleum Ownership And Discoveries' 
[2019] OxCarre Research Paper 219. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See Paul Stevens, 'National oil companies and international oil companies in the middle east: Under the shadow 

















contribution to the management of this natural resources is not straight forward 
to assess. Some NOCs have been seen to contribute to the growth of their 
countries’ economy and petroleum sector. Equinor of Norway is an example. As 
shown by the figure, this study will try to make a theoretical contribution to 
existing research while bringing together theoretical perspectives within which the 
research is defined, is the role of this study’s conceptual framework.14 NOCs when 
effectively used in managing a state’s petroleum resources, can overcome the 
resource curse that has been known to plague petroleum resource-rich states, 
thus wielding their ownership and control rights, often termed resource 
nationalism. 
 
Further, the research aims to explain the upstream sector policy and proposes a 
new focus of policy for a petroleum resource-rich developing country. 
Furthermore, in building the theory, this study will put forward an analytical 
framework to explain the variations and similarities in the upstream sector policies 
and regulatory frameworks of select countries. To achieve the goals mentioned 
above, four bodies of literature are brought together: the literature on national oil 
companies; resource nationalism; resource curse and the rentier state theory. The 
connection between petroleum resources and the resource curse, especially in 
petroleum-rich developing countries has been investigated, and the adverse 
outcomes for the economic development of these countries.15 Notably, some 
resource curse scholarship has neglected the ownership and control structures and 
by extension, the role of policy and regulations in the petroleum industry.16 
According to Berman, the personal conceptualisation of those, as mentioned 
earlier, and new knowledge creation occurs when multiple theoretical frameworks 
are explored in a study, to proffer solutions to the research problem.17 Therefore, 
this study will be built on the foundation of an extensive review of previous 
analysis and studies the theoretical framework of this study will be built. 
 
14 Jeanette Berman, 'Utility Of A Conceptual Framework Within Doctoral Study: A Researcher's Reflections' 
(2013) 23 Issues in Educational Research 1. 
15 See Mohsen Veisi, 'Essays On The Links Between Natural Resources, Corruption, Taxation And Economic 
Growth' (PhD, University of Manchester 2017). 
16 Bianca Sarbu, Ownership and Control of Oil: Explaining Policy Choices Across Producing Countries 
(Routledge 2014) 11. 
17 Jeanette Berman n 14. See also, Jeanette Berman and Robyn Smyth, 'Conceptual Frameworks In The Doctoral 
Research Process: A Pedagogical Model' (2013) 52 Innovations in Education and Teaching International 125. 
 6 
Further, the bodies of literature as mentioned earlier will be used in answering the 
research questions, achieving the aims and scope of the thesis, and showing the 
importance for a petroleum-rich developing state to maintain a NOC. That having 
been said, this thesis will add to existing legal knowledge in connection to NOCs 
as a tool used by governments in exerting control over its petroleum resources 
and industry. In considerable detail, the thesis elucidates the actual control of the 
upstream petroleum sector in a petroleum-rich country; notably, in both a 
developed and developing country. Therefore, this shows the study’s conceptual 
framework validity, as a significant interpretation of the available data concerning 
the theories analysed in the study.18 
 
State control and ownership debates will be unpacked to fully explain the resource 
curse literature and how it shapes the institutions of a resource-rich country. There 
arises the need for a fundamental understanding of the global petroleum industry, 
the policies, control structures, upstream ownership-control dyad, implications of 
state control, and the instruments through which these policies are implemented 
in practice. Nigeria and Norway will be the focus of this study together with their 
NOCs which play a significant role in each countries’ domestic oil and gas industry. 
Debates over the importance of national oil companies, resource nationalism 
(ownership and control), the resource curse and rentier state are then brought 
together to explain the choices of the upstream oil and gas policies of Norway and 
Nigeria.  
 
A country that is endowed with hydrocarbon resources can maximise the benefits 
of its petroleum resources through the establishment of a NOC. Although, today, 
industry commentators support the free market or liberal approach towards the 
development of natural resources, where the development of these resources is 
left in the hands of the private sector.19 Their position on this matter is supported 
 
18 See Shirlee-Ann Knight and Donna Cross, 'Using Contextual Constructs Model To Frame Doctoral Research 
Methodology' (2012) 7 International Journal of Doctoral Studies 39. 
19 See Naná de Graaff, 'The Hybridization Of The State–Capital Nexus In The Global Energy Order' (2012) 9 
Globalizations 231, and Jonah D Levy (ed), The State After Statism (Harvard University Press 2006) 3 – 7. See 
also, Rachel Parker and Stephen Cox, 'The State And The Extractive Industries In Australia: Growth For Whose 
Benefit?' (2020) 7 The Extractive Industries and Society 621, and Richard Huizar, 'Why Was Yacimientos 
Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), Argentina’S National Oil Company, Privatized?' (2019) 6 The Extractive Industries 
and Society 863. 
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by the argument of waste and mismanagement that has occurred in some 
countries and the particular roles played by their NOCs. The critical factor in this 
research is the regulatory frameworks and policy, how these laws and policies are 
formulated, and what influences the decisions taken by the governments. This 
study will be focused on how a government can use its upstream oil and gas 
industry regulatory framework and policy as a strategy in turning its petroleum 
resources into economic development and overall benefit to the people of the 
state. 
 
Finally, for the NOC to create value through the management and exploitation of 
the petroleum resources, the importance of the policies and legal framework 
cannot be over-emphasised because a strong foundation makes for a sturdy 
structure. A robust legal framework and energy policy will guide the NOC in 
achieving the set-out objectives of the government, thus leading to value creation 
for the people of the country. The upstream legal framework and energy policies 
will be the central focus of this study and will assist the research in looking at the 
strategic decisions that face the NOCs. Operatorship, resources, geography and 
political-strategic decisions will be examined in detail. 
 
1.3 Research Questions  
This thesis seeks to answer the following question: to what extent can full 
control and ownership of petroleum resources by a developing country 
through its National Oil Company better lead that country to economic 
development and an enhanced standard of living for its people?  
Further questions arising from the research question:  
1. How can a NOC of a petroleum-rich state convert these natural resources 
into economic and social development? 





1.4 Research Aims and Scope  
The research aims to critically evaluate the expanding roles of NOCs and how a 
NOC from a developing petroleum-rich country can efficiently manage the 
petroleum resources, thus creating value for the people, through the government 
petroleum regulatory policies and the NOCs direct participation in the petroleum 
industry. Furthermore, the research aims to argue the critical role a NOC plays in 
the successful use of petroleum resources to achieve economic and social 
development, especially in a petroleum-rich developing country.  
 
Therefore, in answering the research questions, the theoretical framework that 
will be developed in this thesis is the foundation of a thorough evaluation of 
previous studies and analyses. Further, in answering the research questions 
consultation of the relevant literature will assist the study in articulating the 
theories, that will shed more light and bring to life the research questions, aims 
and scope. Even after the proclaimed ownership and control of petroleum-rich 
developing countries like Nigeria, the evidence shows that these country’s 
petroleum industries are still handmaidens to the IOCs.  
 
As such, this thesis seeks to investigate how a petroleum-rich developing state 
can maximise the benefits of their petroleum resources production, also how to 
ultimately achieve success with a NOC in the development of these petroleum 
resources. 
 
The scope of the thesis is limited to petroleum-producing countries, developed 
and developing ones. Consequently, for emphasis, examples from other 
petroleum-rich countries will be used. Furthermore, for comparative analysis, the 
petroleum industry of Nigeria and Norway represent the developed and developing 
countries, respectively. In both countries, NOCs will be the centre of analysis 
showing the critical roles NOCs play in achieving economic development through 
the effective management of petroleum resources. Nigeria, as a well-known West 
African petroleum-rich state, is usually used as a negative example. For instance, 
when it comes to petroleum resources management and her NOC the Nigerian 
 9 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), it is one of waste and corruption,20 while 
Norway is popularly used as a positive example of a progressive state, whose 
management of their petroleum resources has been remarkable, also their NOC 
Equinor.21 Therefore, the decision to use both countries on different spectrums of 
the global petroleum industry is relevant to the study, as it assist to bring out and 
develop different strands of argument by providing the contrasting illustrations of 
the issues covered in the different theories, topics and chapters in this thesis. 
 
 
1.5 Research Methodology  
The study builds on the extensive literature on NOCs, resource nationalism, the 
resource curse and rentier state theories. Primarily, when carrying out legal 
research,22 communicating the methodology23 to be used makes clear what is 
one's particular academic viewpoint, which helps the reader comprehend where 
one is coming from in the research and where the research sits in connection to 
other scholarly work.24 Further, Jaap Hage, defined methodology and method as 
follows: 
the methodology is the study of the proper standards for scientific 
arguments, and a method is a set of standards through which the 
relevance of arguments can be evaluated.25 
 
Therefore the relevance of the arguments flows from the existing literature or the 
studies in the thesis attempting to answer the questions, and also in achieving the 
 
20 See Nick Branson and Ed Hobey-Hamsher, 'The Diverging Fortunes Of Africa’s Crude Kings' (Petroleum-
economist.com, 2019) <https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/politics-economics/africa/2019/the-
diverging-fortunes-of-africa-s-crude-kings> accessed 30 December 2019. 
For purpose of brevity, the abbreviations ‘NNPC’ will be used to describe the Nigerian NOC. 
21 See Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak, 'Model Of State Management Of Petroleum Sector – Case Of Norway' (2017) 
20 International Studies. Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal 97. 
22 Legal research can be said to be a tradition which draws attention to the law as a practical discipline, and 
methods that position law as an aspect of the humanities or the social sciences. Mathias M. Siems and Daithí mac 
Síthigh, 'Mapping Legal Research' (2012) 71 The Cambridge Law Journal.  
23 Oxford English Dictionary defines Methodology as ‘a system of methods used in a particular area of study or 
activity’ See, Methodology | Definition of Methodology in English by Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford Dictionaries 
|English, 2017) <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/methodology> accessed 24 February 2019. 
24 See Caroline Morris and Cian Murphy, Getting A PhD in Law (Hart 2011) 29. 
25 Jaap Hage in Mark van Hoecke, Maurice Adams and Dirk Heirbaut, The Method and Culture of Comparative 
Law (Hart 2015) 38. Also, the methodology has been described as ways or methods to follow in order to achieve 
a result or results; and methods are the means one undertakes in achieving the result. Geoffrey Samuel, An 
Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method (European Academy of Legal Theory Monograph 
Series) (Bloomsbury Publishing 2014). 
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aims of the thesis. Further, in conducting research, the specific methods of 
collecting data and analysis is a significant component of the research approach.26 
Chynoweth, saw the research process as an analytical one rather than one of data 
collection,27 nevertheless, for clarity of research methodology,28 is critical because 
it provides the structure and underpinning of both the research and the arguments 
that the research is relying on.29 In addition, quantitative and qualitative methods 
or even mixed methods are often used in academic studies. These methods all 
contribute to an approach to research of academic knowledge claims.30 Creswell 
asserted that qualitative research starts with the assumptions and the use of 
interpretative or theoretical frameworks that inform the study of the research 
problems while tackling the meaning attributed to a problem by other 
commentators.31 Furthermore, according to Denzin and Lincoln, qualitative 
research in its rights is a field of inquiry that cuts across disciplines, fields and 
 
26 See John W Creswell, Research Design (Sage Publications 2008) 17. See also, Dilanthi Amaratunga and others, 
'Quantitative And Qualitative Research In The Built Environment: Application Of “Mixed” Research Approach' 
(2002) 51 Work Study 17. 
27 See Paul Chynoweth, 'Legal Research In The Built Environment: A Methodological Framework' [2008] 
University of Salford <http://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/12467/1/legal_research.pdf> accessed 7 January 2020. 
28 According to Morris and Murphy, methodology refers to the particular way or ways in which one carries out 
research, and also any accompanying assumptions and perspectives, articulated or not, surrounding an 
investigation into a particular research topic. See, Caroline Morris and Cian Murphy (n. 24) 28 – 29. 
29 Caroline Morris and Cian Murphy (n. 24) 29. See also, Jan Jonker and Bartjan Pennink, The Essence Of 
Research Methodology: A Concise Guide For Master And PhD Students In Management Science (Springer 2010) 
17. 
30 John Creswell in clarifying three approaches to research, put forward these definitions:  
A quantitative approach is one in which the researcher uses cause and effect thinking, 
reduction to specific variables and hypotheses and questions, use of measurement and 
observation, and the test of theories employs strategies of inquiry such as experiments and 
surveys and collects data on predetermined instruments that yield statistical data. 
A qualitative approach is one in which the researcher often makes knowledge claims based 
primarily on the multiple meanings of individual experiences, meanings socially and 
historically constructed, intending to develop a theory or pattern or participatory 
perspectives, i.e. political, issue-oriented, collaborative, or change-oriented or both. 
Finally, the mixed methods approach is one in which the researcher base knowledge claims 
on pragmatic grounds, e.g. consequences-oriented, problem-centred that employs a strategy 
of inquiry that involves collecting data either simultaneously or sequentially to understand 
the research best. 
John W Creswell (n. 26) 17 – 21. 
31 John W Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design (Sage Publications 2013) 42 – 25.  
Martyn Denscombe gave the distinctions between quantitative research and qualitative research: 
quantitative research uses numbers as a unit of analysis while qualitative research uses words 
or visual images as the unit of analysis; 
quantitative research tends to be associated with analysing specific variables while 
qualitative research tends to be associated with holistic perspective; finally, quantitative 
research usually analyses its data after collection while qualitative research tends to be 
associated with the data analysis during the data collection. 
See Martyn Denscombe, Good Research Guide (Open University Press 2017) 6 – 7; Ian Dobinson and Francis 
Johns in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2007) 
33 – 34. 
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subject matter.32 They further stated that the studied use of numerous empirical 
materials is what qualitative research is involved with.33  
 
Webley asserted that quantitative and qualitative as the two traditions of research 
rest on different epistemologies, as quantitative methods are usually linked with 
deductive reasoning. In contrast, qualitative methods usually depend to a high 
degree on inductive reasoning.34 Arguably, qualitative research may not provide 
structured generalised findings,35 however, in-depth qualitative methods in many 
cases of problems within a legal system leads to best practice insights, and the 
effect of policy shifts can be evidenced.36 Qualitative research and analysis 
theories influence how it is conducted. Consequently, the researcher attempts to 
expand on or develop a theory in order to furnish a more practical comprehension 
of the resource nationalism phenomenon.37 That said, the study will adopt a 
qualitative method in answering the research questions. Consequently, this 
research will critically engage in the examination of some theories and resource 
nationalism phenomenon, and in so doing will advance a better understanding of 
them. In addition, for the research to achieve its aims and objectives the legal 
method of research would be generally used.  
 
 
32 Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln, The landscape of Qualitative Research (Sage 2013) 5 
33 Ibid. (n. 32) 7. 
The use of words as data, collected and analysed in research is the basic definition of qualitative research while 
in contrast, quantitative research uses numbers as data and analyses in carrying out the research. Virginia Braun 
and Victoria Clarke, Successful Qualitative research (Sage 2014) 3 – 4.  
Also, Direct observation, in-depth interviews and analysis of documents are the three main methods of qualitative 
research, although they can be used individually or in a combination. See Lisa Webley, Qualitative Approaches 
to Empirical Legal Research in Peter Cane and Herbert M. Kritzer (eds), The Oxford handbook of empirical legal 
research the Oxford handbook of empirical legal research (Oxford University Press 2010) 928. 
34 Webley asserted that deductive reasoning is formed on general hypotheses put forward before data collection 
begins. While inductive reasoning seeks to obtain general themes or models from the data collected as the research 
progresses. See Lisa Webley, Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research in Peter Cane and Herbert M. 
Kritzer (eds) (n. 33) 929. 
35 When it comes to the findings from both research methods, quantitative studies when well planned and carried 
out usually puts forward findings that are generalised to the population, where a relevant sample from the 
population has been drawn. In contrast, qualitative research usually centres its study on a smaller number of 
observations or data sources whether people, events or documents; it examines them in depth. Lisa Webley, 
Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research in Peter Cane and Herbert M. Kritzer (eds) (n. 33) 934. 
36 See, Lisa Webley, Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research in Peter Cane and Herbert M. Kritzer 
(eds) (n. 33) 948. 
37 Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (n. 31) 21. 
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In carrying out this work, primary and secondary sources of data will be used. 
These may include but are not limited to statutory materials, textbooks, legal 
periodicals, energy Journals, case reports, Parliamentary debates and government 
reports, international organisation papers and reports, e.g. UN reports, World 
Bank reports, IMF reports and OPEC Reports. 
 
1.5.1 Legal Research 
This research involves legal research, which can be interpreted to cover the full 
length of investigative, analytical, critical, theoretical and synthesising of 
intellectual activity, while also formulating the hypothesis to give meaning to 
already created legal rules.38 Given the legal nature of the proposed research, the 
methodology to be adopted will be the qualitative method of research, which will 
be divided into three parts: doctrinal research, non-doctrinal research and a 
comparative study of the Norwegian and Nigerian upstream oil and gas industries. 
The doctrinal approach will help the researcher determine the particular laws of 
the selected petroleum-rich countries. Then one considers the problems currently 
affecting the laws of these petroleum-rich countries and the policies that form the 
basis for the existing law. The flaws of these policies will be highlighted, and this 
may lead to a proposal of change in the existing petroleum law.39  
 
Further, the research will examine the resource nationalism phenomenon and the 
existing theory or body of theory. In doing so, it is particularly suitable to use the 
qualitative research method in examining the phenomenon of resource 
nationalism, its existence and nature.40 For a more useful understanding of the 
phenomenon, an elaboration on the existing theories will be attempted through 
qualitative analysis which is influenced by theories.41 Theories of the resource 
curse and rentier state would critically be examined in the study. Again, the 
conceptual structure of this study borders on the theory of resource nationalism 
 
38 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (n. 31) 161. 
Also, the manipulation and examination of theoretical concepts usually are what legal scholarships are concerned 
with. Knight A and Ruddock L (eds), Advanced research methods in the built environment (Wiley-Blackwell 
2008) 37. 
39 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (n. 31) 20. 
40 Peter Cane and Herbert M. Kritzer (eds), The Oxford handbook of empirical legal research the Oxford handbook 
of empirical legal research (Oxford University Press 2010) 948. 
41 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (n. 31) 21. 
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which in turn includes the ownership, control and regulation of natural resources. 
The NOCs play a critical role in achieving the goals or objectives of government.  
 
1.5.2 Doctrinal Legal Research 
Doctrinal research or Blackletter analysis has been argued to be the traditional 
legal methodology.42 Furthermore, through critical analysis of legal rules, legal 
doctrines are formed, thereby leading to discovery and development of legal 
doctrines.43 This is what doctrinal legal research is concerned with. In light of those 
mentioned earlier, this work seeks to provide a systematic interpretation of the 
rules governing the petroleum industry in the selected jurisdictions, while also 
analysing the relationship between the rules, explaining the areas of difficulty, and 
perhaps, predicting future developments. This form of research is known as 
doctrinal research.44  
 
Further, in making a significant contribution to the understanding of the legal 
processes involved in resource nationalism, resource curse theory, rentier state 
theory and the role of the NOCs from a developing petroleum-rich country, 
conventional legal materials are estimated to contain much data to assist the 
doctrinal legal researcher.45 According to Hutchinson and Duncan, the doctrinal 
method is a two-part process, the locating of the sources of law and then the 
interpreting and analysis which is usually what the doctrinal method entails.46 
 
 
42 Caroline Morris and Cian Murphy stated that: 
black letter method focuses almost entirely on the law's language of statutes and case law to 
make sense of the legal world. 
Furthermore, the internal consistency of the law is what doctrinal analysis is concerned with, and it uses particular 
techniques to achieve that. See, Caroline Morris and Cian Murphy (n. 22) 29 – 30. See also Terry Hutchinson and 
Nigel Duncan, 'Defining And Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research' (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 
83. 
43 See Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research’ in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced Research Methods 
In The Built Environment (John Wiley & Sons 2009) 29-30. 
44 See Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (n. 31) 160. 
45 Ibid., 85. 
46 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan n. 42. 
 14 
1.5.3 Non-Doctrinal Legal Research 
According to Vibhute et al., non-doctrinal legal research seeks to understand the 
impact of the legal process on people, their values and the institutions.47 Most 
non-doctrinal legal research approaches and perspectives fall under the parasol of 
socio-legal.48 Also, socio-legal approach to understanding the law as a social 
phenomenon or as a social experience, it looks beyond the legal doctrine.49 
Furthermore, the exact meanings and definitions of socio-legal studies are 
intricate and disputed, because socio-legal studies cover the broad scope of 
scholarship carried out, and it is not restricted methodically within well-defined 
boundaries.50 An inquiry will be carried out into the functions of the NOC and its 
impact on the welfare of the people. Information on the critical roles of the NOC 
in the selected country and the theory of resource nationalism will be collected by 
systematic observation of the laws, laws-in-action, policies and institutions that 
are relevant to this study.  
 
Further, Crowney and Bradney acknowledged that the term socio-legal could be 
imprecise and at times controversial in nature while stressing that socio-legal 
study is not a synonym for 'empirical research' and that socio-legal research 
undoubtedly draws on many disciplines that are located in the arts and humanities 
and not restricted to the social sciences.51 In addition, the term socio-legal studies 
have been used from research’s ranging from feminist studies to critical legal 
studies, which shows the range and separate movements within the socio-legal 
scholarship.52 The inquiry, therefore, aims to investigate the successful 
management of petroleum resources by one country and why the same 
achievement can be replicated, even in a developing country. Thus, the abundance 
of these resources becomes a factor.  
 
 
47 See Vibhute K. and Ayanalem F., ‘Legal Research Methods’ (2009) Chilot.Wordpress.com 
<https://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/legal-research-methods.pdf> accessed 7 September 2019 87 – 89. 
48 See Caroline Morris and Cian Murphy (n. 22) 34 – 35. See also, Paddy Hillyard, 'Law's Empire: Socio-Legal 
Empirical Research In The Twenty-First Century' (2007) 34 Journal of Law and Society 266. 
49 Ibid. 
50 See, Fiona Crownie and Anthony Bradney in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (Eds), Research Methods In 
Law (2nd edn, Routledge 2013) 35 - 36. See also, Caroline Morris and Cian Murphy (n. 22) 35. 
51 See Fiona Crownie and Anthony Bradney in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (Eds) (n. 47) 51. 
52 Ibid. 
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1.5.4 Comparative Study 
The words ‘Comparative law’53 indicates a cognitive activity with the law as its 
object and comparison as its process thus, the consideration of the similarities 
and differences of the different legal systems of the world is generally referred to 
as comparative law.54 Also, comparative law involves the appraisal of dissimilar 
legal systems.55 Although, in the narrow scope of this study it looks mainly at the 
upstream petroleum sector of the two selected countries. So the difference 
between the Norwegian petroleum sector and that of Nigeria will be carried out 
mainly in chapter 6. A comparative study is, in essence, a question of the 
similarities and differences found in comparing legal systems, and the effort to 
explain the rationale for the differences and similarities in the different 
jurisdictions studied.56 Specifically, this study looks at NOCs and the petroleum 
industries of Norway and Nigeria. In addition Kahn-Freund maintained that when 
carrying out a comparative legal study there is need to be acquainted with not 
only the knowledge of the foreign law, but also of the social and political context 
of the state.57 
 
According to Zweigert and Kötz, when looking into different nations’ legal system58 
the methods of thought and procedure used, which is sometimes called macro 
comparison, can be used to compare the spirit and style of the different legal 
 
53 Rainer put forward that comparative law is a sub-discipline of jurisprudence which basically engages in the 
study of different phenomena in the different legal systems of the world and comparatively examines and analyses 
them. See J. Michael Rainer, Introduction to Comparative Law (Manz 2010) 2.  
Also, John Bell stated that comparative law is a sub-branch of legal research. See also, John Bell in Mark Van 
Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research (Hart Publishing 2011) 157. 
54 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Clarendon Press 1998) 2. Also, 
comparative law, through its process, can lead to a policy recommendation for one or more of the countries 
involved in the research. See, Mathias M. Siems, 'Legal Originality' (2008) Vol. 28 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 147. 
55 See Jonathan Hill, 'Comparative Law, Law Reform And Legal Theory' (1989) 9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
101. 
56 Jaakko Husa in Mark van Hoecke, Maurice Adams and Dirk Heirbaut, The Method and Culture of Comparative 
Law (Hart 2015) 53 – 54. Also, to compare means to observe and explain similarities as well as differences. 
See, Rudolf B. Schlesinger, 'The Past and Future of Comparative Law' (1995) Vol. 43 The American Journal of 
Comparative Law. 477; Geoffrey Samuel in Mark Van Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research (Hart 
Publishing 2011) 182 and Chris G. Pickvance, 'Concepts, Contexts And Comparison In The Study Of Urban 
Movements: A Reply To M Castells' (1986) 4 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 221. 
57 Otto Kahn-Freund, 'On Uses And Misuses Of Comparative Law' (1974) 37 The Modern Law Review. 
58 By looking at other countries legal systems, it is hoped that it benefits the national legal system of the observer, 
offering proposals for the future developments, providing warnings of possible difficulties, giving the observer a 
chance to stand back from one's national system and look at it more critically yet not separating it from the 
comparative study plan. Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (n. 31) 87. 
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systems.59 Further, according to Legrand when carrying out a comparative work 
the interpreter needs to augment their knowledge for different structures of 
meaning and must decide on how to communicate the acquired understanding of 
another legal culture within the incompatible framework of their own legal 
structure.60 Also, one must have the awareness that the nature of the culture 
varies from one society to another.61 A cross-national analysis of the NOCs, and 
regulatory frameworks of the petroleum industry of Norway and Nigeria will be 
used to argue and explain the thesis assertions. There is no agreement on the 
kind of methodology to be followed, nor even the methodologies that could be 
followed when carrying out a comparative study, as comparative legal studies are 
usually conducted to look outside one's territory to see how legal problems have 
been solved elsewhere or looking across families of law for common threads of 
development or patterns in legal answers to societal issues.62 Furthermore, a 
thorough and contextual approach may be required when engaging in comparative 
research, that sets out to improve one's legal system by looking at a different 
legal system.63  
 
Conceivably, knowledge is the primary aim of comparative law it extends and 
enhances the 'supply of solutions' and assists the researcher to understand 
different societies and cultures of the world also, comparative law is especially 
useful to develop countries embarking on the journey of law reform.64 Petroleum 
 
59 They went forward to say that by contrast, a micro comparison has to do with specific legal institutions or the 
rules used to solve actual problems. Flexibility is the dividing line between macro comparison and micro 
comparison. However, most times it is expected both are done at the same time because to understand why another 
nation's legal system solves a particular problem the way it does, and one has to study the procedures by which 
the rules are applied. See Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, (n. 54) 4 – 5.  
60 Pierre Legrand, 'Comparative Legal Studies And Commitment To Theory' (1995) 58 The Modern Law Review 
262. See also, Pierre Legrand, 'Comparative Legal Studies And The Matter Of Authenticity' (2006) 1 Journal of 
Comparative Law 365. 
61 See Alan Watson, 'From Legal Transplants To Legal Formants' (1995) 43 The American Journal of Comparative 
Law 469. 
62 See Mark Van Hoecke, 'Methodology of Comparative Legal Research' [2015] Law and Method 
<https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/7145504/file/7145530> accessed 25 September 2019 and Caroline Morris 
and Cian Murphy (n. 22) 37. See also, Jonathan Hill, 'Comparative Law, Law Reform And Legal Theory' (1989) 
9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 101. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz (n. 54) 15 – 16. Also, Legal solutions given to a particular problem may be the 
same notwithstanding the difference in legal concept, legal rules and legal procedures. See, Mark Van Hoecke n. 
56. See also, Sylvester O Nliam, 'Principle Brought Home In The Nigerian Petroleum Industry? Comparative 
Perspectives Between Nigeria And The UK' (PhD, University of Aberdeen 2011) and Douglas T Mailula, 
'Protection Of Petroleum Resources In Africa: A Comparative Analysis Of Oil And Gas Laws Of Selected African 
States' (PhD, University of South Africa 2013). 
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sector reforms have been on the rise since the oil price crash, and especially for 
petroleum resource-rich states, it has become paramount that strategic changes 
be made in the petroleum sector for an increase in value creation through the 
effective management of the petroleum resources, and revenues. 
 
Therefore, the need to learn from a developed petroleum-rich state becomes 
necessary as foreign laws and experience of other countries in a particular legal 
system can help another country choose the best solution that is suitable to its 
legal tradition.65 Although, it is essential to proceed with caution and intelligence, 
the rejection of a solution to a problem on the grounds that it is foreign, even after 
a comparative analysis suggest the adoption of that particular solution would not 
be a sage decision.66 In adopting an assumed superior foreign solution Zweigert 
and Kötz put forward two critical questions that must be asked:  
 
first, whether it has proved satisfactory in its country of origin and 
secondly, whether it will work in the country where it is proposed 
to adopt it.67   
 
Adopting a different solution is not always straight forward, as many factors must 
be considered. For example, history, demography, type of government and many 
more factors come into consideration. Zweigert and Kötz stated that the 
fundamental methodological principle of all comparative law is that of 
functionality.68 Moreover, this principle flows through all the other rules which 
determine the choice and extent of the undertaking of the laws to be compared,69 
 
65 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz (n. 54) 17. 
66 Ibid. See also Pierre Legrand, 'Comparative Legal Studies And The Matter Of Authenticity' (2006) 1 Journal of 
Comparative Law 365. 
67 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz (n. 54) 17. Also, legal or non-legal institutions are comparable if they are 
functionally identical if they fulfil similar functions in different legal systems. See, Ralf Michaels, 'The Functional 
Method of Comparative Law' (Duke Law School Legal Studies Duke University, 2005) 
<http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2033&context=faculty_scholarship> accessed 25 
September 2017. 
68 Functionality has been noted to serve different goals: from understanding laws, comparing, focusing on 
similarities, building a system of legal families, determining the ‘better law’ unifying law and to the critical 
appraisal of the legal orders. See Mark Van Hoecke n. 56. See also, Geoffrey Samuel (n. 25); Jaakko Husa in 
Mark van Hoecke, Maurice Adams and Dirk Heirbaut (n. 56) 60 – 63. 
69 Zweigert and Kötz stated that: 
incomparable cannot usefully be compared, and in law, the only comparable things are those who fulfil 
the same function.   
Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz (n. 54) 34. 
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although legal scholars have widely criticised the principle of functionality.70 
Further, the belief that most legal systems of different societies face 
fundamentally the same problems and these are resolved in different ways, 
although often with similar results. Thus, functionality,71 the proposition is 
supported by the knowledge gained by the legal comparatist.72 Critical and 
normative assessment of the findings and inquiring which solution most effectually 
answers the social problem in each place is said to be the final step of a functional 
approach.73 The validity of the findings generally supports the choice of a specific 
method used in the thesis.  
 
Consequently, the validity of the conclusion of the study becomes essential.74 
Therefore, to achieve this, comparative research must be unbiased when carried 
out between two different legal systems for the study to be relevant.75 This study 
will include a comparative chapter, where a comparative study on the Norwegian 
and Nigerian upstream petroleum industry and NOC will be carried out. The laws 
regulating both countries’ oil and gas industry, the legal institutions and the 
national oil companies, will help uncover the lessons that can be learnt from the 
different countries’ petroleum industry.76 As a result, will engage in a critical 
assessment of the quality of law and legal institutions in these countries.77  
 
 
70 See, for example, Antonios E. Platsas, 'The Functional and the Dysfunctional in the Comparative Method of 
Law: Some Critical Remarks' (2017) Vol. 12.3 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 
<http://www.ejcl.org/123/art123-3.pdf> accessed 25 March 2018. 
71 Functionality as a method of comparative research is fundamentally looking for such 'functional equivalents' at 
the level of the solutions. Mark Van Hoecke n 56.  
72 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz (n. 54) 34 – 35. 
73 Petra Mahy, 'The Functional Approach In Comparative Socio-Legal Research: Reflections Based On A Study 




d_indonesia_1.pdf> accessed 25 March 2018. See also, Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz (n. 54)  
74 See Jennifer Rowley, 'Using Case Studies In Research' (2002) 25 Management Research News 16. See also, 
Larry M. Dooley, 'Case Study Research And Theory Building' (2002) 4 Advances in Developing Human 
Resources 335. 
75 See Catherine Valcke and Matthew Grellette in Mark van Hoecke, Maurice Adams and Dirk Heirbaut, The 
Method and Culture of Comparative Law (Hart 2015) 101 - 102 
76 Vibhute K. and Ayanalem F. (n. 47) 73. 
77 See Mathias M. Siems, 'Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance And Comparative Law' (2007) 52 McGill 
Law Journal 55. 
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In determining how best a resource-rich developing country can successfully 
manage its oil and gas industry, the study will compare the upstream petroleum 
industry policies of Norway and Nigeria in each countries respective petroleum 
industry.78 In embarking on the comparative study the researcher hopes to carry 
out a critical study of two different petroleum industries and present a new 
perspective of the manner in which a petroleum-rich developing country controls 
and regulates its petroleum industry.79 Further, by looking at another country’s 
petroleum industry, or rather one that is known in the industry for setting the best 
practice standard and looking at petroleum-rich developing countries’ in the 
petroleum industry, it is hoped that more renowned petroleum producing country 
will offer suggestions for future developments and grant the opportunity to step 
back from one's petroleum industry and look at it more critically.80 
 
This comparative method will trigger questions such as, how effective has the 
government been in the control and regulations of these natural resources and 
how have the laws helped in dealing with the problems being faced by the 
petroleum-rich developing country?81 Furthermore, the comparative study will not 
only highlight the technical doctrinal problems present in the petroleum-rich 
developing country, but will also show the social and economic problems and 
progressively reveal other factors that play a part in deciding the positive or 
negative outcomes in these countries.82 For the research problem to be placed 
within the context of the study, a case study approach will be employed to 
compare the two nation’s NOCs, petroleum legal frameworks and policies, thus 
leading to the possible application of Norway's legal frameworks to Nigeria.83 
 
In the comparative study of the Norwegian and Nigerian upstream petroleum 
sector, the functional method of comparative study will be used in looking at the 
actual upstream petroleum problem in Nigeria, and the way in which it is or was 
 
78 Chiara van Ingen, Requier Wait and Ewert Kleynhans, 'Fiscal Policy and Revenue Management in Resource-
Rich African Countries: A Comparative Study of Norway and Nigeria' (2014) Vol. 21 South African Journal of 
International Affairs. 367 – 390. 
79 Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton, Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013) 100. 
80 See Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (n. 31) 88. 
81 Ibid., 88. 
82 Ibid., 88. 
83 Chiara Van Ingen n. 78. 
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solved in Norway.84 The analytical method of comparative law will be used as a 
tool in analysing the legal concepts and rules governing the upstream petroleum 
industry (e.g. ownership of natural resources) in different legal systems in such a 
way that similar parts and differences are discovered.85 It is essential to note that 
no two countries are the same. The same is true of their legal systems, when 
studying and looking to learn from the experience of an older or more advanced 
country, a developing country in the early stage of its petroleum activities, should 
be realistic, and not rush into adopting the policies of that jurisdiction without 
considering various factors, like petroleum potential and reserves, geological and 
geographical conditions.86 These will serve as a guideline for the comparative work 
in this study.  
 
Limitations, controversies and difficulties usually surround the comparative 
method of study. From the structural differences between the economies of 
Nigeria and Norway, the size of the two economies, the state administration and 
type of government system, the fiscal and revenue management policy of Norway 
and Nigeria is by no means an exhaustive list of limitations, difficulties and 
controversial issues and questions that arise in carrying out this comparative study 
at every level and will show how onerous the process is.87  
 
1.6 Thesis Structure  
 
This research is structured into seven thematic chapters. Structurally, the thesis 
proceeds by developing a conceptual framework in Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 
4 and Chapter 5 which is then applied in the comparative analysis of the choice of 
legislation; upstream policy and legal frameworks chosen by Norway and Nigeria 
in articulating the key roles and objectives of their NOCs. This will be carried out 
in Chapter 6. Consequently, the earlier chapters build the theoretical framework 
 
84 Mark Van Hoecke n. 56. 
85 The historical method of the comparative study will be essential for helping the researcher understand the 
differences and similarities between the two legal systems and their historical background. Finally, the law-in 
context method will be used, and although it has a historical dimension, it centres on the current societal context. 
Mark Van Hoecke n. 56. 
86 Atef Suleiman, 'The Oil Experience Of The United Arab Emirates And Its Legal Framework' (1988) 6 Journal 
of Energy & Natural Resources Law 1. 
87 See, Geoffrey Samuel (n. 25) and Chiara van Ingen n. 78. 
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of the thesis, while chapter 6 will critically unbundle these theories in a critical 
comparative analysis. Finally, conclusions will be drawn in chapter 7. 
 
NOCs are introduced in Chapter 2, where the historical perspective behind the 
birth of NOCs will be analysed. Other key players in the global petroleum industry 
will be analysed, such as OPEC, IOCs and government. Further, the relevance of 
petroleum resources to the NOCs and global petroleum industry will be examined. 
As established earlier, 'petroleum resources are the main resource in the 
discussion. Therefore, chapter 2 seeks to answer the question of 'why petroleum 
resources?'—also, what is the link between these resources and the NOCs and 
their objectives.   
 
Chapter 3 critically analyse the rationale behind establishing a NOC, and the 
relevance of NOCs to the global petroleum market and the home country too. 
NOCs are the main focus of this research. The rationale in establishing a NOC, the 
importance of a NOC to a petroleum-rich country developed or developing, 
objectives whether commercial or non-commercial that guide these NOCs and 
most important is the legal framework or the policies that steer these NOCs. 
Finally, there is the rationale for a NOC and the significance of a NOC. Importantly, 
are NOCs still relevant in today's petroleum industry, especially for the new states 
that are discovering resources within their territory? Thus, to establish the 'who' 
perspective of the study, the first institution analysed will be NOCs. 
 
After that, in Chapter 4, this work critically assesses resource nationalism. As 
earlier stated, the trend of establishing a NOC to assist governments in declaring 
their sovereignty, ownership and control (resource nationalism) over their 
petroleum resources, can generally be said to be the reason many NOCs were 
established. Hence, the nationalisation that occurred in the oil and gas industry is 
considered and its significance in shaping the global petroleum industry into what 
it is today. This study will seek to understand how resource nationalism is viewed 
in the global petroleum industry and did resource nationalism aid in the expansion 
of the roles of the NOCs? If yes, what are these new roles and how beneficial have 
they been for the average citizen of the resource-rich state?  For example, the 
 22 
PDVSA of Venezuela has had success over the years in exploiting the natural 
resources of Venezuela. However, yet it is evident that this exploitation has not 
benefitted the average citizen of the state, whom the state NOC was operating 
for; instead, the resources were only for the nations elites and their international 
partners.88 This situation can also be witnessed in some other developing states 
like Nigeria, where its natural resources riches have not benefitted the average 
citizen. Furthermore, there are types of nationalisation, forms, views and debates 
about resource nationalism. 
 
Chapter 5, critically examines the Resource Curse theory. It sets out to theorise 
the resource curse as the problem of resource-rich countries that perform poorly. 
It reviews the importance of the institutions of the state, the ownership structure 
and control structure debates. The Dutch disease as a factor for these countries, 
and poor performance will be critically analysed. Furthermore, Chapter 5 discusses 
the Rentier State theories. This chapter will be critical in light of the poor 
performing resource-rich developing countries. Furthermore, the Rent-seeking 
activities of these countries will be examined. Chapter 5, as well as chapter 4, set 
out to answer the questions of ‘how’ the NOCs can successfully create value 
through the effective management of the petroleum resources for the state. 
 
In Chapter 6, the critical case of the upstream regulatory framework of the select 
NOCs (NNPC and Equinor) will be assessed comparatively. Correspondingly, a 
comparative analysis will be given of the Upstream petroleum Regulatory/Policy 
framework adopted by Norway and Nigeria. An attempt will be made to mirror the 
cases of Norway and Nigeria, their upstream policies, the legal institutions and the 
regulatory frameworks that guide their petroleum industry. Why do some 
countries’ upstream oil and gas sector performs better than the others? For 
governments engaged in selecting upstream petroleum policy option, a 
comparative study and critical evaluation of the experience of other countries can 
be instrumental, in helping the country to draw useful lessons.89  
 
88 See Charles Mcpherson and World Bank Group, 'National Oil Companies Evolution, Issues, Outlook National 
Oil Companies Workshop Current Roles and Future Prospects' (World Bank Washington D.C. 2003). 
89 Atef Suleiman n. 86. 
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Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. This chapter revises the proposed analytical 
framework by modifying and strengthening some of the arguments. Outline 
recommendations will aim at the improvement of the NOC towards achieving a 
high level of value creation. It will also suggest petroleum sector reforms. 
Furthermore, the chapter will identify the research contribution and limitations, 
while spelling out its relevance to the regulatory and economic developments in a 
developing petroleum-rich country, and finally, proffer further research paths. 
 
1.7 Significance and Contribution to Knowledge  
This thesis accordingly seeks to emphasise the role NOCs have to play in the 
petroleum industry of any state. The reason why there are various petroleum 
upstream policies pursued by petroleum-rich countries has not been clearly 
explained. The study seeks to argue that a country might own its natural 
resources, but does not control it. This research hopes to contribute to this niche, 
especially in a petroleum-rich developing country, in examining what control 
means and the control structures in the petroleum industry. 
 
The study will be drawing on the experience of the upstream petroleum industry 
of Nigeria, one of Africa's largest petroleum producer and exporters. Norway, on 
the other hand, is acknowledged as one of the best run upstream petroleum 
industry in the world. Furthermore, the thesis will attempt to give some original 
contribution to the thinking of ownership and control, especially in a petroleum-
rich developing state. This study seeks to emphasise the presence of resource 
nationalism in the oil and gas industry of the developed and developing oil and 
gas-rich states. In addition, the presence of resource nationalism in a select 
resource-rich developing state does not mean a successful utilization by the state 
of its resources.  
 
Emphasis will be made on the importance of strong government institutions. In 
particular, the roles of NOCs in the present global petroleum industry and the 
possible path for a developing petroleum-rich state through its legal and fiscal 
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framework. This research will attempt to contribute to the body of work on the 
phenomenon of resource nationalism, resource curse, rentier state and literature 
on NOCs. This study is expected to offer answers to the questions on the legal 
thinking behind the theory of resource nationalism, and how ownership and 
control affects the legal relationship in the petroleum industry. Furthermore, this 
work will contribute to the body of petroleum law by attempting to provide a 
proper reference point considering the hypothesis that states through its legal 
framework and the NOCs as a state tool, can properly own and control the 
petroleum resources of the state, and this can lead to economic development and 
value creation for the people of the state. 
 
Finally, no ethical issue is expected to arise in the process of conducting the 
research. The study will be a library-based one, and it will be carried out by 
reviewing existing literature on resource nationalism, resource curse theory, 
rentier state and NOCs, mainly through primary and secondary sources.
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CHAPTER TWO – THE ROLE OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES IN THE 
GLOBAL PETROLEUM INDUSTRY    
 
 
2.1 Introduction   
 
This chapter carries out a brief enquiry into the global petroleum industry, the 
industry key players, and the role National Oil Companies have played and 
continue to play in the growth of the industry. Thus, this sets the scene for the 
debate over the position NOCs currently occupy in the industry, which will be 
discussed in chapter 3. A review of the global petroleum industry would not be 
complete without a discussion of other key players in the industry. In particular, 
the early key players who shaped the global petroleum industry into what it is 
today. For some insights, one would have to go back to the history of the industry 
to see who played critical roles in the advancement of the industry through the 
ages. Only by doing that can a proper perspective of the industry be gained. The 
study’s pick of key players in the global industry can be debated. Also, the 
numbers of these players are not restricted to the ones selected in this study. 
 
This research focuses on the creation of NOCs as a tool for resource nationalism 
and how it solved the problem of control and ownership in the petroleum industry 
of some countries, but it did not work for others. One might argue that today, 
especially in the petroleum resource-rich developing countries that the 
maintenance of the relationship between the IOCs and governments is based 
mainly on conditions which allow the continuation of amassing wealth by the 
national ruling classes, and also the continued maximisation of wealth by the 
participating IOCs.1 However the falling crude price has affected and changed the 
dynamics of the petroleum industry significantly.   
 
Finally, in this chapter, the contextual understanding of the international 
petroleum industry is essential in appreciating the role of NOC in the global 
 
1 Carlo J Morelli, ‘The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 1945-1954: Government Business Relationships in Conflict’ 
in Alain Beltran (ed.), A Comparative History of National Oil Companies (PIE-Peter Lang SA 2010) 340. See Ian 
Bremmer, 'The Return Of State Capitalism' (2008) 50 Survival 55, and Naná de Graaff, 'The Hybridization Of 
The State–Capital Nexus In The Global Energy Order' (2012) 9 Globalizations 531. 
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petroleum industry. There is an the appreciation of the importance of petroleum 




2.2 Role of NOC in Managing Petroleum Resources  
 
When it comes to petroleum resources, there is no doubt that the sole aim of any 
petroleum-rich country, whether a developed or a developing country is to 
maximise wealth through the exploitation of its petroleum resources. It is 
generally observed that this pursuit of wealth maximisation in developed countries 
usually leads to the people benefitting from the exploitation of these petroleum 
resources. In contrast, in developing countries, it is alleged that the wealth from 
the exploitation of petroleum resources goes to a particular group or the elites of 
the country.2 Different factors can be used to arrive at this conclusion, but the 
most tangible factor could be the poverty level in these petroleum-rich states. 
Economic development, healthcare facilities and education can play critical roles 
in assessing the level of benefits gained from the petroleum wealth in the country.  
 
Therefore, if a country wants to achieve the national goal of fully benefitting from 
the exploitation of its natural (petroleum) resources, the government has a 
significant, strategic and facilitating role to play. Although, in the critical sense, 
fully benefitting from these resources is difficult. However, acceptable levels where 
a more significant number of the population benefits from the exploration of these 
resources would be viewed as an acceptable level, and be considered a success. 
Therefore, this shows not only the importance of governments in the management 
of petroleum resources in a particular country but also the importance of these 
governments in the global petroleum industry.3 Be it IOCs or NOCs, these 
petroleum companies do not operate in a vacuum, but within the borders and 
jurisdiction of countries, and countries are governed by elected governments or 
 
2 See Lindsay Whitfield and Lars Buur, 'The Politics Of Industrial Policy: Ruling Elites And Their Alliances' 
(2014) 35 Third World Quarterly 126; Naná de Graaff, 'Oil Elite Networks In A Transforming Global Oil Market' 
(2012) 53 International Journal of Comparative Sociology 275 and Michael W. Hansen and others, 'The 
Economics And Politics Of Local Content In African Extractives: Lessons From Tanzania, Uganda And 
Mozambique' (2015) 43 Forum for Development Studies 201. 
3 Morris Albert Adelman, The Genie Out of The Bottle (MIT Press 1995) 30 – 34. 
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otherwise. However, the point is that the government sets the petroleum sectors 
frameworks and guidelines. Arguably, unlike private owners and international oil 
companies, governments not only look at maximising wealth as the primary 
objective when exploiting the petroleum resources of a state, and according to 
Adelman, this is the non-maximising theory.4 However, the above assertion goes 
against recent events of resource nationalism5 where governments have sought 
to collect higher revenue from the exploitation of their petroleum resources rather 
than keep these resources underground.6 
 
So far, the global petroleum industry has shown that petroleum resources are vital 
to any state, whether developed or developing. The exploitation and management 
of these resources within a practical regulatory framework7 that guides and 
structures the petroleum industry of every state is pivotal in the ability of the 
government to convert these resources to benefit the people of the state.  
 
Given that petroleum resources are non-renewable, there needs to be efficient 
management of these resources. The right stewardship of the income generated 
from the petroleum resources has a huge potential to lift the people of the country 
out of poverty and contribute to sustainable social and economic development.8 
For insight into the value chain of any extractive industries, see the figure below. 
 
Figure 2: Value Chain for Extractive Industries  
 
4 Ibid., 33. 
5 For example, Tanzania, Kazakhstan, Venezuela and Bolivia. See Thabit Jacob and Rasmus Hundsbæk Pedersen, 
'New Resource Nationalism? Continuity And Change In Tanzania’s Extractive Industries' (2018) 5 The Extractive 
Industries and Society 287; Natalie Koch and Tom Perreault, 'Resource Nationalism' [2018] Progress in Human 
Geography 1 and Ekim Arbatli, 'Resource Nationalism Revisited: A New Conceptualization In Light Of Changing 
Actors And Strategies In The Oil Industry' (2018) 40 Energy Research & Social Science 101. 
6 Morris Albert Adelman (n 3) 33-34. 
7 Regulatory frameworks usually emanates from the constitutional provisions of the state to legislation, contracts 
and agreements that define the rules, procedures and regulations that guide the petroleum resources sector or the 
oil and gas industry of the State. See Evelyn Dietsche, Sector Legal Frameworks and Resource Property Rights 
in Wojciech Ostrowski and Roland Dannreuther (eds), Global Resources Conflict And Cooperation (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2013) 159-184. 
8 Eleodoro Mayorga Alba, 'Extractive Industries Value Chain' [2009] Extractive Industries for Development 
Series - The World Bank Working Paper 125. 
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Source: Alba, Extractive Industries for Development.9  
 
Therefore, as petroleum resources are not renewable, the need for careful 
management of these resources arises, and attention needs to be paid to every 
sector of the value chain. The onus is on the government to ensure this through 
the country’s petroleum sector regulatory and legal regime. Academics such as 
Bentham remarked that in the global petroleum industry, petroleum development 
and production take place under many legal systems.10 Thus, regardless of the 
particular provisions of a legal regime, petroleum exploitation usually goes on, 
and to consider a regulatory framework as sufficient will arguably rely on the 
success of the petroleum sector, the level of revenue generated from the 
petroleum resources and most importantly, the economic development that is 
achieved through the exploitation of these resources. This, presumably, will be 
considered value creation through these resources. 
 
In addition, it is somewhat accepted by petroleum industry observers that 
governments use NOCs as a tool in achieving beneficial management and 
exploitation of the natural resources for the state; also the use of policies and 
regulations in achieving these goals is usually contingent on the objectives the 
 
9 Ibid. 
10 R.W. Bentham, ‘The International Legal Structure of Petroleum Exploration’ in Judith Rees and P. R Odell 
(eds), The International Oil Industry (Macmillan 1987) 62-66. 
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governments are looking to achieve.11 Furthermore, the major theme of this study 
is targeted at the regulatory framework used by governments in marshalling their 
NOCs. According to some, NOCs have demonstrated that they can reach the levels 
attained by IOCs and above, the creation of public revenues and acting as 
stewards for the natural resource industry. On the contrary if not properly 
managed this can be a medium by which a nation's resources can be wasted, as 
demonstrated by Petrobras of Brazil.12   
 
As a natural resource, petroleum resources are vital to any NOC, as this is the 
single resource which most NOCs are established to deal with. Amidst the energy 
transition arguments from fossil fuels to renewable energy, there seems to be a 
consensus that petroleum still has a role to play for the foreseeable future.13 
According to Marcel, NOC has a role to play in this transition and cited Equinor as 
one NOC investing in renewable energy.14 Could this investment planned by 
Equinor be geo-political or public relations, aimed at joining the recent trend of 
renewable energy campaign, on the surface but still engaging in petroleum 
resource production, as a recent argument by Mills, posits the continued relevance 
of petroleum resources to the worlds energy demand.15   
 
11 Silvana Tordo, Brandon S Tracy and Noora Arfaa, National Oil Companies And Value Creation (World Bank 
2011) xi-xiiii. See also María José Paz Antolín and Juan Manuel Ramírez Cendrero, 'How Important Are National 
Companies For Oil And Gas Sector Performance? Lessons From The Bolivia And Brazil Case Studies' (2013) 61 
Energy Policy 707 and Patrick R.P. Heller, Paasha Mahdavi and Johannes Schreuder, 'Reforming National Oil 
Companies: Nine Recommendations' [2014] Natural Resource Governance Institute 
<https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_9recs_eng_v3.pdf> accessed 8 November 
2018. 
12 Can we buy or rent the IOC’s technical expertise rather than surrendering control over our oil and gas resources 
to an IOC are the question that some of the NOCs are asking. See Andrew C. Inkpen and Michael H Moffett, The 
global oil & gas industry: Management, strategy and finance (PennWell Books 2011) 63; Patrick R P Heller, 
‘Doubling Down: National Oil Companies as Instruments of Risk and Reward’ (2017) 81 UNU-WIDER 
<https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2017-81.pdf> accessed 14 March 2018 and David R Mares, 
'Resource Nationalism and Energy Security in Latin America: Implications for Global Oil Supplies' 
(Scholarship.rice.edu, 2010) <https://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/91400/EF-pub-
MaresResourceNationalismWorkPaper-012010.pdf?sequence=1> accessed 4 March 2018. 
13 Tina Hunter, ‘Redefining Energy Security: The New Prize in a Time of Arctic Petroleum Resources and 
Technological Development’ in Slawomir Raszewski (ed), The International Political Economy Of Oil And 
Gas (Palgrave Macmillan 2018) 12-15. See also, 'The Oil And Gas Industry In Energy Transition' (IEA - World 
Energy Outlook Special Report, 2020) <https://www.iea.org/reports/the-oil-and-gas-industry-in-energy-
transitions> accessed 5 March 2020, and Anthony J. Venables, 'Using Natural Resources For Development: Why 
Has It Proven So Difficult?' (2016) 30 Journal of Economic Perspectives 161. 
14 See Valérie Marcel, 'National Oil Companies Of The Future' (2019) 95 Annales des Mines-Responsabilité et 
Environnement <https://www.cairn.info/revue-responsabilite-et-environnement-2019-3-page-133.htm.> 
accessed 27 August 2019. 
15 For Mark Mills arguments on the difficulties facing renewable energy’s scalability and demand. See Mark P. 
Mills, '41 Inconvenient Truths On The "New Energy Economy"' (Foundation for Economic Education FEE, 2019) 
<https://fee.org/articles/41-inconvenient-truths-on-the-new-energy-economy//amp?__twitter_impression=true> 
accessed 6 November 2019. 
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The importance of petroleum in today's world cannot be denied even in the wake 
of global warming campaigns, and the rise of renewable energy.16 Many 
organisations like OPEC, believe that petroleum will continue to play a crucial 
global role in modern living,17 Moreover, it is commonly accepted that petroleum 
has always been vital to the economic growth of nations, at least since it took 
centre stage as the primary energy source for the government’s agenda of 
industrialisation.18 According to Tugendhat and Hamilton, more than any other 
traded commodity, our civilisation was contingent on petroleum.19 This in turn, 
has made petroleum resources the topic of most significant international contracts 
and disputes.20 
 
Therefore, it can still be argued that at present, petroleum is very relevant to 
modern living. For example, Doric and Dimovski expressed that daily, petroleum 
or petroleum products make up the essential part of products we use.21 Natural 
gas and oil for many decades have grown to be the primary global energy sources. 
Further, according to Yates, the global petroleum industry is arguably the biggest 
and widely integrated of all global commodity networks, and is vital to the global 
economy.22 One might, therefore, argue that until the demand for petroleum 
resources reduces, this particular natural resource will continue to lead the energy 
demand and supply path of world energy. At the moment, cheap and easily 
accessible energy is still a significant factor for world energy and discussion is on 
the topic of the energy mix.23 Furthermore, van der Ploeg commented that 
petroleum would continue to be used for decades, although the price of the 
 
16 Thijs van de Graaf, The Politics And Institutions Of Global Energy Governance (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 8. 
17 See 'OPEC: Keynote Address By OPEC Secretary-General At The 3Rd Dundee Energy Forum' (Opec.org, 
2019) <https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/5555.htm> accessed 25 June 2019 and  
'OPEC: Petroleum Will Still Be The Major Energy Resource In The 21St Century' (Opec.org, 2019) 
<https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/902.htm> accessed 25 June 2019. 
18 See, Leslie E Grayson, National Oil Companies (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 1981) 1-3. See also Silvana Tordo, 
Brandon S Tracy and Noora Arfaa (n 11) 22. See also David Humphreys, ‘Minerals: Industry History and Fault 
Lines of Conflict’ in Wojciech Ostrowski and Roland Dannreuther (eds), Global Resources Conflict And 
Cooperation (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 33-34. 
19 Christopher Tugendhat and Adrian Hamilton, Oil The Biggest Business (Eyre Methuen Ltd 1975) 1. 
20 See A Timothy Martin, 'Model Contracts: A Survey Of The Global Petroleum Industry' (2004) 22 Journal of 
Energy & Natural Resources Law 281. 
21 See Barbara Doric and Vlado Dimovski, 'Managing Petroleum Sector Performance – A Sustainable 
Administrative Design' (2018) 31 Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja 119. 
22 Douglas A. Yates, The Rentier State In Africa: Oil Rent Dependency And Neocolonialism In The Republic Of 
Gabon (Africa World Press 1996) 1. 
23 See Ken Koyama, 'A Japanese Perspective On International Energy Landscape', 3rd Dundee Energy 
Forum (IEEJ 2019) <https://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/8474.pdf> accessed 28 January 2020. 
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resources will be lower.24 Hence the need for the petroleum-rich states to be 
prepared for this possibility, and plan accordingly. 
 
This preparation by petroleum-rich states is expected to be political planning in 
the first instance. Unlike any other traded commodity, petroleum resources have 
been shown to be a highly political one.25 It is therefore not surprising that the 
global petroleum industry has been politicised over the years, and many 
academics, including Edward Morse, affirmed this point:  
 
Rather than keeping oil and politics on their separate tracks, 
the nations of the world have found ways to bind them 
together.26  
 
As the petroleum resources affect the day-to-day activity of millions of people, 
and as earlier mentioned, these resources fall within the purview of  the 
governments where these resources are discovered. Petroleum resource is 
relevant to a country and the global industry is motivated by the political 
interference of governments because petroleum resources are vital to almost 
every kind of human activity and general welfare, at least for the foreseeable 
future.27 Markus remarked that one could not separate politics from the oil and 
gas business.28 Furthermore, the question of national security has been considered 
by the way states view their petroleum resource supplies or petroleum resource 
exports, consequently creating an international petroleum marketplace with a 
 
24 Frederick van der Ploeg, 'Fossil Fuel Producers Under Threat' (2016) 32 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 
206. 
25 See Anjli Raval, Derek Brower and David Sheppard, 'Russia Breaks Opec Oil Alliance As It Takes On US 
Shale' (Financial Times, 2020) <https://www.ft.com/content/c1b899ec-5fe5-11ea-b0ab-339c2307bcd4> accessed 
12 March 2020; Ilya Arkhipov and others, 'How Putin Spurned The Saudis To Start A War On America’S Shale 
Oil Industry' (Los Angeles Times, 2020) <https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-03-08/oil-price-war> 
accessed 12 March 2020; Irina Slav, 'Saudi Arabia Prepares To Flood The Market With Even More Oil' (OilPrice, 
2020) <https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Saudi-Arabia-Prepares-To-Flood-The-Market-With-Even-More-
Oil.html> accessed 12 March 2020; Tsvetana Paraskova, 'Oil Price War Escalates As OPEC's No.3 Boosts 
Production' (OilPrice, 2020) <https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Oil-Price-War-Escalates-As-OPECs-No3-
Boosts-Production.html> accessed 12 March 2020, and Nick Cunningham, 'U.S. Shale Collapse Will Lead To 
Higher Oil Prices' (OilPrice, 2020) <https://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/US-Shale-Collapse-Will-Lead-To-
Higher-Oil-Prices.html> accessed 12 March 2020. 
26 Edward L. Morse, 'A New Political Economy Of Oil?' (1999) 53 Journal of International Affairs 1. See also, 
Matt Huber, 'Resource Geography II: What Makes Resources Political?' [2018] Progress in Human Geography 1. 
27 Dag Harald Claes, ‘Cooperation and Conflict in Oil and Gas Markets’ in Andreas Goldthau, The Handbook of 
Global Energy Policy (John Wiley & Sons Inc 2013) 177. See also, Thomas L. Friedman, 'The First Law Of 
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curious blend of profit-driven venture that is merged with national security.29 More 
often than not, the organisation used by government for achieving these goals are 
the nation’s NOC. Conversely, this situation is different in the United States of 
America as the liberal market model is where the country has no state entity to 
exploit these resources but, the exploration and production of petroleum are left 
in the hands of private petroleum companies. 
 
The importance of energy, whether coal, crude oil, wind power, hydropower, solar 
power or gas, cannot be overemphasised in the evolution of modern-day living. 
Arguably, human development and advancement since primaeval times have 
always had energy as the key driver.30 Petroleum is the life force of industrial 
civilization according to Matutinović; also petroleum fuels the transport system, 
aids highly productive agriculture, is the main industrial component in 
pharmaceuticals, plastics, and computer chips.31 Petroleum has evidenced over 
the years various forms of usage, especially in modern living, so when arguments 
for the push for renewable energy arise, one has to consider the various 
components of this singular resource.  
 
Following the above, it is self-evident that there cannot be industrialisation without 
energy. Therefore, energy is the foundation for industrialisation, although the 
looming peak oil production, maximum demand and climate change, at the 
moment questions this development model, just as the developing countries 
aspire to join the wealthy industrialised countries in the present situation of cheap 
and abundant fossil fuels.32 Doric and Dimovski claim that they are convinced that 
the manner in which countries like the United States, Canada, and Western 
European countries achieved industrialisation through petroleum, could lead to 
similar positive, and sustainable economic development, though it may be 
predicated on the continued demand, relevance and life of petroleum resources.33  
 
29 Ibid., 1. 
30 Gilles Carbonnier and Fritz Brugger, the Development Nexus of Global Energy in Andreas Goldthau, The 
Handbook of Global Energy Policy (John Wiley & Sons Inc 2013) 64. See also, Charles Mcpherson and World 
Bank Group, 'National Oil Companies Evolution, Issues, Outlook National Oil Companies Workshop Current 
Roles and Future Prospects' (World Bank Washington D.C. 2003); Silvana Tordo, Brandon S Tracy and Noora 
Arfaa (n 11) xi and Cyril I. Obi, 'The Petroleum Industry: A Paradox Or (Sp)Oiler Of Development?' (2010) 28 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 443. 
31 See Igor Matutinović, 'Oil And The Political Economy Of Energy' (2009) 37 Energy Policy 4251. 
32 Gilles Carbonnier and Fritz Brugger in Andreas Goldthau (n 30) 72 – 75. 
33 Barbara Doric and Vlado Dimovski, n 21. 
 33 
Be that as it may, the present-day push for renewable energy goes against the 
drive for the use of petroleum as a major source of energy and subsequently any 
form of industrialisation by any country. It is important to note that today the 
majority of the discovery of enormous petroleum reserves are within the 
territories of developing countries. As a result, it has been suggested that for these 
developing countries to achieve social and economic progress through these 
resources today, they must take into account their petroleum governance and 
planning alongside climate change and its policies in order to mitigate having 
stranded assets.34 
 
Today the drive is towards renewable energy due to the crisis scenarios illustrated 
by the ‘peak oil' theory, peak demand and the assumption that oil and gas prices 
will continue to rise, but today oil and gas prices are low. If it continues renewables 
will be less competitive, which in turn will make governments reduce its support 
for renewable energy.35 Since 1900 oil has been indispensable to the modern 
economy, from transportation and the exchange of goods, industrial 
specialisation, and military power which was seen in the outcomes of two world 
wars.36 For instance, historically when it comes to war, oil and gas has always 
been strategic for the warring parties, because they would commit themselves to 
seize oil-rich areas and deny enemies access to the oil areas, as was evidenced 
with Hitler's strategy to infiltrate the Caucasus to control Baku's oil region and the 
Japanese takeover of oilfields in Borneo and Sumatra.37 Churchill relied on oil from 
Persia as fuel for the British naval fleet to fight the Germans during the First World 
War.38 These and many more present-day examples show that oil has always been 
the winning card in wars, from ground attacks and occupation, air campaigns and 
 
34 See Daria Ivleva and others, 'From Riches To Rags? – Stranded Assets And The Governance Implications For 
The Fossil Fuel Sector' (ECC Library, 2018) <https://library.ecc-platform.org/publications/riches-rags-–-
stranded-assets-and-governance-implications-fossil-fuel-sector> accessed 27 February 2020. 
35 Øystein Noreng, ‘Global Resource Scramble and New Energy Frontiers’ in Andreas Goldthau (n 14) 171.  
See also, Ralf Boscheck, 'The Governance Of Oil Supply: An Institutional Perspective On NOC Control And The 
Questions It Poses' (2007) 1 International Journal of Energy Sector Management 366 and Bassam Fattouh, 
Rahmatallah Poudineh and Rob West, 'The Rise Of Renewables And Energy Transition: What Adaptation 
Strategy For Oil Companies And Oil-Exporting Countries?' [2018] The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies MEP 
19. 
36 Øystein Noreng in Andreas Goldthau (n 35) 159. 
37 See Leonardo Maugeri, Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, And Future of The World's Most Controversial 
Resource (Praeger 2006) 51 – 61, 63 -75. 
38 See James C Humes, Churchill: The Prophetic Statesman (Regnery History 2012) 61 - 64. See also, B. S 
Mcbeth, British Oil Policy 1919-1939 (Frank Cass 1985) 9 - 12.  
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naval battles.39 Present-day examples include ISIS taking over oilfields in Syria 
and the US-UK invasion of Iraq on the grounds of the presence of WMDs.40 
Furthermore, the importance of petroleum to Western development was visible in 
the manner in which the democratic government of Iran under Mossadegh was 
overthrown by a coup, all in the name of gaining access to petroleum, with the 
CIA and British Intelligence involvement well documented.41 
 
Therefore, following the history of petroleum, and the attempts to predict the 
importance and trajectory of petroleum to the modern-day world, the view of this 
study is that petroleum will continue to be very vital to the modern-day world for 
the foreseeable future, consequently strengthening the relevance of NOCs in the 
global petroleum industry. 
 
 
2.3 The Historical Shaping of NOCs 
 
There have been various accounts of the history of petroleum. Petroleum 
historians have not agreed on where oil was first discovered, whether it be in 1859 
Titusville, Pennsylvania in the United States or Bibi-Aybat near Baku, which was 
then part of the Russian Empire in 1846.42 Although a historical perspective is 
essential to this study, the work will not be engaging in a contentious discussion 
of different accounts of the history of oil. The following section briefly outlines the 
significant events that have shaped the global petroleum industry, which in extent 
led to the establishment of NOCs by various countries. 
 
 
39 See Morgan Downey, Oil 101 (Wooden Table Press 2009) 10 – 11; Leslie E Grayson (n 18) 197 – 211 and 
Edward L. Morse, 'The Coming Oil Revolution' (1990) 69 Foreign Affairs 36. 
40 See Ellen Loanes, 'ISIS Is Staging Attacks In Symbolically Important Places To Send A Message: We're Back' 
(Business Insider, 2019) <https://www.businessinsider.com/isis-oil-field-and-raqqa-attacks-send-a-message-
2019-10?r=US&IR=T> accessed 4 February 2020, and Erika Solomon, Robin Kwong and Steven Bernard, 'Syria 
Oil Map: The Journey Of A Barrel Of Isis Oil' (Financial Times, 2016) <https://ig.ft.com/sites/2015/isis-oil/> 
accessed 4 February 2020. 
41 See TehranTimes, 'Jack Straw Says Iranians Have Good Cause To Call Britain 'Cunning, Colonial Fox' (2019) 
<https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/438423/Jack-Straw-says-Iranians-have-good-cause-to-call-Britain-
cunning> accessed 23 July 2019. 
42 See Gawdat Bahgat, 'Russia's Oil And Gas Policy' (2010) 34 OPEC Energy Review 162 – 183.  
For detailed accounts of the oil and gas industry see, Daniel Yergin, The Prize (Simon & Schuster 2012); 
Leonardo Maugeri (n 37); Valérie Marcel and John V Mitchell, Oil Titans: National Oil Companies In The Middle 
East (Chatham House 2006), and Bernard Taverne, An Introduction To The Regulation Of The Petroleum 
Industry (Graham & Trotman 1994). 
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Industry commentators such as Downey, assert that the modern oil industry 
began due to the shortage of whales because until 1859 most people used animal 
fat in the form of beeswax candles or whale oil for illumination.43 Downey’s account 
goes further to state that crude oil was used to produce a flame-throwing weapon 
known as Greek fire as far back as 600AD by the Byzantines.44 In 1000BC China 
refined and used crude oil for lamp and heating oil, although in small quantity.45 
In the Middle East in 4000BC crude oil that flowed to the surface was used as 
adhesive in the construction of roads and buildings, and also for waterproofing 
boats according to Downey’s account.46 
 
In the 1840s in Pennsylvania Samuel Kier an owner of a salt mine marketed oil he 
thought was waste from his mines as medicine after he noticed that the local 
Seneca Indians were using it as a medicine.47 Oil was struck at a depth of 69.5 
feet on 27 August 1859, in a village near Titusville in north-western 
Pennsylvania.48 Charles More’s account of the early years of the international 
petroleum industry took a British outlook of the industry.49 Where the first 
commercial drilling of oil took place has always been contested, from scattered 
accounts of subsurface drilling in places like France, Japan, Azerbaijan and some 
other Asian countries.50 Maugeri asserted that the first significant oil revolution 
happened in 1859 Pennsylvania, United States of America, when Edwin Drake first 
succeeded in extracting oil with the aid of a drilling machine coupled with his 
epoch-making experiment of oil extraction. This was regarded as the birth of the 
oil industry.51 This account was supported in the landmark work of Daniel Yergin 
on the global petroleum industry.52  
 
43 Morgan Downey (n 39) 1 – 18.  
44 Ibid., 1-18. 
45 Ibid., 1-18. 
46 Ibid., 1-18. 
47 As recorded in the 1840s, crude oil by-products continued to be used as a source of either medicinal rock oil 
until the discovery of Kerosene, this by-product of crude oil was documented as the product that drove the demand 
of oil. The relentless drilling action of Edwin Drake gave rise to the American oil industry, which led to the 
demand for kerosene and diesel. After these activities in Pennsylvania followed the gradual consolidation and 
monopolisation of the industry by John D Rockefeller. See Morgan Downey (n 39) 1 – 18.  
48 Bernard Taverne (n 42) 19 – 44 and Silvana Tordo, Brandon S Tracy and Noora Arfaa (n 11) 15. 
49 See Charles More, Black Gold: Britain And Oil In The Twentieth Century (Continuum 2009) 1 - 46. 
50 See Leonardo Maugeri (n 37) 3 – 5. See also, Paul Stevens, ‘A History of the International Oil Industry’ in 
Wojciech Ostrowski and Roland Dannreuther (eds), Global Resources Conflict And Cooperation (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2013) 14 and Paul Stevens, 'The History of Oil' [2010] POLINARES Working Paper n 3. 
51 Leonardo Maugeri (n 37) 3 – 5. 
52 See Daniel Yergin n 42. 
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Various industry commentators claimed that the United States was arguably the 
world's only source of crude and refined products for more than 20 years, and this 
industrial strength of the United States bore the name of John D. Rockefeller who 
held the controlling stake in Standard Oil Trust.53 Standard Oil Trust was 
established in 1879 with thirty affiliated companies.54 His grand design and 
strategy were to control every sphere of the oil market, from upstream to 
downstream, and by so doing, suppress competition.55 Remarkably, in the early 
1880s, Rockefeller succeeded in implementing his monopolistic plan, and he 
controlled about 90 percent of the U.S. oil market, and this was when the U.S. 
accounted for 85 percent of the world’s crude oil production and refining.56 
Needless to say, the amount of wealth amassed, as a result, made him an 
influential figure in the United States of America and globally too.   
 
Rockefeller’s dominance over the industry continued until the mid-1880s when 
competition emerged from Russia, (although the production in Russia was 
concentrated around Baku, in Azerbaijan) led by the Nobel brothers,57 Ludwig and 
Robert.58 Identically as John D. Rockefeller led the Western Pennsylvania, U.S.A. 
dominance in the oil industry, the Nobel brothers led the Caucasus region of tsarist 
Russia, to become the world's second oil producer.59 Furthermore, following 
Russian production and with the financial support of the French side of the 
Rothschild family who invested heavily in the Russian oil market, paving the way 
for a key pantheon in the global petroleum industry. Marcus Samuel and his 
brother founded Shell with a strategic commercial vision of constructing 
sophisticated oil tankers. The Royal Dutch Company was incorporated in 1890.60 
 
53 Leonardo Maugeri (n 37) 10 – 18; Daniel Yergin (n 42) 19 – 39;  Christopher Tugendhat and Adrian Hamilton, 
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54 Silvana Tordo, Brandon S Tracy and Noora Arfaa, (n 11) 15. 
55 See Leonardo Maugeri (n 37) 3 – 11; Daniel Yergin (n 42) 21 – 26 and Silvana Tordo, Brandon S Tracy and 
Noora Arfaa, (n 11) 15-16. 
56 Ibid. 
57 See Brita Åsbrink, 'Ludvig Nobel Enters The Fight For Oil - The Branobel History' (The Branobel History, 
2001) <http://www.branobelhistory.com/themes/the-nobel-brothers/ludvig-nobel-enters-the-fight-for-oil/> 
accessed 17 June 2019 and 'Robert And Ludvig Nobel And The Oil Industry In Russia' (The Nobel Prize 
Organisation, 2019) <https://www.nobelprize.org/alfred-nobel/robert-and-ludvig-nobel-and-the-oil-industry-in-
russia/> accessed 17 June 2019. 
58 See Leonardo Maugeri (n 37) 10 – 18 and Daniel Yergin (n 42) 40 – 48, 55-57.  
59 Ibid. 
60 Leonardo Maugeri (n 37) 10 – 18 and Daniel Yergin (n 42) 40 – 48, 55-57. See also, John P. Rafferty (editor), 
'Royal Dutch Shell PLC | International Corporation' (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019) 
<https://www.britannica.com/topic/Royal-Dutch-Shell-PLC#ref14723> accessed 17 June 2019 and  
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Consequently, the emergence of other global players in the oil industry led to the 
stronghold of Standard Oil over the global petroleum industry being significantly 
weakened, and even in the American oil market local competitors started to 
emerge and challenge the position of Standard Oil, as oil was discovered in various 
parts of America.61  
 
The global petroleum industry scene has since changed, not only because of 
competition, and global players or because of the increase of Chinese, or Asian 
demand but also by the rise of unusual hybrids of great new oil and gas 
companies: mostly state-owned with a proportion of their equity publicly traded, 
for example Petrobras, Rosneft, Lukoil and CNPC.62 Conceivably, these events 
gave birth to a somewhat competitive global petroleum market. However, it is still 
contended that monopoly and oligopoly remained the central doctrine that guided 
the oil industry's behaviour, albeit echoing Rockefeller's curse on free competition 
in the petroleum business.63 Contentiously, this could be the reason and drive by 
petroleum companies, especially IOCs to book reserves by any means, and has 
been evidenced by the number of illegal payment cases to government officials to 
ensure that exploration and production contracts are awarded.64 
 
Whatever the hypothesis for oil formation is or will be, there are current 
classification systems used in assessing reserves which were devised by the World 
Petroleum Congress (WPC) and the Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE), who 
outlined proven reserves, probable reserves and possible reserves as the three 
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 38 
categories of assessing the level of natural resources.65 It is also important to note 
that all definitions of reserves are based on estimates and beyond 'proved' 
reserves are 'probable' or contingent reserves, here oil or gas has been identified. 
There is a 50% or higher probability that the benchmark of proof will be reached.66 
OPEC’s figure on the world’s proven reserves are stated on the graph: 
 
Figure 3: World Proven Crude Oil Reserves 
 
Source: OPEC World proven crude oil reserves.67 
 
Today, figures attached to reserves have been revised, especially by OPEC 
members during the 1980s. The reason for these upward revisions was viewed 
then as a struggle to obtain higher production quotas within the organisation. At 
the same time, this might be true, Maugeri asserted that the explanation for these 
 
65 See Leonardo Maugeri (n 37) 212. See also, 'Oil Reserve Definitions' (Bp.com, 2018) 
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2012) 
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upward revisions of reserve figures are far more complicated than the given 
explanation.68 Furthermore, these revisions occurred within OPEC countries that 
nationalised their natural resources, and these resources were previously under 
the control of the IOCs (seven sisters); accordingly, the theory which follows was 
that the IOCs manipulated the reserve figures to support their self-interest in 
controlling oil output to avoid overproduction in an already flooded market, a 
policy that drove them to underestimate the official reserves.69 Although this may 
sound like another conspiracy against the IOCs, needless to say, their track record 
in the global petroleum industry serves as evidence of the many claims against 
them.  
 
It is an accepted fact that petroleum resources are finite and at the same time, it 
is also a fact that no one knows how finite these natural resources are.70 For 
example, according to Van de Graaf, the theories of the organic origin and 
inorganic origin of petroleum that has been put forward has continuously been a 
debated issue amongst scientists and geologists till now.71 It is worth to raising a 
caveat that the search for alternative energy today should be done with caution. 
It must be remembered that in the late 1970s with the perception of ever-rising 
oil prices, many countries decided to choose nuclear power, then came the mid-
1980s when the oil price fell, and the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents 
caused a decrease in nuclear power investment.72  
 
Furthermore, many countries depend on petroleum resources for diverse reasons, 
this makes this natural resource the world’s most sought-after commodity, and its 
impact on a global scale is evidenced.73 Petroleum has become the primary global 
commodity, unequalled in importance and often used to measure the health of 
globalisation worldwide,74 although the world is looking to move away from the 
 
68 See Leonardo Maugeri (n 37) 219 – 232. 
69 Ibid., 229-232.  
70 See Leonardo Maugeri (n 37) 207 – 212. 
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72 Øystein Noreng in Andreas Goldthau (n 35) 171. See also, Richard Gray, 'The True Toll Of The Chernobyl 
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use of hydrocarbons. In addition, with all the renewable energy push, it is 
significant to state that modern economic development was fuelled by petroleum 
which rapidly became a substitute for coal.75 Consequently, it was the primary 
energy source for the industrial revolution of the late 1950s to 1973, when the 
number of automobiles and other passenger vehicles rose from 53 million to nearly 
250 million.76 The importance of petroleum in today's modern development did 
not end there, the advancement of civil aviation, the natural gas-based revolution 
of petrochemicals to the modern-day plastics have changed daily human life.  
 
Historically, IOCs have dominated the global petroleum industry until recently. For 
instance, looking back at the global petroleum industry’s beginnings, albeit, not 
fully structured as it is today, was heavily dominated by IOCs. For example, it was 
true from the early 1880s Standard Oil, Nobel, the Rothschilds oil properties, the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Royal Dutch (Shell) who controlled the global 
petroleum industry. Remarkably, this control was achieved by a few American and 
European oil companies.77 These IOCs dubbed the 'Seven Sisters'78 enjoyed 
favourable concessions for a long period, until it was challenged in Latin America 
in 1938 when Mexico nationalised its petroleum industry.79 Some of the 
characteristics and strategies of IOCs can be linked to the earlier times of the 
industry in the United States of America.80 Potentially, the fight to dethrone the 
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oil majors started by Enrico Mattei with his attack on the then oil majors he called 
“the cartel”. He coined the term “Sette Sorrelle,” meaning the Seven Sisters.81 
The “Seven Sisters” were, Standard Oil of New Jersey (American, future Exxon 
Corp.), Royal Dutch-Shell (Anglo-Dutch), the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (English, 
later British Petroleum), Socony-Mobil Oil (American), Gulf (American) and 
SOCAL-Standard Oil of California (American).82 
 
Be that as it may, the present situation in the global petroleum industry according 
to Carola Hoyos of Financial Times, is that the most influential energy companies 
are now NOCs, which are now called the “new seven sisters”.83 In addition, Watts 
stated that this changing landscape of the petroleum industry was as vital as OPEC 
and the developing countries nationalist revolution, that changed the operating 
environment of the then oil majors (seven sisters), which gave rise to NOCs.84 
Basil and Lee, in their work, also acknowledged that the emergence of OPEC 
shaped the structure of the international petroleum industry.85 
 
Consequently, as many countries continue to discover crude oil within their 
territory, the number of petroleum-producing countries has increased from what 
it used to be in the early 1990s.86 Concurrently, the energy demand from countries 
like India and China has also increased.87 This could be attributed to their 
massively growing population and economy, which therefore results in the 
increase in energy demand and ways to sustain their growth. These have changed 
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the landscape of the global petroleum industry, as these countries have NOCs that 
go out of their countries in search of energy. In doing this, they contribute to 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the upstream projects, stimulating competition 
in the industry, and going into contracts with the petroleum-producing countries 
to buy shares in their production.88    
 
 
2.4 NOCs Relationship with other Players in the Global Petroleum 
Industry  
 
Going by the history of the global petroleum industry, IOCs, governments, OPEC 
and NOCs are arguably considered the key players in the international petroleum 
industry. De Graaff identified the state, IOCs and NOCs as the three main 
categories of actors in the global petroleum industry.89 Furthermore, it can be 
argued that some Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and inter-
governmental organisations, for example, International Energy Forum (IEF), 
United Nations, and International Energy Agency (IEA) are also key players in the 
global petroleum industry. Be that as it may, in this study, a brief overview of the 
activities of select critical players in the global petroleum industry will be carried 
out in this chapter. In contrast, a critical analysis of NOCs will be carried out in 
the next chapter (chapter 3). It can be argued that the roles played by IOCs, 
governments and OPEC, gave rise to the presence of NOCs in the present-day 
international petroleum industry. 
 
For this study, the NOC will take centre stage in the analytical framework. Here, 
the relationship between the NOCs and some global petroleum industry players 
will be examined. The role of IOCs in the global petroleum industry has been well 
established, so a thread of its role in the global petroleum industry will run 
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throughout this work. Furthermore, in theory, building this work will briefly 




2.4.1 International Oil Companies and National Oil Companies  
 
As has been highlighted in many publications and reports, the global petroleum 
industry was controlled by the so-called 'Seven Sisters' (international oil 
companies or oil multinationals) the likes of Exxon, Royal Dutch/Shell, Mobil, 
Texaco, Standard of California, Gulf and British Petroleum in the 1970s dominated 
the global petroleum operations.90 Then, IOCs had access to over 80% of the 
world’s petroleum reserves, unlike today when this access has shrunk to about 
14%.91 The earlier mentioned can be observed in the history of the global 
petroleum industry, which was briefly discussed earlier in this chapter. This control 
over the global petroleum industry started to diminish as countries started forming 
corporate entities that would protect the interests of these states in the 
exploitation of their petroleum resources, these entities are usually known as 
national oil companies.92 Historically, the IOCs represented the private ownership 
spectrum of the global petroleum industry, while NOCs represented the state 
ownership spectrum. Over time, amidst all the tussle for control of the petroleum 
resources there emerged forms of cooperation between IOCs and NOCs, though 
most of these were within a national control framework.93 
 
In explaining the roles played by IOCs, Wälde in his work, stated that multinational 
energy companies are the major actors in the industry because, through their 
operations and activities in the global petroleum industry, international energy 
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laws are and were generated.94 It can be contended that the state generates the 
international energy law, but for the debate on who is the producer of the global 
energy to be critically assessed, one would have to examine these major players 
in the industry. In the international petroleum industry of the 21st century, one 
can argue that NOCs are now the major players. 
 
As expected, IOCs role in the global petroleum industry has been one that has 
been contended; from the instruments used by its host government to drive their 
foreign policy, to a symbol of capitalism and one of the critical factors of national 
energy security.95 IOCs have been known to help in the promotion of individual 
Western governments national interests through their policies of economic 
liberalism.96 These Western governments have benefitted from the dominant 
international and domestic positions their IOCs occupied in the global petroleum 
industry.97 According to Gordon, the IOCs have been known to receive support 
from their central government - these governments were always willing to support 
the IOCs in times of stress and made sure that the national oil and gas industry 
developed in specific areas.98 For example, in promoting its policy of oil exploration 
outside the United States after fear about its domestic oil reserves, the US 
government urged the involvement of American majors in the Red Line Agreement 
with the demands of an open-door policy in its exploration across the Middle 
East.99 Hence, it can be argued that IOCs were a tool used by the First world in 
exploiting the wealth of natural resources of the Third world.  
 
94 Thomas W Wälde, 'International Energy Law: Concepts, Context And Players: A Preliminary Introduction' 
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05-international-oil-companies-stevens.pdf> accessed 3 December 2018; Giacomo Luciani, ‘Corporations vs. 
States in the Shaping of Global Oil Regimes’ in Wojciech Ostrowski and Roland Dannreuther (eds) (n 32) 123; 
 'Where Our Oil Comes From - Energy Explained, Your Guide To Understanding Energy - Energy Information 
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96 See Carlo J Morelli in Alain Beltran (ed.) (n 1) 340. 
97 Anthony Sampson (n 77) 35 and Thijs van de Graaf (n 16) 44. 
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99 See Daniel Yergin (n 42) 187 – 189. See also, Michael Morton, 'Once Upon A Red Line - The Iraq Petroleum 
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Notwithstanding, today, IOCs continue to play an essential role in the global 
petroleum industry. This can be witnessed especially in petroleum resource-rich 
developing countries where IOCs as parties with NOCs invest significantly in the 
host country's petroleum industries. Sometimes referred to as IOC-NOC 
partnerships, both companies come together to collaborate on projects and this 
could range from a production sharing agreement (PSA) to a joint venture 
agreement.100 The relationship is one that benefits both companies regardless of 
the company objective. What is more, through this collaboration IOCs gain access 
to the NOCs petroleum resources, while the NOC could become a means by which 
the government will promote economic programmes, social initiatives and political 
agendas.101  
 
Furthermore, the relationship between IOCs and NOCs varies, and is mostly 
dependent on various factors. For instance, it has been contended that the level 
of resource nationalism in a country influences the balance of power between the 
NOC and IOC.102 However, according to de Graaff, taking a relational approach to 
power between NOCs and IOCs will lead to a better understanding of the trans-
national trends between these companies and the changes that have taken place 
in the past decade.103 The quantity of the petroleum resources, in turn determines 
the potential revenue to be gained.104 The relationship between the NOCs and 
IOCs has changed over the past 30 years as NOCs have broadened their 
operations, as some now exert influence in the management of the petroleum 
resources in their countries.105 Today, NOCs and IOCs sometimes compete to book 
petroleum resource reserves both nationally and internationally. In addition, 
transfer of technological knowledge, engineering expertise and project 
management skills become some of the central driving forces for investment 
between the IOCs and NOCs.106 
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2.4.2 Governments and National Oil Companies  
 
As vast deposits of minerals are discovered in a country, the onus always falls on 
the government to come up with a strategy that will be used in the exploitation of 
these natural resources. Historically, during the early stage of the petroleum 
industry, governments usually lacked the knowledge to properly develop a 
coherent petroleum strategy that would enable it to gain from the exploitation of 
petroleum resources. For example, Norway, Denmark and the United Kingdom 
knew little about oil and gas resources and its potential when petroleum resources 
were discovered in the North Sea.107 The same scenario can apply to a developing 
country that discovers large deposits of mineral within its territory. Knowledge of 
petroleum resources, its economic impact and the global petroleum industry, is 
vital to any government in developing a sound strategy, and a specific legal 
framework and policies in assisting the government in making sure that the people 
benefit from the exploitation of these natural resources.  
 
Usually, the legal framework applied to the petroleum sectors of a state sets the 
objectives of the government.108 These legal frameworks usually originate from 
the constitution, and define the ownership of petroleum resources, followed by 
the legislation guiding the petroleum industry of the state; this legislation sets out 
the rights, rules and procedures for granting access to the natural resources.109 
Thus, establishing the administrative framework that structures the petroleum 
property rights, which can be in the form of concessions, licences, leases, or any 
other term that is used by the state, and these can be covered in the form of 
contracts, or agreements and joint ventures which the state goes into with other 
parties, for the exploitation of their petroleum resources.110 It is important to bear 
in mind that these petroleum resources are to be utilised for the benefit of the 
whole country and not for a select group. 
 
 
107 Svein S Andersen The Struggle Over North Sea Oil And Gas: Government Strategies In Denmark, Britain And 
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According to Grayson, contrary to the popular belief that the petroleum industry 
was not regulated, the presence of onerous regulations that were imposed on the 
industry since the 1920s in Japan, France, Italy and the United States asserts that 
the industry was not regulated are inaccurate.111 The debate of government 
involvement in the petroleum industry, or getting involved in the exploitation of 
the country’s natural resources has been an ongoing one, since the entrance of 
governments through their NOCs to the industry. The level of government 
involvement in the petroleum industry varied from country to country. However, 
in all, there is evidence of regulations and industry policies, whether these policies 
changed over time or remained consistent, the importance of government 
involvement was seen as vital, especially during the 1973-1974 oil embargo.112  
 
Further, as the significance of petroleum as an energy source grew, the 1973 
embargo, followed, by the rise of oil prices, it then became clear to governments, 
especially the Western European governments, that they had to be directly 
involved with the petroleum industry and to do this, they had two options, one 
was to attempt to regulate the petroleum market indirectly with tariffs, taxes and 
licenses. The alternative was to participate directly in the petroleum industry by 
the establishment of national oil companies.113 As a result, this highlights one of 
the important factors of a NOC in a petroleum resource-rich country and also, the 
importance of direct participation in the industry. 
 
Grayson pointed out that the rise of the oil price in 1979 led to the more 
substantial involvement of governments in the global oil and gas industry, and 
this was done through the establishment of NOCs.114 It dawned on these 
governments that there was a possible, huge revenue to be gained from these 
resources; hence the need for control grew. This government control was 
exercised in different ways, from the appointment of the board's directors, to the 
power to appoint and remove personnel at the will of the government.115 This 
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influence might affect the performance of the NOCs or its ability to carry out its 
duties rather than attending to that set by the present government. Geographical 
diversification can assist the NOC to minimise technical and political risks, and this 
means that its operations have to be carried out not only within its territory, also 
when it registers a loss in, say Ghana, it can also offset these losses in Sudan.116 
Therefore that is the goal of a truly internationalised NOC. This signifies that NOCs 
operate competently within their domestic petroleum industry but also within the 
global petroleum industry. For instance Equinor and Petrobras.   
 
As more governments started getting involved in the development of their natural 
resources and in the petroleum industry through their NOCs, this meant that 
political considerations and each country’s economic well-being became the main 
issue, and subject matter in the petroleum industry.117 The Private company goals 
of profit-making became secondary once the interest of the state became the 
ultimate goal. Usually, the petroleum industry was controlled and driven by IOCs. 
The name of the game was profit, but as governments and NOCs started getting 
involved, the policies had to serve broader economic goals than the maximisation 
of profits.118 
 
Traditionally, governments are expected to regulate the state's petroleum 
industry, to be able to create value for the public from the exploitation of 
petroleum resources.119 This means that governments are expected to formulate 
the policies for all the phases of the state’s petroleum industry. Fundamentally, 
each government is expected to formulate and follow a petroleum policy that 
targets the promotion of the state’s interest in petroleum affairs within and outside 
its territory, as the ultimate goal would be creating value for the people through 
these petroleum resources.120 
 
Furthermore, the International Energy Agency (IEA) captured the importance of 
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for it is governments that “hold the key to changing the mix of 
energy investment” and it is the policy and regulatory frameworks 
that they establish, nationally and internationally…121 
 
The IEA statement supports the argument that the government has a huge role 
to play in the creation of value and benefits through the petroleum resources of 
the state. As the drilling of the first oil well marked the beginning of the petroleum 
industry, correspondingly this also prompted the start of the development of 
mining legislation that would guide the petroleum industry and its operations.122 
Petroleum legislation is the instruments employed by governments to regulate the 
exploration and development of petroleum in the state.123 Petroleum legislation 
consists of all laws, regulations, rules and policies that are designed to regulate 
the state’s petroleum industry and its operations.124 It is important to note, that 
the petroleum industry changes from time to time as has been evidenced from its 
history, therefore it is usually expected that these petroleum frameworks evolve 
with the industry, so as to maintain the state's ability to create value through the 
petroleum resources. Although this is usually viewed at the level of revenue, the 
state accrues it from the exportation of the petroleum resources. 
 
In addition, through policies, laws and regulations, governments directly intervene 
in the petroleum industry and directly through its participation and investment in 
the petroleum industry125 According to Sarbu, differing from the contested main 
sectoral objective of commercial activities that will increase the revenue of the 
state for any petroleum resource-rich developing country, one might argue that 
this is not usually obtainable. Instead, the seeking of rent and ways to increase 
the rent that can be received from the exploitation of its natural resources is what 
drives the government and its policies.126 The ability for a government to gain 
huge rent from the petroleum resources is equally commendable. As this would 
mean more petroleum resource revenue that goes into the country’s coffers. 
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However, some arguments against this situation will be raised in the subsequent 
chapters of this thesis. Commercial activities by the state's NOC could be a 
sustainable measure, employed by the state to ensure a steady revenue stream 
for the country, as the state's petroleum resources could dry up one day. The 
NOC's commercial expertise can help the government continue the generation of 
revenue through its international petroleum activities. 
 
Today the importance of governments in the petroleum industry cannot be ignored 
because the development of international petroleum strategies strongly requires 
the input of governments, whether from petroleum exporting or importing 
countries.127 The government of any resource-rich state is usually expected to be 
able to manage these resources in the interests of the state. However, there is a 
view that governments are often at a disadvantage when entering into a contract 
with IOCs or any mineral company, as these companies are more knowledgeable 
in the industry than the government.128 For example, there are recent reports on 
Exxon-Mobil and Guyana contracts, where allegations were levelled against the 
IOCs for cheating the Guyanese government and state of over 55 billion dollars 
over the contract they entered into with the company.129 Whatever the case may 
be in Guyana, the burden is on the government to ensure that the people get a 
fair share and benefit from these petroleum resources discovered within its 
territory.130   
 
Moreover, according to Heller, the competent, accountable, and the transparent 
management of oil and gas, and mineral resources is the definition of good 
resource governance.131 This can be tagged modern-day exploitation, because of 
the countries' lack of industry know-how that resulted in their losing a substantial 
amount that would help in its economic development. Mitchell et al. for example, 
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claimed that a scenario where the governments were disadvantaged was observed 
in DR Congo.132 In 2008 the DR Congo government received $92 million in mineral 
taxes and tariffs on estimated mineral exports of $2billion.133 
 
Ways to correctly manage natural resources by a state, and primarily through its 
NOCs has seen many solutions promulgated towards the improvement of the 
performance of the NOC, because the benefits are numerous, from enhancing the 
performance of the petroleum sector of a state, with an accommodating domestic 
economic policy and governance, contributing importantly to the international 
energy supply and security.134 
 
Furthermore, often in a developing petroleum-rich state, the NOCs are 
unceremoniously controlled by the ruling party and an elite group.135 The 
politicised NOC board and executive management, coupled with the controlling 
elite group show little or no interest in the overall performance of the NOC, instead 
they seek to use the NOC to achieve the group's goals rather than that of the 
state.136 This undermining of the corporate governance structure of the NOC 
affects the corporate performance of the NOC and disrupts the transparency 
process, which leads to corruption and mismanagement of funds. As with the other 
negative examples, NNPC in Nigeria provides a classic example of these 
governance and transparency problems. A critical step or process in improving the 
governance in the petroleum sector of a state has been observed to be 
transparency.137 It is essential to know whether these NOCs were set up by act of 
parliament (legislation) or whether they were incorporated as a company through 
filing and registration at company house.138 This will form a part of the 
comparative analysis in chapter 6. Whether a NOCs in its legal status can be an 
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agent or servant of the government, whether it was constituted by an act of 
parliament or incorporated through the company act.139 
 
NOC failure can have terrible consequences for the country, as has been witnessed 
in some petroleum-rich states.140 It is known that the overall objectives of every 
state petroleum sector are defined at the very top of government and depending 
on the political system in the state when it comes to decision making in relation 
to the petroleum or petroleum resources of the country, it might be subject to 
public debate and parliamentary approval.141 Again, the upstream sector policies 
of the petroleum industry of the two countries, i.e. Norway and Nigeria, will be in 
focus in the comparative chapter of the study. Questions like, what are the 
policies? How does it relate to control? How does it relate to ownership? How are 
these policies implemented in practice? What are the tools? These will be analysed 
in chapter 6.  
 
Further, the government playing the role of the sovereign owner on behalf of the 
people, according to Sarbu, is one government role that has been contested.142 
However, the energy policies are set down by the government and the role of the 
NOC also, so it can be argued that the government is a steward and not the owner 
of the natural resources since the natural resource is for the people.143 
Relationships between governments, NOCs and IOCs are usually guided by 
upstream legal frameworks and fiscal regimes. These legal frameworks and fiscal 
regimes can also regulate the midstream and downstream sector of the petroleum 
industry of the state. Expectedly, these are the tools used by a sovereign country 
to implement their policies of their petroleum industry.144 As such different legal 
instruments may be enacted by the petroleum law of a state, especially for the 
upstream sector, these usually come in the form of exploration and production 
agreements.145 
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Le Leuch, in his work, remarked that usually two main approaches are followed 
by a state when picking its legal instruments:  
One, a state following the terms defined in the national legislation and regulation 
awards specific petroleum licences, which could be an exploration licence or permit 
over an exploration area authorizing exploration, or a production licence (or lease 
or concession) over a restricted development area authorizing the development 
and production.146 This was observed in the exploration terms and obligations in 
the agreements in countries like the UK, Norway and Denmark.147 Two, there is 
usually a conclusion of the exploration and production contracts in the national 
law, commonly observed in developing states that are yet to issue comprehensive 
legislation and regulation.148 This provides the terms and conditions applied to 
exploration and production not covered under the legislation and regulation.  
 
Sarbu argued that developing countries that are endowed with natural resources 
often pursue policies that will only maximise the inflow of rent into the government 
coffers rather than pursuing resource development policies with a long-term view 
of taking over from the IOCs.149 It, therefore, seems that the governments are 
fixated on getting huge revenues from the petroleum resources, which could then 
mean neglect of the other sectors of the economy. Therefore,  one might argue 
that the best route for sustainable development of petroleum resources would be 
pursuing commercial objectives as shown in countries like Norway and Brazil, 
rather than depending solely on the rents from the activities of IOCs in the 
exploitation of its natural resources. It is also important to note that commercial 
and non-commercial objectives can be achieved. However, most often, the 
resource-rich developing countries lack the institutional capacity to carry out these 
objectives.150 On the other hand, it can also be argued that the state lacks the 
willingness to achieve both objectives; this situation is usually seen as a state 
lacking the 'political will' to achieve specific objectives. 
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Accordingly, the state promulgates an upstream petroleum law which defines the 
whole upstream sector process, from types of agreements,151 terms and 
conditions to be met, exploration, exploitation operations and the applicable 
petroleum tax regime.152 It is important to note that over time countries might 
decide to review or change their policies, especially the fiscal policies. Introduction 
of new terms in upstream petroleum contracts and tax systems always evolve, 
and this can be arguably tied to the political evolution of the country, and whether 
the country is developed or developing, these changes will occur.153 Hopefully, this 
change in the country’s petroleum framework will have value creation for the 
people of the state at heart, thereby ensuring that the people continue to benefit 
from the petroleum resources. Arguments about leaving petroleum resources in 
the hands of the market or private sector, or having the government usually 
intervene by the NOCs which is conventionally the government agent has been 
going on for a while.  
 
For all the argument against government intervention in the exploitation of a 
developing countries’ petroleum resources it is essential to note that the 
developed or industrialised countries have a ‘self-sustained’ economy whereas the 
developing countries did not.154 So the discovery of petroleum resources in these 
developed countries was made within a well-defined or somewhat well-structured 
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• Production Sharing Contract (PSC) 
The terms of the PSC do not grant the IOCs petroleum rights over the minerals but is legally appointed to conduct 
petroleum operations on an exclusive basis as a contractor to the state or its NOC, on account of the contract they 
signed. 
• Risk Service Contract (RSC) 
The terms under this arrangement grant the IOCs a monetary remuneration only on account of the commercial 
production; thus, the IOC does not hold any direct access to any share of the petroleum produced but rather 
compensation for its work performed as a contractor to the state or the NOC of the state. 
See Honoré Le Leuch, ‘Recent Trends in Upstream Petroleum Agreements: Policy, Contractual, fiscal, and Legal 
Issues’ in Andreas Goldthau (n 27) 132 – 134. See also, Ernest E Smith and John S Dzienkowski n 78. 
152 Honoré Le Leuch in Andreas Goldthau (n 27) 129. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Coby van der Linde, The State and The International Oil Market (Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000) 27-35.  
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These petroleum resources are expected to be managed with the interest of the 
public at the forefront, and not the interest of a select group of elites. According 
to Van de Linde, the expected government roles as a maximiser of social welfare 
both as an economic regulator and a provider of public goods is what the ‘public 
interest’ theories highlights.155 However, much criticism has been levelled at this 
theory, mainly that the present government will use this to further its political 
interests which seldom aligns with social welfare and therefore create misguided 
policies.156 One can say that this situation makes it pertinent for government 
intervention to properly regulate the petroleum industry rather than leave it to 
the world market forces, as a state’s petroleum sector is affected by domestic and 
international factors. 
 
Control has always been an essential factor in the petroleum industry, from the 
direct control over the revenues, from the exploitation of petroleum resources to 
the control of how the income from these resources is redistributed. This was and 
is still the concern of these petroleum-producing state’s governments.157 For 
example, according to Andersen, control of its petroleum industry has always been 
the goal of the Norwegian government, securing the lion’s share of the possible 
income from the exploitation of its resources was the long-term goal, and this was 
achieved through control of the day-to-day activities of the industry.158 It can be 
concluded that the intentions and objectives of the governments towards the 
management of its petroleum resources can be gleaned from the legislation 
enacted that is targeted towards this goal. 
 
Finally, in elaborating the role of government in petroleum development Van de 
Linde observed that it is a well-known fact that the government's role is usually 
one of law and order; therefore the argument has been one of making sense of 
law and order in an economic dimension, from the NOCs involvement in 
 
155 Ibid. See also, Richard A. Posner, 'Theories Of Economic Regulation' (1974) 5 Bell Journal of Economic 335; 
Gilbert Becker, 'The Public Interest Hypothesis Revisited: A New Test Of Peltzman's Theory Of Regulation' 
(1986) 49 Public Choice 223; Theodore E. Keeler, 'Theories Of Regulation And The Deregulation Movement' 
(1984) 44 Public Choice 103, and Michael Hantke-Domas, 'The Public Interest Theory Of Regulation: Non-
Existence Or Misinterpretation?' (2003) 15 European Journal of Law and Economics 165. 
156 Ibid. See also, Andrei Shleifer, 'Understanding Regulation' (2005) 11 European Financial Management 439, 
and Oliver James, 'Regulation Inside Government: Public Interest Justifications And Regulatory Failures' (2000) 
78 Public Administration 327. 
157 Coby van der Linde (n 154) 27-35. 
158 Svein S Andersen (n 107) 63. 
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production, while also having the government regulate the industry, thereby 
having an effect on the private economy.159 This, therefore, gives the petroleum 
industry a structure when the government's framework is one that seeks to create 
value for the people from the petroleum resource of the state. 
 
 
2.4.3 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and NOCs 
 
The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is an influential 
organisation in the global petroleum industry. Some commentators refer to it as 
a cartel or club, but the fact is it has always faced strong opposition from the 
significant IOCs that control the global petroleum industry,160 and, conceivably by 
extension some countries that support the IOCs business model in the global 
petroleum industry. In reiterating the cartel viewpoint, Adelman saw OPEC as a 
loosely cooperating oligopoly – or cartel and, further suggested that the 
organisation is no more than a convenient forum for the member countries.161 
Arguably, it is convenient in the sense that these member states seek maximum 
benefit from their petroleum resources. On the other hand, 'oil colonialism' as Paul 
Roberts termed it, was an arrangement that benefitted the IOCs greatly, which 
unavoidably created political and economic tensions within the petroleum 
resource-rich countries.162 It could even be argued as being one of the reasons 
that gave rise to the birth of OPEC. 
 
It is important to mention that one cannot engage in a discussion about petroleum 
law, policies and regulations without mentioning OPEC. According to Thomas 
Wälde, OPEC is the global organisation with the most significant influence on the 
petroleum industry since it was formed.163 The entrance of governments in the oil 
 
159 Coby van der Linde (n 54) 27 – 35. 
160 Jahangir Amuzegar, Managing the Oil Wealth: OPEC's Windfalls and Pitfalls (IB Tauris 1999) 1 – 9. See 
Judith Rees and Peter Odell, ‘ International Oil Issues and perspectives’ in Judith Rees and P. R Odell (eds) (n 
10) 3-5. See also, M.A. Adelman, ‘OPEC as a Cartel’ in James M. Griffin and David J. Teece, OPEC Behavior 
And World Oil Prices (George Allen & Unwin 1982) 37-55; Dag Harald Claes, The Politics Of Oil-Producer 
Cooperation (Routledge 2018) 61-63. 
161 M.A. Adelman, ‘OPEC as a Cartel’ in James M. Griffin and David J. Teece (n 146) 37. 
162 Paul Roberts, The End Of Oil (Bloomsbury 2005) 99 – 101. See also, Wojciech Ostrowski, ‘The Political 
Economy of Global Resources’ in  Wojciech Ostrowski and Roland Dannreuther (eds) (n 32) 115. 
163 Thomas W Wälde (n 67). See also, Bassam Fattouh n 102. 
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and gas industry has been decisive not only for the oil-producing country but also 
for the oil and gas industry as a whole.164  
 
OPEC was founded in 1960,165 possibly on the back of the proposal of then 
Venezuelan Oil Minister Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso and the Saudi Oil Minister 
Abdullah Tariki.166 Pérez Alfonzo was said to be fascinated by the Texas Railroad 
Commission (TRC), the agency that regulated the oil production in Texas, and 
later in the United States of America in the early 1930s.167 Equally, Pérez Alfonzo 
had studied the example of the pro-rationing policies of the Texas Railroad 
Commission and intended to replicate this model on an international scale.168 
Moreover, Venezuela then was the largest exporter of oil in the world, and as such, 
was the country most affected by the Mandatory Oil Import Program, implemented 
by President Eisenhower in March 1959, which was designed to protect the 
domestic petroleum industry at the expense of foreign-sourced oil.169 Thus, 
Venezuela’s move to create OPEC was a direct response to this new quota 
programme. 1960 saw five oil-producing countries (Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Iraq and Iran) formed OPEC in a bid to assert more control over the 
activities of the IOCs (seven sisters).170  
 
Equally importantly, Van De Graaf remarked that OPEC was established to reduce 
dependence on the IOCs by discussing royalties and tax questions, not as a cartel 
to set prices and quotas.171 Giacomo Luciani remarked that the demise of the oil 
majors was not due to the arrival of OPEC, but rather a combination of market 
 
164 Coby van der Linde (n 54) 25. 
165 'OPEC: Brief History' (Opec.org, 2018) <https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm> accessed 13 
December 2018. 
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Southwestern Historical Quarterly 478. See also, William R. Childs, The Texas Railroad Commission: 
Understanding Regulation In America To The Mid- Twentieth Century (1st edn, Texas A & M University Press 
2005). 
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forces and evolving global economic equilibria.172 Consequently, a combination of 
circumstances led to the emergence of OPEC, following the end of World War II, 
a move to challenge the engrained oil power oligopoly structure, set up by the 
IOCs and the Western governments.173 After the end of World War II, economically 
poor but natural resource-rich developing countries sought to gain full ownership 
and control of their natural resources and thus gain energy autonomy from the 
Western superpowers or as commonly referred to the seven sisters.174 
Independent of the struggle by some petroleum resource-rich countries to control 
their resources, and the emergence of OPEC, another factor that also played a 
significant role in the decline of the seven sisters, was the arrival of smaller 
independent oil companies in the oil and gas industry. For example, AMOCO, 
CONOCO, ARCO and Occidental in the U.S, the establishment of state oil 
companies in oil and gas importing states, for example, ENI in Italy, Petrofina in 
Belgium and Gelsenburg in Germany and finally oil and gas exporting states like 
NIOC in Iran, were influential in challenging the oil majors.175 
 
As OPEC member countries were not identical, the binding factor or common 
ground that drove them was the reliance of oil and gas export revenues and the 
importance of ownership, control, distribution and the ability to gain from the 
exploitation of their natural resources.176 The difference between the OPEC 
countries was not only restricted to the above stated factors but it is also essential 
to mention that they were very different in political systems, which ranged from 
theocracy with Islam as the guiding light in Saudi Arabia and Iran, to democracy 
in Ecuador, Gabon and Venezuela, and military rule as observed in Libya and 
Nigeria.177 There were also the hereditary emirates in Kuwait, Qatar and UAE. 
 
 
172 Giacomo Luciani, ‘Corporations vs. States in the Shaping of Global Oil Regimes’ in Wojciech Ostrowski and 
Roland Dannreuther (eds) (n 91) 124-126. 
173 See Jahangir Amuzegar (n 160) 23 – 26. See also Bernard Mommer, Global Oil And The Nation State (Oxford 
University Press 2002) 151-167. 
174 Ibid. 
175 A publication from OPEC stated that OPEC was created out of a demonstration against the imperiousness of 
the major IOCs (the Seven Sisters) who controlled the oil and gas industry. Jahangir Amuzegar (n 58) 26, 28. See 
also, Bernard Mommer, 'The Governance Of International Oil: The Changing Rules Of The Game' [2000] Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies WPM 26; Hasan S. Zakariya, ‘The Third World Perspective on Petroleum: The 
Travails of the ‘Haves’ and the Plight of the ‘Have-Nots’ in Judith Rees and P. R Odell (eds) (n 10) 111-112. 
176 See Jahangir Amuzegar (n 160) 1 – 9. 
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Uniquely, with all these disparities between OPEC member states, it can be 
contended that the common goal of control and ownership of their petroleum 
resources was the driving force for OPEC and the gaining of high revenues from 
these resources. Hence, the importance of OPEC in the global petroleum industry 
cannot be denied, and the role it played in shaping the industry to what it is today. 
Although these might be true about OPEC, much criticism has been levelled 
against it, maybe for its unsuccessful attempt at reconciling the individual and 
collective interests of its member countries.178 For a graphic insight into the OPEC 
share of crude in the global petroleum industry: 
Figure 4: OPEC share of world crude oil reserves. 
 
Source: culled from OPEC.179 
 
No matter the level of development in the OPEC member states, the ultimate goal 
was to improve the living standards of its citizens, and the overall goal was for 
the citizens to benefit from the exploitation of their petroleum resources. From 
national economic growth, reducing the income inequities, increasing the 
efficiency of productive factors and ultimately catching up with the advanced 
countries of the West.180 Amuzegar in his work argued that the OPEC member 
 
178 See Coby van der Linde (n 54) 67.  
179 See 'OPEC : OPEC Share Of World Crude Oil Reserves' (OPEC, 2020) 
<https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm> accessed 27 May 2020. 
180 Jahangir Amuzegar (n 58) 1 – 9, 10-12. 
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state ownership and control of their natural resources led to misallocation, 
inefficient use, waste and misappropriation, and stated that this might be the 
same if these resources were in the hands of private corporations, like the IOCs.181 
The question remains, why are some of these OPEC member countries still miles 
away from achieving these goals, even after gaining full ownership and control of 
its natural resources? 
 
OPEC countries, although the same framework guides them, yet some seem to 
perform better than others. The 1970s nationalisation that swept the oil and gas 
industry, saw the replacement of IOCs with NOCs in OPEC countries. Even though, 
this movement from private sector control to public sector control favoured the 
governments, who received vast economic rents and profits from the exploitation 
of its natural resources.182 It is important to note, that some of these OPEC 
member countries were not satisfied to only collect rent, a few of them like Saudi 
Arabia, Venezuela and Kuwait used their NOCs to undergo vertical integration and 
internationalization in the oil and gas process to make sure their various countries 
are guaranteed markets for their resources and long-term revenue.183 Other OPEC 
countries cannot undertake some measures, instead their governments or NOCs 
cannot finance these operations themselves, nor are capable or willing to, or form 
the necessary technical, geological, and price risks which subsequently lead them 
to continue seeking partners in IOCs to take the risk, therefore making them 
reliant on the IOCs for the exploitation of their natural resources.184  
 
OPEC promoted the growth of state power in the petroleum industry,185 Moreover, 
the trend was for the member state to shoulder, by necessity or design an 
increasingly dominant role in the exploitation of its natural resources.186  Whether 
these countries pursued a socialist transformation or took a 'non-capitalist road' 
(e.g. Algeria, Iraq and Libya), capitalist and democratic, the government became 
the architect of socio-economic transformation, and the country obtained an 
increasingly more influential hand over of its natural resources.187 It is important 
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182 Coby van der Linde (n 54) 79 - 80. See also Robert Mabro n 44. 
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to note that, today OPEC has formed alliances with non-OPEC member countries, 
for example, Russia and Mexico.188 These countries are also petroleum-rich, and 
through their production output can influence the global petroleum market price. 
This move by OPEC is viewed as a means to formalise their relationship with these 
countries in a bid to control the global petroleum market share and price. It was 
also, to mitigate the crude price crashing by cutting production.189 
 
Finally, when looking at how well a petroleum-rich developing and developed 
country has effectively managed their petroleum resources, the study seeks to 
look closely at an OPEC developing country-Nigeria, and a non-OPEC member 
Norway. Furthermore, according to OPEC country report cards, when analysing 
the growth of its member states, focusing on an OPEC member state, for instance, 
Nigeria, which is seen as a petroleum-rich developing state, set out objectives to 
boost its economic growth and modernisation while improving the equitable 
distribution of the incomes from these natural resources amongst regions and 
ethnic groups.190 With that in view, today, Nigeria has the most mediocre 
performance record, although this is debatable. This was shown by its unsavoury 
rent-seeking activities and harmful domestic controls and regulations in handling 






This study’s interest lies in the debatable fact that NOCs and petroleum resources 
will still be valuable in the global petroleum economy for the next couple of 
decades, and especially vital for the developing countries and their economy. The 
focus on the upstream sector is because it is the highest revenue-generating 
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sector of the petroleum value supply chain and where NOCs play a dominant role. 
In addition, It can be argued that petroleum is the crucial element that has shaped 
Western living to what it is today and still continues to play a vital role in the 
global energy sector. Energy demand and security remain a top priority to any 
government, and modern economy especially. Many wars have been fought over 
the control and ownership of petroleum resources.192  
 
Despite the push for renewables or its growth, petroleum resources are still 
significant, especially for a developing country. Accordingly, if Western 
industrialisation was built on the back of petroleum resources, then upon which 
resources should the developing countries build theirs? Maybe upon renewable 
energy, even so, petroleum is still a cheap source of energy. With the right policies 
and framework from the government, the benefits of these resources can be 
hugely significant. Ever since petroleum became the primary source of energy in 
the world, the struggle for the control of this resource has been remarkable. The 
history of the international petroleum industry showed us that whether it was a 
private or public entity, the fight was one of control over the resources. Rockefeller 
planned to monopolise the petroleum industry using Standard Oil as a tool. Today, 
the struggle for control and ownership remains the same for many governments 
(particularly developing countries). Historically, the issue of control over 
petroleum resources is one that has engaged governments, IOCs and NOCs to 
various degrees. 
 
Finally, sole ownership of petroleum or natural resources are usually vested in the 
state, and the sovereign rights over their exploration and exploitation are vested 
in the state.193 Usually, the policies used in the upstream sector seek to find a 
balance between the interests of the country and that of the IOCs or NOCs as 
applicable, because attracting investment into the petroleum sector of a state is 
vital to the sector’s growth.194 It is important to realise that for a government to 
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govern the petroleum sector of the state better, it is expected that the government 
be well informed about the industry. The international petroleum industry is 
arguably, today dominated by NOCs, thus making the role of each government 
even more critical in directing its NOC to operate most efficiently, domestically 
and internationally.
 64 






The objectives and activities of NOCs will be examined in this chapter, most 
importantly, the rationale for the establishment of a NOC. Much literature, when 
defining the key players in the global petroleum industry focuses mainly on OPEC 
and the IOCs, no primary interest has been paid to the NOCs until recently.1 
Arguably, NOCs are a massive tool of value creation for the management of a 
state’s petroleum resources. In essence, this study seeks to debate the antiquated 
tag on a NOC when a state seeks to manage its petroleum resources using the 
NOC model. This study, therefore, believes the NOC, especially in a petroleum-
rich state, can assist the state in achieving economic development through the 
effective management of their petroleum resources.  
 
At a time when government interventions are at an all-time high in their home 
countries due to the Covid-19 pandemic, it highlights the critical roles government 
play in the progress and economic development of their country.2 When it comes 
to petroleum resources, there is no doubt that the sole aim of any petroleum-rich 
country, whether a developed or a developing country is to maximise wealth 
through the exploitation of its petroleum resources. Therefore, if a country wants 
to achieve the national goal of fully benefitting from the exploitation of its natural 
(petroleum) resources, the government has a significant, strategic and facilitating 
role to play. Although, in the critical sense, fully benefitting from these resources 
would be difficult. However, acceptable levels where a more significant number of 
the population benefits from the exploration of these resources would be viewed 
as adequate, to be considered a success.3 
 
1 Leslie E Grayson, National Oil Companies (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 1981) 5. 
2 See 'Government Support Schemes For COVID-19' (TMF Group, 2020) <https://www.tmf-
group.com/en/news-insights/coronavirus/government-support-schemes/> accessed 1 May 2020. See also, Aimee 
Manning, 'COVID-19 Updates: US Federal & State Government Relief Programs' (Linnworks, 2020) 
<https://blog.linnworks.com/covid-19-us-government-relief-programs> accessed 1 May 2020. 
3 Victor C. Azubike, 'Critical Government And National Oil Company Role In Their Petroleum Resource 
Development: Lessons For Guyana Petroleum Sector' (2020) 46 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 461. 
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The Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), an international non-profit 
organisation dedicated to the improvement of natural resource governance in their 
recent publication, advanced further support on the importance of NOCs to the 
global petroleum industry, and most importantly, the significant roles they play in 
their home-country economies.4 As per OPEC’s 2018 statistics that were stated in 
the previous chapter: NOCs control over 90% of the world's oil and gas reserves; 
as a result, the importance of these government institutions to the global oil and 
gas industry cannot be exaggerated.5 Petroleum is an essential commodity, and it 
is key to the interest of any petroleum-rich state and is usually closely linked to 
its national security.6 When it comes to crude reserves, the question of whether 
these reserves are producing reserves raises another point in determining the 
percentage.  
 
NOCs play an essential role in both petroleum exporting and importing countries, 
and one cannot deny that in the present global petroleum industry that the NOCs 
operate in a political context as much as an economic.7 According to Jonathan 
Green, in today’s global petroleum industry, NOCs are now a force to be reckoned 
with, although he calls them the ‘international NOCs’ .8 Regarding these 
 
4 See 'The National Oil Company Database' (Resource Governance, 2019) 
<https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/national_oil_company_database.pdf> accessed 22 
July 2019. 
5 Valérie Marcel and John V Mitchell, Oil Titans: National Oil Companies In The Middle East (Chatham House 
2006) 1; Jennifer Ernst Robinson, 'National Oil Companies And The Dual Mandate: A Balance Between 
Profitability And Social Development In The Middle East' (2009) 1 Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced 
International Studies 1-13; John V. Mitchell and Beth Mitchell, 'Structural Crisis in The Oil and Gas Industry' 
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And Political Perspective' (2010) 64 The Middle East Journal 427; Alexey Bereznoy, 'Catching-Up With 
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1. 
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29 February 2020. 
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assertions, this chapter will argue the vital seat occupied by the NOC in the global 
petroleum industry, and even more so in a petroleum-rich developing state. 
 
 
3.2 The Meaning of National Oil Companies 
 
Notably, since 1991 nearly 90% of conventional crude oil reserves have been 
controlled by NOCs. However, this control over petroleum resources during this 
period has not led to operational efficiency, as the works of Eller et al., suggested.9 
Furthermore, as indicated by Eller et al. this inefficiency stems mainly from how 
profits are redistributed and the high degree of political influence over these 
NOCs—granted that most NOCs are used as political tools by their governments. 
One might argue that with the right policies and legal framework that directs and 
guides the objectives of the NOCs, they can efficiently perform as well as the IOCs.  
 
Petroleum has been argued to be a political commodity, and the international 
domain in which petroleum resources are produced and traded is mainly political. 
Why one may ask? It is debatable that the push to secure access to petroleum 
resources has always been fundamental to geopolitics and international relations. 
For instance, energy security has driven international politics, from European 
imperial expansion and industrialisation in the 19th century and the scramble for 
raw materials in Africa.10 The two world wars both had vital resource dimensions, 
from the struggle to control the iron reserves in Alsace-Lorraine and the oil fields 
in the Caucasus.11 Furthermore, petroleum reserves in the Persian Gulf were 
linked to the Cold War.12 Therefore, as petroleum resource is the primary business 
of the NOC, most of these events affect these government-owned institutions, 
directly or indirectly. 
 
9 Stacy L. Eller, Peter R. Hartley and Kenneth B. Medlock, 'Empirical Evidence on the Operational Efficiency of 
National Oil Companies' (2010) 40 Empirical Economics. See also, Chidi Basil Ike and Hyunjung Lee, 
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Of A National Oil Company' (2008) 30 Energy Economics 2460; Paul Markwell and others, 'The New Frontier 
For National Oil Companies' [2014] SSRN Electronic Journal. 
10 See Roland Dannreuther, Geopolitics and International Relations of Resources in Wojciech Ostrowski and 
Roland Dannreuther (eds.), Global Resources Conflict And Cooperation (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 79-81 and 
Caroline Kuzemko, Andrew Lawrence and Matthew Watson, 'New Directions In The International Political 





However, in reality, NOCs should be concerned with the overall economics and 
industrial matters rather than the political side of the industry.13 Although this 
might be true in some countries, it is clear that NOCs are always affected and 
influenced by politics, especially the NOCs from a developing state. This is so 
because the government develops the petroleum policies, and the legal framework 
that guides the NOCs and appoints the board of directors, and in many cases 
subsidise the operations of the NOCs.14  
 
3.2.1 Defining a National Oil Company 
 
In today’s global petroleum industry, the definition of a National Oil Company 
cannot be restricted to one. In an attempt to define the term national oil 
companies while noting the ambiguity of the term, Grayson stated that when a 
company is being used for a public purpose, it can be said to be a national oil 
company.15 However, this social purpose has to be connected to the management 
of the states petroleum resources, as states do have different government entities 
that manage different resources and sectors. Furthermore,  Paul Stevens defined 
a NOC as ‘an oil and gas company operating in some part of the oil and gas value 
chain owned and controlled by the government’.16 In other words, NOCs were 
created to ensure state control over any country's petroleum resources and to 
ensure higher revenues from petroleum production.17 High revenue and achieving 
economic development through the effective management of petroleum resources 
became the primary purpose of establishing a NOC. However, the ability of these 
NOCs to achieve these goals is another matter altogether. 
 
Historically, the 1960s and early 1970s marked the end of European colonial rule 
and the rise of nationalist movements, which gave impetus to several major oil-
 
13 Valérie Marcel and John V Mitchell (n 5) 3 – 4. See also, Dag Harald Claes, The Politics Of Oil-Producer 
Cooperation (Routledge 2018) 2. 
14 Valérie Marcel and John V Mitchell (n 5) 4. 
15 Leslie E Grayson (n 1) 5.  
16 Paul Stevens, 'National Oil Companies: Good Or Bad' (2003) 
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/49e9/e0b16dd0bb57fbb6c996ec0f5c5cfb2babbd.pdf> accessed 4 February 
2018. 
17 See 'National Oil Companies (NOCs)' (Extractives Hub, 2020) 
<https://extractiveshub.org/servefile/getFile/id/4220> accessed 27 February 2020. 
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producing nations to nationalise their petroleum reserves to regain control from 
foreign oil companies that were not serving the national interests of the host 
government.18 Today there are many varieties and different forms of NOCs.19 
These range on the one hand, from NOCs set up by a government through 
legislation, owned entirely by the government and given exclusive rights over the 
natural resources of the state to NOCs that are partly owned by the government 
with a similar structure to a private company.20 NOCs like Petrobras of Brazil, 
PDVSA of Venezuela, Saudi Aramco of Saudi Arabia, NNPC of Nigeria and Statoil 
of Norway all represent the different forms.21 There are two types of NOCs, the 
NOCs established by an oil and gas importing government and NOCs established 
by an oil and gas producing and exporting government.22 In increasing the 
bargaining position of a state in the global petroleum industry, its NOC has always 
been seen as the most suitable way to do so and also to be the best tool to develop 
relevant technical and commercial expertise.23 As agents of their government 
NOCs have taken up a proactive role in their domestic petroleum industry and also 
abroad.24 
 
Accordingly, for this study, a NOC can be said to be any petroleum corporation set 
up by a sovereign state, for the primary purpose of managing, exploring and 
exploiting the petroleum resource or seeking out petroleum resources on behalf 
of the state.25 Essentially, a NOC is a petroleum enterprise where the government 
have a significant equity share. This percentage has to be 50% and above; this 
signifies the controlling shares. Building on that, a NOC is usually characterised 
by the higher level or percentage of interest held by the state government in the 
company. Today, British Petroleum cannot be characterised as a NOC because the 
 
18 The Changing Role of National Oil Companies in International Energy Markets', (The James A Baker III 
Institute for Public Policy of Rice University 2007) 
<http://large.stanford.edu/publications/coal/references/baker/studies/noc/docs/BI_Study_35-1.pdf> accessed 5 
February 2018; Valérie Marcel and John V Mitchell (n 5) 5. 
19  Silvana Tordo, Brandon S. Tracy and Noora Arfaa, National Oil Companies And Value Creation (World Bank 
working paper 2011) 15. 
20 See Valérie Marcel and John V Mitchell (n 5) 5 – 6. 
21 Ibid.  
22 See Oystein Noreng n 5. See also, Brent Steedman, 'The Rise Of The National Oil Companies And Impact On 
Australia' (2009) 49 The APPEA Journal 591. 
23 Ibid. See also, Leon Moller, 'The Governance of Oil and Gas Operations in Hostile but Attractive Regions: 
West Africa' (2013) 11 Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence. 
24 Ibid. 
25 See Oystein Noreng, (n 5) Leslie E Grayson (n 1) 5. 
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British government does not have a controlling stake in the company.26 The 
importance of knowing the extent of the government stake in the NOC will help 
an observer to determine the level of control that the government exerts over the 
NOC. As this study will be focused on the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC), and the Norwegian NOC - Equinor (formerly Statoil), it is, therefore, 
pertinent to distinguish the stakes of the government in each NOC. While NNPC is 
100% owned by the Nigerian government today, Equinor is over 60% owned by 
the Norwegian government which still gives it the controlling power.27  
 
NOCs controlling petroleum reserves can be beneficial to a state, as long as the 
control results in the efficient redistribution of the petroleum resource revenue 
that benefits the people of the state. To assert that the petroleum industry will be 
overtaken by political objectives if the NOCs continue to assert their control over 
it, is very debatable.28 If one follows the history of the global petroleum industry, 
even when it was controlled by the IOCS (seven sisters), one can see that politics 
and petroleum resources go hand in hand. Hence, that is why petroleum resources 
are usually referred to as political commodities. 
 
Rather than discouraging the continuation of state control and ownership over 
their petroleum industry, the direction should be to encourage these states, and 
their NOCs to adopt efficient methods through strong petroleum industry policies 
and legal frameworks.29 When a government is endowed with petroleum 
resources, it is usually assumed that the way its resources are regulated, or the 
regulatory framework which guides its petroleum industry, will show the 
objectives and aims of the government, and what it seeks to achieve. For example, 
this can be observed in the tax policies adopted by Russia, which points to a 
broader economic and geostrategic rationale, which shows the government’s 
desire to use the control of its petroleum resources to build its economy and at 
the same time reassert its authority in the global petroleum industry. However, 
 
26 Ibid. 
27 See Statoil 'Our Shareholders - Statoil.Com' (Statoil.com, 2018) <https://www.statoil.com/en/investors/our-
dividend/our-shareholders.html> accessed 12 February 2018 and 'NNPC Corporate Info' (Nnpcgroup.com, 2018) 
<http://nnpcgroup.com/AboutNNPC/CorporateInfo.aspx> accessed 3 December 2018. 
28 See Stacy L. Eller, Peter R. Hartley and Kenneth B. Medlock (n 9). 
29 Harley Balzer, 'The Putin Thesis And Russian Energy Policy' (2005) 21 Post-Soviet Affairs 210. 
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this strategy has been argued as a means used by the Russian government to 
destroy Yukos.30 
 
Furthermore, it is vital for a country that is blessed with an abundance of 
petroleum resources to perfect their legislation that concerns these natural 
resources, also perfecting the economic mechanisms for the resource exploitation 
and, defining and rectifying the system of licensing and regulations in the area of 
the exploitation of its petroleum resources.31 It is also important to mention that 
within petroleum-producing countries, their various NOCs differ from each other. 
While in some of these countries the NOCs participate with other companies or 
IOCs in a licensing regime, others exercise complete state ownership and control 
of exploitation.32  
 
Yergin et al. pointed out that the birth of the NOCs is generally described as being 
the event that took place in 1908 in Austria-Hungary Emperor Franz Joseph 
approved the building of a topping plant. During that period private oil producers 
encountered a surplus supply of crude, and this topping plant was owned and 
operated by the government.33 Mcpherson pointed out that as the need to secure 
energy supplies grew in the minds of Western governments the need to establish 
a government entity that would achieve the security and diversity of energy supply 
while going into contracts with IOCs on behalf of the state also grew.34 What 
followed in the coming years was the establishment of NOCs by various 
governments around the world. For a chronological order of the establishment of 








32 Coby van der Linde, The State and The International Oil Market (Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000) 12–13. 
33 In 1914 the government of United Kingdom purchased 51% ownership share in Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
(which later became British Petroleum). See Daniel Yergin, The Prize (Simon & Schuster 2012) 130; Andrew C. 
Inkpen and Michael H Moffett, The global oil & gas industry: Management, strategy and finance (PennWell 
Books 2011) 52 – 55 and Silvana Tordo, Brandon S Tracy and Noora Arfaa (n 19) 16. 
34 Charles Mcpherson and World Bank Group, 'National Oil Companies Evolution, Issues, Outlook National Oil 
Companies Workshop Current Roles and Future Prospects' (World Bank Washington D.C. 2003) 
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Table 1. Some Established NOCs in Chronological order  
 
Year Country Company 
1922 Argentina YPF 
1924 France CFP 
1924 Italy AGIP 
1933 Saudi Arabia Saudi Aramco 
1938 Mexico PEMEX 
1951 Iran NIOC 
1953 Brazil Petrobras 
1956 India ONGC 
1960 Kuwait KNPC 
1965 Algeria Sonatrach 
1971 Indonesia  Pertamina 
1971 Nigeria NNOC 
1971 United Arab Emirates ADNOC 
1972 Norway Equinor 
1974 Malaysia  Petronas 
1975 Venezuela PDVSA 
1975 Canada Petro-Canada 
1975 United Kingdom BNOC 
1976 Angola Sonangol 
1982 China CNOOC 
2000 China Sinopec 
2002 Equatorial Guinea GEPetrol 
2006 Chad SHT 
2015 Uganda National Oil Company  
 
Source: Compiled by author from various sources. 
 
It is important to note, that Mexico set up Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) in 1938 
specifically to expropriate and nationalise the foreign assets of companies in the 
country.35 The establishment of NOCs continued to 2000, and these NOCs were 
set up by both petroleum importing and exporting governments. Today, there are 
many NOCs in both petroleum exporting and importing states with different 
government mandates. Some of these NOCs are listed in Appendix 1. 
 
With the importance attached to the petroleum industry and the historical 
dominance of IOCs over the industry, resource-rich states would exert control 
 
35 Andrew C. Inkpen and Michael H Moffett (n 32) 52 – 55; Silvana Tordo, Brandon S Tracy and Noora Arfaa (n 
18) 16 – 19; Charles Mcpherson and World Bank Group n 33; David G Victor, David R Hults and Mark Thurber 
(eds.) Oil and Governance (Cambridge University Press 2014) 5 – 8; Donald Mmari and Sufian Bukurura, 
'Strategic Significance Of National Oil Companies: Lessons For Tanzania' [2016] REPOA, Working paper 16/3; 
Paul Stevens, 'The History of Oil' [2010] POLINARES Working Paper. 
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over their resources, mainly by setting up a NOC.36 As an illustration, due to the 
significance of the oil and gas industry, the French government took legislative 
and regulatory steps to control the activities of the industry as early as the First 
World War.37 Tugendhat and Hamilton stated: 
 
The dominance of the IOCs may owe much to historical accident, 
to intrigue, manipulation and to the past realities of imperialism 
and geo-political power in the world. But it also owes much to the 
basic need in the sources with markets and growth with 
investment.38 
 
Rawlings observed that the periods of resource nationalism and participation 
agreements in the global petroleum industry was a time of learning for the NOCs, 
as they acquired ownership over their natural resources which led them to learn 
how to operate their fields independent of the IOCs.39 Although over the years, 
many NOCs have become inefficient in their operations as pointed out by Eller et 
al.40 This might be true to a certain level and also applicable to some NOCs. A 
point often overlooked is that a NOC model is evident in the sense that it belongs 
to the state, and is tasked with carrying out the objectives of the government. At 
the same time, an IOC is mostly considered as carrying out the goals set by its 
board or shareholders.41 It is also significant to note that IOCs do have a national 
identity, as most of its shareholders and executive staff come from one country 
and its head office is located in one country. It will be assumed that its corporate 
culture will be developed within the national framework of that country.42 Some 
developing states are still dependent on IOCs to develop the states’ natural 
resources, thus relegating the NOC to the role of rent collecting.43 There is, 
 
36 Alain Beltran, ‘A Comparative History of National Oil Companies: Introduction’ in Alain Beltran (ed.), A 
Comparative History of National Oil Companies (PIE-Peter Lang SA 2010) 9.  
Joint venture agreements and production sharing agreements regulate the relationship between the IOCs and the 
NOCs today. Oher contractual relationships between the NOC and IOCs do exist, like the royalty-based licensing 
systems that are used in Namibia and South Africa. See also, Leon Moller n 23. 
37 See André Philippon, The French Example: The 1928s Laws, Longevity and Effectiveness of the Approach to 
Creating and Maintaining a National Oil Industry in a Consumer Country – Appearances and Realities in Alain 
Beltran (ed.), A Comparative History of National Oil Companies (PIE-Peter Lang SA 2010) 21 – 22. 
38 See Christopher Tugendhat and Adrian Hamilton, Oil The Biggest Business (Eyre Methuen Ltd 1975) 381. 
39 A. A Rawlings, 'The Rise of the National Oil Company - Implications for International Oil Companies' (2015) 
13(6) Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence 1–18; Also see Silvana Tordo, Brandon S Tracy and Noora Arfaa (n 
19) 29. 
40 Stacy L. Eller, Peter R. Hartley and Kenneth B. Medlock (n 9). 
41 See Alain Beltran (ed.) (n 35) 9; Samir Saul, ‘SN REPAL, CFP and “Oil-Paid-in-Francs”  in Alain Beltran (ed.) 
(n 36) 93. 
42 Ibid. 
43 A. A Rawlings (n 39). 
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therefore, a need to understand why, after many years of exploitation of natural 
resources, a petroleum-rich developing country still cannot show evidence of 




3.3 The Rationale For NOC 
 
There are many reason why NOCs have been established. Professor Paul Stevens 
alluded that various arguments exist about the rationale for forming a NOC; from 
political reasons based upon the sovereignty and economic nationalism to the 
need to feed national pride and give the petroleum resource state a sense of 
independence from the West.44 In like manner, petroleum resources have been 
seen to be a very nationalistic commodity.45 Further, Mommer remarked that the 
First Arab Petroleum Congress was held in Cairo in 1959, and there a “gentlemen’s 
agreement” was reached between the participating petroleum exporting states to 
establish NOCs, thus leading to the forming of OPEC in the following years.46 One 
might argue that the desire of petroleum producing countries to exercise their 
sovereign rights over their petroleum resources has led to the formation of most 
NOCs today.47 Other significant incidents could be said to have contributed to this, 
some of which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
The relatively recent phenomenon of NOCs has to be understood against the 
background of global petroleum industry history, bearing in mind that, its present 
shape has been determined by general conditions as they have developed through 
the century.48 It is assumed that, all NOCs are created to pursue national-
orientated policies, although all NOCs are not the same. Thus the difference in 
their status depends on whether they are from a petroleum-producing exporting 
 
44 Paul Stevens, 'National Oil Companies And International Oil Companies In The Middle East: Under The 
Shadow Of Government And The Resource Nationalism Cycle' (2008) 1 The Journal of World Energy Law & 
Business 5. 
45 See Andrew Lister, 'Tax And Royalty Regimes', Stephenson Harwood LLP: Three-day Workshop for National 
Oil Companies (CW Energy LLP 2020). 
46 See Bernard Mommer n 5. See also, Francisco Parra, Oil Politics: A Modern History Of Petroleum (IB Tauris 
2004) 93-96 and Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies And The World They Made 
(Hodder and Stoughton 1993) 209. 
47 Michael A. Olorunfemi 'The Dynamics Of National Oil Companies' (1991) 15 OPEC Review 321. 
48 See Paul H. Vrankel, 'The Rationale Of National Oil Companies' (1978) 2 OPEC Review 46. 
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country or a petroleum importing country.49 Furthermore, the ability to gain first-
hand knowledge of the inner workings of the petroleum industry was one of the 
reasons put forward for the creation of NOCs by the governments for them to be 
used as an industrial tool.50 The length of time it has taken to learn the inner 
workings of the petroleum industry, is a point that industry commentators have 
not agreed on.  
 
The reasons for the establishment of a NOC vary from one state to the other.51 
There have been different comments on the rationale for forming NOCs, whether 
in a developing country, where they have been established as a tool to gain 
popular support from the people.52 The reasons for the creation of the NOCs and 
their roles differ from nation to nation.53 In a developing natural resource-rich 
state, these can vary from political, ideological to economic.54 Also referred to as 
National Resource Companies (NRCs), Cameron and Stanley asserted that these 
government set up companies are now increasingly popular in petroleum 
resource-producing countries it goes without saying that they are beyond 
controversy.55  
 
Donald Losman, in his work on NOCs, argued that many NOCs were established 
partly as a result of the historical feeble bargaining positions of petroleum-rich 
states concerning the IOCs strong position and also partly on ideology.56 
Therefore, it is essential to understand the historical context in which the NOCs 
were established.57 To have a better grasp of NOCs, one must take into account 
the historical, political and socio-economic context in which the NOCs were formed 
and in which they developed.58 It is anticipated that a detailed and critical analysis 




51 See David G Victor, David R Hults and Mark Thurber (eds.) (n 18) 8 – 9. Kameel I.F. Khan, National Oil 
Companies: Form, structure, accountability and Control in Khan (ed), Petroleum Resources And 
Development (Belhaven 1988) 185. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Andrews D. C. Smith and Michael J. Trebilcock, 'State-Owned Enterprises In Less Developed Countries: 
Privatisation And Alternative Reform Strategies' (2001) 12 European Journal of Law and Economics 217. 
55 Peter Cameron and Michael Stanley, The Extractive Industries Sourcebook (World Bank Group 2017) 64. 
56 Donald L. Losman n 2. 
57 See Silvana Tordo, Brandon S Tracy and Noora Arfaa (n 19) 29. See also Andrews D. C. Smith and Michael J. 
Trebilcock n 54. 
58 Ibid. 
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NOCs came about as a result of asset nationalisation of the IOCs who were seen 
to be against or exploiting the state. Their goals of maximising profit were 
damaging to the national interest where they explore but benefitted the IOCs 
governments.59 Important to note that one of the most popular nationalisations in 
the global petroleum industry was witnessed in Mexico. 
 
The majority of OPEC NOCs started getting involved in the petroleum industry in 
the early 1970s. However, one might argue that they have limited experience in 
the industry. It is pertinent to note the critical role they play in the global 
petroleum industry, as in many cases they have taken the leading role in 
managing the business of producing and exporting oil and gas.60  
 
The following events that unfolded are still unfolding in the global petroleum 
industry. NOCs have been formed for various reasons, from the need for the 
government to secure energy for the state, to the need for state control over its 
abundant petroleum resources. It could be that a country responds to the 
directives of OPEC, or the assertion of state sovereignty over its natural resources, 
which made the NOC a symbol of independence for the state in the post-colonial 
world and against the imperialist governments that were adverse to the interests 
of the nation.61 
 
Countries set up NOCs for various reasons, but the establishment of NOC is more 
notable in countries which have abundant natural resources within their territories. 
Although the lack of abundance of natural resources has not been known to hinder 
the establishment of a NOC, this was demonstrated by Italy, who compared to 
other Western European countries did not have the abundance of natural 
resources. However, it still established its NOC ENI (Ente Nationale Idrocarburi), 
and its subsidiary Azienda Generale di Petrolio (AGIP).62 Furthermore, Leslie 
Grayson observed that as Italy's petroleum industry could not attract IOCs into its 
 
59 See Bianca Sarbu Ownership and Control of Oil: Explaining Policy Choices Across Producing Countries 
(Routledge 2014) 35. See also Giacomo Luciani, ‘Corporations vs. States in the Shaping of Global Oil Regimes’ 
in Wojciech Ostrowski and Roland Dannreuther (eds) 132-133. 
60 H.E. Ali M. Jaidah, 'Problems And Prospects Of State Petroleum Enterprises In OPEC Countries' (1978) 2 
OPEC Review 1. See also, Øystein Noreng, Crude Power (IB Tauris 2002) 17 - 26. 
61 See Silvana Tordo, Brandon S Tracy and Noora Arfaa (n 18) 22 – 29; Leslie E Grayson (n 1); Michael A. 
Olorunfemi n 46; H.E. Ali M. Jaidah (n 59); Paul H. Vrankel (n 47) and Paul Stevens n 43. 
62 See Leslie E Grayson (n 1) 107 – 108. 
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upstream exploration and production (E&P), perhaps due to the unattractive 
commercial quantity of their reserves, the government did not sit down and 
complain about their dilemma, they took some action which started with the 
establishment of ENI, and its subsidiary AGIP responsible for petroleum E&P both 
home and abroad.63 It could be said that concerns over energy security were the 
main reason ENI was created. There was an apparent need for a national 
establishment that could go abroad while representing the state and seek out 
energy sources for Italy.64 
 
In 1972 the Norwegian governments in a bid to take over the activities involved 
in the exploitation of its petroleum resources established a NOC Equinor (former 
Statoil).65 The present-day reputation and competence of Equinor were not built 
overnight. The government even suspended giving out new concessions from 
1974 to 1978, to help Equinor develop and build up its competence in the 
industry.66 This took time, and Equinor was not operational until the early 1980s 
when it led other Norwegian companies in the take-over of major offshore 
activities in NCS.67 
 
Consequently, the establishment and maintaining of a NOC is built on statist 
ideology where the critical factor is the underpinning of state control over the 
petroleum resources.68 Some NOCs from petroleum producing and exporting 
countries have evolved from being tools of government policies to being 
commercial enterprises.69 This arguably should be the goal for most NOCs, and 




64 This ENI and AGIP achieved, by successfully seeking concessions abroad, which started in Iran and Egypt in 
1957. Uniquely, they offered more favourable terms to host governments, than the oil majors did. See Francisco 
Parra (n 45) 50. 
65 Additionally, after the reorganisation of the petroleum industry, in 1985 in a bid to retain oil money while 
promoting direct investment in the sector the Norwegian government split the operations between Statoil and the 
SDFI. See 'Norway’s Petroleum History' (Norwegian Petroleum, 2020) 
<https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/framework/norways-petroleum-history/> accessed 28 May 2020. See also, 
Andrew McKay, 'Black Gold: Norway's Oil Story' (Life in Norway, 2019) 
<https://www.lifeinnorway.net/norway-oil-history/> accessed 28 May 2020. 
66 See Svein S Andersen The Struggle Over North Sea Oil And Gas: Government Strategies In Denmark, Britain 
And Norway (Scandinavian University Press 1993) 98. 
67 Ibid. 
68 David G Victor, David R Hults and Mark Thurber (eds.) (n 18) 9.  
69 See Michael A. Olorunfemi n 47. 
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In implementing the upstream oil and gas industry in any state, there are various 
tools through which this is achieved, and the creation of a NOC is one of the vital 
tools, as NOCs and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are the tools used by political 
leaders in exerting control over the management of a petroleum resources of the 
country.70 Furthermore, the fact that these institutions are present in the state 
does not automatically make the country a capitalist state.71 Most important is 
how these tools are used and not the tools themselves.72 Norway is an example 
of a state that manages its natural resources well through its tool, which is Equinor 
(StatoilHydro) in which the government owns over 60% of the corporation. The 
government manages the Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) of the country.73  
 
In ensuring the coherence and coordination of other policy tools and the NOC,74 it 
is to be noted, that NOCs vary and this depends on the level of competition each 
faces in the market it operates, the degree of commercial orientation and 
internationalisation.75 Likewise, arguments for maintaining NOCs are usually more 
cogent from the political leaders because as a generator of profit, when compared 
with IOCs, NOCs usually underperform.76 According to Sarbu, as the level of 
relevance of the petroleum industry to the producing countries grew in their 
domestic economy, it became vital for the state to establish a NOC as a tool to 
exert control over its oil and gas industry.77 
 
There may be empirical evidence against the maintenance of NOCs. One of the 
arguments in this study is to understand the rationale and mindset of Western 
governments when they established their NOCs. However, considering that some 
later were privatised, should developing countries also have a period of this control 
over their petroleum resources through their NOCs as evidenced in some Western 
states, before moving towards the liberal market option? 
 
70 See Ian Bremmer, 'The End Of The Free Market: Who Wins The War Between States And Corporations?' 




74 See Bianca Sarbu (n 59) 34. See Benjamin Bridgman, Victor Gomes and Arilton Teixeira, 'The Threat Of 
Competition Enhances Productivity' (Economicdynamics.org, 2008) 
<https://www.economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2008/paper_302.pdf> accessed 27 November 2018. 
75 Ibid. 
76 David G Victor, David R Hults and Mark Thurber (eds) (n 18) 10. 
77 See Bianca Sarbu (n 59) 36. 
 78 
The creation of a NOC helped the state to control its resources appropriately, and 
brought with it international and domestic political advantage.78 Another reason 
for an NOC creation is the benefit of state control, through direct involvement in 
the activity of the oil and gas industry through its NOC it can be involved in solving 
the wider socio-economic issues.79 Another view is that the establishment of NOCs 
enable the oil and gas producing states to nationalise their resources, as it gave 
them the technical and organisational competence to take control of the 
operations of the IOCs.80 Similarly, Victor et al. also remarked that governments 
when establishing NOCs were driven by the fact that state ownership of the 
petroleum resources would assist the government to effectively promote and 
control economic development, redistribute the income attained from the 
petroleum resources, and promote national pride.81 How well this worked out for 
the majority of the governments that setup NOCs for this purpose is yet to be 
evidenced.  
 
Paul Vrankel stated that NOCs played a vital role in what one could call the phase 
of emancipation and self-determination and will be called upon to provide the 
foundation for the period of coexistence and coordination.82 In the same fashion, 
debates over the benefits of NOCs to the average citizen of any state has been 
on-going for a while, and some theories have been put forward to argue for and 
against the running of the petroleum industry by a NOC. Evidently, when NOCs 
are well managed and guided by the legal framework and petroleum policies they 
can be highly beneficial to the people of the country. As a result, the delivery of 
substantial value to shareholders through the fiscal revenue contributions to the 
treasury of a state, successful exploration efforts, and the development of new 
skills and technologies is usually a mark of effective NOCs.83   
 
 
78 See Bianca Sarbu (n 59) 36. See also, Valérie Marcel and John V Mitchell (n 3) 29 -30. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 David G Victor, David R Hults and Mark Thurber (eds) (n 18) 8 – 9. See also, Donald L. Losman n 2; Ole 
Gunnar Austvik, 'Landlord And Entrepreneur: The Shifting Roles Of The State In Norwegian Oil And Gas Policy' 
(2011) 25 Governance 315, and Paul Stevens n 43. 
82 Paul H. Vrankel n 47. 
83 See The National Oil Company Database: Report (National Oil Company Database, 2019) 
<https://www.nationaloilcompanydata.org/api/publications/content/NFInSnhdYNC4ntCohaYqok1u2jHAG4vvL
XK1jwrL.pdf> accessed 25 June 2019. 
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The boosting of national pride can be linked to the creation of a NOC, which leads 
to state control over its petroleum industry without any foreign interference.84 
There has to be a regulatory framework that supports this state control, for 
instance, the legal framework for exploration, development and production of 
petroleum reserves in the oil and gas producing countries is usually set down in 
the constitution of the country, with hydrocarbon laws and regulations.85 According 
to Sarbu, these legal arrangements and fiscal components allow for all possible 
combinations of control: private control, state control, and mixed control by the 
state.86  
 
For a better grasp of the conceptual order of the legal framework applicable to the 
petroleum industry, see the following diagram by Fisho and Ogeer which is 

























Figure 5: Conceptual Order of Petroleum Legal Framework 
 
Source: culled from Alache Fisho and Naadira Ogeer, 2020.87 
 
It can be seen from the diagram that the constitution acts as the building block 
for the petroleum legal framework. By means of this order, most NOCs emerged. 
Through these legal frameworks, the roles of the NOCs are seen, also the parts 
they play in assisting the government in efficiently managing the state’s petroleum 
resources and creating value for the people of the state. Further, Waelde asserted 
that the need for a legislative instrument that would be used to exert political 
control was not only restricted to developing countries. Even the transitional-
economies needed a NOC for the control, but there has been a movement towards 
the privatisation of NOCs, as observed in BP, TOTAL, Elf, REPSOL and Petro-
 
87 Alache Fisho and Naadira Ogeer, 'NOC And Government Negotiating Tactics', Stephenson Harwood Law, 
London (Commonwealth Secretariat 2020). 
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Canada who moved towards a more liberalised regime and replaced the 
government ownership model.88  
 
An instance of state ownership and control of petroleum resources can be 
observed in the UKCS. The UK Department of Energy (DEN) published a paper in 
early May 1974, proposing that there should be a state entity that will ensure the 
security of revenue for the government, exercise control over the distribution of 
oil and its direct participation in the production, maybe including exploration in 
later licences.89 Further, DEN considered the argument that the department was 
not suitable for undertaking commercial activities; thus a separate new body was 
seen to be appropriate, through which the government could exert control over 
the exploitation of its resources.90 This led to the birth and establishment of the 
British National Oil Corporation (BNOC).91 The primary intention is that these 
bodies would work in the national interest, complementing the work of a NOC, and 
to that end, the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC) was set up on 1 January 
1976.92 BNOC took over the oil and gas assets of the National Coal Board, which 
had been a risk-taking partner in a consortium with Conoco and Gulf since the 
1960s.93 
 
Arguments in favour of the NOCs can span from the historical context, as the 
geopolitical scene and the context in which NOCs were established have an impact 
on the NOC’s structure.94 The following are important to the petroleum sector, the 
political gains from state control, efficiency and monitoring of operations, 
petroleum rent maximisation and socioeconomic issues and priorities.95 
Nevertheless, the roles and behaviours of the NOCs today are not what it used to 
be in the 1970s. 1970s NOCs were involved mainly in the domestic petroleum 
 
88 See Thomas W. Waelde 'International Energy Investment' (1996) 17 Energy Law Journal 191. See also, Donald 
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89 See Alexander G Kemp, The Official History Of North Sea Oil And Gas (Routledge 2012) 341 – 343. See also 
Bernard Mommer, Global Oil And The Nation State (Oxford University Press 2002) 186. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 See R.J.P. Ross, ‘The Government as Entrepreneur: with Special Reference to the United Kingdom in Khan 
(ed) (n 50) 198-204. 
93 Ibid. 
94 See Valérie Marcel and John V Mitchell (n 3) 36. 
95 Silvana Tordo, Brandon S Tracy and Noora Arfaa (n 19) 22 – 24.  
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industry while today many NOCs extend their activities globally.96 Thus, the NOC-
NOC alliance that is occurring in the industry is something that did not happen in 
the old global petroleum industry structure. 
 
NOCs can come in different forms; whether it is a monopoly or participates within 
the global petroleum market, variations in their degree of commercial orientation 
and internationalization elucidate the forms in which NOCs come.97 Concerning 
the UKCS, Professor Kemp observed that although BNOC was granted commercial 
participation licences, it was expected that it would not behave purely like a 
commercial licensee as the main objective was to enable the government to 
covertly influence the licensees’ decisions in the interest of the nation, which 
sometimes would go against the commercial interest of BNOC.98 On the other side 
of the debate, analysis of the increased number of NOCs and their control over 
global petroleum resources, has the reservation that this will lead to the majority 
of petroleum developments to be made with political objectives in mind, which in 
turn will result in inefficiencies in the production of revenues because the pursuit 
of more commercial objectives will be limited.99  
 
The performance of NOCs and their commercial efficiency has been one of the 
major arguments against the setting up of a NOC. From the historical context and 
the ideology behind the establishment of a NOC there is a perception that the 
IOCs over the years have short-changed the country during the period it 
developed its petroleum resources. This can interfere with how these states 
embark on the exploitation of its petroleum resources and by extension, the 
maximisation of economic efficiency and the generation of social welfare from the 
exploitation of the petroleum resources.100 The economic cost of political control, 
operational inefficiencies, lack of competition, subsidies and non-commercial 
objectives, weak corporate governance, funding strategy and requirements and 
conflict of interests and balance of control all sum up the cogent arguments 
against the establishment of a NOC in a petroleum endowed country.101 Waelde 
 
96 See Dag Harald Claes, ‘Cooperation and Conflict in Oil and Gas Markets’ in Andreas Goldthau, The Handbook 
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97 Silvana Tordo, Brandon S Tracy and Noora Arfaa (n 19) 22. 
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100 See Silvana Tordo, Brandon S Tracy and Noora Arfaa (n 19) 24-29;  Paul Stevens (n 43). 
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stated that soon government participation either by equity or regulation in the 
petroleum operations would diminish.102 If that were to be the case today, then 
the presence of these strong NOCs dominating the global petroleum industry 
would not be so. However, he recognised that NOCs were of symbolic economic 
and political importance to the state, being used as a means for the expression of 




3.3.1 Examples of NOCs in Developing and Developed Countries 
 
The analysis of Norway and Nigeria’s petroleum industry in this chapter serves as 
an overview. Extensive and critical analysis will be carried out in chapter 6 of the 
legal frameworks adopted by Nigeria and Norway. It is important to understand 
the rationale for the establishment of these two NOCs. Together with the factors 
that influenced the frameworks and policies that were adopted by these two 
governments and how well has it helped them in harnessing the benefits from the 
exploitation of its petroleum resources.104 Collier and Venables, grouped Nigeria 
amongst the eight country’s that has failed to harness the full potential of their 
natural resources.105 There is an impact of a robust petroleum policy and legal 
framework on the socio-development of a state. 
 
The Nigerian NOC - NNPC 
In a bid by the Nigerian government in the late 1970s to exert control over its 
petroleum resources and industry, it created the Nigerian National Oil Company 
(NNOC) in 1971, which then went on to become the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) after merging with the Petroleum Inspectorate in 1977.106  
 
102 See Thomas W. Waelde n 88. 
103 Ibid. 
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in Paul Collier and Anthony Venables (eds), Plundered Nations? (Palgrave Macmillan 2011)1-2; Per Heum and 
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105 Ibid. 
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Of Its Corporate Status As A Statutory Body Rather Than As A Separate Legal Entity Under The NNPC Act 
1977?' (2015) 8 International Energy Law Review 304; Ike Oguine, 'Nigerian Content In The Nigerian Petroleum 
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The Petroleum 1969 Act was the first statutory regime and framework that defined 
the structure of the petroleum sector of Nigeria.107 This act structured the legal 
relationships in the country’s oil and gas industry.108 Some of these legal 
relationships are joint venture agreements, participation agreements, production 
sharing agreements and service contracts.109 
 
The latest legislation restructuring the Nigerian petroleum industry in the form of 
the Petroleum Industry Governance Bill (PIGB) is proposed to aid the government 
to embark on industry restructuring, especially the country’s upstream petroleum 
industry.110 It is pertinent to look at Nigeria’s upstream industry through the lens 
of a structured upstream petroleum industry like Norway. In doing that, the NOC 
of both countries will be in focus and the legal framework too.111 Significantly, the 
federal government’s control over petroleum resources was achieved when Nigeria 
was ruled by a military regime.112 Arguably, the military regime did not invest the 
revenues in creating conditions for sustainable development, which Omorogbe 
considered to be a catastrophic failure of public policy.113 Instead, the petroleum 
resources became an instrument of politics. Hence, the seat now occupied by the 
country’s NOC. NNPC arguably was created to champion the petroleum course of 
the country. However, with an underly tone of resource nationalism, the need to 
have a government entity managing the petroleum resources was deemed 
adequate. As an OPEC member state, the directive of OPEC for a member state to 
establish a NOC was a factor. 
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108 See Yinka Omorogbe, 'The Legal Framework for The Production Of Petroleum In Nigeria' (1987) 5 Journal 
of Energy & Natural Resources Law; Yinka Omorogbe, The oil and gas industry: Exploration and production 
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The petroleum industry of Nigeria can be argued to have been influenced by the 
movement of resource nationalism, similarly the ownership and control of its 
natural resource sector.114 For instance, these movements are identified within 
the sections of the Petroleum Act of 1969 to the 1978 Land Use Act, and the state 
has always been proactive in the actual control and ownership of its natural 
resources.115 OPEC influence can be identified here. In recent times, it has been 
challenging to define NNPC. As a formal organisation that is supposed to be 
vertically integrated petroleum company, it is neither a commercial entity nor a 
significant petroleum operator, as it relies on other companies to carry out the 
complex activities, that an oil operator should do.116 Nevertheless, the proposed 
restructuring will effect the needed change in the NOC. 
 
The Norwegian NOC - Equinor 
Identified as the second youngest NOC in Europe, but also as a small NOC 
compared to some in Europe.117 1972 was the year Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap 
AS (Statoil) now  Equinor was founded.118 It was considered to be a state-owned 
company but most similar to an IOC, maybe because of its strong international 
commercial objectives.119 Norway, through its legal framework, has been 
successful in the development of its oil and gas resources, and it has become a 
driver of Norwegian economic growth and national savings.120 The legal basis and 
regulatory framework for petroleum activities in Norway today are conferred by 
the Petroleum Activities Act, 1996 and Petroleum Regulations, 1997.121 The 
success of the Norwegian petroleum industry is evidenced by the billions of dollars 
in its Sovereign Wealth Fund.122 
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Today, Equinor is one of the most essential NOCs nationally, and internationally. 
One might argue that this fit was achieved mainly due to the fact that it was the 
principal operator in the vast oil and gas field of the country, whose oil and gas 
needs were not vast.123 Consequently, as significant findings were made at Ekofisk 
and the primary gas discovery at Frigg in 1971, it became imperative that the 
Norwegian government set up a NOC to handle and control its resources. This 
view was echoed by the proposal the government made to the Norwegian 
Parliament (Storting).124 Ownership and control of petroleum resources have 
resource nationalism as an underlying principle. Whichever the country, when the 
government reacts to establish ownership and control over a natural resource 
discovery, it means the same thing, irrespective of the geographical location of 
the country. 
 
Following the proposal, in September 1972 Statoil (now Equinor) was established 
with the following objectives: 
 
To carry out, by itself or in participation or in cooperation with 
other companies, exploration and production, transportation, 
refining and marketing of petroleum and products derived 
therefrom, and other activities reasonably related thereto.125  
 
The objective handed to Equinor translates the desire of the Norwegian 
government not only to own its resources but also control the resources and 
exploitation of these resources. The NOC was mandated to be involved in every 
facet of the Norwegian petroleum industry. Important to note, although Equinor 
was given the mandate, the government were aware of how powerful Equinor 
could become, and when its influence grew it might start controlling the 
government, citing the experience of Italy with Enrico Mattei and the struggle to 
get ENI controlled by the government and not the other way round. The legislators 
had to find a way to limit the powers of Equinor.126  
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Policies are the focus of any government in the context of natural resource 
development, and this includes political and fiscal policies.127 According to Hunter, 
the needs of the state as an owner and regulator of the petroleum resources are 
what these policies should generally attempt to balance.128 Thus, in 1971 the ‘Ten 
Oil Commandments’129 laid out the principles of the Norwegian petroleum policy.130 
Accordingly, these were a set of goals and strategies that guided Norway’s 
involvement in the development of petroleum resources throughout the value 
chain of the petroleum industry.131 
 
For these reasons, the Norwegian upstream petroleum industry has been labelled 
one of the best in the world, and its policy framework is remarkable.132 
Remarkably, Norway has controlled and managed its natural resources through 
its NOC that is engaged in commercial hydrocarbon operations; the government 
ministry that directs policies and a regulatory body that provides oversight and 
technical expertise.133 Norway has demonstrated and shown the importance of 
dividing policy and regulatory roles among different government agencies which 
has led to the high achievement levels by its NOC.134 While Nigeria, on the other 
hand, with a wealth of natural resources, are yet to have any positives to remark 
on, with regard to the benefits of the exploitation of their petroleum resources.135  
 
 
3.3.2 Different Categories of National Oil Companies 
 
When categorising, NOCs they usually vary in form or organisational structure: 
from differences in size, geographical endowment, experience, mandate, goals set 
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by the NOC as a company and goals prioritised by their various governments.136 
Some are not independent of their governments while some are independent and 
are immune to political interference from the government.137  
 
It is still arguable whether NOCs can completely rid itself of government 
interference or influence. Although NOCs vary from country to country, one can 
determine the form of each NOC by its characteristics.138 These characteristics can 
include the NOCs created by a particular statutory instrument by the legislature; 
a separate legal personality; administration by a board usually appointed by a 
designated minister; having a responsibility to the government as its symbolic 
shareholder; employees are not civil servants; revenue-earning assets have 
usually been taken over from private ownership; usually financial reviews are done 
by private accounting and auditing; a NOC having autonomous private legal entity 
with full legal liability without privileges or immunities; having a separate judicial 
personality; an independent budget, and a designated autonomous body for 
management and decision-making.139 
 
In terms of production and reserve size, NOCs are amongst the largest companies 
in the global petroleum industry.140 IEA report grouped NOCs into two. The report 
separated national oil companies (NOCs) that concentrate on domestic production 
and the group of international NOCs (INOCs) that have both domestic and 
significant international operations.141 This categorisation by the report was done 
based on their upstream activities.142 Internationalised NOCs and domestic NOCs 
seem to be an easy categorisation, because one can quickly identify the objectives 
of these NOCs from their modus operandi. As NOCs are usually set up by the 
government, they might evolve into commercial profit-driven entities, proving that 
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non-interference from government will be a tough task, especially when the 
government has the higher share in the NOC like Equinor.143 
 
Al-Fattah described Equinor as a perfect example of a NOC that is commercially 
driven,144 but as stated above the controlling shares are held by the Norwegian 
government. Whether overtly or covertly, it can be argued that the Norwegian 
government exerts control over the corporation. The level of control is one that 
will be critically examined in this study. In the opposite direction lies Nigeria’s 
NNPC who has no strong commercial presence, and is used by the Nigerian 
government as a rent collector from IOC activities within its territory and it needs 
constant approval from the government.145  
 
The forms of NOCs that will be examined in this study will be the: 
1. "Façade/Mailbox" a NOC confined to creating employment and representing 
the government in the oil and gas sector of the country in its relations with 
IOCs, also lacking any or limited capabilities and no actual E&P operations. 
E.g. NNPC in Nigeria; and 
2.  “Privatized/competitive” this NOC invests in efficiency and development of 
technology and technical expertise, enjoys full operational capacity, and is 
free to venture into business opportunities globally. e.g. Equinor in 
Norway.146  
 
To characterise these NOCs by the above alone can be misleading to some extent. 
These different NOC forms can be said to embody the characteristics of one or 
more of the types stated. There seems to be an overlapping of the characteristics 
of each group, or the possibility of these forms of NOC metamorphosing into one 
or more of the stated forms.  As the petroleum industry, especially the domestic 
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one of a state matures, the objectives of the NOC could change, and this change 
could cause the formation of the NOC to change. 
 
PFC Energy, an American international energy consulting company, now IHS 
Markit after the acquisition outlined the array of NOCs: 
1. “Statist bureaucracy” this NOC mainly provides patronage for the ruling 
elites; despite that, it does not contribute extensively towards economic 
development. E.g. PDVSA in Venezuela, Sonatrach in Algeria, Sonangol in 
Angola, LNOC in Libya and GNPC in Ghana; 
2. “Development bureaucracy” this type of NOC ensures revenues to the 
government, provides domestic subsidies for fuel and facilitates broader 
socio-economic development. E.g. CNPC, Sinopec – both in China, Saudi 
Aramco in Saudi Arabia, QP in Qatar, Rosneft in Russia, KMG in Kazakhstan, 
KPC in Kuwait, ADNOC in Abu Dhabi, PEMEX in Mexico, ONGC in India, NIOC 
in Iran and Pertamina in Indonesia;  
3. “Public entrepreneur” this type of NOC supports the industrialization and 
growth efforts in the respective countries as they are granted autonomy in 
the pursuit of commercial goals both domestically and internationally. E.g. 
CNOOC in China, Petronas in Malaysia, Petrobras in Brazil, Ecopetrol in 
Colombia and PTT in Thailand.147 
 
3.3.3 Objectives Of National Oil Companies  
 
Grayson pointed out that the main objective for the setting up of NOCs was to 
reduce dependency on the IOCs.148 If that was the case, why is it still a norm in a 
resource-rich country like Nigeria that though that they have a NOC, the country 
still relies heavily on the activities of IOCs in the exploitation of its natural 
resources. Correspondingly, Stevens maintained that protecting national 
hydrocarbon wealth, promoting economic development and advancing the political 
interests of the state overseas are the three ways that the accomplishment of the 
NOCs objectives are measured. More often than not these roles of the NOCs can 
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be affected by exogenous and endogenous factors. However, most often, the 
divergence between these factors is blurred.149  
 
IOCs main objectives are usually to maximize and grow profits, while NOCs have 
many objectives. These objectives might include:  
 to maximise and grow profits;   
 to provide a major portion of the government budget, for example, Mexico, 
Venezuela, India, Nigeria, and Algeria; 
• to subsidize domestic fuel, for example, Venezuela and Iran;  
• to provide employment and social programmes  employment, for example, 
Venezuela; 
• to serve as an implementing government agent, for example, Venezuela;  
• to provide “energy security” for the state, for example, Brazil; 
• to pursue foreign policies targets of the government, for example, Russia; 
and 
• to extend the lifetime of the petroleum resources, for example, Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia.150 
 
Therefore, determining the objectives of the NOC becomes the most crucial 
question that governments face, as this will be connected to the overall petroleum 
policy and legal framework that will guide the NOCs in carrying out its 
objectives.151 Olorunfemi observed that the NOCs evolved through two phases. In 
the first phase, NOCs were seen as instruments of government policy, that was 
used to establish the government sovereignty over its petroleum resources and 
help extend the benefits of the exploitation of its natural resources while the 
second stage evidenced the period when the NOCs changed structurally and were 
involved in integration and diversification into the global petroleum market.152 
Arguably, this evolution can be said to have affected the objectives of the NOCs. 
Accordingly, Commercial and non-commercial objectives are usually the main 
categories of NOC objectives. Although there are common objectives that most 
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NOCs share, there still exist differences in the objectives set out by some 
governments for their NOCs. As the primary tool or in combination with other 
policy tools, NOCs are usually used to accomplish a broad range of objectives set 
out by the government.153   
 
In assessing some governments and their NOCs Thurber came up with this table. 
Table 2: 
 
Source: culled from Thurber.154 
 
Attention must be paid to the positions of NNPC and Equinor (Statoil) in this table. 
As these two NOCs mirror two different outcomes on the table. Consequently, 
establishing that they are  at polar ends of the table, one with a negative low 
outcome and the other with a definite high outcome.  
 
African NOCs have usually promised more commercial activities. However, they 
have shown little or no evidence of achieving this, unlike the NOCs in the Middle 
East, who are even getting into the trading market as a means of expanding their 
commercial activities.155 For most NOCs the roles and responsibilities are usually 
set by their governments. These roles intertwine with the set objectives, bearing 
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in mind that these objectives set by the government can afford an observer an 
understanding of what the government sets out to achieve with the NOC. For this 
study, these objectives set out for a NOC will be categorised under commercial 
and non-commercial objectives. 
 
 
3.3.3.1 Commercial Objectives 
 
During the period when petroleum-producing countries decided to establish NOCs, 
the primary thought and expectation were that these NOCs would one day emulate 
and offset, or even replace the commercial roles played by the IOCs.156 Although 
it has been challenging to access the data that shows the level of NOCs efficiency, 
although some theoretical, analytical work, anecdotal evidence and empirical 
works of Hartley and Medlock, Victor, and Mcpherson, suggest that the NOCs have 
not done well commercially or at least in comparison to the IOCs.157  
 
Be that as it may, it will be wrong to generalize, because some NOCs, to some 
extent have done well in various commercial endeavours. In light of this study, 
the second NOC to be considered in terms of upstream commercial activity has 
little or no commercial activity. The research seeks to find an answer to the poor 
performance of NNPC and contends that pursuing a more commercial role would 
lead to a better performance from the NOC. When it comes to commercial roles, 
and the ability of the NOC to be an operator of large-scale upstream fields, Equinor 
of Norway is a top example. At the same time, the NNPC example of a commercial 
role is one of a non-operating, primary equity holder in a joint venture group.158  
 
Correspondingly, Mcpherson in his work identified some reforms introduced to 
improve NOC commercial performance which include: upstream capacity building 
and corporatization progress; bench-marking against private sector performance; 
introduction of competition; divestiture of non-core functions; joint venturing with 
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the IOCs; partial privatization through listing on stock exchanges; and sector-wide 
reform and restructuring.159 All these are great ideas, but one must realise that 
for all these to be achieved, the government has to support these NOC goals as 
the government dictates these objectives of the NOCs. 
 
Therefore, the opportunity to assist the government in developing a particular 
understanding of the petroleum industry so that it is able to control the operations 
of the IOCs is another crucial objective of a NOC.160 When a NOCs is to become a 
commercial player in the international petroleum industry, funding becomes the 
main issue.161 The petroleum industry is a very capital-intensive industry; as a 
result, NOCs select the options that best suit them when participating in the 
industry, by equity participation and NOC borrowing which are ways in which the 
NOC participates in the petroleum industry.162 NOCs usually seek to reduce their 
exposure to the petroleum industry, hence the choice of opting for joint ventures 
with IOCs bearing the costs and funding the projects.163  
 
In some countries, their petroleum laws provide that the NOCs take on the 
responsibilities of the operator in the oil fields. In contrast, some laws mandate it 
to become an operator, while others provide a vaguely phrased mandate, thus 
leading to ambiguity in the definition of the roles of the NOCs.164 In today’s 
international petroleum industry, there seems to be a call for more commercial 
NOCs, owing to the low oil price, and other industry elements. The argument 
towards a commercial NOCs was captured aptly by EY Global oil and gas Leader 
Adi Karev: 
 
The case for NOC transformation is clear. The coming years will be 
defining for the NOCs as they progress to become “commercial 
NOCs,” fully embracing the need to embark on the capital 
transformation.165   
 
 
159 Charles Mcpherson in Andreas Goldthau (n 96) 147. 
160 See Leslie E Grayson (n 1) 8 – 13. 
161 Ibid (n 1) 148. 
162 Ibid., Leslie Grayson (n 1) 148. 
163 Charles Mcpherson in Andreas Goldthau (n. 96) 148. 
164 Valérie Marcel, 'The Cost Of An Emerging National Oil Company' [2016] Chatham House - The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs. 
165 See Adi Karev, 'Why National Oil Companies Need To Transform' (EY, 2018) <https://www.ey.com/en_gl/oil-
gas/why-national-oil-companies-need-to-transform> accessed 13 December 2019. 
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He went on state that there is need for proper management of the revenues from 
petroleum resources at this period of downturn in the international petroleum 
industry, especially concerning developing petroleum-rich countries with NOCs, 
that are heavily dependent on petroleum revenues.166 The consequences could 
affect government budgets, sovereign investment, economic development 
incentives, and critically on subsidy support and social welfare programmes.167 
Expressively, these petroleum-rich states benchmark most of the government 
expenditure on the price of oil. It is therefore reliant on global petroleum market 
forces for its internal spending. For example, the Nigerian government uses the 
price of oil as a benchmark for the national budget.168 This benchmarking on the 
oil price can be observed in Saudi Arabia.169 
 
 
3.3.3.2 Non-Commercial Objectives 
 
NOCs role in the future of the global petroleum industry, especially the non-
commercial objectives, is one that is not so clear. Analysts’ opinions of this have 
differed, from the view that NOCs are inefficient and corrupt to the other view that 
the NOC is in a transformation stage and will become a competitive power to be 
reckoned with.170 Accordingly, some of these non-commercial objectives could 
include wealth redistribution, industrialisation, economic development and energy 
security.171 In balancing the roles of a NOC, these objectives could also help one 
see the vital role NOCs play in a state and global petroleum industry. It, therefore, 




168 See '2020 Budget: FG Maintains Benchmark In Spite Increase In Oil Price' (Punch Newspapers, 2020) 
<https://punchng.com/2020-budget-fg-maintains-benchmark-in-spite-increase-in-oil-price/> accessed 16 March 
2020. 
169 See Abeer Abu Omar, 'Saudi Arabia isn’t Counting On An Oil Price Rise In 2020 Budget' (World Oil, 2020) 
<https://www.worldoil.com/news/2019/12/10/saudi-arabia-isn-t-counting-on-an-oil-price-rise-in-2020-budget> 
accessed 16 March 2020. 
170 See, Andrew C. Inkpen and Michael H Moffett (n 32) 16; Andrew Cheon, Maureen Lackner, and Johannes 
Urpelainen (n 68). 
171 The Changing Role of National Oil Companies in International Energy Markets' (n 17). See also Miranda L. 
Wainberg, Dmitry Volkov and Michelle M. Foss, 'Commercial Frameworks For National Oil Companies' [2007] 
Centre for Energy Economics - Working paper 
<http://www.usaee.org/usaee2007/submissions/OnlineProceedings/CEE_National_Oil_Company_USAEE_PDF
%203.pdf> accessed 8 November 2019. 
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level and also the ability to maximise the value obtainable from their oil resources 
are interfered with by the firms’ non-commercial objectives.172 
 
The way events unfolded in the 1970s, and the importance that was attributed to 
the control of petroleum resources, makes one wonder why these strategies that 
have helped individual nations in achieving excellence in the exploitation of its 
petroleum resources have not been replicated in resource-rich developing 
countries.173 The domestic objectives are set by the governments, these are 
usually susceptible to change over time, and the range of these objectives could 
sometimes be contradictory.174 The objectives set out by the governments of 
Norway and Nigeria will be critically examined in Chapter 6, and also the fulfilment 
of the set objectives.  
 
A NOC that is competent and has a good governance process perhaps will be 
better than allowing the petroleum industry to be controlled by IOCs. However,  
many negative remarks has been made against the NOCs, from their inefficiencies 
to corruption.175 In the same light, some NOCs have been applauded in the way 
they go about their business, whether within their borders or outside.176 
 
It is often anticipated that in a petroleum resource-rich developing state with a 
NOC, that the goals and objectives would lead to better benefits for the people of 
the state. It has not been so, because some petroleum resource-rich state frontier 
countries, still have citizens living in poverty.177 Many debates on the development 
of petroleum, especially in Africa is always linked with corruption, poor 
governance, human rights abuse and violent conflict.178 So, petroleum 
nationalisation has not lived up to expectations, and the role of the NOC in this 
 
172 Ibid. 
173 See Kameel I.F. Khan, National Oi Companies: Form, structure, accountability and Control in Khan (ed) (n 
50) 187-188. 
174 Ibid. 
175 See Valérie Marcel and John V Mitchell (n 3) 2 – 3. 
176 See Paul Stevens (n 43). 
177 See Cyril I. Obi, 'Oil and Development in Africa: Some Lessons from the Oil Factor in Nigeria for the Sudan' 
(Research Gate, 2007) 
<https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Cyril_Obi/publication/265568602_Oil_AnD_DevelOpment_in_AfricA_S
Ome_leSSOnS_frOm_the_Oil_fActOr_in_nigeriA_fOr_the_SuDAn/links/560018aa08ae07629e52842c.pdf> 
accessed 2 March 2018 
178 Ibid. 
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has been conflicting, many governments using the NOCs as a de facto treasury.179 
For example, nearly all NOCs exist to control and manage the petroleum-rich 
country's resources, on the other hand, NOCs from petroleum resource-poor 
countries like India and China exist to manage the energy security needs of their 
particular countries, this then demonstrates that the roles assigned to these NOCs 
will differ. The NOCs structure or form will be different.180 
 
Therefore, for there to be clarity of goals and objectives, it is essential to have a 
strong separation of functions and responsibilities as epitomised in the Norwegian 
petroleum industry where the ‘policy-making’, ‘strategy-making’, ‘operational 
decision-making’, and monitoring-regulation are distinguished.181 Of course some 
NOCs have been known to be well run and profitable. For example, Equinor of 
Norway is considered to be one of the best NOCs in the Global oil and gas industry, 
also other NOCs like Petronas and Petrobras have received high commendation on 
the way they are run.182   
 
Although the roles and responsibilities of the NOCs are non-exhaustive Mcpherson 
advanced a list of NOC roles and responsibilities as follows; commercial participant 
and revenue generator, sector regulator and overseer,183 a promoter of national 
capacity,184 development agency,185 fiscal and financial agent,186 an instrument of 
foreign policy.187 Generally, NOCs are assigned the role industry regulator. It is 
expected that the NOC will be familiar with the petroleum industry, have a superior 
technical capacity, and preferential access to information.188 Nevertheless, it is 
 
179 Oil revenues represented about 60% of the GDP and more than 90% of hard currency earnings in Nigeria. See 
Andrew C. Inkpen and Michael H Moffett (n 32) 15. 
180 See Andrew C. Inkpen and Michael H Moffett (n 32) 55. 
181 Bianca Sarbu (n 58) 24 – 25. 
182 See, Andrew C. Inkpen and Michael H Moffett (n 32) 15. 
183 Charles Mcpherson in Andreas Goldthau (n 96) 148 – 149.  
184 Charles Mcpherson in Andreas Goldthau (n 96) 149. 
185 As a development agent, that means the NOC is expected to engage in non-commercial activities, like social 
infrastructure obligations – schools, hospitals, roads, and bridges. This expectation on the NOC will be higher 
especially if the NOCs commercial activities do not involve the actual exploration and production activities, but 
the act more like rent collector from the activities of the IOCs in its territory.  
Charles Mcpherson in Andreas Goldthau (n 96) 150. 
186 As stated earlier, NOCs that do not get involved in the exploration and production in its oil and gas sector, are 
usually reduced to being a tax collector, or rather having the main responsibility of assessment and collection of 
royalties. Charles Mcpherson in Andreas Goldthau (n 96) 150. 
187 See Charles Mcpherson in Andreas Goldthau (n 96) 151. See also Hongyi Lai, Sarah O'Hara and Karolina 
Wysoczanska n 141.;  Seyed Kamran Bagheri and Alberto Di Minin n 4; and Alan H Gelb, Oil Windfalls: Blessing 
Or Curse (Oxford University Press 1988) 3. 
188 Charles Mcpherson in Andreas Goldthau (n 96) 148 – 149. 
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arguable that some NOCs, especially in a petroleum-rich state, do not have the 
above qualities. However, they are considered to be the regulators of the 
petroleum industry in that state. As a regulator, the responsibilities will include: 
making sure of compliance with sector legal, contractual, and regulatory 
obligations; critical policy functions, input to the drafting of sector legislation and 
regulations; collection and maintenance of industry technical and contractual 
data; oversight of procurement; and cost or "value for money" audits. Usually, 
conflicts will arise in carrying out these responsibilities, and especially when the 
NOC is involved in commercial activities. 
 
As the NOC builds, it owns the internal capacity; in turn, it is expected to promote 
and develop a broad national petroleum sector capacity.189 Usually, the first task 
should be building its technical capacity. The example of productive capacity 
building using the private sector as Shell Petroleum Development Corporation 
(SPDC) in Nigeria which is almost staffed on every level by Nigerians, is worth 
applauding, but why shouldn't such examples of success be associated with the 
NNPC, as development is expected to be on a national level.190 
 
Petroleum importing countries like China, India and South Korea usually persuade 
their NOCs to acquire petroleum assets abroad in a bid to guarantee steady 
petroleum supply or import into its parent state.191 Presumably, this is a rational 
policy that ensures energy security for petroleum importing countries. In like 
manner, this study research seeks to understand the different views of the NOCs 
as commercial players. Over the years, there have been arguments for and against 
this. This study believes that the commercial role of a NOC over time can be the 





The initial establishment of NOCs by western European countries after the oil 
embargo of 1973, was for the governments through their NOCs to gain knowledge 
 
189 Charles Mcpherson in Andreas Goldthau (n 96) 149. 
190 Ibid. 
191 See Seyed Kamran Bagheri and Alberto Di Minin n 4. See also Alan H Gelb (n 182) 3. 
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about the petroleum industry. Norway and Nigeria exemplify two extremes of a 
public policy choice when managing their natural resources: to consume for the 
benefit of the present generation or invest or save for the benefit of future 
generations.192  
 
Following the discussions in this chapter, a pattern emerges whenever a country 
discovers abundant petroleum resources. The need for the government to control 
the exploitation of these resources becomes paramount. This usually follows the 
establishment of a separate government entity that through it, the government 
will exert control. Correspondingly, these governments establish their national oil 
companies. This was observed with the Norwegian and British government. 
Professor Kemp in his work on the North Sea oil and gas industry observed that 
the British government needed to control and influence the activities of BNOC, 
albeit covertly, so as not to go against the international obligations, particularly 
under the Treaty of Rome.193  
 
The reasons for establishing a NOC might vary from state to state, but the main 
aim of the state is to have control over the petroleum resources. Whether the 
state is an exporting or importing state, the drive to have a separate government 
entity that secures these resources or ensures the proper exploitation of the 
petroleum resources is one that has been evidenced by the history of the global 
petroleum industry. Thus, the importance of a NOC to date is immense. As of 
2017, NOCs control assets valued at over three trillion dollars, thus making them 
considerable players in public financial management, globally and within their 
states as they are critical players in the global petroleum industry, and also play 
huge roles in their home-country economies.194 
 
These analyses show that governments always have a strong role to play in the 
exploitation of natural resources. Although some might relinquish their role to the 
private sector later on, for the formative years of the petroleum industry in most 
countries, the government has a dominant role to play. Importantly, NOC as the 
 
192 Andrew Bauer and Juan Carlos Quiroz in Andreas Goldthau (n 96) 256. See also, Per Heum and others n 100. 
193 See Alexander G Kemp (n 89) 341 – 343.  
194 See The National Oil Company Database: Report (National Oil Company Database, 2019) 
<https://www.nationaloilcompanydata.org/api/publications/content/NFInSnhdYNC4ntCohaYqok1u2jHAG4vvL
XK1jwrL.pdf> accessed 25 June 2019. 
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tool for achieving the goals of the state towards the beneficial exploitation of its 
resources is indispensable. NOCs activities influence domestic development 
through its impact on macroeconomic management, investment and overall 
governance and stability, and in like manner how well a NOC performs not only 
affect its domestic economy, it also has significant ramifications on international 
energy supply and security.195  
 
The theme of the argument for maintaining a NOC is drawn from the analysis of 
this chapter. Historical support was received from the works analysed. The 
subsequent chapters will continue in like manner, but the narrower analysis will 
be carried out on the Norwegian and Nigerian upstream industry. The analysis in 
this chapter goes to show the need for an entity that can be used to exert control 
over the petroleum resources. For a developing country, the importance of a NOC 
as a tool of the government to exert its authority over its resources is vital. 
  
Mommer remarked that today, NOCs can be transformed into new liberal licensing, 
and contracting agencies, which was contrary to their duties in the past where 
they were used as rent collecting agents of the state or ‘landlord state’ as Mommer 
calls them.196 However, nationalisation expanded the role of NOCs 
tremendously.197 Although today some of these NOCs in petroleum-rich states, 
especially the developing ones, still limit their NOCs to petroleum-rent collectors. 
 
It is pertinent to state that historical experience in Norway and Nigeria reflect the 
policy paradigms, which are generally tailored to the commitment to Western 
liberal ideas and constitution, arguably Norway in more ways than Nigeria.198 
Critical analysis of the paths these governments chose can be said to be the 
government's generalized perspectives and corresponding strategy rules as a 
government reaction to the new problem.199  
 
 
195 Charles Mcpherson in Andreas Goldthau (n 96) 146. See Leonardo Maugeri, 'Oil: The Next Revolution' [2012] 
The Geopolitics of Energy Project <http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/Oil-
%20The%20Next%20Revolution.pdf> accessed 8 November 2018.  
196 Bernard Mommer (n 89) 183. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Svein S Andersen (n 66) 14. 
199 Ibid. 
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One might say that Norway pursued Western liberal ideas, but the form of control 
exerted by its government on the petroleum industry did not depict a liberal policy 
path. More attention should be paid to the petroleum industry policies and legal 
frameworks, especially for a developing petroleum-rich country because 
appropriate policies will help the government optimize the benefits of these 
resources.200 The impact of the petroleum policies and legal frameworks of Norway 
and Nigeria will be examined in subsequent chapters.  
 
Finally, for all the commentary that the NOC model is not the best option for a 
petroleum-rich state, this work seeks to argue against that. The history of the 
global petroleum industry proves otherwise. The argument that the days of NOCs 
as tools of government control of natural resources are numbered is one of the 
debates. The thesis argues that NOCs are still as relevant as they were years ago, 
and they have the potential to be the critical government entity that could assist 
any state primarily a petroleum-rich developing one to reap the benefits of its 
petroleum resources. Chapters 4 and 5 will critically analyse the theories of 
resource nationalism and resource curse that impact the management of 
petroleum resources by a NOC, thereby linking the theoretical concepts of this 
study with the arguments of maintaining a NOC. 
 
200 Alexander G. Kemp, 'Petroleum Policy Issues In Developing Countries' (1992) 20 Energy Policy. 
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4.1 Introduction  
 
Natural resources should be used for the good of the whole nation, not for a select 
group as these resources are the wealth of the nation.1 Building on this, a nation 
cannot boast of being rich with petroleum resources and yet have the majority of 
its population living in poverty. It is expected that when a state is rich in petroleum 
resources, this will translate to a good standard of living for the citizens of that 
state. Sadly, as has been identified by numerous studies, and investigations, in 
reality, it is not usually the case.2 
 
A substantial petroleum resource strategy is what that should be demanded of 
every government from the people of the state, as these natural resources are for 
the good of the people. Hence they need to be observant of the way the petroleum 
revenues are being used by the government.3 The government should be held 
accountable for the outcomes of natural resource exploitation as these resources 
are usually, entrusted into the hands of the government by the people, who 
elected the government officials into office. Bear in mind that this viewpoint comes 
into play if the state is a democratic one. These days the relationship between the 
extraction of petroleum resources and economic development is far from 
straightforward because some of these petroleum-rich developing states are 
marked by economic and political dysfunction. Where Norway is usually cited as a 
prominent exception, Nigeria, on the other hand, is a notable example.4 
 
 
1 Charles Mcpherson and World Bank Group, 'National oil companies evolution, issues, Outlook national oil 
companies workshop current roles and future prospects' (World Bank Washington D.C. 2003). 
2 See Marcus Power, 'Angola 2025: The Future Of The “World's Richest Poor Country” As Seen Through A 
Chinese Rear-View Mirror' (2011) 44 Antipode 993. 
3 Robert F. Buchanan and Syed Tariq Anwar, 'Resource Nationalism And The Changing Business Model For 
Global Oil' (2009) 10 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 241. 
4 See Natalie Koch and Tom Perreault, 'Resource Nationalism' [2018] Progress in Human Geography 1-21 and 
Nna Emeka J. Wokoro, 'Beyond Petroleum Production To Community Development: International Oil Companies 
As Proxy Governments' (2009) 5 Texas Journal of Oil, Gas, and Energy Law 323. 
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The core ideology behind resource nationalism is that the natural resources should 
be used for the good of the nation as a whole, rather than for private or a 
privileged group in the nation.5 Thus, many commentators hold the view that 
resource nationalism should not be a medium for enrichment for government 
officials and elite groups. Instead, it should be used for the national development 
and the benefit of all the citizens of the nation.6 Pryke contends that regardless of 
the arguments against resource nationalism, the phenomenon should be situated 
within the arc of national development.7 Rosales claimed that the notion of 
national development played an important role in driving resource nationalism.8 
Therefore the potential of “positive” resource nationalism deserves to be 
recognised in the context of wealth distribution and national development.9 
 
This chapter attempts to establish the resource nationalism phenomenon in the 
global petroleum industry, and the continuous role NOCs play in achieving the 
economic development of a state through their petroleum resources. This chapter 
starts by conceptualising and defining resource nationalism and attempts to 
critically analyse the view of resource nationalism and offers a different dimension 
on the perspective of resource nationalism. The analysis will be done within the 
context of a developed and developing state while bringing concepts of ownership 
 
5 David R. Mares, 'Oil Policy Reform In Resource Nationalist States: Lessons For Mexico' (The Future of Oil in 
Mexico James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, 2011) 
<https://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/91374/EF-pub-MaresLessons-04292011.pdf?sequence=1> 
accessed 8 August 2018. See also Natalie Koch and Tom Perreault (n 4). 
6 See Rasmus Hundsbæk Pedersen and others, 'Mining-Sector Dynamics In An Era Of Resurgent Resource 
Nationalism: Changing Relations Between Large-Scale Mining And Artisanal And Small-Scale Mining In 
Tanzania' (2019) 62 Resources Policy 339; Orhon Myadar and Sara Jackson, 'Contradictions Of Populism And 
Resource Extraction: Examining The Intersection Of Resource Nationalism And Accumulation By Dispossession 
In Mongolia' (2019) 109 Annals of the American Association of Geographers 361; Ekim Arbatli, 'Resource 
Nationalism Revisited: A New Conceptualization In Light Of Changing Actors And Strategies In The Oil Industry' 
(2018) 40 Energy Research & Social Science 2214; Thabit Jacob and Rasmus Hundsbæk Pedersen, 'New 
Resource Nationalism? Continuity And Change In Tanzania’S Extractive Industries' (2018) 5 The Extractive 
Industries and Society 287 and Guillaume Fontaine, José Luis Fuentes and Iván Narváez, 'Policy Mixes Against 
Oil Dependence: Resource Nationalism, Layering And Contradictions In Ecuador’s Energy Transition' (2019) 47 
Energy Research & Social Science 56. 
7 Sam Pryke, 'Explaining Resource Nationalism' (2017) 8 Global Policy 474. Further, Tugendhat and Hamilton in 
assessing the importance of petroleum to development expressed: 
Developments have taken much of the bloom of youth away from oil just as they have taken 
much of glamour from the oil industry. During the coming years, both will be subject to 
increasing pressures and restrictions as the questions of internationalism versus nationalism 
grow more intense.  
See Christopher Tugendhat and Adrian Hamilton, Oil The Biggest Business (Eyre Methuen Ltd 1975) 382. 
8 Antulio Rosales, 'Contentious Nationalization And The Embrace Of The Developmental Ideals: Resource 
Nationalism In The 1970S In Ecuador' (2017) 4 The Extractive Industries and Society 102.  
9 Misheelt Ganbold and Saleem H. Ali, 'The Peril And Promise Of Resource Nationalism: A Case Analysis Of 
Mongolia's Mining Development' (2017) 53 Resources Policy 1. 
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and control into the analysis. The increasing influence and essential role of NOCs 
in this, and the change in ways which resource nationalism are expressed today, 
from broad nationalisation to regulatory control.10  Some 1970s works on resource 
nationalism were centred on the cyclical price of petroleum and resource 
nationalism,11 in contrast, some recent works focused on historical elements,12 
institutions,13 and the politics of identity and social justice.14  
 
This chapter seeks to examine the debates about resource nationalism by 
establishing the phenomenon in a resource-rich developing state like Nigeria and 
a resource-rich developed state like Norway. The in-depth analysis of these 
countries experience in the ownership and control of their resources through 
regulatory control will be analysed in the following chapter. Reflecting on resource 
nationalism from a historical perspective will assist the study in understanding 
what initially prompted the select countries to adopt policies and legislations of 
resource nationalism. Nevertheless, the capability of some countries to convert 
resource nationalism to economic development in its petroleum industry continues 






10 Petroleum resources are a well-recognised major source of rent and powerful diplomatic weapon, as a 
consequence there is no surprise that resource-rich governments will keep adopting new strategies in exercising 
its control over this important tool in its possession. See Ekim Arbatli n 6 and Thabit Jacob and Rasmus Hundsbæk 
Pedersen n 6. 
11 Vlado Vivoda, 'Resource Nationalism, Bargaining And International Oil Companies: Challenges And Change 
In The New Millennium' (2009) 14 New Political Economy 517. 
12 Ian Bremmer and Robert Johnston, 'The Rise And Fall Of Resource Nationalism' (2009) 51 Survival. Also, 
Vugar Gojayev, 'Resource Nationalism Trends In Azerbaijan, 2004 - 2009' [2010] RUSSCASP and Stefan 
Andreasson, 'Varieties Of Resource Nationalism In Sub-Saharan Africa's Energy And Minerals Markets' (2015) 
2 The Extractive Industries and Society 310. 
13 Jeffrey D. Wilson, 'Understanding resource nationalism: Economic dynamics and political institutions' (2015) 
21(4) Contemporary Politics 399. 
14 Siri Lange and Abel Kinyondo, 'Resource Nationalism And Local Content In Tanzania: Experiences From 
Mining And Consequences For The Petroleum Sector' (2016) 3 The Extractive Industries and Society 1095. 
15 Theoretically, resource nationalism that occurred in the middle of 2000s was expected to provide new 
opportunities for a more advantageous use of petroleum resources for development. See Paul A. Haslam and Pablo 
Heidrich, From Neoliberalism to Resource Nationalism in Paul Alexander Haslam and Pablo Heidrich, The 
Political Economy Of Natural Resources And Development (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 2016) 4-5.  
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4.2 Reviewing the meaning of Resource Nationalism in the Context of 
the Petroleum Sector  
 
Joffe et al. claimed that the first documented action of resource nationalism was 
in 1938, in Mexico, soon followed by Venezuela, and after that the wave moved 
on to the Middle East with Iran’s nationalisation of its properties in an attempt to 
wrestle control from British Petroleum.16 Morse contended that before Mexico’s oil 
nationalisation, the first significant incident of petroleum nationalisation was the 
Bolshevik Revolution of 191717 in Russia.18   
 
As the global petroleum industry continued to grow, so did the dissatisfaction with 
the terms of petroleum concessions following World War II concurrently with the 
globally rising demand of petroleum, and the emphasis on national sovereignty 
over natural resources by a United Nations declaration set the conditions for a 
new era in the global petroleum industry.19 The creation of OPEC in 1960 
evidenced this new petroleum development era20 and the establishment of NOCs 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s were vital developments which changed the 
balance of power between IOCs and governments in favour of the latter in the 
global petroleum industry.21  
 
 
16 George Joffe and others, 'Expropriation Of Oil And Gas Investments: Historical, Legal And Economic 
Perspectives In A New Age Of Resource Nationalism' (2009) 2 The Journal of World Energy Law & Business 3. 
See also Bernard Mommer, Global Oil And The Nation State (Oxford University Press 2002) 65-84, and Noel 
Maurer, 'The Empire Struck Back: Sanctions And Compensation In The Mexican Oil Expropriation Of 1938' 
(2011) 71 The Journal of Economic History 590; Antulio Rosales n 8. 
17 See Simon Cosgrove, 'Russia In Revolution. An Empire In Crisis, 1890–1928; The Russian Revolution, 1905–
1921' (2019) 71 Europe-Asia Studies 513; 'Russian Revolution' (History.com, 2009) 
<https://www.history.com/topics/russia/russian-revolution> accessed 25 June 2019 and 'Russian Revolution | 
Definition, Causes, Summary, History, & Facts' (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019) 
<https://www.britannica.com/event/Russian-Revolution-of-1917> accessed 25 June 2019. 
18 Edward L. Morse, 'A New Political Economy Of Oil?' (1999) 53 Journal of International Affairs. 
19 Ekim Arbatli n 6. See also Paul Domjam and Matt Stone, ‘A Comparative Study of Resource Nationalism in 
Russia and Kazakhstan 2004 – 2008’ (2010) Europe-Asia Studies 35; Paul Stevens, 'National oil companies and 
international oil companies in the middle east: Under the shadow of government and the resource nationalism 
cycle' (2008) 1(1) The Journal of World Energy Law & Business 5; Sam Pryke n 7. 
20 See Bernard Mommer, 'The Political Role Of National Oil Companies In Exporting Countries: The Venezuelan 
Case' [1994] Oxford Institute for Energy Studies and James Bamberg, British Petroleum And The Political 
Economy Of International Oil (Cambridge University Press 2000) 143 – 151. 
21 See Giacomo Luciani, 'Global Oil Supplies: The Impact Of Resource Nationalism And Political Instability' 
[2011] SSRN Electronic Journal. See also Bernard Mommer, 'The Governance Of International Oil: The Changing 
Rules Of The Game' [2000] Oxford Institute for Energy Studies; Valérie Marcel and John V Mitchell, Oil Titans: 
National Oil Companies in the Middle East (Chatham House 2006) 34-36; Daniel Hellinger, Resource 
Nationalism and the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela in Paul Alexander Haslam and Pablo Heidrich (n 15) 
204 – 217. 
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The norm in the global petroleum industry then was state ownership and 
establishment of NOCs. The relationship between the host governments and IOCs 
was confrontational and antagonistic.22 For instance, events from the 
nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian oil company in 1951 which brought about the 
refusal of the company and the government of Britain of an equal distribution of 
tax revenue between the Iranian government and the British government. The 
coming of power of Colonel Qaddafi in 1969 and his stance on IOCs operating in 
Libya, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resource nationalism that occurred 
in South American countries like Venezuela and Bolivia are further examples.23 
 
The campaign against IOCs by petroleum exporting states was led by Libya.24 
Colonel Qaddafi seized power from King Idris in 1969, and Bamberg commented 
that this event transformed the political landscape of the global petroleum 
industry.25 Resultantly, these events gave rise to resource nationalism in the 
global petroleum industry.26 The IOCs started losing their remaining petroleum 
concessions in OPEC countries; for example, Saudi Arabia took a 60% share in 
Aramco in June 1974 and settled the terms of full nationalisation in 1976.27 Iraq 
nationalised its remaining private interests which included BP’s 23¾%  in the 
Basra Petroleum Company in December 1975.28 Nigeria raised its participation to 
55% in 1974; and Libya depending on the circumstances of the IOCs which had 
stood out against the nationalisation decree of September 1973, took either 51% 
or 100%.29 
 
However, Arbatli observed that from the mid-1980s there was an evident decline 
in resource nationalism, and thus the relationship between the host government 
changed from confrontational to mostly cooperative.30 This lasted for the next two 
decades. Taking into consideration these developments, petroleum industry 
 
22 See Ekim Arbatli n 6; Paul Stevens n 19; James D. Fry and ElFadil Ibrahim, 'Reassessing Venezuela's Organic 
Hydrocarbon Law: A Balance Between Sovereignty And Efficiency?' (2013) 6 The Journal of World Energy Law 
& Business 234; Kameel I.F. Khan, National Oil Companies: Form, structure, accountability and Control in Khan 
(ed), Petroleum Resources And Development (Belhaven 1988) 185-186. 
23 See Giacomo Luciani n 21. 
24 See James Bamberg (n 20) 450 - 466.  
25 Ibid. 




30 See Ekim Arbatli n 6. 
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expropriations were brought to a halt between 1986 and 2005, as developing 
countries were believed to be sufficiently institutionalised to exercise regulatory 
control over their petroleum resources, rather than resorting to costly and risky 
methods of expropriation.31 Although this was the general behaviour in some 
petroleum-rich countries things were different, for instance in Venezuela.32  
 
The change in energy policies, disputably not the only reason, was attributed to 
the rise of production from non-OPEC countries, and the move away from the 
ideology of state control as the best petroleum policy towards a more market or 
liberal form of managing the petroleum production.33 Further, as per the 
Washington consensus, the need to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) into a 
state’s petroleum sector became the industry convention.34 Moreover, as a 
package of economic reforms related to the neoliberal agenda, privatisation 





32 See Clifford Krauss, 'Conocophillips Wins $2 Billion Ruling Over Venezuelan Seizure' (The New York Times, 
2020) <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/25/business/energy-environment/conocophillips-venezuela-
ruling.html> accessed 17 March 2020. See also, 'U.S. Glass Firm Sues Venezuela To Collect $500 Million 
Expropriation Award' (Reuters, 2020) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-owens-venezuela-lawsuit/u-s-glass-
firm-sues-venezuela-to-collect-500-million-expropriation-award-idUSKCN1Q1061> accessed 17 March 2020. 
33 See Ekim Arbatli n 6. See also Roland Dannreuther, Geopolitics and International Relations of Resources in 
Wojciech Ostrowski and Roland Dannreuther (eds), Global Resources Conflict And Cooperation (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2013) 86-88. 
34 Ibid. 
35 The ‘Washington Consensus’ albeit coined by John Williamson refers to the development strategies that focus 
on privatisation, liberalisation and price stability. Often referred to as ‘neoliberal’ policies because of the emphasis 
on liberalisation and because of the 19th Century liberalism, which stressed the need for minimal state role. These 
strategies were believed to be the most likely way to promote development in the world’s poorest countries. These 
policies were recommended by Washington-based International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and the US Treasury 
in 1989. Albeit, it was aimed at the Latin American poor countries, the oversimplified rendition of these policy 
recommendation was carried out especially during the period of the 1980s and early 1990s. See Joseph E Stiglitz, 
‘Is there a Post-Washington Consensus Consensus?’ in Narcís Serra and Joseph E Stiglitz (eds), The Washington 
Consensus Reconsidered: Towards A New Global Governance (Oxford University Press 2008) 41. 
See also John Williamson, ‘A Short History of the Washington Consensus’ in Narcís Serra and Joseph E Stiglitz 
(eds), The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards A New Global Governance (Oxford University Press 
2008) 14-27; John Willaimson, 'The Strange History Of The Washington Consensus' (2004) 27 Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics 195; Charles Gore, 'The Rise And Fall Of The Washington Consensus As A Paradigm For 
Developing Countries' (2000) 28 World Development 789; John Williamson, 'Democracy And The “Washington 
Consensus”' (1993) 21 World Development 1329; Moisés Naím, 'Washington Consensus Or Washington 
Confusion?' [2000] Foreign Policy 86 and John Williamson, 'What Should The World Bank Think About The 
Washington Consensus?' (2000) 15 The World Bank Research Observer 251. 
36 Jomo K. S., ‘A Critical Review of the Evolving Privatization Debate’ in Gérard Roland (Editor), Privatization: 
Successes And Failures (Columbia University Press 2008) 199-201. See also Paul Stevens and others, Conflict 
And Coexistence In The Extractive Industries (Chatham House 2013) 18-20. 
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Vernon asserted that as per the ’obsolescing bargain’, petroleum exporting 
countries no longer need IOCs as the source of capital, as the revenue from the 
sale of crude was already giving these countries a sense of independence and the 
access to technology for the exploitation of the petroleum resources which can be 
obtained from the growing number of independent oil companies.37 This situation 
might be exact in some petroleum exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia and 
Russia. However, in other exporting countries such as Nigeria and Angola, it can 
still be argued that they rely to a great extent on the IOCs for capital, technology 
and the exploitation of the petroleum resources.38 
 
With the strategic position of NOCs in the global petroleum industry, it is not 
clear in which direction the global petroleum industry will move.39 Naná de Graaf 
put forward some perspectives on the shape the global energy order will take 
and stated: 
…an unidirectional shift towards either a more state-dominated 
energy sector nor towards a liberalized global free market 
exclusively dictated by private forces, or towards an increasingly 
energy order in which all kinds of statist, private, and hybrid 
alliances & coalitions of interest mix in the competition over 
resources, but which remains wedded to a system of states with 
distinct and at times conflicting interests and strategies and thus 
with an ever present geopolitical dimension underneath.40  
 
As in all the proposed direction the global energy industry could take, it is evident 
that the roles played by the NOC, state and IOCs remain significant, thus possibly, 
giving the NOC a lasting role in the global energy order. Studies have shown that 
today the global petroleum industry is dominated by NOCs and important ones 
that leave their borders and are commercial.41 At present, in the global petroleum 
 
37 See Raymond Vernon, 'Sovereignty At Bay Ten Years After' (1981) 35 International Organization 517. 
38 See Alexey Bereznoy, 'Catching-Up With Supermajors: The Technology Factor In Building The Competitive 
Power Of National Oil Companies From Developing Economies' [2018] Industry and Innovation 127 and 
Emmanuel Graham and Jesse Salah Ovadia, 'Oil Exploration And Production In Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-
Present: Trends And Developments' (2019) 6 The Extractive Industries and Society 593. 
39 See Naná de Graaff, 'The Hybridization Of The State–Capital Nexus In The Global Energy Order' (2012) 9 
Globalizations 231, and Jonah D Levy (ed), The State After Statism (Harvard University Press 2006) 3 – 7.  
40 Ibid. 
41 See Robert J. Weiner and Reid W. Click, 'Resource Nationalism Meets The Market: Political Risk And The 
Value Of Petroleum Reserves' [2009] SSRN Electronic Journal; Sajjad M. Jasimuddin and Munir Maniruzzaman, 
'Resource Nationalism Spectre Hovers Over the oil industry: The transnational Corporate Strategy to Tackle 
Resource Nationalism Risks' (2016) 32(2) Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 387; S. Guriev, A. 
Kolotilin and K. Sonin, ‘Determinants of Nationalization in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel 
Data’ (2009) 27 journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 301.  
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industry, some NOCs like Saudi Aramco are planning to go public, by offering its 
shares on the international stock market.42 Although these planned initial public 
offerings (IPOs) have not yet materialised, the mere fact that it is on the agenda 
of these NOCs shows the shape the industry could take. Therefore Naná de Graaf’s 
opinion that the petroleum industry being a mixture of state control and private 
control seems not far from the present reality of the global petroleum industry. 
 
It is generally held that in petroleum-rich developing countries, for those in favour 
of resource nationalism, it can play a major part in progressing the countries 
development objectives; thus attention needs to be paid to the role of political 
factors surrounding policy-making that influences the government decisions about 
its resources, for instance, the countries domestic political systems and 
governments’ policy objectives.43 The primary goal should be value creation for 
the people through the effective management of petroleum resources. If 
nationalist resource policies achieve these goals for the people, without any 
adverse effect on external players in the industry, as these policies are usually 
state-centric, then the government would be seen to have created value through 
petroleum resources. 
 




4.2.1 Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources  
 
When it comes to natural resource allocation, international law plays a significant 
part in shaping the underlying framework, by establishing rules under which 
nations and especially resource developing states will assert property rights over 
 
42 See 'Saudi Aramco IPO Delayed Until 2019, UK Officials Told' (Ft.com, 2018) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/62fa88b0-21f4-11e8-9a70-08f715791301> accessed 3 May 2018; 'Pemex CEO 
Says We Must Move To IPO, But Will Take Years' (Rigzone.com, 2018) 
<https://www.rigzone.com/news/wire/pemex_ceo_says_we_must_move_to_ipo_but_will_take_years-25-apr-
2018-154383-article/> accessed 3 May 2018. 
43 Jeffrey D. Wilson n 13. See also Eve Warburton, 'Resource Nationalism In Indonesia: Ownership Structures 
And Sectoral Variation In Mining And Palm Oil' (2017) 17 Journal of East Asian Studies 285. 
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natural resources.44 The concept of sovereignty has existed for centuries. 
However, the 1962 United Nations Resolution45 was the first concrete expression 
of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources which officially 
recognised the sovereign and permanent rights of people and nations over their 
natural resources, which entitled them to exercise this right of national 
development and welfare of the people of the state.46  
 
Expressively, the resolution considered the position of a more significant number 
of capital-importing, and developing countries acting on informed self-interest as 
opposed to the small voting power of the capital-exporting countries.47 It was part 
of a campaign to reinforce the economic and political sovereignty of the recently 
independent states following decolonisation.48 Nevertheless, this study is well 
aware of the debates over the interpretation49 of the principle or right of 
 
44 Richard B. Bilder, 'International Law And Natural Resources Policies' (1980) 20 Natural Resources Journal 
451. 
45 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, UNGA Res 1803 (XVII) (14 December 1962) UN Doc 
A/RES/1803. 
46 Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty Over Natural Resources (Cambridge University Press 1997) 2. Sovereignty has 
served as the foundation for international law, ever since the treaty of Augsburg 1555 and the Peace of Westphalia 
1648.  
Also, this declaration also recognised the right of any host state when it nationalises or expropriates the property 
of IOCs or foreign investors. See Yogeshi Tyagi, 'Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources' (2015) 4 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law; Emeka Duruigbo, ‘Permanent Sovereignty and 
Peoples’ Ownership of Natural Resources in International Law’ (2006) Vol 38, Issue 1 The George Washington 
International Law Review 33; John Agnew, 'Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality And State Authority In 
Contemporary World Politics' (2005) 95 Annals of the Association of American Geographers 437. See also 
Pauline Jones Jones and Erika Weinthal, Oil Is Not A Curse: Ownership Structure And Institutions In Soviet 
Successor States (Cambridge University Press 2010) 60. 
47 Karol N. Gees, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural resources’ (1964) 13 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 398; Nico Schrijver (n 46) 3-7; Stephan Hobe, Evolution of the Principle on Permanent Sovereignty 
Over Natural resources, in Marc Bungenberg and Stephan Hobe (Editors), Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural 
Resources (Springer 2015) 6-7. 
48 Nico J. Schrijver, Fifty Years Principle on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: The 1962 UN 
Declaration as the Opinio Iuris Communis, in Marc Bungenberg and Stephan Hobe (eds), Permanent Sovereignty 
Over Natural Resources (Springer 2015) 16-17. 
49 Schrijver termed the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources as one of the more controversial 
new principles of international law since World War II. After decolonisation the developing countries sought to 
assert their control over their natural resources, through the development of new principles and rules of 
international law which will in turn help them promote their social economic development. The principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources granted these states the right to enjoy benefits of resource 
exploitation albeit allowed for unequal legal arrangements, which can now change the rights of the foreign 
investors or even revoke their rights which led to opposition by the industrialised countries while citing the respect 
for acquired rights and the principle of pacta sunt servanda. See Nico Schrijver (n 46) 1 – 7. Also Stephan Hobe 
(n 48) 4 – 5; Nico J. Schrijver (n 46) 17-18. 
In carrying out analytical review on the evolution of UN’s work on permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
to the final instrument that was adopted, Karol Gess iterated the utterance of the United States representative 
during the debate at the 32nd session: 
the problem was not what the Council collectively believed the resolution to mean, but what others might 
be led to believe it meant. See Karol N. Gess (n 33). 
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permanent sovereignty over natural resources. This thesis will not be engaging in 
that, rather a sweeping view of the principle will be used in connection with the 
phenomenon of resource nationalism in the global petroleum industry.50  Professor 
Tyagi asserted that permanent sovereignty over natural resources is a principle of 
international law and also a right of the state which gives a dual legal identity.51 
He stated that the principle is widely accepted while the right is often contested, 
and important to realize that a legal principle is usually expressed with open 
language to provide general guidance while a legal right is more precise in 
language to govern legal relationships in particular contexts.52 Furthermore, it has 
been confirmed in several arbitral and judicial cases as an international principle, 
thus giving the principle a legal status as many states have adopted it.53 It further 
serves as the legal foundation for a long list of rights that emerges from the 
principle, from the right to possess, use, freely dispose of, explore, exploit, 
market, manages, and conserve the natural resources on land or in the sea.54 
 
Furthermore, Bernard Taverne observed that ownership of petroleum resources as occurring in their natural state, 
is a starting point of any regulation of petroleum activities in a state. Nonetheless, the issue of ownership of 
petroleum resources in a wider context has been and is still a subject of international debate amongst countries. 
See Bernard Taverne, An Introduction To The Regulation Of The Petroleum Industry (Graham & Trotman 1994) 
223; Seán Patrick Eudaily and Steve Smith, 'Sovereign Geopolitics? – Uncovering The “Sovereignty Paradox”' 
(2008) 13 Geopolitics 309-334. 
50 Furthermore, the 1974 UN General Assembly Declaration on the Establishment of the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO Declaration) and the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) 
was aimed to supplement the 1962 UN Resolution by presenting the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources in the language of rights and duties. See Yogeshi Tyagi n 46.  
See Concerted Action for Economic Development of Economically Less Developed States, UNGA Res 1515 
(XV) (15 December 1960) UN Doc A/RES/1515(XV); 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New Economic Order, UNGA Res 3201 (S-VI) (1 May 1974) UN Doc 
A/RES/S-6/3201; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UNGA Res 3281 (XXIX) (12 December 
1974) UN Doc A/RES/29/3281.  
The United Nations resolution on permanent sovereignty over natural resources from a legal point of view is 
noteworthy as it is a positive reaffirmation of four principles of international law: 
1. That compensation must be paid in the event of a lawful taking of rights and property; 
2. That the payment of such compensation must be in accordance with international law; 
3. That investment agreements between States and IOCs have a binding effect; 
4. That arbitration agreements between States and IOCs have a binding effect.  
See Karol N. Gees (n 47); Stephan Hobe, Evolution of the Principle on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural 
resources, in Marc Bungenberg and Stephan Hobe (eds) (n 48) 4-11. 
Additionally, Emeka Duruigbo contends that the right to permanent sovereignty is not vested in the state, rather 
it is vested in the people and they are the owners of the natural resources and the governments are trustees of these 
resources whom manage the resources for the benefit of the people. Norway is a good example of a country that 
utilizes the natural resources of the country for the benefit of the citizens. On the other hand, some writers assumed 
that people’s rights and the states’ right are similar and they use it interchangeably to express the rights of the 
state over its natural resources. See Emeka Duruigbo (n 46); James D. Fry and ElFadil Ibrahim n 22. 
51 See Yogeshi Tyagi n 46. 
52 Ibid. 
53 See Texaco Overseas Co. and California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, Award 
of 19 January 1977, 17 ILM (1978) 1; ICJ, Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, Judgment of 19 
December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005, 1, 87, mn. 244. 
54 Nico J. Schrijver (n 46) 25-26.  
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1965 to 1980 marked the period in which developing countries started exercising 
their right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources and began changing 
their investment policies and legislation towards the state’s mineral 
development.55 Although, historically nationalisation was one of the observed 
ways in which these developing countries demonstrated their sovereignty over 
their natural resources.56 Most importantly, these new laws reflected the 
ownership rights of the state while upholding the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources.57  
 
It is recognised that the principle will be the primary foundation for economic 
development and the redistribution of wealth and power, causing developing 
countries to actively pursue the implementation of the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources.58 Wälde argued that the setting up of state 
enterprises or NOCs would assist the state to manage better and develop its 
natural resources.59 This was another turn of events after the change in mineral 
laws and policies by these developing countries.60 Many proposals have been put 
forward when it comes to ways of properly managing petroleum resources, for 
instance, Wälde proposed, a postponement of mineral development by developing 
countries until the state sectors and institutions are strengthened.61 He called it a 
period of strengthening and gaining knowledge of the mineral industry. This would 
benefit a resource-rich developing state, rather than the alternative of rushing 
into the development of these natural resources without having a formidable 
institution to support their petroleum industry.62 Furthermore, in this work, the 
importance of a strong institution in the development of natural resources will be 
critically discussed. In the stewardship of the petroleum resources in a state, the 
public, in theory, has interest and responsibilities towards its petroleum resources 
 
55 Bernard Mommer n 20. See also, Thomas Wälde, 'Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources Recent 
Developments In The Mineral Sector' (1983) 7 Natural Resources Forum 239; Sajjad M. Jasimuddin and Munir 
Maniruzzaman n 41; John Agnew n 46; Richard B. Bilder n 44; Daniel Augenstein, 'Paradise Lost: Sovereign 
State Interest, Global Resource Exploitation And The Politics Of Human Rights' (2016) 27 European Journal of 
International Law. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Thomas Wälde n 39. 
58 Nico Schrijver (n 46) 82-83; Bernard Taverne (n 49) 223 – 227. 
59 Thomas Wälde n 39. 
60 Ibid. See also, Paul R. Lachapelle and Stephen F. McCool, 'Exploring The Concept Of “Ownership” In Natural 




and therefore needs to be informed about their petroleum resources and the ways 
it has been managed. 
 
Finally, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources was born in 
the General Assembly of the United Nations and evolved from a political claim to 
an accepted international law principle.63  
 
Finally, in Professor Bilder stated that: 
 
National sovereignty should not be viewed not as an ideological 
absolute, but as a functional approach to the achievement of 
national goals.64 
 
Therefore, in whatever way a nation chooses to express their sovereignty within 
the confines of national and international law, the end game should always be to 
accomplish the national goals of economic development, thus, giving the resource 
nationalism policies a form of support. Important to note that the expression of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources has been carried out by both 
developed and developing countries. Natural resources continue to be the 
underlying factor. As a result, whenever there is a massive discovery of petroleum 
resources, primarily when located within the borders of the state, the need to echo 
these rights becomes apparent.  
 
 
4.3 Revisiting the Meaning of Resource Nationalism 
 
Many authors and scholars are yet to agree on one definition or interpretation of 
resource nationalism. Professor Paul Steven stated that restricting the operations 
of IOCs and asserting a substantial national control over natural resource 
development are assumed to be the two main parts of resource nationalism.65 The 
moving of the political and economic control of its petroleum resources sector 
away from IOCs to state-controlled companies is what resource nationalism 
comprises in a petroleum resource-rich nation.66 However, some governments 
 
63 Nico Schrijver (n 46) 33. 
64 Richard B. Bilder n 44. 
65 See Paul Stevens n 19.  
66 See Ian Bremmer and Robert Johnston n 12. 
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instead seek to increase the rents they accrue from the exploitation of their natural 
resources rather than restricting the operations of the IOCs. Only when 
restrictions on IOCs activities are involved, then one can say the state carried out 
expropriation. 
 
Luciani posits that it is hard to draw a line between resource nationalism, political 
instability and conflict in real life.67 Although he went on in his literature to support 
his assertion, one might argue that resource nationalism can occur without the 
presence of political instability or conflict, because today resource nationalism 
debates are strongly tied to the price of crude. Therefore, as the price of oil goes 
up, the more the state will want from their resources; thus, they embark on 
resource nationalism. Complementary to the Stevens comments, Luciani went 
further to define resource nationalism as the complete policies adopted by a state 
that limit the access to its petroleum resources from IOCs or foreign investors.68 
The control of petroleum revenues for political aims, strengthening of ownership 
over petroleum resources to the form of resource nationalism embarked by 
importing or consuming countries in securing petroleum resources are some of 
the broad scopes of definitions of resource nationalism.69 
 
Different definitions and meanings of resource nationalism are put forward, for 
instance, Arbatli stated that:  
 
resource nationalism are the complete set of strategies that a host 
state uses to increase control over its natural resource wealth at 
the expense of foreign participation and investment.70 
 
The author’s use of control as the main component of his definition while giving 
meaning to the phenomenon, failed to mention the ownership component of the 
phenomenon, especially after the post-colonial era when petroleum-rich 
developing countries were looking to establish their rights of ownership over their 
natural resources. However, the author included an analysis of ownership 
structure in her resource nationalism debate. Important to realize that NOCs do 
 
67 See Giacomo Luciani n 21. 
68 Ibid. 
69 See Ekim Arbatli n 6. 
70 Ibid. 
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not only come from oil-rich nations but also oil-importing countries like China, 
India and Japan.71 
 
Similarly, Trudgil observed that limiting the operations of IOCs and asserting 
sovereign control over natural resource development, while guarding the national 
petroleum industry against foreign influence is what resource nationalism is 
understood to be.72 Luciani observed that this limitation or restriction to the access 
to petroleum resources usually exist de facto or are set out in the law of the 
state.73 For instance, the Mexican government, included the exclusion of IOCs 
from its upstream petroleum in the constitution.74 
 
Professor Stevens contended that the struggle between national and foreign 
interests over natural resources is one way to describe resource nationalism.75 
Bremmer and Robertson equally added that the attempt by some natural 
resource-rich states to move economic and political control from the IOC to state-
controlled companies of its petroleum sector is what resource nationalism is.76 
Important to note is that this pursuit of high state control of their petroleum 
resources could be direct or indirect, which still embodies the characteristics of 
resource nationalism.77 
 
As observed, resource nationalism has no single definition, and every resource-
rich country has its features and motivations of resource nationalism innate to the 
country.78 Nonetheless, the diverse set of policies and practices used by these 
countries in nationalising their petroleum industry could be termed resource 
nationalism.79 Between 2006 and 2014 the governments of Argentina, Bolivia, 
 
71 See Sajjad M. Jasimuddin and Munir Maniruzzaman n 41. 
72 See Charlotte Joy Trudgil, 'International oil companies and petroleum legal policy in Iran: Evolution in the 
shadow of resource nationalism, 1951-1980’ 2 SOAS law journal 2015 129. See also Jeffrey D. Wilson n 13. 
73 See Giacomo Luciani n 21. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Paul Stevens, 'International oil companies the death of the old business model' (Chatham House 2016) 
<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-05-05-international-oil-
companies-stevens.pdf> accessed 16 January 2017; Paul Stevens n 19; Halina Ward, 'Resource Nationalism And 
Sustainable Development: A Primer And Key Issues' [2009] International Institute for Environmental 
Development. 
76 Ian Bremmer and Robert Johnston n 12. 
77 See Vugar Gojayev n 12 and Halina Ward n 73. 
78 Kuanysh Sarsenhayev, ‘Kazakhstan Petroleum Industry 2008 – 2010: Trends of Resource Nationalism Policy?’ 
(2011) Journal of World Energy Law and Business Vol. 4 No. 4 369. 
79 Paul Alexander Haslam and Pablo Heidrich (n 15) 1-2.  
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Ecuador and Venezuela announced full or partial nationalisations of their 
petroleum and mining industry.80 In other words, when a country that is rich in 
petroleum resources does not leave the exploitation to global market processes, 
instead they set about achieving some of their national development goals by 
using their legal jurisdiction over these resources, these processes can be said to 
involve resource nationalism.81 When governments seek to assert control over 
natural resources for strategic, political or economic reasons using its policies it 
has undertones of resources nationalism.82  
 
The state, when carrying out resource nationalism, is supported by their right to 
control and own natural resources that are located within their territory, without 
any interference from foreign authority.83 As has been evidenced, the weathering 
of the dominance of the IOCs in the international petroleum industry was because 
of resource nationalism.84 
The ‘inherent and overriding right’ of the state to control the use of its natural 
resources is what permanent sovereignty portrays.85 Likewise, the expression of 
a state’s resolution to gain the maximum national advantage from the exploitation 
of its natural resources is, in essence, resource nationalism.86 The willingness of a 
nation to take certain actions toward their petroleum resources that may be 
detrimental to the IOCs or foreign investors in the state can be pointed out among 
other things to be resource nationalism.87 Unlike the resource nationalism of the 
1970s, today’s resource nationalism is driven by a more complex and varied set 
 
80 See  Guillaume Fontaine, José Luis Fuentes and Iván Narváez n 6. 
81 Jeffrey D. Wilson, ‘Resource Nationalism or Resource Liberalism? Explaining Australia’s Approach to Chinese 
Investment in its Minerals Sector’ (2011) 65 Australian Journal of International Affairs 283. 
82 See Sam Pryke n 7. See also Antulio Rosales n 8 and Andreas Pickel, 'Explaining, And Explaining With, 
Economic Nationalism' (2003) 9 Nations and Nationalism 105-127. 
83 See Paul Stevens n 19; Jeffrey D. Wilson n 13; Sajjad M. Jasimuddin and Munir Maniruzzaman n 41; A Butler, 
'Resource Nationalism And The African National Congress' (2013) 113 The Southern African Institute of Mining 
and Metallurgy <http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/jsaimm/v113n1/05.pdf> accessed 18 June 2018; Ahmad D. Habir, 
'Resource Nationalism And Constitution Jihad' [2013] Southern Asian Affairs 121-134. 
84 See George Joffe and others n 16; Charlotte Joy Trudgil n 68. 
85 Franz Xaver Perez, 'The Relationship Between "Permanent Sovereignty" And The Obligation Not To Cause 
Transboundary Environmental Damage' (1996) 26 Environmental Law 1187.  
Also, the most significant statement regarding permanent sovereignty over natural resource was the United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) which set the tone for the resource nationalism phenomenon. 
See UN General Assembly Resolution on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Resolution 1803 
(XVII) of 14 December 1962. 
86 George Joffe and others n 16. See Jason Pierce, 'A South American Energy Treaty: How The Region Might 
Attract Foreign Investment In A Wake Of Resource Nationalism' (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal. 
87 Ibid. 
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of factors than the price of oil alone, which was the main factor during the 1970s.88 
Factors like global energy security, climate change, sustainable development and 
poverty reduction are all connecting factors that need to be understood in the 
context of resource nationalism today.89 Nationalisation by a host government in 
no small degree has been accepted and seen as the entitlement of the 
government, if it is carried out on conditions, to protect the public interest and in 
the exertion of its sovereign rights.90 Sovereign states have legitimate goals 
toward which they endeavour to marshal the natural resources under their 
control.91 
 
The push by a state to take full control of all the facets of the natural resource 
industry can also be termed resource nationalisation.92 In Africa or to be specific 
sub-Saharan Africa, indigenisation programmes like local content policies take the 
form of resource nationalism in these areas, and these resource nationalism 
policies, promise to bring the benefits to the average citizen from the exploitation 
of the petroleum resources in these areas.93 The results of these policies have 
been very disappointing in these areas and the average citizens barely benefit 
from the exploitation of the petroleum resources in the state.94 
 
When a state embarks on resource nationalism in its petroleum industry, the 
government may resort to nationalisation in varied manners and degrees. For 
instance, it may depend on minimum state control over the petroleum industry 
through joint-venture and association contracts, or full control through direct 
exploitation of petroleum resources by its NOC.95 Following this analysis, it, 
therefore, means that for a state to say it has full control of its petroleum industry, 
 
88 See Halina Ward n 73. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Paul Stevens n 19. 
91 See Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (Longman 1971) 249. 
92 Ruben Berrios, Andrae Marak and Scott Morgenstern, 'Explaining Hydrocarbon Nationalization In Latin 
America: Economics And Political Ideology' (2011) 18 Review of International Political Economy 673-697. 
93 Stephen Burgess and Janet Beilstein, 'This Means War? China's Scramble For Minerals And Resource 
Nationalism In Southern Africa' (2013) 34 Contemporary Security Policy 120-143. 
94 See Valérie Marcel and others, 'A Local Content Decision Tree For Emerging Producers' [2016] Chatham 
House <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-07-13-local-content-
decision-tree-marcel-tissot-paul-omonbude.pdf> accessed 24 February 2020. 
95 Guillaume Fontaine, Ivan Narvaez and Susan Velasco, 'Explaining A Policy Paradigm Shift: A Comparison Of 
Resource Nationalism In Bolivia And Peru' (2017) 20 Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and 
Practice 142-157. See also, Ahmad D. Habir n 81. 
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it must be involved and participate in the exploration and production sector of the 
industry. Most importantly, it must do this through its NOC. As has been observed 
throughout the events of resource nationalism in some countries, especially the 
developing ones, resource nationalism does not always lead to a state’s direct 
participation in the exploration and production sector of the upstream industry.  
 
Ownership and control thus become the two reoccurring concepts within most of 
the definitions and will be used in analysing resource nationalism in this study. 
The critical analysis will be within the context of the level of ownership and control 
which the select states exert over their petroleum resources and industry. 
 
 
4.4 Considering Resource Nationalism  
 
The period from the 1950s through to the 1970s saw producing nations gain more 
from their natural resources due to the wave of resource nationalism, unlike the 
previous periods when the concessions granted the IOCs were disadvantageous 
to the nations.96 Unlike the resource nationalism of the 1950s – 1960s, the 
resource nationalism of today is said to be more pragmatic and opportunistic, 
where the state still maintains a conducive environment where the IOC roles are 
preserved, and at the same time tightening state ownership and increasing the 
government’s take from the exploitation of the resources.97 The resource 
nationalism of today is not usually a fight against Western capital expansion and 
the dominance of the “Seven Sisters’. Instead, it is the recent movement by these 
resource-rich states to expand globally.98 It may be to catch up with Western 
states and compete with them or break away from the dominance of these 
Western states or the colonial rulers, that is the issue behind today's wave of 
resource nationalism. 
 
Various studies have put forward several arguments about the determinants of 
resource nationalism. The increase of the government’s ownership stake and 
 
96 Stefan Andreasson n 12. 
97 Vlado Vivoda, Rise of State-firm Bargaining in the 2000s in Paul Alexander Haslam and Pablo Heidrich (n 15) 
56-59.  
98 See Naná de Graaff n 39 and Ekim Arbatli n 6. 
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increase in taxes, and royalties are different forms in which resource nationalism 
occurs.99 Many reasons have been put forward by researchers on the rationale 
behind the nationalisation of the petroleum industry by a government. It mostly 
falls under maximisation of revenue from natural resources; the state’s assertion 
of control over the petroleum industry and development through the government’s 
enhanced capacity to manage the petroleum industry.100 
 
Mahdavi using statistical historical nationalisation analysis and quantitative case 
comparison expressed that the main drive for nationalisation by governments is 
to maximise revenue from the natural resources.101 The expropriation that 
occurred enabled the state to gain control of the hard assets of the IOCs like rigs, 
pipelines, and drilling equipment, but the increase in the share of the profits from 
the petroleum industry is the most crucial aspect that is attributed to 
expropriation.102 For instance, President Evo Morales of Bolivia upon becoming the 
president criticised the country’s neoliberal model of development and argued that 
the neoliberal model was not the solution for the people of Bolivia and that the 
privatisation of the country’s natural resources leads to more hunger and 
hardship.103 How well these strategies worked for the government and state is yet 
to be evidenced.  
 
Public utility, security or the national interest were grounds stipulated in 
Resolution 1803 (XVII) for nationalisation, expropriation or requisition. Therefore 
the right invalidated private interests both foreign and domestic.104 The state can 
then accumulate 100% of the profits from the sale of petroleum resources through 
its NOC.105 Although, this might be true in some countries, yet situations in 
countries like Nigeria where the reliance on IOCs for the actual production of these 
resources through a profit-sharing agreement, means that the government cannot 
 
99 Samuel K. Gayi and Janvier D. Nkurunziza, ‘Trends in Minerals, ores and Metal Prices’ in Paul Alexander 
Haslam and Pablo Heidrich (n 15) 36. 
100 Paul A. Haslam and Pablo Heidrich, Towards a Theory of Resource Nationalism in Paul Alexander Haslam 
and Pablo Heidrich (n 15) 224-225. 
101 See Paasha Mahdavi, 'Why Do Leaders Nationalize The Oil Industry? The Politics Of Resource Expropriation' 
(2014) 75 Energy Policy 228. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Brent Z. Kaup, 'A Neoliberal Nationalization?' (2010) 37 Latin American Perspectives 123. 
104 Nico Schrijver (n 46) 289 – 291; Bernard Taverne (n 49) 224. 
105 See Paasha Mahdavi n 99. 
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take 100% of the profits even after it has nationalised its petroleum industry.106 
Vivoda maintained that the reason for the resurgent resource nationalism of the 
2000s was the high oil price and this, in turn, became one of the main factors for 
the fall of the IOCs.107  
 
Another critical point in discussing resource nationalism is the obsolescing 
bargaining theory developed by Vernon, which in summary, expounded that where 
the relationship is between the host government and IOCs they are characterised 
by conflicting interests and change in the bargaining power over time, usually in 
favour of the government.108 This usually comes about after the IOCs have 
invested in a project, capital, technology, and managerial skills as these are the 
advantages the IOCs hold over the government, and are thus reflected in terms 
of the agreement with the state. However, once the company starts the extraction 
process, fixed capital investments become sunk, the power asymmetry is now in 
favour of the host government leading to a renegotiation of the initial agreement 
terms.109 Further, in analysing the reasons, states embark on an obsolescing 
bargain as a form of resource nationalism, and many variables should be 
considered. According to Vernon, in consideration of these variables, one can 
easily find themselves moving away from variable economics aspect to the 
political, social, and cultural variables.110 
 
Another argument about the determinants of resource nationalism focuses on the 
cyclical nature of the rise and decline in state control over the petroleum resource 
sector.111 Hence, the global petroleum industry has been known to have a cyclical 
nature, the bargaining and negotiation power between the host states and their 
NOCs and IOCs in determining the division of rents historically has shown the 
 
106 Ibid. 
107 Vlado Vivoda, Rise of State-firm Bargaining in the 2000s in Paul Alexander Haslam and Pablo Heidrich (n 
15) 56. 
108 Raymond Vernon (n 91) 46-53.  
109 See Paul Stevens and others (n 36) 42-43; Vlado Vivoda, Rise of State-firm Bargaining in the 2000s in Paul 
Alexander Haslam and Pablo Heidrich (n 15) 54-58; Ekim Arbatli n 6; Sajjad Jasimuddin and A F M 
Maniruzzaman, 'Reshaping International Oil Companies' Response Mechanism To Deal With The Spectre Of 
Resource Nationalism' (Researchportal.port.ac.uk, 2012) 
<https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/portal/files/1804815/JASIM_BAM_CARDIFF_SEP_2012_PAPER_2_.pdf> 
accessed 10 April 2018.  See also, Noel Maurer n 16. 
110 Raymond Vernon (n 91) 230. 
111 See Ekim Arbatli n 6. 
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cyclical nature of the industry.112 Furthermore, the cyclical idea posits that 
resource nationalism is driven by fluctuations in global crude prices which in turn 
affects the bargaining power of the governments against IOCs.113 High crude 
prices make investment attractive for IOCs, which would lead them to accept 
terms or renegotiation from the host government. In today's petroleum industry, 
when the oil price has plummeted, what will be the terms which IOCs, NOCs and 
governments will be negotiating?  
 
Under the circumstances of high oil prices, the bargaining power is with the host 
government. Conversely, during periods of low crude prices, the IOCs would not 
be willing to take the risk and renegotiate prior contracts; hence the host 
governments lose their bargaining power, thus leading to a shift of bargaining 
power to the IOCs.114 Questions arises as to how the global petroleum industry 
will adjust, also the governments in these periods of low oil prices. 
 
The third strand of argument of the determinants of resource nationalism focuses 
on the political goals and institutional quality.115 Important to note, that no matter 
the driver of resource nationalism in a state, the ultimate goals especially, on the 
part of the government are the ownership of the nation’s natural resources, 
greater control over the petroleum industry and most importantly, to maximise 
revenue from the exploitation of the petroleum resources. On the part of the 
people of the state that are endowed with petroleum resources, the goal is to 
benefit from the exploitation of these natural resources.  
 
 
4.4.1 Theoretical Analysis of Old and New Interpretations on Resource 
Nationalism  
 
The scope and application of resource nationalism have changed over the last 
decades, and one might argue that it is still on the agenda of any resource-rich 
 
112 See Sajjad M. Jasimuddin and Munir Maniruzzaman n 41. 
113 Vlado Vivoda n 9. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ekim Arbatli n 6. 
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country, whether a developed or developing country. Thus, contemporary 
resource nationalism differs from the old resource nationalism in specific ways.  
 
4.4.1.1 From Ideology to Pragmatism  
 
The 1970s marked the high point of confrontation between resource-rich 
governments and the IOCs, and this can be argued as so, due to the historical 
circumstances in the global petroleum industry.116 For instance, after the cold war, 
energy was seen as one of the ‘commanding heights’ of any economy which should 
be controlled by the state.117 Thus state intervention in the petroleum sector 
became a political matter. Backing state involvement in the petroleum sector was 
the ‘right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources’ which was recognized 
in the United Nations resolutions on permanent sovereignty in 1952, 1962 and 
1966.118 
 
These ideological motives required government intervention, but today the 
political and economic motives replaced the ideology, which favoured minimal 
government intervention, along with trade openness and accepting FDI as a 
petroleum sector growth policy.119 Arbatli further commented that today, the 
relationship between governments and IOCs are defined by pragmatic motives 
rather than ideology.120 Resource liberalisation today has undermined the 
popularity of resource nationalism led by the idea of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources.121 Some of the opposition towards the IOCs from the state was 
born out of some state ideologies. For example, Marxism as the concept of the 
class struggle, capitalist exploitation, imperialism and because the socialist 
ideology that became popular amongst developing countries after World War II.122 
 
116 See Ekim Arbatli n 6.  
117 S. Guriev, A. Kolotilin and K. Sonin n 41. 
118 Ibid. 
119 See Ekim Arbatli n 6. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Resource liberalisation can be defined as the widening of the scope of private sector participation in the 
petroleum industry of a country, this is also what neoliberalism is concerned with. Consequently, allowing the 
petroleum sector of a state to be controlled by the IOCs advanced resource liberalism. See Jewellord T. Nem 
Singh, 'Who Owns The Minerals? Repoliticizing Neoliberal Governance In Brazil And Chile' (2012) 28 Journal 
of Developing Societies 229. See also, David Harvey, A Brief History Of Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press 
2011) 64-66, and David Harvey, A Brief History Of Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press 2011) 26-41. 
122 This ideology mainly placed limits on the role of foreign investment. See Raymond Vernon (n 91) 201-202. 
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There are arguments that in a developing country, the state stands to benefit from 
the strong presence of IOCs and foreign investment in their country.123 
 
Another critical point termed dependencia syndrome by Vernon, relates to a 
situation when states depend on IOCs or foreign enterprises for the exploitation 
of their natural resources. However, they might benefit but most of this benefit 
usually goes to a class or group of elites.124 Vernon expressed that it is a known 
fact that members of elite groups and political leaders in host countries especially 
ones from resource-rich developing countries are predominantly conscious of the 
fact that most IOCs primarily the U.S. controlled ones abide by the “when in 
Rome…” golden rule.125 Vernon further contended that governments, especially in 
developing countries, are drawn to plan of action which involve the sharing of 
ownership and control within the subsidiaries of these IOCs, as the inevitable fact 
is that the IOCs stand against the states control and interest.126 
 
For example, following the trends of the early Latin American development stage, 
African elites aimed to control the government structure rather than become 
modern businessmen, technicians, and managers, hence the excellent reception 
granted to the IOCs, as they were viewed as supportive of the elite development 
albeit initially.127 Important to realise that the goals of the elites of a state are not 
usually aligned with those of the state. Their goals and objectives are usually 
personal. Conversely, the intellectual elites usually raise the question of the 
economic and political disadvantages while depending on the IOCs for the 





123 That is, if benefit is measured in such limited economic terms like gross national product or national income. 
See Raymond Vernon (n 91) 203. 
124 This means that control over these resources are handed over to the IOCs or foreign enterprises. See Raymond 
Vernon (n 91) 203-204. 
125 Raymond Vernon (n 91) 265. 
126 Raymond Vernon (n 91) 266-267. 
127 For example, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Taiwan, and South Korea elites took this way. See Raymond 
Vernon (n 91) 196. 
128 Furthermore, some propose the value of independence and freedom of the state in exploiting its natural 
resources as this is threatened by the IOCs. See Ibid., 200-201. 
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4.4.1.2 From Full-Scale Nationalisation to Creeping Expropriation 
 
The nationalisation of IOC assets in host countries was the primary tool of resource 
nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s, but today, direct expropriation and full-scale 
nationalisation have become exceptions rather than the norm. Instead, a form of 
indirect (creeping) expropriation has been stated to be the new form of resource 
nationalism.129 Under this form of resource nationalism, the investor (IOC) retains 
legal title to the fields. However, the rights of use are limited by state interference 
in the natural resource sector through regulatory control.130 This indirect 
expropriation can include diverse measures such as changes in hydrocarbon 
legislation, limits to profit repatriation, renegotiation of existing contracts, 
domestic price controls, adverse tax changes, production limitations and export 
restrictions.131 The most commonly used is tax regulations. For example, 
Ecuador’s Hydrocarbon Law in April 2006 raised the royalty percentages of IOCs 
windfall revenues from 20% to 50%. 2007 also saw the government further raise 
the tax total windfall revenues on IOCs to 70%.132  
 
Important to note that the level of regulatory control of the upstream petroleum 
industry of the select state will be assessed in chapter 6, where the regulations 
guiding these states petroleum industry will be explained. Furthermore, the 
introduction of local content requirements by host countries is a form of regulatory 
control used by these countries which require that IOCs in their petroleum industry 
purchase a percentage of their production materials from the domestic market, as 
well as employ and train nationals.133 These local content policies will form part of 
the analysis in the comparative chapter (chapter 6). 
 
 
129 Ekim Arbatli n 6. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Susan Wacaster, 'The Mineral Industry Of Ecuador' (Minerals Yearbook-2007, 2010) 
<https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2007/myb3-2007-ec.pdf> accessed 14 May 2018. See also, 
indirect expropriation measures in George Joffe and others n 19.  
132 Ibid.  
133 Although, local content requirements vary across countries in terms of aims, scope, implementation, and 
compliance regimes. Local content requirements are particularly relevant in Africa, as countries like Ghana, 
Tanzania, Angola and Nigeria have implemented regulatory control of their various petroleum sector. See Ekim 
Arbatli n 6; Sveinung Eikeland and Trond Nilsen, 'Local Content In Emerging Growth Poles: Local Effects Of 
Multinational Corporations’ Use Of Contract Strategies' (2016) 70 Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift - Norwegian 
Journal of Geography 13-23. 
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4.4.2 Forms of Resource Nationalism  
 
Free market supporters usually see resource nationalism as the measures 
embarked by a resource-rich state to restrict the operations of IOCs while 
asserting greater national control over its natural resource development.134 
Countries are reassessing their foreign policies and their alliances as resource 
nationalism is on the rise, as the search for energy sources in the world 
continues.135 Scholars have advanced some variations of resource nationalism, 
and it can take many forms, different policies and ideas.136 Childs postulated that 
resource nationalism comes in various forms, whether it be a hard or soft resource 
nationalism policy. Two different opinions are formed on the type of resource 
nationalism by the geographical location,137 whereby some places are seen as 
worse than others.138 If resource nationalism is said to exist in some OECD 
countries, it is seen as a valid, legitimate debate with merit. However, in a 
different geographical focus like sub-Saharan Africa, it is seen in a negative 
light.139 The geographical binary between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ resource nationalism 
has been echoed in the ‘legitimate’ resource nationalism of the West and the ‘risky’ 
resource nationalism of Africa.140 As the oil-rich African nations of Angola, Algeria, 
Nigeria and Libya continue to demand more significant ownership stakes in the 
exploration and production of their natural resources what will that mean for the 
operations of IOCs in the near future, especially in the period of low oil prices.141 
 
It may include revolutionary resource nationalism as witnessed in countries like 
Russia and Venezuela; economic resource nationalism, in Kazakhstan; Legacy 
 
134 John Childs, 'Geography and resource nationalism: A critical review and reframing' (2016) 3(2) The Extractive 
Industries and Society 539. 
135 See Joseph A Stanislaw, 'Power play — resource nationalism, the global scramble for energy, and the need for 
mutual interdependence' (Deloitte 2009) <http://expertosenred.olade.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2014/07/IE005-us_er_PowerPlayResource-
Nationalism_theGlobalScramble_forEnergyWEB_240209.pdf> accessed 17 July 2017. 
136 Antulio Rosales n 8. 
137 See John Childs n 129. See also Stefan Andreasson n 12. 
138 Free market supporters usually see resource nationalism as the measures embarked by a resource rich state to 
restrict the operations of IOCs while asserting greater national control over its natural resource development. The 
form of resource nationalism which does not involve tearing up existing contracts and nationalising its assets is 
known as soft resource nationalism, often seen in OECD countries where the use of fiscal measures, like taxes 
and royalty to increase the benefits from the states natural resources. See Ian Bremmer and Robert Johnston n 12; 
John Childs n 129. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
141 See Robert F Buchanan and Syed Tariq Anwar n 3. 
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resource nationalism as seen in Nigeria and soft resource nationalism usually 
observed in OECD countries.142 President Putin’s severe measures on Yukos in 
mid-2003 was the beginning of the resurgent resource nationalism of the 2000s 
in Russia.143 As a result, Russia moved away from liberalisation to high levels of 
state control. Renationalisation of much of its petroleum industry and increased 
regulation and higher taxes, which resulted in an anti-FDI petroleum 
environment.144 Greater importance was given to state control of the petroleum 
industry, as Russia was a transitioning economy. With this realisation came new 
subsoil legislation which was introduced in May 2008.145 This legislation further 
made foreign investment in the Russian petroleum industry harder.  
 
In addition to the forms of resource nationalism put forward, ‘developmental and 
market-based’ resource nationalism was advanced by Wilson.146 To enumerate, 
Wilson stated that resource nationalism that is aimed at resource production 
towards development outcomes is known as developmental resource nationalism. 
In contrast, the market-based resource nationalism is one that is common in 
developed countries or liberal markets where the governments use taxation as a 
significant tool.147 
 
Ian Bremmer and Robert Johnston postulated some forms of resource nationalism, 
namely, the revolutionary resource nationalism as exhibited by Russia and 
Venezuela, where its form of resource nationalism is connected to broader political 
and social disruption.148 Another characteristic of this revolutionary resource 
nationalism comes in another form where takeover of assets by forced 
renegotiation of existing contracts, citing historical injustice or contractual 
wrongdoing as the grounds for that.149 Also this form involves the use of political 
control over natural resources to control and increase a country’s political 
 
142 See Vlado Vivoda, Rise of State-firm Bargaining in the 2000s in Paul Alexander Haslam and Pablo Heidrich 




146 See Jeffrey D. Wilson n 13. 
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148 See Ian Bremmer and Robert Johnston n 12. See also Daniel Hellinger (n 23) 204 – 207 and Kuanysh 
Sarsenhayev n 74. 
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influence over a region and is implemented by means of forced negotiations and 
expropriation as witnessed in Russia and Venezuela.150 
 
As natural resources are central to a state’s national political and cultural identity 
the state goes on to nationalise its oil and gas assets, this is known as the legacy 
resource nationalism as seen in Kuwait and Mexico.151  The form of resource 
nationalism which does not involve the tearing up of existing contracts and 
nationalising its assets is known as soft resource nationalism, often seen in OECD 
countries where the use of fiscals measures, like taxes and royalties increase the 
benefits from the states natural resources.152 No matter the form in which resource 
nationalism takes, as long as it ends up benefitting the state, this is the ultimate 
goal for the government. The forms of resources nationalism are essential when 
analysing a state that embarks on resource nationalism. This study concerns the 
concepts of the theory as it is in these concepts that the roles of a states’ NOCs 
are established.  
 
 
4.5 Key Concepts Of Resource Nationalism:  Ownership and Control 
 
Ownership means the act or right of possession of something, while control means 
the power to influence, limit or regulate something.153 Ownership of natural 
resources is usually stipulated in the constitution of any state and grants the right 
of possession of these natural resources. Arbatli observed that the increase in 
petroleum demand and the increase in oil prices fuelled the re-emergence of 
resource nationalism policies in resource-rich countries in the form of increasingly 
hostile regulations against IOCs and foreign investors.154 For instance, with the 
 
150 Ibid. 
151 This form is connected to the sovereignty of the state and a state’s right over its natural resources. This 
translates to state ownership of every natural resources within its territory. See Ian Bremmer and Robert Johnston 
(n 10). See also Kuanysh Sarsenhayev n 74. 
152 This form entails revenue maximization from a state’s extractive industries by using legislation and fiscal 
regulation to promote these goals. This form is linked to the economic type of resource nationalism and is common 
to OECD countries such as Canada and UK. See Ian Bremmer and Robert Johnston n 12 and Kuanysh 
Sarsenhayev n 74. 
153 See 'Ownership | Definition Of Ownership In English By Lexico Dictionaries' (Lexico Dictionaries | English, 
2019) <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/ownership> accessed 25 June 2019 and 'Control | Definition Of 
Control In English By Lexico Dictionaries' (Lexico Dictionaries | English, 2019) 
<https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/control> accessed 25 June 2019. 
154 See Ekim Arbatli n 6.  
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rapid increase in demand for petroleum, the global crude price in 2008 reached 
the yearly average of 107,06 $/bbl. After a relative drop in the period of 2008 – 
2010 due to the global financial crisis, the prices peaked once more in 2011 – 
2013 period, getting up to their highest point of $117,23 on average. 
 
As oil prices rose so did the resource nationalism wave. In 2006 five petroleum 
sector expropriations were witnessed in the global industry. Bolivia, Chad, 
Ecuador, Russia, and Venezuela.155 At present, the story is different, and how it 
will affect the global petroleum industry arrangements will be interesting to 
observe. 
 
Today in some resource-rich developing countries, the petroleum resources are 
owned by the state, while the IOCs are allowed to extract the petroleum 
resources.156 Direct involvement in the exploration and production of its petroleum 
resources was one of the directives of OPEC to its member states.157 According to 
some industry commentators, some OPEC countries cannot categorically state 
that it is directly involved in the E&P of its petroleum resources.158 The definition 
of ‘direct’ can be argued in the context of the various forms of upstream 
participation that go on in the global petroleum industry, especially in a petroleum-




Vining and Boardman contended that ownership matters in the global petroleum 
industry.159 Using the empirical analysis Vining and Boardman stressed the 
importance of ownership, and this does not always mean that private ownership 
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is preferable to state ownership.160 In the petroleum industry, the ownership of 
petroleum resources is usually stipulated in the laws of the state in which these 
resources are found. Thus selected institutions are given the mandate to oversee 
this. Today, in the global petroleum industry, NOCs are usually the institution used 
by the government to achieve government control over their natural resources.  
 
In regulating, use, management, transfer and alienation of natural resource 
endowment the various theories of ownership and control have influenced and 
formed the foundation for the legal system and property rights that are adopted 
by some resource-rich countries across the world.161 Private ownership or state 
ownership are the theories of ownership and control that are adopted by states or 
sometimes a mix of both. The adoption of a legal and fiscal framework by a 
resource-rich developing state has been one of the problems that have plagued 
the resource-rich developing world. 
 
If the petroleum resource revenue represents a large portion of the economy, then 
the ownership of these resources becomes significant to the country.162 Important 
to note, that no one solution will solve the problems arising from the handling of 
petroleum resources, each case should be looked at in the specific country 
context, bearing in mind that petroleum resource governance always generates 
emotions from people and the arrangements to govern their use and exploitation 
can be complicated.163 Drawing on the experience of a developed resource-rich 
state, an attempt to gain insight into the developing resource-rich state is what 
this study aims to achieve. This will be carried out in chapter 6 of this study. 
 
This study will examine the structures of control and ownership critically present 
in the select states. Control whether ‘operational’ is referenced to Boscheck’s work 
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161 See Lanre Aladeitan, ‘Ownership and Control of Oil, Gas, and Mineral Resources in Nigeria: Between Legality 
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and state ownership forms as observed by Luong and Weinthal which have 
variations, from state control when the upstream operations are carried out by 
the NOC and the private control when the IOCs run the upstream activities of the 
state.164 In all the observed variations, the central theme revolves around state 
control and ownership, and private control and ownership. Therefore this study 
looks into these arguments for the best way through state policies and regulations 
to develop a natural resource to benefit the people better.  
 
The drop in the price of oil in 1986 and the following years, started a movement 
away from state ownership which saw states like the UK, Italy and France to 
privatise their oil industries.165 A close look will be given to a petroleum resource-
rich state. Is private control or ownership the answer, or will it be a state control 
and ownership structure that will better serve the state? People and nations are 
always passionate when it comes to the subject of the control and ownership of 
natural resources in their territory which can sometimes lead to controversy 
amongst them.166 It is essential to know that the ownership of petroleum 
resources by the state is not lessened; while on the other hand, real control of the 
oil and gas industry still belongs to the IOCs.167 There are several forms of 
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Private ownership or state ownership are the theories of ownership and control 
that are usually adopted by states or sometimes a mix of both.169 There are 
various reasons behind the privatisation of public enterprises or state-owned 
companies by the government. Although the main argument raised by the 
privatisation promoters is the need to enhance the efficiency of the state-owned 
firm by transferring the firm to private hands, as the poor performances of public 
or government firms are well documented.170 Based on two premises that the 
public firms or government-run companies perform poorly, compared to the 
privately-owned companies and the transfer of these state-owned firms to private 
ownership will improve the efficiency of the state-owned firm, because improving 
efficiency is one of the main arguments used in justifying the privatisation of state-
owned enterprises.171 
 
Although the arguments put forward in promoting the privatisation of state-owned 
firms, on the grounds of enhancing efficiency might be true in some cases, in 
assessing the extent to which privatisation effectively contributes to the efficiency 
of the formerly state-owned enterprises is still debatable.172 Some countries 
engaged in nationalisation programmes after World War II. However, in the United 
Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher, she initiated a policy swing in the other 
direction in the 1980s, by pushing for the privatisation of many of the British 
public-owned firms and this was followed by Russia and other transition 
countries.173 Regardless of the specific institution that governs the exploitation of 
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these petroleum resources, these resources are the nation’s, and thus should be 
for the ultimate benefit of the citizens of the nation.174 
 
Arguments have been put forward supporting the importance of creating good 
institutions before the privatisation or strengthening of weak institutions.175 
Aharoni and Ascher argued that the conventional recommendation of privatisation, 
when a state’s NOC or state-owned enterprises are underperforming is not usually 
feasible or may be unwise especially when it comes to state-owned enterprises or 
NOCs in the petroleum industry of the state.176 They argued that often the 
weakness is not in the NOC, but in the broader complex and politicised task of 
extracting and allocating petroleum rents and a host of other financial resources 
related to petroleum exploitation.177  
 
Jomo commented that instead of dismantling the public sector, there should be a 
critical comprehensive review of the public sector, including statutory bodies and 
other public enterprises, to enhance efficiency, cost-effectiveness being geared 
towards sustainable national economic development, in an industry that is 
inefficient, for example, the petroleum industry of the state.178 He went further to 
assert that privatisation cannot be the global solution for the numerous problems 
of the public sector.179 As the problem of public firms are not an ownership 
problem per se, but rather because of the lack of explicit, or achievable objectives, 
or even too many objectives, and often contradictory goals could well be the 
problem of the public sector.180 This, importantly, is usually the case for some 
NOCs. Dewenter and Malatesta in their work stated that although government 
firms are usually less profitable than private firms, they could not find much 
evidence to support the claims that the privatisation of government firms increase 
the profitability.181 In their report paper using empirical evidence on the relatively 
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efficiency of public and private firms, demonstrated that the evidence of advanced 
improvement after privatisation is not very robust. 
 
Further criticism levelled against government-owned entities is that these firms, 
rather than employ the best-qualified persons, would hire politically connected 
people, maybe because of pressure from the government.182 Commentators on 
privatisation contended that it should be a form of economic strategy available to 
reformers to reduce inefficiency in government firms.183 They viewed privatisation 
as a blend of reallocating control rights over employment from politicians to 
managers and the increase in cash flow ownership of managers and private 
investors.184 Thus privatisation will work as the managerial discretion problem is 
small when compared to the political discretion problem.185 The broader market, 
regulatory and institutional environments are the context on which the effects of 
privatisation will be dependent when implemented.186 
 
Finally, partial privatisation has been promulgated as a form of privatisation that 
can help a state to benefit from the exploitation of its natural resources.187 
Although the study conducted by Boardman and Vining has strongly argued 
against partial privatisation.188 The study suggests that partial privatisation will 
not be the best strategy for a government and that it would be worse, especially 
in terms of profitability, than complete privatisation of state ownership.189 For 
example, in Western Europe, when it comes to ownership and control in privatised 
companies, privatisation is partial and incomplete, thus not changing the 
governance structures and creating a conducive environment for private 
ownership and public control to coexist.190 Some of the cases observed today show 
that when it is supposed to be privatisation, it is only partial divestiture, which 
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means that the government retains majority ownership, hence ultimate control of 
the firm.191 The claims that privatisation will decrease the administrative and 
financial burdens are misleading and flawed.192 As the sale of these firms is just a 
one-off revenue gains for the government. 
 
There has been much literature against the NOC model controlling the exploration 
and production of the petroleum resources, and the inefficiency of the NOCs.193 
While attributing the NOC inefficiency in terms of ownership, Gong’s estimate in 
his findings are that NOCs are about 60% less efficient than IOCs.194 Some 
explanation is based on the principal-agent problems and as the NOCs are 
controlled by bureaucrats with different goals from that of the public’s interest, 
most of the time they cater for the goals of a select interest group or political 
parties.195  
 
The debate over the management of a country’s natural resources has advanced 
two major arguments, one in support of full state ownership and direct 
participation in the oil and gas industry while the other argument is that the 
management of a country’s resources should be left in the domain of the private 
sector, and the hands of IOCs.196 A state’s participation in the ownership and 
development of its oil and gas resources can come in different forms. Resource 
nationalism seems to be the primary aim of the state’s participation, and this all 
comes from the aspiration of the government to maintain control of its natural 
resources.197 
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4.5.2 Control  
 
Boscheck in his work on NOC and the governance of petroleum, expressed 
different forms of control: political control, regulatory control, management 
control and operational control.198 Most resource-rich developing states claim to 
have control and ownership of their natural resources, although one might argue 
that a state’s control over their petroleum resources can be measured by the share 
of the state’s NOC in the overall national production of petroleum.199 For example, 
Cyril Obi in his work, posits that despite the Nigerian state ownership of the 
petroleum industry, the country lacks control over its petroleum industry.200 Even 
though the country’s NOC (NNPC) is supposed to champion the exploitation of the 
country’s petroleum industry, and have firm control of the petroleum industry, 
would the implementation of Boscheck’s different level of control over natural 
resources lead to a success story? 
 
Amid all the ownership and control debates in Nigeria, there is ongoing local 
debate as to the right to own and control the petroleum resources in the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria.201 Debates whether the Nigerian state or the Niger Delta 
region have the right of ownership and control of the petroleum resources.202 
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Cameron and Stanley acknowledged that these nationalist sentiments could make 
the activities of IOCs in these regions controversial.203 This study recognises the 
extensive debate and literature on this Niger Delta subject, but engaging in the 
same will deviate the study from its central theme. Therefore, this study will work 
on the premise that both Norwegian and Nigerian governments have the authority 
to allocate rights for the development of a state’s petroleum resources as per 
these country’s constitutions. As the importance of petroleum grew in Nigeria, and 
it became the fiscal basis of the economy, so did the quest for autonomy by the 
petroleum-rich region of the Niger Delta region.204 One then wonders if, these 
resources were absent would this region still clamour for autonomy? 
 
The question that arises is how much control of the petroleum industry can a NOC 
of a developing nation exert on an industry in which it lacks a high level of technical 
capability? Can a developing nation that is reliant on Foreign Direct Investment 
from IOCs into its petroleum industry exert a high level of control over its 
resources?  Accordingly, Kaup in his work on nationalisation in Bolivia, stated that 
Bolivia recovered the right to commercialise its hydrocarbon resources and also 
increased the prices it received from the sale of its natural resources after the 
nationalisation of its natural resources by President Morales.205   
 
Some factors have been put forward by some scholars as a way of knowing how 
much control a state has in its petroleum industry. Firstly, in a petroleum 
resource-rich developing country the leaders and executives prefer to engage 
IOCs in the extraction of its natural resources, thus bringing foreign investments 
into the country which leads to less state control in the upstream sector.206 
Secondly, the inability of the state’s NOC to be able to carry out the exploration 
and production of petroleum by its means shows the lack of technical capabilities, 
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which translates into less state control in the upstream sector of the petroleum 
industry.207 Thirdly, it has been observed over the periods of high oil prices that 
state leaders exercise more control because higher oil prices lead to massive 
windfalls.208 Fourthly, more state control would be expected if the level of 
dependency by a state on oil and gas revenues constitutes their primary source 
of income.209 
 
There are dimensions to control: from the form where complete control is achieved 
by a state, whether through joint ventures which permits the IOCs to continue 
doing business in the state but as minority shareholders.210 Other forms can be 
when the state takes complete control of the petroleum industry, and this will 
entail expropriation of IOCs assets and expelling them from the state.211 There 
are many mixtures in the way states go about establishing control over its natural 
resource industry. However, the form chosen by each government determines a 
lot great deal the economic development and growth of the industry.212 
 
Finally, It is crucial for the state that wants to control its petroleum resource 
industry to regulate it properly. Regulation can be said to be a set of rules enacted 
under the statute of a state.213 Barton stated that an institution, an objective or 
set of objectives, the power to make rules or standards, authorisation and permits, 
procedure, monitoring, and surveillance, enforcement and accountability make up 
for the standard traditional state regulations.214 All the above are essential in 
ensuring the efficient management of petroleum resources in a petroleum-rich 
state, and are usually pioneered by the NOC. 
 
When an ownership with control form is established in the petroleum industry, 
through the NOC, as expected, the managers of the NOC will be concerned with 
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comes with competing internationally to win production contracts abroad, which 
will require the NOC to maintain better control over its finances in carrying out its 
obligations.215 NNPC is yet to maintain a high petroleum production through her 
subsidiary NPDC, and also has no operations abroad.  
 
 
4.6 NOC Role in State Ownership and Control   
 
Paul Steven asserted that for a state to embark on resource nationalism, there 
has to be a NOC.216 The rising power and influence of NOCs in the global petroleum 
industry have changed the relationship structures in the global petroleum 
industry, as petroleum-rich countries no longer need to rely on IOCs for capital 
and technology, as these can be readily available for purchase on the international 
markets.217 Additionally, NOCs provide political advantages. The advanced NOCs 
now ally with other NOCs in the development of natural resources.218 Ownership 
control through NOCs guarantees the flow of oil revenues directly to the state’s 
pocket and is available for public spending. NOC dominance has been linked to its 
role as a promoter of economic growth and development.219 Promoting growth 
through oil revenues can be seen as an essential driver of resource nationalism.220 
Thus, resource nationalism has crucial policy implications for both petroleum 
exporting and importing countries. Arbatli observed that resource nationalism is 
far from disappearing in the global petroleum industry. However, nationalisations 
are much less frequent than in the 1960s and 1970s, and instead, it is taking new 
forms under regulatory control.221 
 
Resource nationalism policy choices that countries adopt with regard to their 
petroleum industry should enable the state to leverage its natural resources for 
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development while also engaging in institution building or strengthening.222 The 
growing government interventionism in the economy and especially in the 
petroleum industry of a state has been described as State Capitalism,223 and this 
has been observed in some emerging countries.224 Although this can be a good 
thing for the state, on the flip side, this government intervention gives rise to a 
form of crony capitalism which increases the power of those connected with the 
government, as observed in Argentina.225 In responding to the pessimist, there is 
a need to understand that the political natures of state-capitalist governments 
matter most to the economic and national security implications of modern state 
capitalism.226 
 
It is well known in the global petroleum industry that NOCs control the highest 
number of reserves, this denotes that governments and not IOCs or private 
companies own the world’s largest petroleum companies and control these 
reserves.227  Bremmer remarked that the people who run the NOCs usually have 
very close ties to the people that govern the country, and this is one key feature 
of state capitalism.228 He also put forward four principal actors in state capitalism: 
national oil corporations, state-owned enterprises, privately owned national 
champions, and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs).229 For this study, the primary 
attention will be on the National Oil Corporations/Companies, so as not to depart 
from the central theme of the study.230 The criticism of these close ties can lead 
to commercial decisions being left in the hands of political officials. They have little 
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Important to remember that the oil produced for the international market was 
progressively brought under state control around the 1970s and early 1980s which 
led to the loss of control of many deals by the IOCs with oil-exporting 
governments.232 This led to the rise of NOCs, which made NOCs a vital institution 
and agent of the state in resource development.233 Preachers and promoters of 
economic liberalization are still sceptical about the state control of petroleum 
resources, and yet following the history of the petroleum industry one can see 
that when it was in the hands of the IOCs, it was a monopoly. These companies 
controlled the hydrocarbons in the countries that were resource-rich, and these 
states had nothing to show for it.234 As it is well known, today, over 70 per cent 
of global oil reserves and control are owned and controlled by countries and their 
NOCs.235 
 
State control of its petroleum resources can be measured by the share of the 
state’s NOC in the overall national production of petroleum.236 The petroleum 
industry has undergone different power structures, in the 1970s and early 1980s 
the industry was brought under state control and the late 1980s and 1990s the 
industry saw a reverse in the control of the oil and gas industry.237 The critical 
discussions of the rationale for state ownership were gaining ground amongst 
policymakers around the world.238 The British government sold off its large shares 
in BP, and that was viewed as a bold step into privatization in support of the 
liberalization of the oil and gas industry. However, the movement into 
liberalisation by developing countries was primarily inspired by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) with the promotion of its Stabilisation Programmes.239 After 
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NOCs, as a tool to control the petroleum resources of a resource-rich country, has 
been the preferred means. However, one might argue that the use of NOCs cannot 
be effective without a robust and transparent regulatory framework. In all this 
evident, state control over its petroleum resources one can still argue that some 
IOCs in certain petroleum-producing countries exert what can be said is control 
over the petroleum resource industry of these countries.241  
 
Oystein stated that the key to economic and political success in managing 
petroleum resources in the petroleum industry is control.242 He further stated that 
direct state participation in the petroleum industry would assist the state in 
securing its national interests better than leaving it to free-market forces and in 
the hands of IOCs (private sector).243 For example, Brazil adopted a combination 
of select market liberalisation policies and some statist policies for the 
globalization strategy of its petroleum industry.244 
 
In determining the degree of state control, some factors have to be considered: 
Firstly, in developing countries the leaders and executives prefer to engage IOCs 
in the extraction of its natural resources, thus bringing foreign investment into the 
country which leads to less state control in the upstream sector; secondly, the 
inability of the state’s NOC to be able to carry out exploration and production of 
petroleum by its means, shows the lack of technical capabilities, which translates 
into less state control of the upstream sector of the petroleum industry; thirdly, it 
has been observed over the periods of high oil prices that state leaders exercise 
more control because higher oil prices lead to massive windfalls; fourthly, more 
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state control would be expected if the level of dependency by a state on petroleum 
revenues is as their primary source of income.245  
 
The question that arises is how much control over the oil and gas industry can a 
NOC from a developing nation exert on an industry in which it lacks a high level 
of technical capability? Following that, can a developing nation that is reliant on 
Foreign Direct Investment from IOCs into its oil and gas industry exert a high level 
of control over its resources?  
 
Nationalisation from a positive angle, in many ways, was a huge step forward for 
oil-producing countries in gaining greater control over their natural resources.246 
These all led to these states capturing a greater share of the profits from their 
petroleum resources.247 For example, nationalisation under President Morales can 
be argued to have given Bolivia back control over its natural resources. For 
instance, firms that invested in the natural gas of Bolivia were able to claim the 
resource as it is extracted from the ground. However, after the nationalisation 
that brought some legal changes, this gave the state control of natural gas until 
it reached its point of sale.248 In Bolivia’s case although nationalisation gave back 
control of the natural resources to the state, it did not bring with it the radical 
socio-economic change due to the path-dependent trajectories of the policies, 
contracts, and socio-material constraints that surround the extraction, transport 
and use of natural gas in Bolivia.249 
 
As observed by Kaup, the Bolivian nationalisation case provides a case which 
includes the possibilities and potential problems that any state might face as they 
try to gain and exercise greater control over their natural resources development 
path in an increasingly global petroleum economy.250 Coby commented that one 
 
245 Cemre Nur Öztürk (n 197). See also Tim Wegenast and Gerald Schneider n 198 and Bernard Mommer (n 16) 
134-140. 
246 Michael Lewin Ross, The Oil Curse (Princeton University Press 2013) 8. 
247 Nationalization helped the revenue of oil-rich states to grow dramatically, this gave the governments 
outstanding windfalls. As a result, these oil-rich governments grew richer and more powerful. In contrast, the 
average citizens of these oil-rich states often did not benefit from their resources. See Ibid., 8. 
248 Brent Z. Kaup n 98. 
249 Kaup contended that this situation was due to five main factors: existing contracts of sale, a set distribution of 
taxes from hydrocarbon rents, a general lack of industry capacity in YPFB the state NOC and the government, a 
lack of hydrocarbon exploration, and previously constructed transport infrastructure. Arguably, this same scenario 
would not be far from that of Nigerian petroleum industry. Brent Z. Kaup n 98. 
250 Brent Z. Kaup n 98. 
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of the novelties in the petroleum industry in the 1970s was the cartel power 
formed by the oil-producing governments from the developing countries.251 This 
observation goes to show that no matter how it is recounted, the importance of 
petroleum-rich developing states cannot be underestimated. As reserves were 
nationalised, this shifted the power structure in the global petroleum industry, 
which was dominated by IOCs. The ownership and control structure moved from 
the IOCs to NOCs or the governments where these petroleum resources were 
found. This then led to some attention being paid to the petroleum market policies 
and regulations of these governments.252  
 
The state ownership structure has always been criticised, and this was brought to 
light in the 1980s when the weakness of the state monitoring and regulating the 
activities of the petroleum industry was brought to the fore.253 There was some 
argument that these governments regulated the industry through OPEC so instead 
of getting their national policy right, so much effort was put into getting OPEC 
policies right.254 Most arguments against the nationalisation of the 1970s mainly 
came from consuming countries who were anxious about the steady supply of 
petroleum. However, this action by resource-rich developing states is no different 
from the ones taken by the United Kingdom and Norway in playing a dominant 
role in the development of petroleum resources in the North Sea.255 
 
A country’s general economic development strategy determines the ownership 
structure employed by the state to manage its petroleum resources.256 Different 
approaches have been employed by states rich in natural resources to assert their 
ownership. In a resource-rich state where the natural resource revenue represents 
a large portion of the economy, then the ownership of these natural resources is 
of significant importance to the country.257 Arguably, the present-day forms of 
resource ownership by the state are embedded in the 1970s nationalisation that 
 
251 Coby van der Linde (n 237) 3 – 8.  




256 Pauline Jones Jones and Erika Weinthal (n 46) 315. 
257 See Nicholas Haysom and Sean Kane (n 160); Silvana Tordo, Brandon S Tracy and Noora Arfaa (n 155) 28. 
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took place in the global petroleum industry, which in turn changed the ownership 
structures, evidenced by the establishment of NOCs taking over from the IOCs.258 
 
In modified support for the importance of institutions to a petroleum-rich state, 
Khanna asserted that regardless of the conditions of institutions in a petroleum-
rich state, the state can avoid the resource curse, by adopting private ownership 
of its petroleum resources. In contrast, the states with already good institutions 
can perform better by adopting state ownership and control.259  
 
An essential characteristic of national sovereignty and political decision-making is 
the state’s direct control over its natural resources.260 In order to affirm state 
ownership over natural resources, some of the petroleum-producing states 
changed their constitutions, or petroleum laws. In contrast, others relied on using 
the contracts they enter into with the IOCs to affirm their ownership through the 
contract terms.261 In reality, was that enough effort from the state in affirming its 
control over its natural resources? To emphasise this point, Luong and Weinthal 
stated that a state might own its petroleum resources but not necessarily have 
control over the petroleum resources.262 However, that is the situation in most 
petroleum developing countries which are rich in petroleum resources. As it is 
understood that the state exerts a level of control of its petroleum industry, the 
states NOC has to be involved in the E&P of the petroleum sector as an operator, 





This chapter took a stand, that resource nationalism can have a positive outlook 
for the state, and not always be viewed as an anti-Western strategy, by a state to 
claim ownership, and gain control over their petroleum resources. This can be a 
good strategy when done for the greater good of the petroleum-rich state. 
 
258 Gavin Lee Kretzschmar and Liliya Sharifzyanova, 'Resource Nationalism - Limits On FDI' [2009] SSRN 
Electronic Journal. 
259 Arpita Asha Khanna, 'Revisiting The Oil Curse: Does Ownership Matter?' (2017) 99 World Development 214. 
260 Christian Wolf, ‘Does Ownership Matter? The Performance and efficiency of State Oil Vs Private Oil (1987 – 
2006)’ (2009) 37 Energy Policy 2642. 
261 Coby van der Linde (n 237) 3 – 8. 
262 Pauline Jones Jones and Erika Weinthal (n 46) 9-16. 
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According to Barry, when thinking about ethics, whether in a national or 
international context, the well-being of individual human beings is the only thing 
that fundamentally matters.263 For instance, the recently proposed nationalisation 
of Northern Rail in the United Kingdom supports the fact that value creation for 
the people is usually the main goal of nationalisation, as the nationalisation 
strategy was resorted to, after numerous complaints and dissatisfaction from 
many British citizens.264 Likewise, with the petroleum sector, nationalising it 
should not be viewed as a cynical strategy by the state government, as long as 
value is created for the people. In like manner, Wegenast et al. in their empirical 
study claimed that in the presence of sound economic and political institutions, a 
NOC could pioneer the states’ economic growth and development.265 However it 
is, how the resource nationalism is carried out that matters. Therefore, if 
petroleum resource can aid in improving the wellbeing of a people, then care 
needs to be taken in the manner in which these natural resources are put to use.  
 
Regardless of the drivers of resource nationalism in a state, or the form, the 
essential factors to consider are its sustainability and the extent of its 
transformational potential. In other words, will the resource nationalism policies 
lay the foundation for institution-building, economic development, diversification, 
and globalised professional NOCs like Equinor? Alternatively, the dislodging of 
IOCs by the state, when there is a lack of knowledge and capacity development, 
leads to inefficiency, rent-seeking and locked-in social spending.266 Further, 
Bremmer, explained that governments from Europe usually intervene in the 
market and that European governments have a history of statism267 combined 
with social democracy which makes the nationalisation and bailouts more 
politically pleasant to the public, to maintain popular support from the people.268  
 
263 See Brian Barry, 'Statism And Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique' (1999) 41 Global Justice 12. 
264 See Tanya Powley and Jim Pickard, 'Northern Rail Franchise To Be Nationalised, Says UK Government' 
(Financial Times, 2020) <https://www.ft.com/content/42a20344-429b-11ea-abea-0c7a29cd66fe> accessed 20 
March 2020. See also, Gwyn Topham and Lucy Campbell, 'Northern Rail Franchise To Be Renationalised' (The 
Guardian, 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jan/29/northern-rail-franchise-to-be-
renationalised> accessed 20 March 2020. 
265 Tim Wegenast, Arpita Khanna and Gerald Schneier, 'The Micro-Foundations Of The Resource Curse: 
Ownership And Local Economic Well-Being In Sub-Saharan Africa' [2018] GSDS Working Paper No. 2 
<https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/handle/123456789/41571/Wegenast_2-
fofaixjy8n8a4.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y> accessed 20 March 2020. 
266 Paul A. Haslam and Pablo Heidrich (n 15) 234. 
267 “State-centred approach” is Statism for short. See Göran Therborn, 'Karl Marx Returning' (1986) 7 
International Political Science Review 131. 
268 Ian Bremmer (n 149) and Jonah D Levy in Jonah D Levy (ed) (n 39) 367 – 375.  
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Today, with the alliances continuing on in the global petroleum industry, one 
cannot categorically say that the industry will be state-dominated nor that it will 
move towards a liberalized global free market. That will be fully controlled by 
private forces instead of the global petroleum industry pointing towards a hybrid 
energy order in which all kinds of statist, private, and hybrid associations and 
partnerships of interest mix in competition over resources, but which would 
remain married to a system of states.269 Hammerson also commented that as 
ownership and control can be said to be resource nationalism ideas, therefore the 
contention models seen in today’s global petroleum industry is usually between 
political statist or resource nationalism against the free-market political model.270 
 
NOCs are no longer restricted within their borders. The downstream and upstream 
internalization of the NOCs in the oil and gas industry while also enjoying a 
monopoly in their home state has endangered the IOCs activities in the global oil 
and gas industry.271 
 
IOCs usually come with funds, and especially in the eyes of developing countries 
rich with petroleum resources, they consider the IOCs as a ‘necessary evil’.272 
Edwards commented that operatorship and control become the bargaining chip 
when the payment structures are being negotiated, and this becomes even 
significant if the NOC has operatorship.273 With what is going on in the petroleum 
industry, especially those from a developing country, the need for gaining higher 
revenue or rents from the exploitation of their petroleum resources, makes the 
reliance on the IOCs necessary, because that is the only way the government will 
maintain their rent-seeking ways. 
 
This chapter has attempted to draw on the literature of resource nationalism and 
its central concept of ownership and control. The chapters go further to contend 
 
269 Naná de Graaff n 39. 
270 Marc Hammerson, 'Legal Concepts: Introduction To Oil And Gas As An Asset Class', Three-day Workshop 
for National Oil Companies (Stephenson Harwood LLP 2020). 
271 Many NOCs see themselves as ‘hybrids’ as a result of their globalisation which sees them perform in the 
capacity of an IOC and also NOC. See Vlado Vivoda n 11. 
272 Armando Zamora, 'Strategic Implications Of Emerging Market-Oriented Latin American Petroleum Policies' 
(2014) 3 Energy Strategy Reviews 55-62. 
273 Tony Edwards, 'Prepayment Structures For Nocs', Three-day Workshop for National Oil 
Companies (Stephenson Harwood LLP 2020). 
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that a state cannot say that they own and control their petroleum resources 
without full participation in the exploration and production of their petroleum 
resources, especially the production phase. As reliance on the IOCs full 
engagement in the upstream sector of the state, while the state takes a back seat 
of rent collecting, means that the state does not have full control of their natural 
resource sector. The conceptualising of the ownership and control will come into 
play in the comparative chapter when the regulation control of natural resources 
are viewed from a developed and developing resource-rich states. 
 
Thus, the crux of this chapter is that Ownership and Control can be said to mean 
direct involvement or participation, and entails that the petroleum-rich state, must 
through its NOC be involved in the development and production of its natural 
resources before the nation can categorically say that it has control over its natural 
resources.
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CHAPTER FIVE - A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE NATURAL RESOURCE 
CURSE, AND ROLE OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The pre-salt is a gift from God. This wealth, if well explored and 
well administered, can propel great transformations in Brazil, 
consolidating change of the highest degree for our economy and 
improvement of the living conditions of our people. But the pre-
salt also presents risks and challenges… Poor countries that 
discovered vast oil, but did not resolve this question, continued to 
be poor…1  
 
These remarks by President Lula da Silva on August 31, 2009, during his speech 
to the Brazilian National Congress on the regulatory framework for the pre-salt 
petroleum reserves, expressed awareness of the natural resource curse, and the 
danger it can cause a petroleum-rich state. Expectedly, when tackling a problem, 
one identifies the problem, then one goes further to proffer solutions. The question 
of the resource curse is one that should be addressed by natural resource-rich 
countries, in particular those that fall into the list of countries plagued by the many 
ills or failures of the international petroleum industry. It is generally accepted that 
the ‘paradox of plenty’ of petroleum resources has plagued many countries, 
evidenced in developing countries that are rich in petroleum resources. 
 
In every petroleum-rich developing country, the effective management of their 
petroleum resources should aim at the improvement of the living standards of 
citizens within its territory. Falling short of that would be viewed by the public as 
a failure; usually, this is on the part of the government. Public expectations require 
that natural resource wealth should have a positive effect on a state, even 
 
1 Jewellord T. Nem Singh, 'Who Owns The Minerals? Repoliticizing Neoliberal Governance In Brazil And Chile' 
(2012) 28 Journal of Developing Societies 229. See also Doug Gray, 'Lula Gives TV Oil Speech' The Rio 
Times (2009) <https://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-politics/lula-gives-tv-oil-speech/> accessed 10 January 
2019. 
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estimating by economic principles. However, it all depends on how these natural 
resources are managed.2 This will be addressed further in this study. 
 
Recently, many vital surveys and empirical studies have been carried out by 
several economists and political authors, such as Robert Deacon, Anthony 
Venables, Jeffrey A. Frankel and Frederick Van Der Ploeg in an endeavour to 
evaluate and summarise the resource curse literature, as it expands.3 In the light 
of the available key literature on resource curse, the well-being of citizens across 
resource-rich countries has been demonstrated by the high level of disparity 
between some countries. Countries such as Norway and Brunei are ranked highly. 
In contrast, some resource-rich countries, including Nigeria, Yemen and Angola, 
are placed at the lower levels of the index by the United Nations Human 
Development Index.4  
 
According to Humphreys et al., the result of this resource wealth disparity does 
not only cut across these countries but also countries where the poverty level is 
extremely high, which leads to the outcome of having poor people in a natural 
resource-rich country.5 On the other hand, this idea of the resource curse can be 
disputed by political and economic analysts, as it all depends on the parameters 
or specifications used in assessing the state’s growth.6 It can be argued that the 
 
2 Daron Acemoglu, Simon H. Johnson and James A. Robinson, 'An African Success Story: Botswana' (2001) 
Working Paper 01-37 SSRN Electronic Journal 1. See also, Peter Cameron and Michael Stanley, The Extractive 
Industries Sourcebook (World Bank Group 2017) 4-6, and Maria Sarraf and Moortaza Jiwanji, 'Beating The 
Resource Curse: The Case Of Botswana' (The World Bank, 2001) 
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/18304/multi0page.pdf?sequence=1> accessed 7 
March 2019. See also Anthony J. Venables, 'Using Natural Resources For Development: Why Has It Proven So 
Difficult?' (2016) 30 Journal of Economic Perspectives 161. 
3 See Ramez Abubakr Badeeb, Hooi Hooi Lean and Jeremy Clark, 'The Evolution Of The Natural Resource Curse 
Thesis: A Critical Literature Survey' (2017) 51 Resources Policy 123. See also Robert Deacon, 'The Political 
Economy Of The Natural Resources Curse: A Survey Of Theory And Evidence' (2011) 7 Foundations and 
Trends® in Microeconomics 111; Jeffrey A. Frankel, 'The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey' [2010] National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 15836; Anthony J. Venables n 2;  Frederick van der Ploeg, 
'Natural Resources: Curse Or Blessing?' (2011) 49 Journal of Economic Literature 366 and Hajime Takatsuka, 
Dao-Zhi Zeng and Laixun Zhao, 'Resource-Based Cities And The Dutch Disease' (2015) 40 Resource and Energy 
Economics 57. 
4 See, 'Human Development Reports' (United Nations Development Programme, 2018) 
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/2018-update> accessed 27 April 2019. See Macartan Humphreys, Jeffery D Sachs and 
Joseph E Stiglitz, Escaping The Resource Curse (Colombia University Press 2007) 2. See also Lkhagva Gerelmaa 
and Koji Kotani, 'Further Investigation Of Natural Resources And Economic Growth: Do Natural Resources 
Depress Economic Growth?' (2016) 50 Resources Policy 312 and Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene and Ragnar 
Torvik, 'Institutions And The Resource Curse' (2006) 116 The Economic Journal 1. 
5 Macartan Humphreys and others (n 4) 2. See also Ragnar Torvik, 'Natural Resources, Rent Seeking And Welfare' 
(2002) 67 Journal of Development Economics 455. 
6 Sevil Acar, Curse Of Natural Resources (Palgrave Macmillan 2017) 159. 
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government is the curse, as the petroleum resources cannot decide how they are 
managed. Therefore the blame lies on whoever is in charge of managing these 
resources. 
 
This research focuses on petroleum resources as the primary natural resource of 
discussion in this study. This chapter builds on the broader literature on resource 
curse theories. It will not be engaging in the several hypotheses associated with 
the resource curse, oil-rentier state theories, and institutions. Instead, it will focus 
on the critical interrogation of already established literature, data, and variables 
to be used in the chapter discussion. This chapter will argue the importance of a 
NOC as one of the institutions of extraction, that can assist a state afflicted by the 
so-called ‘natural resource curse’.  
 
A thorough background examination of the resource curse, oil-rentier state (rent-
seeking), and institutions will be carried out to give insight into the thesis 
discussions, especially in the next chapter (comparative chapter). Theories of the 
resource curse and rentiers state will be critically analysed, in the narrow confines 
of the phenomenon in an attempt to establish NOC as the institution supporting 
the natural resource-rich state to efficiently harness the benefits of its petroleum 




5.2 Understanding the Complex Nature of the Natural Resource Curse 
 
Badeeb et al. comment on countries blessed with an abundance of petroleum 
resources, relying heavily on these resources as the main route for development 
and economic growth has gained some support recently.7 Although, this reliance 
on petroleum resources does not always lead to the anticipated growth of the 
economy, especially in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, as recently 
observed by some economists.8 Accordingly, under these circumstances, the 
countries are said to be suffering from the resource curse. Auty, on the contrary, 
 
7 See Ramez Abubakr Badeeb, Hooi Hooi Lean and Jeremy Clark n 3. 
8 Ibid. 
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claimed that natural resource-poor countries have been inclined to grow 
remarkably faster than the ones that are blessed with an abundance of natural 
resources, and this has been observed since the mid-1970s.9 Reconciling the 
influence of the results, abundance, and lack of petroleum resources on an 
economy would create an intriguing debate. The implications of economic 
development with and without petroleum resources will emerge. 
 
According to Ross the early 1980’s ushered in a group of oil-rich developing 
nations, where up to the present moment, the average citizen in these countries 
cannot claim to be benefitting from the countries petroleum resources.10 This 
situation has been referred to by many commentators as the ‘resource curse’.11 
In articulating the resource curse, Sachs and Werner asserted that the anomaly, 
whereby a natural resource-poor country’s economy performs better than a 
natural resource-rich country’s economy, continues to be the theme of economic 
history.12 For example, in the 17th century the Netherlands which were resource-
poor, surpassed Spain, notwithstanding the large amount of gold and silver Spain 
received from their colonies.13 In the 19th and 20th centuries, natural resource-
poor countries like Japan and Switzerland grew ahead of resource-rich countries 
like Russia.14 Most remarkably, natural-resource poor recently industrialized 
economies, like Singapore, Hong Kong and Korea are amongst the economic star 
performers, while resource-rich countries like Nigeria and Venezuela are 
struggling economically.15 The state fails to manage these natural resources in 
ways that will advance the growth of these economies.16  
 
9 Richard M. Auty (ed), Resource Abundance And Economic Development (Oxford University Press 2004) 1-2. 
See also Richard M Auty, 'The Political Economy Of Resource-Driven Growth' (2001) 45 European Economic 
Review 839. 
10 Michael Lewin Ross, The Oil Curse (Princeton University Press 2013) 1. 
11 Ibid. As already demonstrated by some studies, resource curse is the negative relationship between economic 
growth and natural resource abundance. See Lkhagva Gerelmaa and Koji Kotani n 4; Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew 
M. Warner, 'The Curse Of Natural Resources' (2001) 45 European Economic Review 827; Frederick van der 
Ploeg n 3. 
12 See Jeffery D Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, 'Natural Resource Abundance And Economic Growth' [1995] 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No. 5398. See also Anne D. Boschini, Jan 
Pettersson and Jesper Roine, 'Resource Curse Or Not: A Question Of Appropriability' (2007) 109 Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics 593; Hossein Mahdavy, ‘The patterns and problems of economic Development in Rentier 
States: the case of Iran’ in M. A Cook (ed), Studies In The Economic History Of The Middle East From The Rise 
Of Islam To The Present Day (Oxford University Press 1970) 432. 
13 Ibid. See also, Robert Deacon n 3. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Sevil Acar (n 6) 2. See Melina Ey and Meg Sherval, 'Exploring The Minescape: Engaging With The Complexity 
Of The Extractive Sector' (2016) 48 Area 176. 
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The oil or petroleum resource curse will be central in this chapter, as this study 
focused on petroleum resources. The petroleum industry is one of the world’s 
largest industries which makes it pertinent to understand the resource curse in 
these developing countries who rely heavily on their petroleum resources which 
assist in fuelling their economies.17 Dependence and reliance on the petroleum 
and mineral industries are usually measured by the share of earnings from these 
natural resources (commodities) in the total export earnings and by the tax 
revenue generated from these resources as a share of the total fiscal revenue.18 
 
According to Ross, the oil curse has been debated over time, with some observers 
pointing accusing fingers at the Western powers who interfered with the oil-rich 
country’s government, and other observers blaming the IOCs that go into these 
countries to make huge profits at all cost.19 Although this may be true, in recent 
past, some oil-rich states like Iran, Venezuela and Russia have resisted the 
pressures from the Western states, and ferociously blocked any form of 
interference from the West. Nevertheless, they still suffer the same resource curse 
problem as the other accommodating petroleum-rich countries.20 Accommodating 
petroleum-rich countries, therefore, implies countries that accept the western 
powers way of doing things, especially in the petroleum industry. 
 
It is puzzling to observe countries, which are supposedly rich in natural resources, 
yet still have a high level of poverty present in their various economies. Ross 
referred to poverty that can be linked to resource export as the Dutch disease and 
the resource curse, and these terms have been used interchangeably by 
journalists in capturing the situations in some oil-rich developing countries.21 
Waldner and Smith asserted that rentier state and resource curse theory are 
strictly related; as the outcomes of these theories are usually conditional on weak 
 
17 See Degol Hailu and Chinpihoi Kipgen, 'The Extractives Dependence Index (EDI)' (2017) 51 Resource Policy 
251. See also Michael Ross (n 10) 3. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Michael Ross (n 10) 4. 
20 Michael Ross (n 10) 4. 
21 Michael Ross (n 10) 48. See Sevil Acar (n 6) 12-13. Also income inequality and curse on educational spending. 
See Osiris J. Parcero and Elissaios Papyrakis, 'Income Inequality And The Oil Resource Curse' (2016) 45 
Resource and Energy Economics 159 and Lara Cockx and Nathalie Francken, 'Natural Resources: A Curse On 
Education Spending?' (2016) 92 Energy Policy 394. 
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state institutions.22 To emphasise, as these countries discover natural resources, 
especially petroleum in huge quantity within their territories, they begin to 
perform worse than countries that are not rich in natural resources like them.23 
Some of the poorest and wealthiest countries of the world are composed of 
countries that are rich in natural resources.24 For instance, some OPEC member 
countries experienced this oil curse, as they became poorer in 2005 than they 
were 30 years earlier; precisely because the Dutch disease aspect of the resource 
curse plagued these countries.25  
 
The argument is that these countries face, political, economic and social 
challenges, identified as the different features of the resource curse.26 The 
resource curse paradox proposes slower economic growth for resource-rich 
countries, in contrast to resource-poor countries.27 Debates about this curse, 
based on the type of natural resource in question, have taken place.28 The 
existence of the resource curse phenomenon has been debated, and the 
supporting evidence shows the widespread presence of the phenomenon.29 High 
levels of poverty, poor healthcare and low life expectancy are some of the 
surprising findings that have been known to be the characteristics of the resource 
 
22 David Waldner and Benjamin Smith, ‘Rentier State and State Transformation’, in Stephan Leibfried and others 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook Of Transformations Of The State (Oxford University Press 2015) 714. 
23 Emeka Duruigbo, 'The World Bank, Multinational Oil Corporations, And The Resource Curse In Africa' (2005) 
26 University of Penn Journal of International Economics Law 
<https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1207&context=jil> accessed 22 January 2019. 
24 Ragnar Torvik, 'Why Do Some Resource-Abundant Countries Succeed While Others Do Not?' (2009) 25 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 241. 
25 Michael L. Ross, 'Blood Barrels - Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict' (2008) 87 Foreign Affairs 2. 
26 Naazneen H. Barma, 'The Rentier State At Work: Comparative Experiences Of The Resource Curse In East 
Asia And The Pacific' (2014) 1 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies 257. 
27 Christa N. Brunnschweiler and Erwin H. Bulte, 'The Resource Curse Revisited And Revised: A Tale Of 
Paradoxes And Red Herrings' (2008) 55 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 248. See also 
Indra Overland, ‘Introduction: Civil Society, Public Debate and Natural Resource Management’ in Indra Øverland 
(ed), Public Brainpower: Civil Society and Natural resource Management (Palgrave Macmillan 2018) 1-2. 
28 Caitlin C. Corrigan, 'Breaking The Resource Curse: Transparency In The Natural Resource Sector And The 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative' (2014) 40 Resources Policy 17. See Anne D. Boschini, Jan 
Pettersson and Jesper Roine n 11; Jonathan Isham and others, 'The Varieties Of Resource Experience: How 
Natural Resource Export Structures Affect The Political Economy Of Economic Growth' (2005) 19 The World 
Bank Economic Review 141; Jann Lay and Toman Omar Mahmoud, 'Bananas, Oil, And Development: Examining 
The Resource Curse And Its Transmission Channels By Resource Type' (Econstor.eu, 2019) 
<https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/3267> accessed 18 April 2019. 
29 Emeka Duruigbo n 22. See also Emma Gilberthorpe and Dinah Rajak, 'The Anthropology Of Extraction: Critical 
Perspectives On The Resource Curse' (2016) 53 The Journal of Development Studies 186; S. Erdem Aytaç, 
Michael Mousseau and Ömer Faruk Örsün, 'Why Some Countries Are Immune From The Resource Curse: The 
Role Of Economic Norms' (2016) 23 Democratization 71 and Andrew Rosser, 'Escaping The Resource Curse' 
(2006) 11 New Political Economy 557. 
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curse, especially in an oil-rich developing country.30 The poor economic 
performance of resource-rich economies continues to validate the theory of 
resource curse, which posits that rather than promote economic growth, the 
abundance of these natural resources does the opposite.31 There are many 
explanations and factors in this negative outcome. For example, Dutch disease, 
rent-seeking, weak institutions and extractivist enclaves32 are some factors that 
explain the poor economic performance.33 Sachs and Warner, in their empirical 
studies, affirmed the unfavourable effects of natural resource dependency.34 The 
resource curse is a solid fact that has been established by some empirical 
studies.35 Conversely, natural resources being a blessing to a resource-rich state 
has also been established.36 For example, Botswana and Norway are success 
stories of countries with an abundance of natural resources.  
 
According to Karl the ‘petroleum resource curse’ can be referred to as the 
astonishingly adverse outcome of petroleum resources in countries that are reliant 
 
30 Terry Lynn Karl, ‘Understanding the Resource Curse’ in Svetlana Tsalik and Anya Schiffrin (eds), Covering 
Oil: A Reporter's Guide To Energy And Development (Open Society Institute 2005) 22; Hirdan Katarina de 
Medeiros Costa and Edmilson Moutinho dos Santos, 'Institutional Analysis And The “Resource Curse” In 
Developing Countries' (2013) 63 Energy Policy 788; Carole Nakhle, 'Towards Good Governance Of The Oil And 
Gas Sector In The MENA' [2017] Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) 
<https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/page_attachments/oilgasgovernance-arab-final-
submitted.pdf> accessed 13 March 2019. 
31 Jahangir Amuzegar, Managing the Oil Wealth: OPEC's Windfalls and Pitfalls (IB Tauris 1999) 190. See also 
Lkhagva Gerelmaa and Koji Kotani n 4; Elissaios Papyrakis, 'The Resource Curse - What Have We Learned From 
Two Decades Of Intensive Research: Introduction To The Special Issue' (2017) 53 The Journal of Development 
Studies 175; Jahangir Amuzegar, 'Oil Wealth: A Very Mixed Blessing' (1982) 60 Foreign Affairs 814. 
32 See Muriel Côte and Benedikt Korf, 'Making Concessions: Extractive Enclaves, Entangled Capitalism And 
Regulative Pluralism At The Gold Mining Frontier In Burkina Faso' (2018) 101 World Development 466 and 
Matthew Himley, 'Extractivist Geographies: Mining And Development In Late-Nineteenth And Early-Twentieth-
Century Peru' (2018) 46 Latin American Perspectives 27. 
33 Stefan Peters, ‘Beyond Curse and Blessing: Rentier Society in Venezuela’ in Bettina Engels and Kristina Dietz 
(eds), Contested Extractivism, Society And The State: Struggles Over Mining And Land (Palgrave Macmillan 
2017) 47-48. 
34 Jeffery D Sachs and Andrew M. Warner n 10. See also, Ramez Abubakr Badeeb, Hooi Hooi Lean and Jeremy 
Clark n 3 ; Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong, 'Combating The Resource Curse: An Alternative Solution 
To Managing Mineral Wealth' (2006) 4 Perspectives on Politics 35. 
35 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner n 10; Alan H Gelb, Oil Windfalls: Blessing Or Curse (Oxford 
University Press 1988); Ivar Kolstad, 'The Resource Curse: Which Institutions Matter?' (2009) 16 Applied 
Economics Letters 439; Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, Oil Is Not A Curse : Ownership Structure And 
Institutions In Soviet Successor States (Cambridge University Press 2010) 1-2; Jørgen Juel Andersen and Silje 
Aslaksen, 'Constitutions And The Resource Curse' (2008) 87 Journal of Development Economics 227; Arpita 
Asha Khanna, 'Revisiting The Oil Curse: Does Ownership Matter?' (2017) 99 World Development 214; Hirdan 
Katarina de Medeiros Costa and Edmilson Moutinho dos Santos n 29 and Chong-Sup Kim and Seungho Lee, 
'Regime Types, Ideological Leanings, And The Natural Resource Curse' (2017) 29 Constitutional Political 
Economy 1. 
36 See Frederick van der Ploeg n 3; S. Erdem Aytaç, Michael Mousseau and Ömer Faruk Örsün n 28; Emeka 
Duruigbo, 'Permanent Sovereignty And Peoples' Ownership Of Natural Resources In International Law' (2006) 
38 The George Washington International Law Review 33; Maria Sarraf and Moortaza Jiwanji (n 2). 
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on these natural resources.37 According to Obi, rent-seeking, corruption, the Dutch 
disease, and conflict are all negative consequences of the resource curse.38 For 
example, Ross remarked, that embarking on building new capital cities, by the 
Nigerian and Kazakhstan government rather than providing running water was a 
wasteful project and that well-governed states with a highly educated population 
and varied economies like Canada and Norway performed better with their 
petroleum resources windfall.39 
 
Many factors influence the success of these resources in creating value for the 
people. Factors like corruption, lack of transparency and conflict tend to add to 
the problems of these petroleum-rich developing countries. To consider all these 
variables would deviate from the research focus. Nonetheless, these variables 
have been proven to be important in the discussions of the resource curse as the 
appraisal of the phenomenon of corruption is substantially onerous.40 According 
to Graham and Ovadia, transparency has been proposed to be the leading solution 
to tackle corruption in the petroleum industry.41 Corruption comes in different 
forms—for instance, policy corruption, commercial corruption, administrative 
corruption and grand corruption. 
 
Corruption has been viewed as the leading cause of the petroleum curse and 
manifest in the form of rent-seeking.42 However, there have been some arguments 
 
37 Terry Lynn Karl, ‘Understanding the Resource Curse’ in Svetlana Tsalik and Anya Schiffrin (eds) (n 29) 21-
24. 
38 Cyril I. Obi, 'The Petroleum Industry: A Paradox Or (Sp)Oiler Of Development?' (2010) 28 Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 443. See also Horatiu A. Rus, 'Corruption, Conflict And The Management Of 
Natural Resources' (2014) 15 Economics of Governance 355 and Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella, 'Rents, 
Competition, And Corruption' (1999) 89 American Economic Review 982. 
39 Michael L. Ross n 25. See also Steinar Holden, 'Avoiding The Resource Curse The Case Norway' (2013) 63 
Energy Policy 870; Inge Amundsen, 'Drowning In Oil: Angola' S Institutions And The “Resource Curse”' (2014) 
46 Comparative Politics 169 and Thorvaldur Gylfason, 'Natural Resources, Education, And Economic 
Development' (2001) 45 European Economic Review 847. 
40 See Paasha Mahdavi, 'Institutions And The “Resource Curse”: Evidence From Cases Of Oil-Related Bribery' 
[2019] Comparative Political Studies 1. See also Rabah Arezki and Markus Brückner, 'Oil Rents, Corruption, And 
State Stability: Evidence From Panel Data Regressions' (2011) 55 European Economic Review 955. 
Also, the Rafsanjani-Statoil Corruption Case, See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes, Managing 
Resource Abundance And Wealth: The Norwegian Experience (Oxford University Press 2017) 234-237; 
Odebrecht Graft, See Michael Smith, Sabrina Valle and Blake Schmidt, 'No One Has Ever Made A Corruption 
Machine Like This One : There's Graft, And There's Odebrecht Graft' (Bloomberg.com, 2017) 
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41 Emmanuel Graham and Jesse Salah Ovadia, 'Oil Exploration And Production In Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-
Present: Trends And Developments' (2019) 6 The Extractive Industries and Society 593. 
42 Ibid. 
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that the curse is a political one,43 then it is a resource curse, as petroleum 
resources on their own cannot lead to a curse.44 As these minerals on their own 
cannot be blamed for the issues of conflict, corruption and rent-seeking, rather 
the problem lies with the policymakers and the government.45  
 
The political resource curse model posits that the abundance of these natural 
resources affects the resource-rich state’s governance negatively.46 The political 
resource curse empirical findings in Brollo et al. show the negative impact of a 
natural resource windfall, thus leading to political corruption and political 
selection.47 In like manner, Collier and Venables with some case study evidence 
suggest that looting, corruption, conflict and accountability are some reasons that 
the abundance of natural resources creates a high risk of state fragility and 
jeopardises the quality of governance.48 Consequently, the importance of good 
governance when it comes to petroleum resources cannot be over-emphasised, 
as these resources have high value and are vital in facilitating economic and social 
development in the state.49 
 
The role of the elites and the ruling group of a state play has been highlighted in 
the analysis of the petroleum resource curse. Concerning the role elites or the 
ruling groups of a State play, when it comes to the resource curse debate, Victor 
et al. commented that it is a well-known fact that in most oil-producing countries, 
oil windfalls are usually distributed among a small group of elites who are close to 
the government, this occurrence is predominant, in a resource-rich developing 
country.50 For example, the patronage system was built by two of the longest-
 
43 See Desiree A. Desierto, 'Formal Models Of The Political Resource Curse' (2018) 19 Economics of Governance 
225. 
44 See Gavin Wright and Jesse Czelusta, 'Why Economies Slow: The Myth Of The Resource Curse' (2004) 47 
Challenge 6. 
45 Matthias Basedau and Jann Lay, 'Resource Curse Or Rentier Peace? The Ambiguous Effects Of Oil Wealth 
And Oil Dependence On Violent Conflict' (2009) 46 Journal of Peace Research 757. 
46 See Fernanda Brollo and others, 'The Political Resource Curse' (2013) 103 American Economic Review 1759. 
See also Desiree A. Desierto n 43. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Paul Collier and Anthony J. Venables, 'Natural Resources And State Fragility' [2010] European University 
Institute Working Paper 36 
<https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/13860/RSCAS_2010_36.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> 
accessed 3 March 2020. 
49 Ibid. 
50 David G Victor, David R Hults and Mark Thurber, Oil and Governance (Cambridge University Press 2014) 22.  
See Coby van der Linde, The State and The International Oil Market (Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000) 88. See 
also Arpita Asha Khanna (n 29); Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig, 'It's The Rents, Stupid! The Political Economy Of 
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serving presidents of petroleum-rich countries in Africa, President Obiang of 
Equatorial Guinea and President Dos Santos of Angola.51 This patronage system 
was made possible because they had access to money from the country’s 
petroleum resources.52 The rentier state theory established the roles played by 
the IOCs in providing rent income from oil which contributed to the setting up of 
the elite social class (ruling class) and also kept sustaining them.53 
 
The economic growth of a petroleum-rich state is one this study pursues, albeit 
through the state’s NOC. Thus, it carefully and sceptically aligns with the above 
assertion, with the undeniable evidence of corruption, and the mismanagement of 
petroleum resource revenues.54 As the abundance of natural resources has been 
linked to the resource curse, in like manner so has corruption.55 In assessing 
economic growth, Amuzegar asserted that the nature of the political system, or 
regime type, and quality of governance have been viewed by some theses as an 
essential factor.56 From authoritarian governments and economic performance to 
democratic governments supported by free-market ideologies are all in close 
connection for raising living standards and the connection between the 
effectiveness of a bureaucracy in leading a country out of poverty.57 According to 
 
The Resource Curse' (2009) 37 Energy Policy 5317; Jesse Salah Ovadia, 'The Making Of Oil-Backed Indigenous 
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52 See Ivar Kolstad and Abel Kinyondo, 'Alternatives To Local Content Requirements In Resource-Rich Countries' 
(2016) 45 Oxford Development Studies 406 
53 See, Thomas C. Heller, 'African Transitions And The Resource Curse: An Alternative Perspective' (2006) 26 
Economic Affairs 24. 
54 For example see: 'Nigeria Loses Billions Of Dollars To Prolonged Bid Rounds' (The Nation Newspaper, 2019) 
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accessed 29 April 2019 and 'Nigeria: Kachikwu Acknowledges Falana's Letter, Silent On Lawyer's Query Over 
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56 See Jahangir Amuzegar (n 30) 194. See also Alan H Gelb (n 34) 138-140; Christian Houle, 'A Two-Step Theory 
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Besley et al., political competition usually leads to the adoption of policies that 
would encourage economic growth, while the lack of political competition will 
hamper economic growth.58 They further claimed, that just as in economics 
monopoly is never a good thing, and market competition between companies, 
raises consumer welfare.59 In like manner, as having different political parties 
competing, rather than having one dominant ruling party, is observed in some 
democratic states. 
 
Although the existence of this curse has been shown, yet there has been a level 
of bias resulting from some other unobserved growth restraint that has resulted 
in the presence of the resource curse.60 In the context of a resource-rich 
developing country, for the resource curse to be understood, certain levels of 
analysis should be brought to bear.61 Likewise, Orihuela argued that for a more 
distinct explanation of the resource curse, the political economy viewpoint could 
play a part, thus helping to fill the gap.62  For instance, Nigeria, as a natural 
resource-rich developing country, has been synonymous in many studies as an 
example when the ‘resource curse’ theory is mentioned.63 Many studies tend to 
focus on the topic of high corruption, authoritarian regimes, poor governance and 
low-quality institutions.64 These are all important, but some of these studies have 
come short of explaining why the governments of these developing countries fail 
to take reformatory measures in rectifying the situations in their petroleum 
 
58 See Timothy Besley, Torsten Persson and Daniel M. Sturm, 'Political Competition, Policy And Growth: Theory 
And Evidence From The US' (2010) 77 Review of Economic Studies 1329. 
59 Ibid. 
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Findings from Country Case Studies of Oil and Gas Producing Countries’ in Indra Øverland (ed) (n 26) 371-377. 
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industries.65 For a net exporter of commercial energy, Africa’s energy 
circumstances are confusing, in the sense that, the continent produces about 8% 
of the world’s commercial energy.  
 
In comparison, it only consumes 3% of the global commercial energy, and there 
seems to be a glaring hindrance in its access to energy, that will drive economic 
growth and reduce poverty in the continent.66 On the contrary, some countries 
have used their natural resources to achieve economic development.67 For 
example, Norway transformed its economy that was one of the poorest in Europe 
in the 1900s to one of the richest by effective utilization of its resources.68 It is 
also important to note that some resource-poor countries have achieved desirable 
heights in economic growth and social development.69 The absence of these 
resources can be argued to have helped these countries to focus on all the aspects 
of the country’s economy, rather than depend on the oil and gas industry for their 
economic growth. 
 
Diversifying an economy away from petroleum and the use of petroleum funds are 
some of the remedies advanced by Shaxson to help a developing country escape 
the resource curse.70 Social interests and interests of survival have compelled the 
government of Nigeria to use its NOC as a wide-scale discretionary patronage for 
diverse bureaucratic, regional, and ethnic interest groups, to the degree that few 
funds were left for the infrastructure.71 The inconsistency of the management of 
the public sector is a result of intense politicisation and control by a small interest 
group, which highlights out that Nigeria is a typical example of a kleptocratic 
state.72 
 
65 See Gilles Carbonnier and Fritz Brugger in Andreas Goldthau (n 64) 65-70, 72. See also, Douglas A. Yates, 
The Rise and fall of Oil-Rentier States in Africa, in J. Andrew Grant, W. R Nadège Compaoré and Matthew I 
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66 Ibid. 
67 See Emeka Duruigbo n 22. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 See Nicholas Shaxson, 'New Approaches To Volatility: Dealing With The ‘Resource Curse’ In Sub-Saharan 
Africa' (2005) 81 International Affairs 311. See also Fakhri Hasanov, 'Dutch Disease And The Azerbaijan 
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There should be a change in fortune for Africa because it is a continent with large 
quantities of natural resources. Natural resources have been discovered in some 
Western, Eastern and Central African countries.73 One may question, how much 
of these resources have benefited the citizens of these countries, and also the 
development of Africa as a continent? Correspondingly, in explaining the political-
economic perspective of the resource curse, Ayelazuno raised a salient question; 
how is it possible that amid the abundant natural resource wealth, especially in 
African countries, there still exists the presence of grinding poverty?74 Further, 
Ayelazuno cited Nigeria as an example of an African country where this situation 
exists.75 Although recent attempts to remedy the situation has been observed in 
the adoption of local content policies.  
 
This implementation of national and local content policies in the petroleum 
industry by some governments has been viewed as an attempt to escape the 
curse, by ensuring that the average citizen of the country benefits from the 
exploitation of the petroleum resources.76 The positive impact of this policy is yet 
to be seen. To critically investigate the resource curse, economic and political 
factors will be raised. Badeeb et al. advanced the importance of investigating the 
natural resource curse and argued that it can be divided into economic and political 
categories, although they still overlap.77 The resource curse literature reviews 
proffer economic and political dimensions to the resource-rich economies and how 
these resource booms can adversely affect these economies.78 It is also important 
to realise that other factors can affect the economy of these states where the 
abundance of these resources leads to a negative outcome for the economy. 
Therefore, for this study, the economic and political dimension lines of reasoning 
will be used in advancing this study’s arguments. 
 
 
73 Godwin Onuoha n 60. See Thomas C. Heller n 53 and Jon Phillips, Elena Hailwood and Andrew Brooks, 
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74 See Jasper Ayelazuno, 'Oil Wealth And The Well-Being Of The Subaltern Classes In Sub-Saharan Africa: A 
Critical Analysis Of The Resource Curse In Ghana' (2014) 40 Resources Policy 66. See also Jacques Lesourne 
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76 Godwin Onuoha n 60. 
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Finally, this section embarks on an analysis of the resource curse and implications 
of these resources. The abundance of petroleum does not necessarily translate to 
economic development. Evident attempts have been made by some petroleum-
rich states, especially developing ones to mitigate this, especially by the 
implementation of local content policies. This, therefore, raises the question of the 
level of practical implementation. These arguments thus emphasise the role the 
government institutions, especially the states NOC play in achieving success in 
the exploitation and management of the petroleum resources. 
 
 
5.3 Political Dimension 
 
In advancing a political explanation of the resource curse, Robinson et al. claimed, 
that there are two ways in which natural resource revenues can be used; the 
government in power can either squander the revenue or can use this income 
from the natural resources as patronage, in making sure it retains power, 
especially for re-election purposes.79 They have created a formal model of 
patronage, where the main aim of the incumbent is to maintain power by choosing 
policies that will maximise the consumption of natural resources revenue.80 The 
unsatisfactory economic outcome connected to the political economy factor is 
linked to weak institutions and governance.81  
 
As argued in the previous chapter, NOCs in such states are usually used as the 
collector of these rents accruing to the state from the export of these natural 
resources, thus using the NOC as a cash cow.82 Therefore, in this section, resource 
nationalism and the rentier state theory are examined as the political aspects of 
the resource curse that afflicts the petroleum-rich states.  
 
79 See James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik and Thierry Verdier, 'Political Foundations Of The Resource Curse: A 
Simplification And A Comment' (2014) 106 Journal of Development Economics 194. See also Nathan M. Jensen 
and Noel P. Johnston, 'Political Risk, Reputation, And The Resource Curse' (2011) 44 Comparative Political 
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197 and Peter Cameron and Michael Stanley (n 2) 25. 
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27 Comparative Politics 1. 
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82 See Nordine Ait-Laoussine and John Gault, 'Nationalization, Privatization And Diversification' [2017] The 
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5.3.1 Resource Nationalism and Natural Resource Curse 
 
Following the arguments of the previous chapter (chapter 4), key elements of 
resource nationalism include ownership and control of petroleum resources which 
are generally owned by governments in most countries. The drive of any 
petroleum-rich state to own and control its petroleum resources was argued in 
chapter 4, as resource nationalism.83 Ross remarked that when governments in 
developing oil-rich states, officially, but not, in reality, owned their nations’ oil 
wealth in the 1950s, some of them received only a portion of the available rents.84 
However, observing nationalization from a positive angle, in many ways, it was a 
huge step forward for oil-producing countries in gaining greater control over their 
natural resources.85 These all led to these states capturing a greater share of the 
profits from their oil resources.86 Conceivably, nationalisation helped the revenue 
of the petroleum-rich states to grow dramatically, this gave the governments 
outstanding windfalls, because the petroleum policies were formulated based on 
resource nationalism.87 As a result, these petroleum-rich governments grew more 
productive and more powerful. In contrast, the average citizen of these 
petroleum-rich states did not benefit from their resources. This past situation of 
these Petro-state citizens will be evidenced shortly. 
 
In support of state control, Childs and Hearn commented that increased state 
control in the natural resource sector could lead to more benefits and fair 
petroleum wealth distribution to people of the state.88 According to Ganbold and 
Ali, in terms of the potential for petroleum wealth distribution across society, 
resource nationalism can be argued to have a favourable impact.89  
 
83 See Chapter 4. 
84 Eventually, the wave of nationalisation that engulfed the global oil industry in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s 
changed the ownership and control of the oil wealth. The 1960s and 1970s nationalization made it possible for 
these oil-rich states’ government to capture higher share of the oil rents. Expropriation raised some governments 
share of oil profits from 50 percent in the 1960s to 98 percent by 1974. See Michael Ross (n 10) 37- 41. 
85 Michael Ross (n 10) 8. 
86 See Michael Ross (n 10) 8; Matt Huber, 'Resource Geography II' [2018] Progress in Human Geography 1; John 
Childs and Julie Hearn, '‘New’ Nations: Resource-Based Development Imaginaries In Ghana And Ecuador' 
(2017) 38 Third World Quarterly 844. 
87 Guillaume Fontaine, José Luis Fuentes and Iván Narváez, 'Policy Mixes Against Oil Dependence: Resource 
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88 John Childs and Julie Hearn n 86. 
89 Misheelt Ganbold and Saleem H. Ali, 'The Peril And Promise Of Resource Nationalism: A Case Analysis Of 
Mongolia's Mining Development' (2017) 53 Resources Policy 1. 
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Therefore, instead of the majority of the revenue share from petroleum resources 
going to the IOCs, it goes to the government, as that is what resource nationalism 
in practice means.90 What then have these governments done with the petroleum 
windfalls? There should be progress in these economies, but in reality, it is not 
usually the outcome. Therefore, the resource curse is still prevalent in these 
countries even after they have nationalised their petroleum industry, and adopted 
strong economic policies that ensure that they obtain more rents from the IOCs, 
thereby reducing the amount of capital that has been sent back to the countries 
of these IOCs.91  
 
Some critical components of the petroleum curse point to the nationalisations of 
the 1960s and 1970s, which led to privatisation advocates to claim that state-
owned enterprises are economically incapable of running the oil and gas 
industry.92 Some commentators argued that although the governments are vast, 
secretive and unaccountable, privatisation will only replace them with large 
private, secretive and uncountable companies.93 For instance, in some countries, 
especially in the Middle East with strong NOCs that manage their facilities, talk of 
privatisation would mean that they would move to a more tax-based revenue.94 
Full or partial privatization could boost government accountability in some cases 
as this will make it harder for the oil revenues to be concealed.95 It is debatable 
whether public listing on the stock exchange would make these NOCs more 
transparent, even if the NOC is one where the government is the majority 
shareholder in a partially privatised company, such as Norway and Malaysia.96 
Stabilisation funds are usually set up by governments to hold surplus revenues 
when prices are high, in anticipation of draw down when the prices fall. For a 
stabilisation fund to succeed three components are needed: a process put in place 
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to bring down government expenditure when prices are high; a method to increase 
government expenditure when prices are low; and a procedure to link the two, so 
that money removed from the budget during the economic boom period is 
equivalent to the money added to the budget during the bust period.97 
 
The excessive borrowing on the international market, white elephant projects and 
subsidies are some of the economic policies adopted by these petroleum resource-
rich countries were unsustainable.98 For example, according to Obi, despite the 
state ownership legal structure in the Nigerian natural resource development 
sector, the country still lacks control of these natural resources, especially the 
petroleum resources.99 The argument is that the upstream petroleum sector is still 
dominated by IOCs, while the state-owned company NNPC and its subsidiary 
NPDC, play a secondary or minor role in the actual production of the major fields 
of the country. 
 
 
5.3.2 The Oil-Rentier State Theory 
 
Yates succinctly captured the situation of petroleum production and revenue 
generation in a petroleum-producing state in the following statement: 
 
when international organizations account for oil revenues as 
national income, rather than as a ‘drawdown of the capital value 
of the finite stock of a depletable resources’, the impression of real 
per-capita national wealth is confounded. Wealth is not being 
created, it is being consumed, and at conspicuous rates.100 
 
IOCs account for the majority of oil revenues accrued by a petroleum-rich state, 
especially in a developing state. The steady inflow of foreign revenue can cause 
over-reliance on rents from petroleum resources, as such will make these states 
oil-rentier ones. These petroleum resources which are being exported are 
 
97 Ibid.  
98 Frederick van der Ploeg n 63. 
99 Cyril I. Obi n 37. 
100 Douglas A. Yates, The Rentier State In Africa: Oil Rent Dependency And Neocolonialism In The Republic Of 
Gabon (Africa World Press 1996) 32. 
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exhaustible.101 This begs the question, are rentier states economies sustainable? 
H.E. Hamid Karzai,102 emphasising the importance of not being a rentier state 
forever, and attempting to achieve this, says much about over-reliance on 
external rents as a means of economic growth and sustainability.103 
 
The case for petroleum rents has been made by some economists and academics, 
like Smith, Kolstad and Kinyondo who argued that oil rents in a weak state could 
create long-lived but shallow stability.104 They suggested that the states used their 
windfall revenues to build state institutions and political organisations that could 
help the country during the low oil price period.105 These assertions may be true 
of some states, but some developing states still do not have strong institutions. 
What criteria can be used to define a weak state? According to Beblawi, no 
economy can be said to be free of rents, but one that is a rentier state is an 
economy that relies mainly on rents,106 as opposed to a state that generates 
revenue through taxation. Mahdavy’s work on the Arab world rentier states 
claimed that states that accrue substantial external rents regularly describe a 
rentier state in its broadest sense.107 In a developing oil-rentier state, the 
revenues of these resources are usually concentrated in the hands of the ruling 
elite, or political power groups, thus creating what Yates termed ‘the rentier 
class’.108 As oil revenues continue to increase and become the government’s 
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19 International Studies Perspectives 188. See also Joseph Stiglitz, 'Growth With Exhaustible Natural Resources: 
Efficient And Optimal Growth Paths' (1974) 41 The Review of Economic Studies 123. 
102 The former president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2004-2014). 
103 See Hamid Karzai, 'JISB Interview: ‘We Don't Want To Be A Rentier State Forever’' (2018) 12 Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding 442. 
104 Benjamin Smith, 'Oil Wealth And Regime Survival In The Developing World, 1960-1999' (2004) 48 American 
Journal of Political Science 232; Ivar Kolstad and Abel Kinyondo n 52 ; Hirdan Katarina de Medeiros Costa and 
Edmilson Moutinho dos Santos n 29. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Furthermore, Beblawi identified the main features of a rentier economy as follows: rents become the primary 
target for the economy. The majority of these rents would be externally generated, and only a fraction of the 
economy generate these rents, i.e. engagement in the generation of these rents are carried out by a few, for example 
the ruling class or elites of the society. Finally, the government in the rentier-state is the main receiver of the 
external rent, on behalf of the state. See Hazem Beblawi, ‘The Rentier State in the Arab World’ in Giacomo 
Luciani (ed), The Arab State (Routledge 2016) 87-88. See also Douglas A. Yates (n 100) 14. 
107 Hossein Mahdavy, ‘The patterns and problems of economic Development in Rentier States: the case of Iran’ 
in M. A Cook (ed) (n 11) 428. 
The inflow of vast amounts of rents, in form of foreign exchange, describes the system in which a rentier 
economies are premised on. See Douglas A. Yates (n 100) 11, 23. 
108 Yates further stated that: 
The rentier class does not need to create a national mythos giving credibility to the notion that it 
represents the common good. Because it spends and does not tax, the rentier class is liberated from 
the reliance on legitimation by its society and thus suffers no serious challenge to its power. 
 166 
primary source of revenue, this steady stream of revenue from oil turns the state 
and the majority of its internal activities into a distributive one.109 
 
Consequently, the distribution of rents when not properly or equally allocated can 
result in social conflict when a section of the country feels left out or believes the 
allocation to be unjust, it could resort to violence.110 This has been one of the 
reasons for the crisis that has been going on in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region.111 
Crude oil abundance and the revenue opportunities, especially in a rentier state, 
fuelled the motives for rebels to engage in armed conflict.112 Similarly, Wegenast 
and Schneider suggested that whoever controls the petroleum resources, whether 
privately, publicly, internationally or domestically determines the possibility of the 
extraction of the resource leading to conflict and violence.113 Although these links 
are not yet fully understood, the control by IOCs could elicit violence and conflict 
from the people of that region as seen in the Niger Delta, but the primary 
campaign that has disrupted petroleum resource production has been the claims 
of ownership of the petroleum resources by the region. 
 
Losman stated that contrary to the original use of the word ‘rent’ to describe 
returns to landowners, today the expression ‘oil-rentier state’ describes a state 
that accumulates most of its revenue from the exports of its petroleum 
resource.114 These oil-rentier states lack a productive outlook, as the revenues 
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(2010) 64 The Middle East Journal 427. See also Lucas I. González, 'Oil Rents And Patronage: The Fiscal Effects 
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from the petroleum resources largely contribute to the country’s gross domestic 
product as witnessed in the case of Nigeria.115 For example, Singh remarked that 
the Nigerian government relies heavily on the rentier oil revenue supplied by the 
IOCs, thus helping in sustaining the elite groups of the country.116 Rent-seeking 
activities have been observed in developing economies with significant 
evidence.117 For example, Hansen et al. claimed that in Tanzania, Mozambique 
and Uganda, it seems that the local content policies have been politicised, and 
somewhat gear towards the pursuit of power by the elite and maintaining this 
power.118 As a result, Africa’s growth is limited, as these ruling group continue to 
assign profitable but unproductive economic opportunities to their cronies to 
secure their legitimacy.119 This scenario can be observed in Nigeria, where the 
country’s elite, ruling group and political parties are focused on enriching 
themselves, and in the same vein maintain power in the country. 
 
On the other hand, Rutledge claimed that the ‘production state’ targets have a 
self-sustaining economic growth, unlike the rentier state that is mainly an oil rent 
collection, and allocating state.120 Gunton looked at resource rent positively and 
claimed that a sector of an economy that can generate substantial rents, especially 
one beyond the factors of production should be viewed as a significant advantage 
for that sector.121 It is acceptable to some extent, but when a petroleum-rich state 
relies heavily on revenue from the export of its petroleum resources, the outcome 
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is not usually favourable to the economy of the state, as these external revenues 
are not generated within the country. 
 
Luciani observed that an abundance of petroleum, high production, and export, 
gives the state a sense of freedom from raising income internally, thus leading 
the over-reliance on the petroleum revenue or rents.122 Equally, the abundance of 
petroleum resources usually leads to bad policy choices, less dependence on 
taxation, and weak monitoring of politicians by the citizens.123 For example, Almaz 
in testing the rentier state theory claimed that Azerbaijan could be categorised as 
a rentier state, and the revenues generated from the natural resource export 
hamper democracy.124  
 
Similarly, Houle suggested that petroleum exhibits various effects on various 
levels of the government transition process, and does harm to democracy.125 Ross 
contended that these claims that petroleum hampers democracy are both valid 
and statistically robust and that these detrimental influences of petroleum are not 
restricted to the Middle East, but also democratic states like Nigeria, Mexico and 
Malaysia.126 Conversely, O’Connor et al. argued that the abundance of petroleum 
resources does not have a negative effect on democratic institutions in the long-
run.127 
 
The rentier state has been argued to be the causal mechanism for a state 
performing poorly when blessed with an abundance of natural resources rather 
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than the resource curse theory.128 Furthermore, there arise some difficulties in an 
attempt to systematically investigating the causal path of resource curse, with 
analysis of the type or form of government in place as these resources are 
discovered.129 Contrary to the works of Sachs and Warner, Kolstad and Wiig 
asserted that the resource curse is not about the abundance of natural resources 
per se, but about the resource rent.130 Resource abundance impacts on the real 
exchange rate, and the cushion these rents give the government somewhat slows 
down the speed of any process of reforms.131 Chaudhry argues about the ability 
of a state to develop sound economic policies. The absence of this leaves the state 
weak and is directly related to the petroleum rents which it receives, and mars 
the positive development of active state bureaucracy.132  
 
The outcome will then be a state reliant on external rents to achieve economic 
growth. This leads to a rent collecting mentality. According to Karl, the ‘rentier 
psychology’ is caused when revenue from oil resources diminishes the authority 
of the state, which then creates an opportunity for public authorities and private 
interests to embark on rent-seeking.133 Similarly, Yates termed it the ‘rentier 
mentality’, and sees it as the distinction between the earned and unearned income 
from the state’s natural resources.134 Furthermore, Yates stated that for a rentier 
state the rewards of income and wealth does not come as a result of work, but as 
a result of chance. As the income from these natural resources are viewed as a 
free gift of nature.135 Could it be this mentality that is plaguing Nigeria, or some 
natural resource-rich developing state that has shown the same results, or is it 
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Yates claimed that this inflow of rents from the export of these natural resources 
misleads the rentier state into an optimistic future rise in revenues.136 Secondly, 
the elites or the ruling group of this rentier state become satisfied with the 
conditions. They are content to maintain the status quo, thus ensuring a 
continuous reliance, and steady inflow of these rents that assist in maintaining 
their social standing, class and power.137 Generally, rent-seeking as a strategy for 
wealth creation is usually rampant in a rentier state where the economic influence 
and political power are concentrated.138 According to Lahn and Stevens, these 
petroleum rents are usually accumulated by the ruling group or the country’s elite, 
and as a result, deters the need for the state’s institution building.139 
Consequently, what the scenario mentioned above does, is to hinder the state 
embarking on entrepreneurship and productivity in their economy; instead, they 
resort to rent-seeking.140 
 
Similarly, Badeeb et al. viewed rent-seeking as a political factor, which they 
observed as the need for the elite or ruling group to maintain political influence 
by benefiting from the natural resources.141 By the same token, Kurt Weyland in 
support of the theories of a rentier state affirmed that these rents or incomes from 
natural resources act as a support for the elites and ruling group of the country, 
especially in South American countries.142 For instance, Weyland claimed these 
revenues from natural resource wealth, are usually used by the elites and ruling 
group to circumvent political risks and for paying off any possible opposition.143 
This was observed in some South American countries, like Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Venezuela.144 
 
136 Douglas A. Yates (n 100) 21. 
137 Ibid, 21-22. Also, the current arguments about the present state of Moldova’s democracy capture this.  




accessed 22 April 2019. 
138 Terry Lynn Karl, ‘Understanding the Resource Curse’ in Svetlana Tsalik and Anya Schiffrin (eds) (n 29) 25-
26.  
139 Glada Lahn and Paul Stevens, ‘ The Curse of the One-Size-Fits all Fix: Re-evaluating what we Know about 
Extractives and Economic Development’ in Tony Addison and Alan Roe (eds) (n 81) 97. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ramez Abubakr Badeeb, Hooi Hooi Lean and Jeremy Clark n 3. 
142 See Kurt Weyland, 'The Rise Of Latin America's Two Lefts: Insights From Rentier State Theory' (2009) 41 
Comparative Politics 145. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. See also, Thad Dunning, 'Endogenous Oil Rents' (2009) 43 Comparative Political Studies 379. 
 171 
Waldner and Smith asserted that over-reliance on the revenues from the export 
of petroleum resources can lead to these outcomes, and could also lead to the 
government not taxing its citizens, and local economic players, as they are reliant 
on the rents from the abundant petroleum resources.145 Besley and Persson 
postulated that resource rents discourage politicians from investing in the state’s 
bureaucratic capacity, leaving the institutions weak.146 Kolstad and Wiig 
contended that natural resources in themselves do not give rise to resource curse 
but it is the rents from these natural resources that lead a state suffering from 
the resource curse.147 For example, Adibe et al. claimed that the Nigerian 
petroleum industry has a rentier nature, which limits the level of participation of 
the state or its NOC in the petroleum production process, as the government’s 
primary concern is an inflow of rent from petroleum resources.148  
 
The upstream activities of the Nigerian petroleum industry are dominated by the 
IOCs, thus limiting the state NOC-NNPC to rent collection. Usually, it is expected 
that the NOC of a state dominates its petroleum industry, particularly the 
upstream sector, hence ensuring that the state has firm control over its natural 
resources, especially the OPEC member states. Luong and Weinthal contended 
that the crucial link between petroleum resource wealth and the many adverse 
economic and political outcomes attributed to these resources is the cause of weak 
institutions.149 Important likewise is the state ownership and control structure.150 
Who owns and controls the development of these resources becomes an important 
variable to consider. Correspondingly, Luciani’s work on allocation vs production 
states, claimed that the allocation states rely on external petroleum revenue 
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accrued to the state from the sale of its petroleum, or a state where petroleum 
revenue makes up more than forty per cent of its GDP.151 On the other hand, the 
production state generates revenue internally, thus emphasizing the source of the 
revenue.152  
 
Arguably, developing states, rich in petroleum resources, are usually dependent 
on the petroleum industry, which is the mainstay of the economy. According to 
Karl, this shows the problematic connection between economic growth, poverty, 
bad governance, conflict, and injustice present in this group of petroleum-
dependent countries.153 Karl further argued that petroleum resources itself does 
not lead to this outcome, but it is the structures and incentives created by 
petroleum-dependence.154 These claims point to one thing, which is the negative 
effect of the abundance of petroleum resources, especially in a developing 
country. Remarkably, the goal to achieve economic development through these 




5.4 Economic Dimension 
 
The economic explanation of the resource curse usually raises the question, 
whether the abundance of natural resources to a country generally leads to 
economic development? The reliance on these natural resources as an export 
commodity for economic growth by a country, especially a developing country has 
been a source of concern for economists since the 1950s.155 This section seeks to 
analyse these concerns which have been labelled the Dutch disease, especially 
when it concerns petroleum resources. 
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5.4.1 The Dutch Disease  
 
The achievement of economic growth and development through petroleum 
resources is usually deterred when a state is afflicted by the Dutch Disease. This 
section, therefore, seeks to examine the Dutch disease, and ascertain the 
presence of the Dutch Disease in a petroleum-rich state, and how these petroleum 
resources can become a deterrent to an economy, rather than a blessing.  
 
In a bid to understand why a country with an abundance of natural resources will 
not be doing economically well, the Dutch disease has been argued to affect some 
countries. Petroleum rich states, especially some from developing countries, 
usually focus mainly on their petroleum sector, which in turn will lead to some 
decline in the other sectors of their economy. The discovery of an abundance of 
petroleum should assist the state progress economically, but more often than not 
this is not the situation. According to Corden and Neary, the Dutch Disease 
phenomenon has not been observed in developing countries alone, but also in 
developed countries.156 Generally, the booming sector is the extractive one, and 
the sector placed under pressure is usually the manufacturing sector.157 The 
manufacturing sector of the Netherlands economy started performing poorly as a 
result of the discovery of natural gas in the North Sea.158 The decline in other 
established domestic sectors of a country’s economy, which is a result of the 
discovery of natural resources, can be referred to as the “Dutch Disease”.159 
Further, the term “Dutch Disease” was coined by the Economist on November 26, 
1977, following the debate on the impact of natural gas on the Dutch economy.160 
 
Many studies have put forward empirical pieces of evidence for Dutch Disease 
effects.161 For example, Auty claimed that Russia’s dependence on its natural 
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resource rents impeded reforms, and slowed down the competitive diversification 
of the economy, which led to a sudden depreciation of the real exchange rate, 
following the 1998 oil shock.162 This shock may have cut up to 5% off the GDP, 
and thus affected the non-resource tradable sector negatively.163 Yates described 
the Dutch Disease as a pathology that has been discovered in some petroleum-
rentier economies, as a consequence of the oil-price shock that has occurred in 
the global petroleum industry.164 The rapid growth of the petroleum industry, 
which resulted in higher export of these petroleum resources usually leads to a 
decline in the relative size of the agricultural, and manufacturing sectors of an 
economy.165 For instance, industries built on the export of cocoa, palm oil and 
rubber in Nigeria were devastated by the fall of agricultural production value as a 
consequence of the Dutch Disease in the 1970s until the mid-1980s.166 This was 
a resultant of the discovery of petroleum, and the eventual government focus on 
this sector while neglecting the other sectors. 
 
The sector that tends to fall behind, is the agricultural sector, and this has been 
noted by many observers of the Dutch disease.167 Stevens observed that in 
developing countries that suffer Dutch Disease, the agricultural sector suffers 
most in these countries’ economy.168 As petroleum export values rise, this, in turn, 
makes for appreciation in the exchange rate, which makes the export of non-oil 
and gas commodities hard.169 On the whole, petroleum resources become the 
main priority at the expense of the long-established export sector, as was 
observed in Nigeria in the 1970s.170 In like manner, Frankel affirmed that the 
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abundance of natural resources such as hydrocarbons, minerals, and even 
possibly agricultural endowments could present adverse effects to a country’s 
economy, this assertion being supported by theoretical reasoning and statistical 
evidence.171  
 
Furthermore, Sachs and Werner observed that over-reliance on the export of a 
natural resource, chiefly petroleum for foreign exchange, makes these natural 
resource-rich countries susceptible to the Dutch Disease, thus leading to the 
country neglecting other sectors of their economy.172 The petroleum industry 
becomes the crown jewel of the nation, as the scramble to receive the vast rents 
from the export of petroleum resources intensifies. For example, a Nigerian 
scholar Pat Utomi connects the problems faced by the Nigerian economy to the 
Dutch Disease and he advanced his position using data which demonstrated, that 
in the period 1987 – 1990 when the country’s revenue dwindled, manufacturing 
increased - however, as petroleum revenues grew in 1991, it marked the end for 
the steady growth for the manufacturing sector, and the windfalls from petroleum 
have left the Nigerian economy stagnant.173 Equally, scholars looked at the 
economic problems of Nigeria, about its “stunted institutional growth”, and assert 
that waste and corruption from its petroleum resources rather than Dutch Disease 
is responsible for the economy’s poor performance and state.174 
 
In contrast, Norway is a success story in the manner in which they have managed 
their petroleum resources, and thus avoided the resource curse.175 In addition, 
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Gelb in an attempt to measure the Dutch disease in an economy, observed that 
the most significant shift to non-traded sectors occurred in Trinidad and Tobago 
and Nigeria, and this was observed in the early 1970s.176 Furthermore, Gelb 
assessing the impact of oil windfalls on an economic structure, divided non-oil 
economies into four key sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, construction, and 
services.177 Differently from Gelb, Sachs and Werner’s Dutch Disease model 
asserted that the economy has three sectors; a tradeable natural resource sector 
(usually the petroleum sector), a tradeable (non-resource) manufacturing sector, 
and a non-traded sector.178 The present-day effect of the Dutch disease on these 
economies should be critically examined, to ascertain whether the effects of the 
disease are present in their economies, or have they found a solution to it. 
 
Stevens claimed that the exact nature of the theory of Dutch Disease has been 
disputed, and the empirical pieces of evidence that have been put forward to 
support its existence are also questionable.179 Be that as it may, the present 
situation in countries like Venezuela and Nigeria tend to say otherwise as to the 
slow and stagnated growth of these economies can be perceived. In the same 
way, Gerelmaa and Kotani’s analysis of the Dutch Disease asserted that countries 
rich in natural resources experienced slow economic growth due to the Dutch 
Disease, as these countries depended highly on the national income generated 
from natural resources.180 Important to remember that petroleum resources are 
generally external resources, as crude oil is usually an export commodity. 
 
Going by the above analysis, achieving economic growth through natural 
resources seems tedious but obtainable. Finally, Stevens observed the issue of 
the resource curse, and how natural resources can be a blessing to a resource-
rich state, especially a developing country which is an exceptionally complicated 
matter.181 Although the pieces of literature are separated on both the cures and 
causes of the resource curse, there seem to be an increasing number of authors 
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in agreement, that the curse to some extent, fundamentally has to do with 




5.5 The Role Of Legal And Institutional Dimension 
 
The appropriate definition of an institution is still an on-going debate. The 
definition advanced by Douglass North has been used by many authors.183 The 
importance of institutions for economic growth cannot be overemphasised. 
According to North, institutions provide structure to an economy, and as this 
structure progresses, this would assist in steering an economy towards growth, 
decline, or stagnation.184 According to North, the performance of economies is 
usually influenced by institutions, and this assertion is not contentious.185 
Furthermore, North stated that institutions are the “rules of the game in a society” 
that “structures incentives in human exchange, be it social, economic, or 
political.186  He claimed that the minimisation of uncertainty by setting up a stable 
structure for everyday human life is the central role of the institutions in a state.187  
 
According to Acar, the fact that a state is rich in natural resources does not 
necessarily lead to unpleasant outcomes in every institutional context. Instead, 
this occurs only in some circumstances.188 Thought should be given to the 
interactions between natural resources and institutions, in a specific region, and 
at a particular time.189 Therefore, there is a need to understand how the extraction 
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of petroleum resources in a state interacts with the political system and 
institutions. The abundance of natural resources has been argued to shape the 
institutions and their quality, especially after the colonial period.190 
 
It is essential that the institutions relevant to this study be specified, although 
some of them will be critically analysed in chapter 6. In discussing the relevant 
institutions, Amundsen proffered “institutions of extraction” and the “institutions 
of redistribution”.191 Extraction institutions include the NOC of the state, Ministries 
of Finance and Petroleum, tax authorities, central bank, and the ruling party.192 
While the institutions of redistribution include: the parliament or legislature, and 
the judiciary, as these arms of the government are the institutions entrusted with 
the duties of checks on the executive, in a democratic country.193 Collectively, 
they advance the goal of economic development through the effective 
management of the petroleum resources, for the benefit of the state. 
 
Following the discussion of the resource curse, and rent-seeking states, some 
literature has considered institutions as an intermediary factor between resource 
wealth, economic development and social inequalities.194 At the same time, pieces 
of literature have argued the relationship and role of institutions for economic 
growth.195 In many ways, policies, political and economic institutions have been 
argued to be a vital element in the analysis of economic growth.196 Further, 
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Acemoglu et al. in support of this, claimed that political institutions ‘set the stage’ 
in which economic institutions can be formed.197 While, Flachaire et al. 
hypothesised that there are multiple growth systems and that the political 
institutions are the main factor in ascertaining what system a country is rightly 
placed in, as the use of these natural resources are usually influenced by the 
domestic political institutions.198 Human capital also plays a critical role in the 
connection between resource development activities and economic growth.199 
 
In determining whether natural resources have a positive or negative effect on 
the economic growth of a resource-rich state, Boschini, Pettersson, and Roine 
advanced the argument that in the absence of good institutions, an abundance of 
natural resources can lead to the resource curse, as natural resources by 
themselves cannot impair the economic growth of a state.200 Additionally, 
Corrigan, in her paper, affirmed that the robustness, and quality of institutions, 
and the government could explain the presence of the resource curse in a 
country.201 Using Norway and Botswana as a success story, Corrigan explained 
why some countries benefit economically from their natural resources and others 
do not.202 Alexeev and Conrad, in an attempt to measure the quality of institutions, 
used the rule of law, control of corruption and voice, and accountability as a 
dependent variable.203 Therefore, the government and the institutions of the state 
have a role to play in ensuring the effective management of these resources going 
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For a state to achieve economic development from petroleum resources, a stable 
institution and legal framework is essential. Over-dependence on petroleum 
revenues by government institutions ends up weakening and damaging these 
institutions, and in turn, as the institutions are weak, the government becomes 
less effective. Hence the government’s ability to maintain countercyclical policies 
could be impaired.204 Poor macroeconomic policies were argued by Acemoglu et 
al. as one reason for weak institutions and lead to political institutions that do not 
restrict the political elites and politicians, thus leading to poor management of the 
wealth obtained from the natural resources and corruption.205 
 
In support of the importance of institutions, Van der Ploeg asserted with empirical 
evidence that corrupt institutions do have an unfavourable effect on the growth of 
an economy that is rich in natural resources, thus supporting the claims, that good 
institutions are essential if any country rich in petroleum resources were to avoid 
the resource curse,206 although in his study, he included different variables in his 
analysis. For example, he tied his analysis to corruption, democratic and non-
democratic regimes, presidential democracy, voracious rent-seeking and armed 
conflict.207 Andersen and Aslaksen argued that the enquiry into the institutional 
design rather than the performance of the institution is the answer to tackle issues 
of resource curse.208 With empirical results in their paper, they claimed that the 
form of government is significant in analysing the presence of the resource curse 
and that presidential and non-democratic governments are likely to suffer from 
the resource curse. In contrast, democracies with a parliamentary form of 
government usually escape the curse of abundant natural resources.209 
 
Kolstad in analysing the resource curse and the institutions that matter suggested 
that for a state to avoid the resource curse, good institutions are fundamental.210 
According to Kolstad’s rent-seeking models, and the patronage models of the 
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resource curse, while testing the hypothesis of private sector institutions, and 
public sector institution, concluded that going by empirical analysis the private 
sector institutions matter.211 In like manner, for a state to avoid the effects of the 
resource curse, Idemudia agreeing with Kolstad claimed that for a state with an 
abundance of natural resources to discourage, rent-seeking, political patronage, 
and secrecy in the public sector, there would be the need for strengthening or 
establishment of institutions.212 Dietsche suggested that the academic 
explanations for strong institutions can be looked at as a way to tackle poor sector 
governance, as the institutional constraints will prevent self-interested individuals, 
elites or political groups from using the petroleum rents for personal benefit.213 In 
support, Costa and Santos in their work proffered the strengthening of the state 
institution through legislative oversights.214 These measures could help a state 
gain the benefit of their petroleum resources when the state, through their 
legislation support the institutions that are involved in petroleum development, 
especially  giving support for the role the NOC plays. 
 
Mehlum, Moene and Torvik in their analysis emphasised the need for quality 
institutions, as it is the quality of the institution that will determine whether the 
natural resource-rich state will avoid the resource curse or not.215 Therefore, the 
absence of strong institutions causes rent-seeking and thus will lead to the 
enrichment of the elite groups in the country.216 In an investigation into the role 
of the economic institution, Kotschy and Sunde claimed that high quality of 
institutions could be achieved in both democratic and autocratic governments.217 
 
It is essential to have a look at the debates over the different types of natural 
resources and the impacts on government institutions. Boschini et al. in their work 
on the resource curse, stressed the importance of the type of natural resource a 
country possesses while affirming their results, which indicates that improvement 
in the quality of institutions can lead to a positive outcome for a country’s economy 
that has an abundance of natural resources rather than the resource curse, which 
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has been shown by many studies.218 To emphasise, a developing oil-rich 
government, with sudden high revenues from its resources can sometimes be 
overwhelming for the government institutions which can result in “bureaucratic 
overstretch”.219 For example, Ologunla et al. analyse the Nigerian institutions and 
concluded that the country’s institutions are not strong enough to manage the 
high revenue from petroleum exports, thus leading the country to suffer from the 
resource curse, as there has not been a significant positive impact on the 
economy.220 In addressing the natural resource curse, the works of Sala-i-Martin 
and Subramanian show the harmful impact the quality of a domestic institution 
has on economic growth and cited the Nigerian experience as evidence of the 
natural resource curse.221 The poor long-run economic performance of the 
Nigerian economy is an example of waste and poor institutional quality.222 
 
Some academics claimed that petroleum wealth leads to “bad institutions,” which 
then results in a weak, corrupt, less competent government, who would not be 
able to maintain prudent fiscal policies.223 This might be true in some situations, 
but the extent to which the argument can be tested in different cases and 
institutions is yet to be evidenced.224 Therefore, a developing country may 
suddenly discovers huge petroleum reserves, and start earning higher revenue. 
These revenues cannot overnight make the governments effective; the 
effectiveness of the government will depend on the strength of its institutions. The 
discovery of petroleum which leads to higher revenue for the government cannot 
be said to have harmed the government as a result of the ineffectiveness of the 
government.225 There is no correlation between a developing country’s oil and gas 
income and the quality of its government. When looking at low performing 
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governments some level of variations should be considered in the tasks of these 
governments, rather than infer that it is because of their “weak institutions” as 
assumed by many scholars.226 Weak government institutions take the blame 
whenever government revenues are handled poorly, could the problem be that 
these oil states have normal institutions and need exceptionally strong ones rather 
than they have a weak one and need a normal one.227 In Yildirim and Gökalp’s 
investigative paper, they claimed that developing countries and their institutions 
generally lack adequate efficacy, when it comes to the management of their 
natural resources.228 Studies of the fiscal policies of developing countries, in both 
oil and non-oil states, are inclined to be procyclical instead of countercyclical.229 
 
 
5.5.1 NOC Role in Petroleum Resource Development  
 
Stevens and Dietsche stated that good institutions are a promising variable 
supported by much institutional economics, asserting than the institutions are 
essential in the economic performance of a resource-rich state.230 This begs the 
question, which institutions should a petroleum-rich state be improving and, more 
importantly, how can they go about improving them?231 Equally, Van der Ploeg 
stated that there is a need for studies to understand the changing roles of 
institutions throughout history.232 They are thus strengthening the arguments on 
the importance of institutions in the achievement of economic growth and 
development through abundant natural resources. 
 
How the petroleum-rich government use its petroleum revenue, whether for the 
benefit of a few or many citizens of the state is vital when tracing the political and 
economic problems of the oil state, to put it in another way it is what the oil 




228 See Aynur Yıldırım and Mehmet Faysal Gökalp n 199. 
229 Oil revenue has been known to be unstable, this therefore makes countercyclical policies all the more difficult 
to maintain. See Michael Ross (n 10) 215. 
230 Paul Stevens and Evelyn Dietsche, 'Resource Curse: An Analysis Of Causes, Experiences And Possible Ways 
Forward' (2008) 36 Energy Policy 56. See also Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene and Ragnar Torvik n 4. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Frederick van der Ploeg n 3. 
233 Michael Ross (n 10) 5; Jahangir Amuzegar n 30. 
 184 
considerable benefits to a developing oil-producing state.234 Expectantly, the 
revenue received from the production of these natural resources can enhance real 
living standards by funding higher levels of public and private expenditure.235 
Higher levels of investment can be funded by revenues obtained from these 
petroleum resources.236 Further, as the funding of public investment is 
unavoidably a significant component of any reasonable development plan, 
revenues from petroleum resources can take out the primary barrier to 
development, and as a result, lower the lack of financial resources which are very 
important in the funding of vital public infrastructures and goods.237 Resultantly, 
these contributions to the economy by public and private investment leads to the 
enhanced development of any economy.238 However, the outcomes of these 
discoveries are not always positive. For this reason, Kolstad encouraged any 
petroleum-rich state first to develop the institutions that govern the private sector 
before that of the public sector. Be that as it may, how can a NOC, going by 
arguments of ownership and control of the petroleum resources, have the support 
of government if the private sector becomes the government’s priority? 
 
This study aligns its argument to the tone of Mehlum et al. and contends that a 
NOC, and other vital institutions concerned with petroleum resource development 
in a petroleum-rich state, especially in a developing state, can assist in economic 
and social development through the petroleum resources. According to Nakhle, 
for there to be efficient management of these petroleum resources, 
responsibilities, and separation of roles should be clearly defined between the 
different government institutions.239 
 
As the powers and influence of the oil majors dwindled NOCs after the 1970s, this 
has dominated the global supply of oil and gas.240 Today, from easy access to 
petroleum, financial strength, advanced management competency and 
technological capacity can be attributed to some power pillars of some NOCs.241 
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Nevertheless, in most countries, IOCs continued to play critical roles in some 
developing oil-rich states using their easy access to capital, international 
marketing networks and technical skills to maintain their relevance to these oil-
rich states.242  
 
Going by the assertions of this study, there is a need for the NOC of a petroleum-
rich state to be involved in the production of the nation’s petroleum. Mehlum et 
al. supporting this claim, emphasised the need for producer friendly institutions, 
as they will assist a natural resource-rich state to take advantage of their natural 
resources.243 Albeit, their paper’s results contrast with the claims of Sachs and 
Warner, which stated, that when it comes to the resource curse, institutions are 
not a decisive factor.244 Further, as observed by Mehlum et al. the differences in 
the quality of institutions is the primary explanation for the cause of these 
diverging experiences, where countries rich in natural resources achieve economic 
growth, and others do not.245 Their results showed that natural resources push 
aggregate income down in grabber-friendly institutions while in producer-friendly 
institutions abundance of natural resources raised the income.246 Accordingly, 
their main postulation argues that producer-friendly institutions escape the 
resource curse, while the resource curse afflicts countries with grabber-friendly 
institutions.247 Bulte et al. acknowledged that the natural resource boom would 
spur production in countries with good institutions (producer-friendly).248 Haslam 
contended that the social foundations of institutional change should be 
concentrated on when looking at the transition from a ‘grabber-friendly’ to 
‘producer friendly’ institutions.249 
 
Therefore, the NOCs of a country with high-quality public management often play 
a central role in managing the states’ resources. In contrast, a developing country 
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without a robust public sector who are still improving cannot be relied upon to 
define the relationship with the private sector whose goals run counter to the 
public interest.250 There is always room for improvement, with the right support 
from the government. With robust policies, the public sector can be improved, as 
earlier argued privatisation is not always the answer. Equally important, Stiglitz 
asserts that before any government engages in privatization, its institutions 
should be strengthened, and ownership, transparency and fairness should be the 
aims guiding government decisions.251 According to Ross, no elaborate argument 
has been developed in defence of the inherent level of secrecy in the oil and gas 
industry which has been viewed as nothing out of the ordinary.252  
 
Petroleum revenues are no different, and these revenues are kept out of the public 
eye, equally the finances of resource-rich countries are usually opaque. The states 
where the petroleum revenues are disclosed to the public are predominantly 
democratic: Brazil, New Zealand and Norway. It is also important to note that 
some developing petroleum-rich states are democratic, yet they are not 
transparent. The Nigerian petroleum industry is an example. It is hard to quantify 
the level of secrecy; as a result, the task of documenting how much money a 
government is concealing from the public will be difficult.253 Therefore, petroleum 
states in their bid to cover their financial activities use unreported off-budget 
accounts to hide away some of their massive spending and the NOCs are  mostly 
used as an instrument to achieve this goal of secrecy.254  
 
It is also important to note that not only democratic developing states engage in 
concealing petroleum revenues, but NOCs from Western democratic states have 
also been known to be involved in the act. Notably, France’s National Oil Company 
Elf Aquitaine was involved in a 400 million euros embezzlement by its managers 
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who used the millions to finance campaigns, bribe foreign politicians, and enrich 
themselves.255 
 
There is a case for the development of natural resources by the private sector as 
the solution to the issue of government corruption and the events of government 
officials diverting public funds for their use.256 However, the events of past 
decades have made it amply clear that privatisation does not put an end to the 
chance of corruption.257 Smith contends that privatisation is mainly the pursuit of 
self-interest, and it is no surprise that it did not solve the problem of resource 
diversion.258 The concern of each corporation to see how much one can get, is by 
and large the calculus of modern capitalism.259 The scope for potential collusion 
and corruption by government officials and others in diverting resources away 
from the public is increased by privatisation.260 The ability to realize a substantial 
fraction of the potential value of a country’s resources for its citizens has been 
something few countries have achieved. Seemingly, Norway’s state oil company 
has been described as both efficient and incorruptible. Norway makes a strong 
case for state ownership, and it knocks down the beliefs and principles which claim 
that privatisation is the only way to obtain efficiency and welfare maximization.261 
Following the line of arguments laid out in chapter 4 of this study, the 
strengthening of government institutions is essential before the government 
engages in privatisation.262  
 
In this study, when it comes to petroleum development, the NOC has always taken 
centre stage. Although the NOC alone cannot assist a petroleum-rich state in 
achieving economic development. As expected, a collective effort has to be made 
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by different sectors, and the arm of government. The effective performance of the 
roles of the executive, legislative or parliament and judiciary is necessary on, the 
assumption that the state is democratic. As a result, government policies and legal 
frameworks drive the objectives of most NOCs.  
 
 
5.6 Conclusion  
 
Taking a broader view of the Resource Curse based on the claims of many 
commentators demonstrates that it can be temporary, and can be reversed with 
the right steps.263 According to Luong and Weinthal, the major shortcoming of the 
established literature were focused on single time period, which was around 1970s 
to the 1990s.264 In the institutional context, a NOC can play a vital role as the 
petroleum-rich state’s institution in advancing economic development through 
petroleum resources. Scholars, and policymakers are becoming convinced that the 
resource curse can be thwarted through a wide array of policies that may include 
natural resource funds, economic diversification, transparency and accountability, 
and direct distribution.265 These solutions are reliant on the strength of the 
institutions, and their capacity, which is observed to be lacking in some resource-
rich developing countries, thus leading to their economy suffering from the Dutch 
Disease.266 Petroleum resource policies should be designed to ensure that the 
management of the natural resource windfall leads to economic growth and 
prosperity for the citizens and the country, and does not lead to a decline of 
institutions.267 
 
There is a need to understand the conditions under which natural resource-rich 
countries can avoid the curse. It is essential to identify, and understand the 
experience of a particular country as these experiences vary between countries.268 
This would help a resource-rich country in adopting various sound natural resource 
policies and institutional changes, as suggested by many studies. This will then 
 
263 See Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal (n 34) 28. 
264 Ibid. 
265 Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong n 33. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Robert Deacon n 3. 
268 See Naazneen H. Barma n 25. 
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provide a better idea of what the principal levers of change are and consequently 
which approaches will most likely be successful when these changes are made.269 
A change in policies, when it comes to the management of natural resources is 
usually needed. The question of implementing these policies to help a country 
plagued by the resource curse escape is one issue facing the government, ruling 
group or political elite of the country, especially one from a developing natural 
resource-rich state. Stiglitz remarked that what is mainly lacking is the political 
will to do what needs to be done.270 An abundance of natural resources has been 
observed to be a blessing in some countries and a curse in others. 
 
According to Acemoglu and Robinson, the main reason why these political elites 
accept the economic backwardness of the state and maintain the status quo was 
that, these groups are scared of being replaced by more robust and efficient 
institutions, and losing their political power.271 They formulated a model where 
technological and institutional development may be blocked by the ruling or 
political group, for fear of being replaced, as progress and innovations usually 
erode political elite benefits or as they term it the “political replacement effect”.272 
The historical evidence they presented is Britain, Germany, Japan, Russia and the 
Habsburg empire.273 
 
They were, therefore, tending to be reluctant to implement policies that would 
strengthen the state’s institutions. For instance, Acemoglu et al. claimed that 
many developing countries, especially in Africa had been afflicted with kleptocrats, 
who have sought to implement highly inefficient economic policies, and the 
continued use of the wealth derived from the natural resources for their personal 
use, instead of for the benefit of the citizens of the state.274 
 
 
269 Andrew Rosser n 23. 
270 Joseph Stiglitz, 'We Can Now Cure Dutch Disease' The Guardian (2004) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2004/aug/18/comment.oilandpetrol> accessed 20 March 2019. 
271 See Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, 'Economic Backwardness In Political Perspective' (2006) 100 
American Political Science Review 115. 
272 Ibid. 
273 Ibid. 
274 Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson and Thierry Verdier, 'Kleptocracy And Divide-And-Rule: A Model Of 
Personal Rule' (2004) 2 Journal of the European Association 162. See also P.B. Eregha and Ekundayo Peter 
Mesagan, 'Oil Resource Abundance, Institutions And Growth: Evidence From Oil Producing African Countries' 
(2016) 38 Journal of Policy Modeling 603. 
 190 
The resource curse arguments of this chapter, whether political or economic all 
have one commonality, which is ‘sound policy’ recommendation, to escape the 
resource curse and institutional reforms. This shows the importance of 
government intervention, and the role government has to play in achieving 
efficient and beneficial petroleum resource management. The study extended the 
analysis, using a NOC as its vital institution. Therefore for a state to harness the 
benefits of its petroleum resources, and avoid the resource curse, a strong NOC 
as the government institution, will have to play an essential role in achieving this. 
This, in particular, will be evidenced in the next chapter, when the performance of 
two different NOCs will be critically analysed. 
 
Prudent management of petroleum resources can lead to economic development. 
Many studies have proposed several policy reforms in combating the resource 
curse or avoiding it. Strengthening the institutions, increasing NOC capacity, 
enforcement of the rule of law, decentralisation,275 and transparency are among 
many policies reforms that could enable a petroleum-rich state to benefit from its 
natural resources. Important to mention that higher human development, 
stronger fiscal discipline, less corruption and many more beneficial qualities have 
been suggested by some studies as the outcome when governments are, to a 
greater extent, transparent.276 Papyrakis et al. argued the need for transparency, 
especially for a state with a wealth of petroleum resources, while advising more 
active participation in the extractive industries transparency initiative (EITI).277 
The extent of the effectiveness of the scheme is arguable.  
 
In summary, it is pertinent for a developing petroleum resource-rich country 
reliant on petroleum revenues, to answer the question where the petroleum 
income will come from when the petroleum reserves run out, and they have 
nothing substantial to show for it. For instance they could invest the windfall in 
 
275 Sharing the financial benefits of resource extraction with regional governments is referred to as revenue 
decentralisation. The effective way is to reduce the government’s windfall and ensure that the people of the 
extractive regions will not seek independence as the case of Nigeria and the Niger Delta crisis. Although this can 
also lead to corrupt and incompetent regional governments, since they can also be as ineffective as central 
government. See Michael Ross (n 10) 239. 
276 Michael Ross (n 10) 245. See Caitlin C. Corrigan n 27; Farouk Al-Kasim, Tina Søreide and Aled Williams, 
'Grand Corruption In The Regulation Of Oil' [2008] U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre 
<https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2474801/Grand%20Corruption%20in%20the%20Regula
tion%20of%20Oil?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed 31 January 2019. 
277 Elissaios Papyrakis, Matthias Rieger and Emma Gilberthorpe n 185. 
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either a diversified economy or a sovereign wealth fund.278 Hasanov, in his study 
on the Azerbaijan economy, remarked on the need for focus and development of 
the non-oil tradable sector by the policymakers.279 This can be achieved by 
implementing tax exceptions, which will support the non-oil export policies and 
exchange rate.280 Finally, a NOC of the state, acting as the principal institution for 
the development of the petroleum resources, can be a vital key for the state to 








CHAPTER SIX - EQUINOR AND NNPC: NOCS FROM A DEVELOPED AND 
DEVELOPING PETROLEUM-RICH STATES 
 
 
 6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters analysed petroleum resources, ownership and control as 
concepts of resource nationalism, the rentier state, and resource curse theory. For 
the most part, this chapter should be read in connection with chapters 2, 3, 4, 
and 5. This chapter will, therefore, use these concepts, and theories in the 
comparative analysis of Equinor and NNPC concerning the government’s 
petroleum policies and regulatory frameworks set up in a bid to support the NOC 
in carrying out its objectives. It is expected that countries that are rich in natural 
resources or petroleum resources must find effective ways to manage the revenue 
from these resources, in order to escape the resource curse.1 Norway and Nigeria’s 
constant use of their NOC as a tool for managing petroleum resources and achieve 
a wide array of objectives is what this chapter will be concerned with.2  
 
The commercial roles of NOCs seem to be the benchmark for a successful NOC, 
not forgetting the fact that NOCs are huge complex entities, with varying roles, 
resources and experience, thus, each company’s portfolio capacity will vary.3 
Questions abound as to how to analyse and determine when a NOC is said to be 
performing well with the petroleum resources in its trust, and how these NOCs 
embark on achieving the set objectives?4 According to the Natural Resource 
Governance Institute (NRGI), delivering significant value to state stakeholders and 
treasury, successful exploration, development of non-fiscal benefits such as 
infrastructure construction, the development of new technologies and skills, are 
 
1 Youmanli Ouoba, 'Natural Resources: Funds And Economic Performance Of Resource-Rich Countries' (2016) 
50 Resources Policy 108. 
2 Notably, governments’ through their petroleum sector policies, usually use their NOCs to achieve economic 
development, socioeconomic objectives and most importantly the maximisation of rents derived from the 
exploitation of the petroleum resources. See Silvana Tordo, Brandon S Tracy and Noora Arfaa, National Oil 
Companies And Value Creation (World Bank 2011) Xi. 
3 See 'The National Oil Company Database' (Resource Governance, 2019) 




interpretations of a valid NOC.5 Policies are also the focus of any government in 
the context of petroleum resource development, and this could include political 
and fiscal policies.6 When it comes to good petroleum resource governance, the 
NOCs have taken centre stage in the global petroleum industry in recent times, 
as they act as the champions of the petroleum-rich states.7 This in no way 
diminishes the vital role played by the government in their petroleum industry. 
 
Critical analysis of both NOCs will be made by the available evidence, based on 
their objectives, governance, performance, and concluding what framework 
design would better suit a developing country, looking to achieve economic 
development through their petroleum resources. This chapter, while carrying out 
a comparative study of the two select NOCs: Equinor and NNPC will not ignore the 
role that policies, and regulations have played in the development of the selected 
states’ petroleum industry,8 thus helping one gain insight into the petroleum 
industries of Norway and Nigeria. Comparative study of a developed country’s 
NOC and a developing country’s NOC is expected to give insights to a developing 
country, or the successes of the developed country, in achieving some form of 
economic development, by how it managed its petroleum resources through its 
NOC. Frameworks that support the goals of full ownership and control, as argued 
in chapter 4, and the adoption of sound legislation cover all facets of their 
petroleum industry. 
 
According to Akinola in assessing a state’s failures and institutional - NOC failures, 
different factors have to be evaluated.9 He further argued that exposure to the 
industrialised or developed countries of Western Europe or North America could 
 
5 Ibid. 
6 The needs of the state as an owner and regulator of the petroleum resources are what these policies should 
normally attempt to balance. See Tina Hunter, ‘The Role of Regulatory Frameworks and State Regulation in 
Optimising the Extraction of Petroleum Resources: A Study of Australia and Norway’ (2014) 1 The Extractive 
Industry and Society 48. 
7 Mari-Lise du Preez, ‘Interrogating the ‘Good’ in ‘Good Governance’: Rethinking Natural Resources Governance 
Theory and Practice in Africa’ in J. Andrew Grant, W. R Nadège Compaoré and Matthew I Mitchell (eds.), New 
Approaches To The Governance Of Natural Resources (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) 25-30. 
8 The energy laws of any state is directly related to the management of the natural resources of that state, therefore 
it is very important to get the legal framework right for efficient running of the natural resource sector of each 
state. See Raphael J Heffron and Kim Talus, 'The Development of Energy Law in The 21St Century: A Paradigm 
Shift?' (2016) 9 The Journal of World Energy Law & Business 189. 
9 See Adeoye O. Akinola, Globalization, Democracy And Oil Sector Reform In Nigeria (Palgrave Macmillan 
2018) 61 -  62. 
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accelerate the process of development, which he believes to be a natural process. 
This were affirmed in his arguments on modernization theory.10 
 
This chapter will be divided into five sections. Section one is the introduction, while 
section two will be the history of the petroleum industry of both Norway and 
Nigeria, and a comparative critical evaluation of developed petroleum industry and 
that of a developing one. The third section will comparatively evaluate how both 
countries organised their petroleum sector. Section four evaluates the role of the 
state in the petroleum sector organisation. Section five will undertake a 
comparative evaluation of both countries NOC, where both NOCs will be critically 
analysed based on their achievements, economic, and the socio-economic value 
which they add to their various states. 
 
Other factors that influence these NOCs will be mentioned, albeit not at length. 
Historical, political, and socio-economic considerations have to be analysed in the 
context in which these NOCs were established.11 While bearing in mind that no 
two NOC are the same, the Norwegian and Nigerian petroleum industry differ in 
so many ways, from geology, mandate, endowment, experience, petroleum sector 
organisation, governance, NOC strategy and corporate governance structure.12  
 
The terms ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ country seem to bring different analyses 
or questions of what measures are used in determining which country is developed 
and which one is developing.13 Generally, the level of development of a country is 
 
10 Ibid. 
11 Silvana Tordo, Brandon S Tracy and Noora Arfaa,(n 2) 29. 
12 Ibid (n 2) 45, and Patrick Heller, 'National Oil Company Database: Global Launch' (National Resources 
Governance Institute, 2019) 
<https://www.nationaloilcompanydata.org/api/publications/content/MvBx7qBCgtu0iILVzQGU2yhswUiFrmxx
dwNuaT9C.pdf> accessed 25 June 2019. Also, glaring differences between the two country’s petroleum industry 
exist in terms of political, economic history and structure. See María José Paz Antolín and Juan Manuel Ramírez 
Cendrero, 'How Important Are National Companies For Oil And Gas Sector Performance? Lessons From The 
Bolivia And Brazil Case Studies' (2013) 61 Energy Policy 707. 
13 Basis for comparison between a developed and developing country can range from; unemployment, poverty, 
infant mortality rate, death rate, birth rate, life expectancy rate, living conditions, standard of living, distribution 
of income, industrial growth and factors of production. See Surbhi S, 'Difference Between Developed Countries 
And Developing Countries (With Comparison Chart) - Key Differences' (Key Differences, 2019) 
<https://keydifferences.com/difference-between-developed-countries-and-developing-countries.html> accessed 
19 July 2019. See also, 'How Developing Countries Are Classified For Investors' (The Balance, 2019) 
<https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-a-developing-country-1978982> accessed 19 July 2019 and Margaret 
Cunningham, 'Economic Inequality: Differences In Developed And Developing Nations' (Study, 2019) 
<https://study.com/academy/lesson/economic-inequality-differences-in-developed-and-developing-
nations.html> accessed 19 July 2019. 
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usually measured by income per capita, and also whether the gross domestic 
product income (GDP) per capita is high or low, and the standard of living and 
technological infrastructure of the country.14 According to the Cambridge 
dictionary, when a country has high industrial activity, and the citizens’ income 
levels are high, this country would be categorised as a developed one.15 On the 
other hand, a developing country falls into the category where there is a small-
scale industrial activity in the economy, and the citizens generally have low 
incomes.16 Education level, literacy, health are human development (HDI) factors 
that can also be used to appraise a country’s level of development or economy.17 
Therefore, in this study, Norway and Nigeria will represent both sides of the 
category.18 According to Doric and Dimovski, in developed countries, the 
petroleum resources are used for the benefit of the country, thus leading to higher 
economic growth and income, and this Norway has achieved.19 Nigeria has been 
observed to have negative results from the exploitation of their petroleum 
resources.20 These different outcomes from the exploitation of petroleum 
resources by Norway and Nigeria are what this chapter seeks to analyse critically, 







14 Will Kenton and Christina Majaski, 'Developed Economies Vs. Non Developed Economies And Criteria' 
(Investopedia, 2019) <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/developed-economy.asp> accessed 19 July 2019. 
See also, 'WTO | Development - Who Are The Developing Countries In The WTO?' (World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), 2019) <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm> accessed 19 July 2019;  'Top 25 
Developed And Developing Countries' (Investopedia, 2019) <https://www.investopedia.com/updates/top-
developing-countries/> accessed 19 July 2019;  
15 See 'Developed Country | Meaning In The Cambridge English Dictionary' (Cambridge Dictionary, 2019) 
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/developed-country> accessed 19 July 2019. 
16 See 'Developing Country | Meaning In The Cambridge English Dictionary' (Cambridge Dictionary, 2019) 
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/developing-country> accessed 19 July 2019. 
17 These factors are usually referred to as non-economic factors. See Will Kenton and Christina Majaski n 15. 
18 In this study Norway represents a developed country and Nigeria a developing country. See 'Country 
Classification' (United Nations, 2019) 
<https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.pdf> 
accessed 19 July 2019.  
19 Barbara Doric and Vlado Dimovski, 'Managing Petroleum Sector Performance – A Sustainable Administrative 
Design' (2018) 31 Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja 119. 
20 Mark C. Thurber, David R. Hults and Patrick R.P. Heller, 'Exporting The “Norwegian Model”: The Effect of 
Administrative Design On Oil Sector Performance' (2011) 39 Energy Policy 5367. 
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 6.2 History Of Petroleum Industry  
 
Engaging in a critical comparative analysis of a developed petroleum-rich state’s 
NOC – Norway, and a developing petroleum-rich state’s NOC – Nigeria, certain 
factors have to be reviewed to help paint a better picture of the environment in 
which these NOCs operate. Bearing in mind the apparent facts, for example, that 
Norway is a developed high-income country, and Nigeria, on the other hand, is a 
developing lower-middle-income country.21 The only outstanding similar factor 
being that these two countries can be argued as being petroleum-rich. While one 
country evidences the benefits from their petroleum resources, the other struggles 
to create value for the people of the country through their petroleum resources. 
For example, according to Ahmad in using petroleum resources to achieve some 
development, Nigeria has catastrophically failed to meet these development 
goals.22 Interestingly, the global petroleum industry has undergone several 
cyclical changes especially when it comes to the oil price. So, therefore, if Nigeria 
does not achieve economic development through their petroleum resources when 
the value of petroleum is high, how would they achieve the same in these periods 
of low oil prices, and also, in the present-day energy transition campaign in the 
global petroleum industry. 
 
Furthermore, there could be historical suggestions why both country’s NOC 
perform at different levels, while the value creation results of both are different.23 
These historical differences can be demography, location of petroleum resources, 
political structures, or type of government, and the level of development when 





21 See data from World Bank, 'Nigeria | Data' (data.worldbank.org, 2019) 
<https://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria> accessed 15 November 2019 and 'Norway | Data' 
(Data.worldbank.org, 2019) <https://data.worldbank.org/country/norway> accessed 15 November 2019. 
22 See Ehtisham Ahmad and Raju Singh, 'The Political Economy Of Oil Revenue Sharing In A Developing 
Country' [2003] IMF Working Paper WP/03/16.  
23 See Scott Frickel and William R. Freudenburg, 'Mining The Past: Historical Context And The Changing 
Implications Of Natural Resource Extraction' (1996) 43 Social Problems 444 and 'Researching The Politics Of 
Natural Resource Extraction: A New Conceptual And Methodological Approach' (Effective-states.org, 2019) 
<http://www.effective-states.org/wp-content/uploads/briefing_papers/final-




Claims that Norway has always attracted foreign interests for its natural resources 
abound, from hydro to oil and gas.24 That was the reason the Norwegian 
government has always been proactive when it comes to their natural resources. 
As a result, in a bid to gain full control of its natural resources, and resist foreign 
capital control it passed legislation in 1906, which gave guidelines for the state 
granting concessions whether to Norwegians or foreigners.25 The 1959 discovery 
of vast gas fields in Groningen, Holland did not increase the interest in the 
Norwegian continental shelf.26 The increased interest by oil companies in 
conducting exploration activities made the Norwegian government consider 
legislation that could further protect the interest of the state.27  
 
1962 saw the US oil company Philips Petroleum, apply for permission to carry out 
geological surveys in the waters of Norway, and this interest by Philips was 
followed by other oil companies.28 Unlike the Danish government, Norway did not 
want to enter into negotiation with individual oil companies about the rights on 
the Norwegian Continental Shelf.29 The Royal Decree of May 31, 1963, proclaimed 
the sovereignty of the state over their seabed and subsoil outside the Norwegian 
coast.30 This was the Norwegian government taking charge, and expressing its 
ownership and control rights over their natural resources. Gordon and Stenvoll 
 
24 See Tore Tønne, 'Energy Policy: A Norwegian Perspective' (1983) 5 Northwestern Journal of International Law 
and Business 722. See also, Amir Sasson and Atle Blomgren, 'Knowledge Based Oil And Gas Industry' (2011) 
Research Report 3 BI Norwegian Business School. 
25 Ibid. This Act was also called the “Panic Act”.  
26 In 1958 the Norwegian Geological Survey wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and expressed the little 
chances of finding natural resources like coal, oil or sulphur in the continental shelf. See Norwegian Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy / Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 'Facts 2012: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector' (2012). 
See also, 'Norway's Petroleum History' (Norsk olje og gass, 2019) <https://www.norskoljeoggass.no/en/about-
us/oljehistorien/> accessed 25 July 2019; 'Norway’s Petroleum History' (Norwegian Petroleum, 2019) 
<https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/framework/norways-petroleum-history/> accessed 26 July 2019. 
27 Tore Tønne n 25. 
28 See 'Norway's Petroleum History' (Norsk olje og gass, 2019) <https://www.norskoljeoggass.no/en/about-
us/oljehistorien/> accessed 25 July 2019; Amir Sasson and Atle Blomgren n 25; Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy / Norwegian Petroleum Directorate n 27. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Tore Tønne n 25. See also T. Lind and G. A MacKay, Norwegian Oil Policies (Hurst 1980) 98. Norwegian 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy / Norwegian Petroleum Directorate n 27; Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy/ Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 'Facts 2013: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector' (2013).  
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saw this proclamation as the first step in defining the legal and regulatory 
framework for the Norwegian petroleum industry.31 
 
According to Holden, although the Norwegian government expressed their 
ownership of their petroleum resources, the financing and initial explorations was 
made by IOCs.32 In 1965 Norway and United Kingdom signed a treaty, dividing or 
delineating the continental shelf, according to the median line principle.33 This 
ultimately meant that before any exploration was embarked on in Norway, the 
boundaries were already stipulated, and the field divisions.34   
 
In 1969, the first commercial discovery was made in Norway, by Phillips Petroleum 
Company, this field was the Ekofisk field.35 In 1971, Frigg Field was discovered. 
Norway’s three significant fields then were Ekofisk, Frigg and Stratfjord Fields.36 
Notably, production did not start on this field until 1971.37 Thus began the life of 
the Norwegian petroleum sector. The production on the Ekofisk field can be said 










31 See Section 1-1 Petroleum Act No. 72 1996. See also, Richard Gordon and Thomas Stenvoll, 'Statoil: A Study 
In Political Entrepreneurship' [2007] The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Rice University 
<http://large.stanford.edu/publications/coal/references/baker/studies/noc/docs/NOC_Statoil_Gordon-
Stenvoll.pdf> accessed 26 July 2019. 
32 Steinar Holden, 'Avoiding The Resource Curse The Case Norway' (2013) 63 Energy Policy 870. 
33 Same treaty was signed with Denmark. See Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy/ Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate, 'Facts 2013: The Norwegian Petroleum Sector' (2013) and 'Norway's Petroleum History' 
(Norsk olje og gass, 2019) <https://www.norskoljeoggass.no/en/about-us/oljehistorien/> accessed 25 July 2019;  
34 This was important as in other parts of the world, such clarification has been lacking before drilling starts and 
major discoveries are made. That applies in the Caspian, for instance, where Azerbaijan, Iran and Russia are in 
dispute over boundaries and rights in proven fields. See 'Norway's Petroleum History' (Norsk olje og gass, 2019) 
<https://www.norskoljeoggass.no/en/about-us/oljehistorien/> accessed 25 July 2019;  
35 See Tore Tønne n 25. See also, Amir Sasson and Atle Blomgren n 25. 
36 Ibid. 
37 See 'Norway's Petroleum History' (Norsk olje og gass, 2019) <https://www.norskoljeoggass.no/en/about-
us/oljehistorien/> accessed 25 July 2019 and Tore Tønne n 25.  
38 See Amir Sasson and Atle Blomgren n 25. See also, T. Lind and G. A MacKay (n 31) 100. 
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Figure 6: 
Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) Oil and Gas Industry Development 
 
 
Source: culled from Rovik and NPD.39  
 
The above figure illustrates how NCS that went from no potential to having barrels 
of oil and gas being discovered and produced within the NCS. 
 
Tønne observed that the Norwegian government, in their bid to benefit from the 
exploitation of their natural resources, changed the concession system to 
participation agreements, thereby increasing the states equity share.40 The 
establishment of Statoil (now Equinor) brought with it many changes, as it further 
increased the state’s participation in the petroleum sector of Norway.41 Therefore, 
instead of the state being a party to these participation agreements, Equinor 
became a direct party to these agreements, thus replacing the state.42 According 
to Al-Kasim, in promoting participation by a Norwegian petroleum company, Norsk 
Hydro in 1965 went into partnership with an IOC-Elf.43  
 
39 See Thor Magnus Rovik, 'The Norwegian Offshore Petroleum Province: Opportunities And Challenges' 
(Aberdeen, AIPN January, 2020). See also, 'Facts About Norwegian Continental Shelf' (NPD, 2020) 
<https://www.npd.no/en/facts/> accessed 10 April 2020. 
40 Tore Tønne n 25. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 See Farouk Al-Kasim, Managing Petroleum Resources (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 2006) 55-58. 
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A pattern thus forms of thoughtful reaction and planning by the Norwegian 
government, seen not to be rushed into any decision. Careful planning, and 
strategizing seem to be the motto, although undoubtedly, with the goal of how 
the people will benefit most from these natural resources, ever evolving with their 
policies, and with the global petroleum industry. Hunter asserted that the 
Norwegian way of regulating is ‘Objective-based regulation’ which gives the 
legislation flexibility to respond to changes in the sector or to new issues that 
arise, unlike ‘Rule-based regulatory frameworks’.44  
 
To elaborate a little further on these concepts, rule-based regulatory frameworks 
in a petroleum sector rely on legislatively entrenched rules to regulate petroleum 
activities. In contrast, objective-based regulation frameworks move away from 
detailed, prescriptive rules, instead relying on broadly stated principles or 
objectives to set the standards by which companies conduct their operations.45 
 
Furthermore, Moses and Letnes claimed that in regulating petroleum resources, 
there is a need for commercial acumen, political finesse, and wide-ranging 
competencies.46 Notably, according to Al-Kasim, Norway deemed it necessary to 
gather a wide range of competence and experience, this informed the selection of 
their administrative team and extension of the proposals for their legal 
framework.47 This influenced their appointments for critical position in their 
petroleum resource sector and also in their NOC, thus, giving shape and structure 
to the Norwegian petroleum regulatory legal framework. 
 
Even in 1983, Tønne in defining the Norwegian framework for managing its natural 
resources stated: 
[…] the creation of domestic industrial and management capacity 
to develop and utilize indigenous energy resources has become a 
primary goal.48 
 
44 Tina Hunter n 6. 
45 See, Julia Black, 'Principle Based Regulation: Risks, Challenges And Opportunities' [2007] London School of 
Economics and Political Science and Julia Black and Robert Baldwin, 'When Risk-Based Regulation Aims Low: 
Approaches And Challenges' (2012) 6 Regulation & Governance 2. 
46 Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes, Managing Resource Abundance And Wealth: The Norwegian 
Experience (Oxford University Press 2017) 86. 
47 Farouk Al-Kasim (n 44) 13. 
48 Tore Tønne n 25. 
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While one can say they went on to achieve that goal, they also added more goals, 
such as carrying out commercial activities internationally. Expanding on the 
present goals set, and ever learning from the global petroleum industry. Hence 
the change of the NOCs name from Statoil to Equinor, and with that their set goals 
and objectives.49  
 
6.2.2 Nigeria  
 
Agriculture was the primary industry in Nigeria before petroleum became the 
central component of the Nigerian economy. According to Ogri, the search for 
petroleum in Nigeria started in 1908, and this search intensified in 1938.50 
Different to Ogri’s account, Akpan contended that the initial exploration for 
petroleum started in 1906, and the search for oil by Shell began in 1937.51 
According to various accounts, the first commercial discovery of oil in Nigeria was 
made in Oloibiri in the Niger Delta (in present-day Bayelsa State) in 1956 by Shell-
BP.52 Before the significant discovery of petroleum, some legislation existed, 
however these frameworks were influenced by the British, who were then in 
control of the then Nigerian colony.53  
 
In the spirit of the United Nations Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources, the Petroleum Act of 1969 was enacted which vested the entire 
ownership and control of all petroleum in, under or upon all land or Nigerian 
 
49 See 'CEO Eldar Sætre Speaks About The Name Change - Equinor.Com' (Equinor.com, 2019) 
<https://www.equinor.com/en/magazine/ceo-eldar-saetre-speaks-about-the-name-change.html> accessed 26 July 
2019. 
50 Onah R. Ogri, 'A Review Of The Nigerian Petroleum Industry And The Associated Environmental Problems' 
(2001) 21 The Environmentalist 11. 
51 See Wilson Akpan, 'Putting Oil First? Some Ethnographic Aspects Of Petroleum-Related Land Use 
Controversies In Nigeria' (2006) 9 African Sociological Review / Revue Africaine de Sociologie. 
52 Adedolapo A. Akinrele, 'Transparency in the Nigerian oil and gas industry' (2014) 7(3) The Journal of World 
Energy Law & Business 220. See also, Wilson Akpan n 52; Ahad Gholizadeh Manghutay, 'Different Approaches 
And Different Results: A Comparative Analysis Of The Nigerian And Iranian Laws And Policies On Controlling 
The Foreign Corporations' (2013) 17 Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization 20; Ludwig Herbert 
Schätzl, Petroleum In Nigeria (Oxford University Press 1969) 1. 
Furthermore,  petroleum began to be exported  in 1958. See Alan H Gelb, Oil Windfalls: Blessing Or 
Curse (Oxford University Press 1988) 227; Ogugua V.C. Ikpeze and Nnamdi G. Ikpeze, 'Examination Of Some 
Legislations Referencing Acquisition Of Rights For Oil Exploration, Prospection And Mining In Nigeria' (2015) 
5 Journal of Energy Technologies and Policy. 
53 See Petroleum Ordinance of 1889 and Mineral Regulation (Oil) Ordinance of 1907. See also, Yinka 
Omorogbe, Oil And Gas Law In Nigeria (Malthouse Press 2003) 16-17. 
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territorial waters in the Nigerian government.54 The Act, for the first time in the  
Nigerian oil and gas sector, established a comprehensive statutory regime for the 
grant of rights to search for, and win oil in Nigeria.55 Balogun remarked that in the 
period of the 1960s, the Nigerian government interest in the petroleum industry 
was limited to the collection of taxes, royalties and lease rentals.56 The level of 
change from petroleum rent collectors is yet to be observed in today’s Nigerian 
petroleum industry.  
 
Further, Akinrele contended that the rapid rise of oil production revenues in the 
1970s (the ‘oil boom era'), hastened the realisation of the government policy of 
implementing OPEC resolutions calling on the Member States to participate more 
actively in oil operations and this, in turn, led to the establishment of the Nigerian 
National Oil Corporations (NNOC) by Act No. 18 of 1971 succeeded by the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), which came into existence on 1 April 
1977 according to Act No. 33 of 1977.57 According to Onoh the Nigerian NOC was 
established the same year Nigeria joined OPEC, and this was a response to the 
OPEC resolution No. XVI.90 of 1968, which required petroleum producing member 
states to actively participate in all facets of the petroleum operations within its 
territory.58 Although this may be true, Ogri claimed that NNOC was created as a 
means for the Nigerian government to increase its technological and fiscal benefit 
from petroleum resources.59 To date however, the increase of technology and 
financial benefit from the exploration of the petroleum resources by the NNPC is 
yet to be fully evidenced.  
 
The Nigerian petroleum sector is arguably the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, 
and is central to her growth and development. For example, petroleum accounts 
 
54 See Section 1 of the Petroleum Act of 1969 and also Section 1 Petroleum Act, Cap P10, Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria (LFN) 2004. See also, Olajumoke AKinjide-Balogun, 'Legal framework of the Nigerian petroleum 
industry - corporate/commercial law - Nigeria' (Mondaq, 3 April 2001) 
<http://www.mondaq.com/Nigeria/x/10726/Legal+Framework+Of+The+Nigerian+Petroleum+Industry> 
accessed 10 January 2017. 
55 Adedolapo A. Akinrele n 52. 
56 Olajumoke AKinjide-Balogun n 54. 
57 See Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act Chapter N123 2004. See also, Adedolapo A. Akinrele n 52. 
58 J. K Onoh, The Nigerian Oil Economy (St Martin’s Press 1983) 30. See also, 'Guidelines For Petroleum Policy 
In O.P.E.C. Member Countries' (1968) 7 International Legal Materials 1183. 
59 Onah R. Ogri n 51. 
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for over 55% of Nigeria’s revenue, and about 85% of the country’s export 
income.60 According to Malden, going by the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) report on Nigeria’s petroleum resources, it is believed that 
petroleum resource revenue accounts for 77 per cent of government revenues.61 
Nigerian proven oil reserves are estimated by the United States Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) as between 16 and 22 billion barrels, but other 
sources claim there could be as much as 35.3 billion barrels.62 In support of this 
view, Ogri stated that ever since the first commercial drilling in Nigeria, the 
petroleum estimated proven reserve numbers has been going up, and these 
estimates are conservative estimates at best, and the nation’s reserve potential 







60 See Ariel Cohen, 'Will President Buhari Rescue Nigeria's Oil And Gas Sector?' (Forbes.com, 2019) 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/03/08/will-president-buhari-rescue-nigerias-oil-and-gas-
sector/#5ec570c9433d> accessed 14 August 2019;  Edoabasi Udo, 'The Regulation Of The Petroleum Industry In 
Nigeria: An Assessment' [2014] SSRN Electronic Journal and Tsvetana Paraskova, 'Nigeria Continues To Depend 
Heavily On Oil Export Revenue | Oilprice.Com' (OilPrice.com, 2018) <https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-
News/World-News/Nigeria-Continues-To-Depend-Heavily-On-Oil-Export-Revenue.html> accessed 15 August 
2019. 
61 See Alexander Malden, 'Nigeria's Oil And Gas Revenues: Insights From New Company Disclosures' (Natural 
Resource Governance Institute, 2017) <https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nigeria-oil-
revenue.pdf> accessed 26 August 2019. See also, Joseph Mawejje, 'Natural Resources Governance And Tax 
Revenue Mobilization In Sub Saharan Africa: The Role Of EITI' (2019) 62 Resources Policy 176. 
62 Also, according to Akinrele Nigeria is one of the few major oil-producing nations still capable of increasing its 
oil output. See Adedolapo A. Akinrele n 53. See also Jessica Dillinger, 'The World’s Largest Oil Reserves By 
Country' (WorldAtlas, 2019) <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-world-s-largest-oil-reserves-by-
country.html> accessed 15 August 2019; 'OPEC : OPEC Share Of World Crude Oil Reserves' (OPEC, 2019) 
<https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm> accessed 15 August 2019; Jeff Desjardins, 'Map: The 
Countries With The Most Oil Reserves' (Visual Capitalist, 2019) <https://www.visualcapitalist.com/map-
countries-most-oil-reserves/> accessed 15 August 2019; 'Proven Oil Reserves By Country' (Globalfirepower, 
2019) <https://www.globalfirepower.com/proven-oil-reserves-by-country.asp> accessed 15 August 2019 and 
KPMG Advisory, 'Nigeria’s oil and gas industry brief KPMG professional services' (2014) 
<http://www.blog.kpmgafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Nigerias-oil-and-gas-Industry-brief.pdf> 
accessed 8 January 2017. 
63 Onah R. Ogri n 51. See also, Wumi Iledare, 'Oil And The Future Of Nigeria: Perspective On Challenges And 
Strategic Actions For Sustainable Economic Growth And Development' [2007] International Association for 
Energy Economics 
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f3ef/1cf132344b6d5d19a442bc99892aa6d7d1be.pdf?_ga=2.53949162.313020
515.1566614851-402315301.1566614851> accessed 24 August 2019. 
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6.2.3 Developed And Developing Petroleum-Rich State: Comparative 
Analysis 
 
The Norwegian upstream petroleum industry has been labelled one of the best in 
the world, and their policy framework as being remarkable.64 Norway has 
controlled and managed its petroleum resources through its NOC - Equinor that is 
engaged in commercial hydrocarbon operations, the government ministry that 
directs policies and a regulatory body that provides oversight and technical 
expertise.65 According to Moses and Letnes, the Norwegian petroleum 
management model has two faces: one that focuses externally on its negotiations 
with IOCs, the other that focuses internally on how best to manage the petroleum 
resources for the benefit of the country and its people.66 Therefore, ensuring that 
value is created through the extraction of their petroleum resources.  
 
Norway has demonstrated and shown the importance of dividing policy and 
regulatory roles among different government agencies, which has led to the high 
achievement levels by its NOC.67 Uniquely, the administrative design that 
implemented the separation of functions amongst three government-controlled 
bodies (a commercial, a policy-making and regulatory body), at an early stage, 
can be claimed to be the reason for the success of the Norwegian petroleum 
industry.68 This was implemented in 1972 and was called the Norwegian Model.69 
The practical separation of functions, did not come overnight, it was a gradual 
process and learning curve.70 For example, according to Moses and Letnes the 
1977 blowout on the Ekofisk Bravo platform which spilt over 200,000 barrels of 
oil into the North Sea, and the fatal collapse of the Alexander L. Keilland platform 
of 1980, exposed the complexity of the functions of the Norwegian Petroleum 
 
64 See Mark C. Thurber, David R. Hults and Patrick R.P. Heller n 21; Helge Ryggvik, 'The Norwegian Oil 
Experience: A Toolbox For Managing Resources?' [2010] TIK-Centre University of Oslo 
<https://www.sv.uio.no/tik/forskning/publikasjoner/TIK-rapportserie/Ryggvik.pdf> accessed 8 July 2019. 
65 Ibid.  
66 See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 46) 77. See also, Section 1-2 Petroleum Act No. 72 1996. 
67 See Barbara Doric and Vlado Dimovski n 20; Mark C. Thurber, David R. Hults and Patrick R.P. Heller n 21; 
Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 46) 66. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 See indra Overland, ‘Norway: Public Debate and the Management of Petroleum Resources and Revenues’ in 
in Indra Øverland (ed), Public Brainpower: Civil Society and Natural resource Management (Palgrave Macmillan 
2018) 217-234. 
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Directorate (NPD).71 Therefore there was a need for some of its functions to be 
transferred to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE).72 
 
Norway, through its legal framework, has been successful in the development of 
its oil and gas resources, and it has become a driver of Norwegian economic 
growth and national savings.73 Important to know that the legal basis and 
regulatory framework for petroleum activities in Norway today is conferred by the 
Petroleum Activities Act, 1996 and Petroleum Regulations, 1997.74 The success of 
the Norwegian oil and gas industry is evidenced by the billions of dollars in its 
National Resource Funds.75 Moreover, the revenue to Norway from their petroleum 
resources are partly paid into the state’s Government Pension Fund, which in turn 
invests in global stock markets, as a strategy to guarantee the value of the fund 
for the future population who will not have access to petroleum resources.76 This 
strategy by Norway has been observed by industry analysts as a plan by the 
Norwegian government to secure funds for the future generation, owing to the 
belief that petroleum resources are finite, and thus will run out one day.77  
 
Vital to note that Norway’s funds were not what they are today;78 it took time and 
government support for them to grow. However, today it gives the Norwegian 
government a savings protection, as it can assist the Norwegian economy to move 
away from petroleum resource income dependency, as petroleum resources will 
 
71 See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 87-89.  
72 Policymakers and the public were critical about NPD’s capacity to promote production, and at the same time 
protect the environment and workers. This was seen as conflicting mandate, which was viewed as ‘NPD were 
wearing two hats at the same time’ and this was somewhat not practical. Ibid. 
73 Mark C. Thurber, David R. Hults and Patrick R.P. Heller n 21. 
74 See Tina Hunter n 6; Chiara van Ingen, Requier Wait and Ewert Kleynhans, 'Fiscal Policy And Revenue 
Management In Resource-Rich African Countries: A Comparative Study Of Norway And Nigeria' (2014) 21 
South African Journal of International Affairs 367 and Mark C. Thurber, David R. Hults and Patrick R.P. Heller  
n 21. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Sveinung Eikeland and Trond Nilsen, 'Local Content In Emerging Growth Poles: Local Effects Of Multinational 
Corporations’ Use Of Contract Strategies' (2016) 70 Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift - Norwegian Journal of 
Geography 13. 
77 See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 159-162; 
78 See 'The Fund' (Norsk Bank Investment Management, 2019) <https://www.nbim.no> accessed 8 November 
2019; David Reid, 'Norway's $1 Trillion Sovereign Wealth Fund Grows Despite A Volatile Quarter For Markets' 
(CNBC, 2019) <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/21/norways-1-trillion-sovereign-wealth-fund-enjoys-returns-on-
stocks-and-bonds.html> accessed 8 November 2019 and Jillian Ambrose, 'World's Biggest Sovereign Wealth 
Fund To Ditch Fossil Fuels' (The Guardian, 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jun/12/worlds-
biggest-sovereign-wealth-fund-to-ditch-fossil-fuels> accessed 8 November 2019;  
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run out, as predicted by industry commentators.79 Although, according to Holter, 
the Norwegian people are clamouring to spend some of the vast sovereign wealth, 
as some are opposed to the government’s stance of not spending.80 
 
An equally important factor to note in this comparative section was that Norway, 
before the inception of its petroleum sector was already a stable democracy, this, 
in turn, made the implementation of the administrative design of separation of 
functions obtainable, and this point is often overlooked.81 This raises questions as 
to the extent to which the Norwegian model can be replicated in another country 
with a different political and economic phase of development. According to Lahn 
and Stevens, the policies that contributed to the success of Norway will not 
necessarily work in other countries, because one obvious factor is the state’s 
experience in managing their natural resources which have led to evolved high 
standards of practice.82 Albeit this is a result of long periods of economic stability, 
well-functioning institutions, and experience in the natural resource 
management.83 
 
For clarity, before the discovery of petroleum, Norway enjoyed a fair degree of 
wealth, as they had natural resources like fish, timber and hydroelectricity. The 
‘effective and just’ management of these natural resources before discovering 
petroleum, Moses and Letnes argued is part of the explanation of their petroleum 
industry development.84 Further, they claimed that the long active state 
involvement in the economy, the development of a sturdy labour movement and 
highly developed web of political institutions are the three main political factors 
 
79 Renamed the Government Pension Fund, Global (GPFG) in 2006. Also, today in Norway it is believed that 
the non-petroleum economy need less monetary support, there most of the income from the petroleum sector are 
channelled into the GPFG. See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 46) 162. See also, 'Norway 
Government Pension Fund Global (Norway GPFG) - Sovereign Wealth Fund, Norway - SWFI' (Swfinstitute.org, 
2019) <https://www.swfinstitute.org/profile/598cdaa60124e9fd2d05b9af> accessed 8 November 2019. 
80 See Mikael Holter, 'Norwegians To Giant Wealth Fund: Can I Have My Cash Now' (Bloomberg, 2019) 
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-19/wealth-fund-at-1-1-trillion-has-norwegians-trying-to-
cash-out> accessed 26 November 2019. 
81 See Barbara Doric and Vlado Dimovski  n 20; Juan M. Ramírez-Cendrero and Eszter Wirth, 'Is The Norwegian 
Model Exportable To Combat Dutch Disease?' (2016) 48 Resources Policy 85. 
82 Glada Lahn and Paul Stevens, ‘ The Curse of the One-Size-Fits all Fix: Re-evaluating what we Know about 
Extractives and Economic Development’ in Tony Addison and Alan Roe (eds), Extractive Industries: The 
Management Of Resources As A Driver Of Sustainable Development (Oxford University Press 2018) 103. 
83 Ibid. 
84 See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 47. 
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that assisted Norway to manage their natural resources effectively.85 This active 
state involvement aligns with the claims of this study that when adequately carried 
out by a petroleum-rich developing state it can yield benefits to the state. 
 
Further, according to the adopted 1814 Norwegian constitution, Norway is a 
monarchy, where power is divided between three arms of government: a 
legislative arm, the  – Storting; an executive arm; and a judicial arm.86  Unlike 
Norway, Nigeria’s history is mostly rooted in the history of colonialism by the 
British, from about 1849 to the eve of independence in 1960.87 Professor Sagay, 
detailed a timeline from 1885 to 1914, outlining the British colonial stronghold on 
Nigeria as a country.88 He further claimed that the Nigeria that is known today 
was made up of different independent nations, until the British conquest and the 
ultimate merging of these different nations as one.89  
 
As petroleum was discovered within her territories, Schätzl claimed that the Shell-
D'arcy Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria which was an affiliate of the 
Shell Petroleum Company and the British Petroleum Company acquired the first-
ever petroleum resource concession from the English colonial government in 
1938.90 Shell enjoyed this concession until 1955 when the number of concession 
 
85 Ibid. 
86 Norway is a constitutional hereditary monarchy. The government, comprising the prime minister and the 
Statsråd (Council of State), is nominally chosen by the monarch with the approval of the Storting (Stortinget), the 
country’s legislature. Until 2009 the Storting operated as a bicameral body, though most matters were addressed 
in unicameral plenary sessions. Only when voting on laws was the Storting divided into two houses. One-fourth 
of the members were chosen to constitute the Lagting, or upper house, while the remaining 
members constituted the Odelsting, or lower house. Bills had to be passed by both houses in succession. In 2009 
the Lagting was dissolved, and the Storting became permanently unicameral. The constitution of Norway, drafted 
in 1814 when Norway left the 434-year union with Denmark, was influenced by British political traditions, 
the Constitution of the United States, and French Revolutionary ideas. Amendments can be made by a two-thirds 
majority in the Storting. Unlike many parliamentary forms of legislature, the Storting cannot be dissolved during 
its four-year term of office (amendments to overturn this restriction have been defeated frequently since 1990). If 
a majority of the Storting votes against an action advocated by the Statsråd, the minister responsible or the whole 
Statsråd resigns. In legislative matters the monarch has a suspending right of veto, but, since the 91-year union 
with Sweden was dissolved in 1905, this veto has never been exercised. 
See Joyce Chepkemoi, 'What Type Of Government Does Norway Have?' (WorldAtlas, 2019) 
<https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-type-of-government-does-norway-have.html> accessed 26 July 
2019; 'Norway - Government And Society' (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019) 
<https://www.britannica.com/place/Norway/Government-and-society> accessed 26 July 2019; 'How Is Norway 
Governed?' (Government.no, 2019) <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/the-government/the-government-at-
work1/id85844/> accessed 26 July 2019; 
87 Adeoye O. Akinola, (n 10) 92. 
88 See Itse Sagay, 'Nigeria: Federalism, The Constitution And Resource Control' The Guardian (2001) 
<https://allafrica.com/stories/200105250403.html> accessed 14 August 2019. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ludwig Herbert Schätzl (n 53) 1-9. 
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takers increased.91 According to Onoh, as petroleum was added to the list of 
Nigeria’s raw materials, a British-sponsored oil company – Shell BP marketed this 
natural resource.92 
 
For brevity and focus on the theme of the study, the history of Nigeria was claimed 
by Ross to be the cause of its inefficiencies in managing their natural resources.93 
For instance, to paint a narrow picture of the results of petroleum development in 
Nigeria since 1956 in that town, Watts remarked that the state of Oloibiri had 
been nothing to write home about, as there is no running water, no electricity, no 
roads, high youth violence and the people are so impoverished.94 Then one 
wonders if the development cannot be seen in this historic petroleum town, how 
would the government then guarantee development through the country. Be that 
as it may, this study will focus on Nigeria after independence, and the petroleum 
resource discovery, the establishment of her NOC, and finally the role the NOC 
has played in adding value to the country through the management of these 
petroleum resources.  
 
Today, Nigeria practices the federal system of government, and this has been a 
characteristic of its Independence and Republican Constitution of 1960 and 
1963.95 The country went through several military regimes and then moved to a 
democratic government in 1999.96 Important to note that Nigeria runs a federal 
system of government, with the presence of the three arms of government: 
Executive, Legislative and Judiciary.97 According to Ugo, the federal political 
system was adopted to serve a diverse and heterogeneous society, with the 
maintenance of unity and preservation of the nation’s diversity as the main 
 
91 Ibid. 
92 J. K Onoh  (n 58)) 19. 
93 See Michael L. Ross, 'Nigeria's Oil Sector And The Poor' (UCLA Department of Political Science, 2003) 
<https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/other/NigeriaOil.pdf> accessed 14 August 2019.  
94 See Michael Watts, 'Crude Politics: Life And Death On The Nigerian Oil Fields' (Semantics Scholar, 2009) 
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3f57/b752dea770933bea5894a9669c4b3c44a281.pdf> accessed 4 March 2020. 
95 See Itse Sagay n 88; Philips O. Okolo and Akpokighe O. Raymond, 'Federalism And Resource Control: The 
Nigerian Experience' (2014) 4 Public Policy and Administrative Research 
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7d02/464c4bd1ab3b6eb319c311dd2c705c237511.pdf> accessed 14 August 
2019. 
96 Michael L. Ross n 92. 
97 See Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (CFRN). 
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goals.98 The federal government wills the highest authority in the country, and the 
1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria remains the highest legal 
authority in the country.99 
 
Similarly to Norway, Nigeria is blessed with an abundance of petroleum resources. 
However, in contrast to Norway, according to the recently published resource 
governance index by the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), getting 
low scores, and being ranked within sub-Saharan Africa, and globally, are not 
positive remarks about the petroleum sector of a state.100 Nigeria’s petroleum 
sector alongside Venezuela are usually the two notable petroleum industries 
highlighted in studies which have failed to achieve economic success in the 
exploitation of their petroleum resources.101 Statements stress the need for new 
petroleum nations to avoid falling into the same category as the Nigerian 
petroleum industry. The immense levels of mismanagement and rent-seeking 
have made the country synonymous with corruption.102 Karl expressed the above 
view succinctly: 
 
[…] the growth of poverty has been catastrophic; in these cases, 
real per capita income has plummeted to 1960 levels. It is almost 
as if 40 years of development had not taken place.103  
 
Petroleum resources were supposed to be a blessing to the people of Nigeria, but 
at present, it does not look like that; instead, it looks like a curse.104 Be that as it 
 
98 United States of America, Canada, Australia, and India are some examples of countries that practise federalism. 
See Samuel C. Ugo, 'Resource Control And Its Challenges To Nigerian Federalism' (2004) 4 The Constitution 57. 
99 See Section 1 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. See also, Adeoye O. Akinola (n 10) 99-
101. 
100 See Kaisa Toroskainen, 'Resource Governance Index: From Legal Reform To Implementation In Sub-Saharan 
Africa' (Resource Governance, 2019) <https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/rgi-from-
legal-reform-to-implementation-sub-saharan-africa.pdf> accessed 22 July 2019. See also 'Resource Governance 
Index: Sub-Saharan Africa Highlights' (Resource Governance, 2019) 
<https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/resource-governance-index-sub-saharan-africa-
highlights.pdf> accessed 22 July 2019. 
101 See Ian Gary and Terry Lynn Karl, 'Bottom Of The Barrel: Africa's Oil Boom And The Poor' (2003) 
<http://www.relufa.org/savesite/programs/economicjustice/documents/CRSBottomoftheBarrelfulloilreport.pdf> 
accessed 22 July 2019. See also Cyril Obi, ‘Nigeria: the Role of Civil Society in the Politics of Oil Governance 
and Revenue Management’ in Indra Øverland (ed) (n 71) 202 and Indra Overland, ‘Variations on Public 
Brainpower: Findings from Country Case Studies of Oil-and Gas-producing Countries’ in Indra Øverland (ed), (n 
71) 376-377. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Terry Lynn Karl, 'Oil-Led Development: Social, Political, And Economic Consequences' (2004) 4 
Encyclopaedia of Energy 661. 
104 Ross argued that Nigeria’s petroleum resources has done little to reduce the poverty, as would be expected if 
a nation is blessed with abundance of petroleum or natural resources. See Michael L. Ross n 92. See also 'Nigeria 
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may, the effective utilisation of petroleum resources has proven to be one of the 
most challenging tasks for countries dependent on petroleum exports.105 Campbell 
argued this point and stated that Nigeria is heavily dependent on petroleum 
resources, and not oil-rich.106 His arguments were based on the calculations of Dr 
Doyin Salami and the assertions of Nigeria’s former finance and foreign minister 
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala.107  
 
Whatever claims that are put forward, the fact is, by petroleum reserve 
calculations,108 Nigeria can be categorised as a petroleum resource prosperous 
state, for a country that pumps over 2 million barrels of crude per day.109 New 
deposits of petroleum resources are being discovered increasingly within regions 
of developing countries and specific countries in sub-Saharan Africa.110 In general, 
these discoveries are expected to bring economic and political developments to 
these countries.111 These resources have helped some Western countries 
industrialisation, as it is a well-known fact that some Western countries 
industrialised on the back of resource extraction from natural resource-rich 
developing countries.112 For example, in 2016, crude oil was discovered in Nigeria 
- Lagos (Aje Field), and Borno.113 Therefore, there are possibilities of future 
reserves. How will Nigeria’s NOC – NNPC go about achieving success in the 
 
Recent Developments' (World Bank, 2018) <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/848651492188167743/mpo-
nga.pdf> accessed 14 August 2019 and Chapter 5. Also, Mähler put forward arguments contrary to the resource 
curse hypothesis with regards to Venezuela. See Annegret Mähler, 'Oil In Venezuela: Triggering Conflicts Or 
Ensuring Stability? A Historical Comparative Analysis' (2011) 39 Politics & Policy 583. 
105 Ian Gary and Terry Lynn Karl (n 83). See also Obasesam Okoi, 'The Paradox Of Nigeria's Oil Dependency' 
(Africa Portal, 2019) <https://www.africaportal.org/features/paradox-nigerias-oil-dependency/> accessed 14 
August 2019. 
106 See John Campbell, 'Nigeria Is Oil Dependent, Not Oil Rich' (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019) 
<https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigeria-oil-dependent-not-oil-rich> accessed 14 August 2019. 
107 Ibid. 
108 See Jessica Dillinger n 63; 'OPEC : OPEC Share Of World Crude Oil Reserves' (OPEC, 2019) 
<https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm> accessed 15 August 2019; Jeff Desjardins (n 54) and 
'Proven Oil Reserves By Country' (Globalfirepower, 2019) <https://www.globalfirepower.com/proven-oil-
reserves-by-country.asp> accessed 15 August 2019. 
109 See Tsvetana Paraskova n 61 and Ariel Cohen n 61. 
110 Stefan Andreasson, 'Varieties Of Resource Nationalism In Sub-Saharan Africa's Energy And Minerals Markets' 
(2015) 2 The Extractive Industries and Society 310. See also Peter Cameron and Michael Stanley, The Extractive 
Industries Sourcebook (World Bank Group 2017) 3. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 See 'OML 113 - Aje Field' (OilMapNG.com, 2019) <http://www.oilmapng.com/viewField_page.php?id=52> 
accessed 14 August 2019 and Emmanuel Graham and Jesse Salah Ovadia, 'Oil Exploration And Production In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-Present: Trends And Developments' (2019) 6 The Extractive Industries and Society 
593. 
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6.3 Petroleum Sector Organisation  
 
The upstream petroleum sector in every petroleum-producing country can be the 
highest revenue generator for the state and in the same vein capital intensive with 
high levels of risk associated with its activities. As earlier pointed out, the 
upstream sector of both Norway and Nigeria will be the study’s core focus, as that 
is where the NOC principal mandate lies. In this section, a critical review of how 
Norway and Nigeria organise their upstream section will be carried out to gain an 
understanding of how one country’s sector positively supports the activities of the 
NOC, and by extension assisting in value creation for the people of the state. 
 
 
6.3.1 Norway’s Petroleum Sector Organisation  
 
The Petroleum Act114 governs all petroleum activities in Norway, especially the 
exploration and production of petroleum in Norway, and stresses the importance 
of the relationship between the government organisations, the licensees, and the 
third parties in the Norwegian petroleum sector.115 According to Park, the liberal 
market model whereby parties have the freedom of contract, as in most developed 
countries, Norway has a noteworthy component of standard form contracts and 
‘agreed documentation’.116 Furthermore, the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) 
 
114 The Petroleum Act of 1996 replaced the 1985 Act. The Petroleum Act No. 72 of 29 th November 1996 (The 
Petroleum Act). Also, more specific rules are set out in various regulations including the following connected to 
resources management: 
(a) The Petroleum Regulations No. 653 of 27 Junes 1997 (The Petroleum Regulations); 
(b) The Resource Management Regulations No. 749 of 18 June 2001; 
(c) The regulations relating to use of facilities by others No.1625 of December 2005; and 
(d) The Regulations Relating to the Stipulation of Tariffs, etc No. 1724 for certain facilities of December 
2002 (The Tariff Regulations). 
In addition, there are various regulations relating to Health, Safety and Environment. See 'Regulations' (Npd.no, 
2019) <https://www.npd.no/en/regulations/> accessed 19 November 2019. See also, Yngve Bustnesli, Norway in 
Christopher B. Strong (ed.), The Oil And Gas Law Review (7th edn, Law Business Research Ltd 2019) 263. 
115 See Section 1 (1) Petroleum Act 1996 No. 72. 
116 See Patricia Park, International Law For Energy And The Environment (2nd edn, Taylor and Francis Group 
2013) 277-278. 
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has the ultimate authority with respect to petroleum activities in the country, and 
regulatory authority.117 
 
Organisations or government departments that are usually involved in one form 
or the other in the management of the state’s petroleum resources are many, but 
for this study, a few of these organisations which this study considers crucial to 
the arguments will be mentioned. The Norwegian petroleum sector organisations 
include but are not limited to: 
 
1. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) 
MPE is tasked with the overall responsibility to manage the petroleum resources 
within Norway’s continental shelf.118 Further, the Ministry makes sure all the 
Storting and Norwegian Government guidelines are adhered to, and it has owner’s 
responsibility in for the state-owned Petoro AS, Gassco AS, and the partly state-
owned petroleum company Equinor.119  
 
2. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) 
NPD acts as an advisory body to the MPE, and also plays a vital role in the 
management of petroleum resources, as it exercises administrative authority over 
the exploration and production of petroleum resources in Norway.120 NPD 





117 Also, the Ministry of Petroleum (MPE), ensures the regulatory frameworks are followed when petroleum 
activities are carried out. While the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), ensures the proper management of 
the petroleum resources. See Ibid., 284-285. 
118 See Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy / Norwegian Petroleum Directorate n 27; Ministry Energy, 
'Ministry Of Petroleum And Energy' (Government.no, 2019) <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/id750/> 
accessed 26 July 2019. See also 'State Organisation Of Petroleum Activities - Norwegianpetroleum.No' 
(Norwegianpetroleum.no, 2019) <https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/framework/state-organisation-of-
petroleum-activites/> accessed 26 July 2019 and Ministry Energy, 'Ministry Of Petroleum And Energy' 
(Government.no, 2019) <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/id750/> accessed 26 July 2019.  
119 Ibid. 
120 See Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy / Norwegian Petroleum Directorate n 27; 'Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate' (Npd.no, 2019) <https://www.npd.no/en/> accessed 26 July 2019 and 'State Organisation 
Of Petroleum Activities - Norwegianpetroleum.No' (Norwegianpetroleum.no, 2019) 




3. Petoro AS 
Petoro AS on behalf of the Norwegian government handles the State’s 
Direct Financial Interest (SDFI).122 After the privatisation of Equinor, Petoro 
was tasked with managing Norway’s holdings in various joint ventures, 
monitor the sale of petroleum from the SDFI and manage the finances of 
the SDFI.123  
 
4. Gassco AS 
This government entity is tasked with the transportation of gas from the 
Norwegian continental shelf.124  
 
5. Equinor ASA 
Equinor is an international petroleum company. The Norwegian state owns 
over 60% of this petroleum company, and it is listed in the Oslo and New 











122 Petoro’s major tasks are: 
• Manage the State’s direct participating interests in the joint ventures where the State is represented at 
any given time. 
• Monitor Equinor’s marketing of the petroleum that is produced from the State’s direct participating 
interests in line with the marketing instructions given by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy to 
Equinor. 
• Financial management, including keeping accounts for the State’s direct participating interests. 
See 'Petoro's Key Duties' (Petoro.no, 2019) <https://www.petoro.no/about-petoro/main-tasks> accessed 26 July 
2019. See also, Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy / Norwegian Petroleum Directorate n 27;  
123 See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 93;  
124 See 'Gassco' (Gassco.no, 2019) <https://www.gassco.no/en/> accessed 26 July 2019. 
125 See 'Equinor' (Equinor, 2019) <https://www.equinor.com/en.html> accessed 26 July 2019. 
See also, Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy / Norwegian Petroleum Directorate n 27; 'State 
Organisation Of Petroleum Activities - Norwegianpetroleum.No' (Norwegianpetroleum.no, 2019) 
<https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/framework/state-organisation-of-petroleum-activites/> accessed 26 July 
2019. 
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Figure 7: Norwegian Petroleum Industry Structure 
 
Source: culled from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy.126  
 
The figure details a streamlined sector organisation, although this study will not 
be analysing the different players in the Norwegian petroleum industry, as the 
main focus will be on Equinor. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that all the 
different government organisations play a vital role, and the focus on Equinor does 
not disparage the key roles which the other organisations play.127   
 
 
6.3.2 Nigerian Petroleum Sector Organisation  
 
Akinrele contended that regulating the petroleum sector, upon which the Nigerian 
government, its political system, elites and its commerce depend upon has been 
particularly challenging.128 Contentiously, the assertion did not mention the people 
of Nigeria, which suggests that the petroleum industry of Nigeria does not create 
any significant value for the Nigerian general populace. The export of crude seems 
 
126 Ministry Energy, 'Ministry Of Petroleum And Energy' (Government.no, 2019) 
<https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/id750/> accessed 26 July 2019. 
127 Other Sector organisations are: The Ministry of Labour; The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA); The 
Ministry of Finance; The Petroleum Tax Office; The Directorate of Customs and Excise; Government Pension 
Fund-Global; The Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs; The Norwegian Coastal Administration; The 
Ministry of Environment and The Climate and Pollution Agency. See 'State Organisation Of Petroleum Activities 
- Norwegianpetroleum.No' (Norwegianpetroleum.no, 2019) 
<https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/framework/state-organisation-of-petroleum-activites/> accessed 26 July 
2019. 
128 Adedolapo A. Akinrele n 53. 
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to be the focal point of the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector, and the upstream 
seems to be most active in the country’s petroleum sector.129  
 
According to Akinrele, Nigeria’s petroleum industry is principally regulated under 
legislation enacted in the 1950s and the 1960s.130 Albeit, that is why the country 
is looking to change some of the legislation governing the petroleum sector. He 
further claimed that these legislations and the institutional, regulatory, and policy 
structures under them, which may have been suitable at the time, failed to exact 
maximum benefit from an industry with huge potential, and had instead fuelled 
corruption and helped erode institutional integrity.131  
 
The Petroleum 1969 Act was the first statutory regime and framework that defined 
the structure of the oil and gas sector of Nigeria.132 This act structured the legal 
relationships in the country’s petroleum industry.133 As stipulated in the Nigerian 
1999 Constitution,134 the Petroleum Act also, vests the ownership and control of 
all petroleum resources in Nigeria, under Nigeria’s territorial waters or lands that 
form part of Nigeria’s continental shelf or part of Nigeria’s Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) on the state.135 When it comes to petroleum development in Nigeria, 
the constitution is the guiding principle underlying the petroleum resources sector, 
and also the mineral sector.136 
 




129 See Israel Aye, Laura Alakija and others, Nigeria in Christopher B. Strong (ed.), The Oil And Gas Law 
Review (7th edn, Law Business Research Ltd 2019) 249. 
130 Adedolapo A. Akinrele n 53. 
131 Estimates of Nigeria’s undiscovered gas reserves range from 300 – 600 trillion cubic feet. Nigeria has therefore 
been described largely as a gas province with some oil. See Adedolapo A. Akinrele n 53. 
132 Ibid. 
133 The legal relationships are, joint venture agreements, participation agreements, production sharing agreements 
and service contracts. See Yinka Omorogbe, 'The Legal Framework for The Production Of Petroleum In Nigeria' 
(1987) 5 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law; Yinka Omorogbe, The oil and gas industry: Exploration 
and production contracts (Malthouse Press 1997) 37 – 38; Adedolapo A. Akinrele n 53. 
134 See Section 44 (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended, CFRN). 
135 Section 1 Petroleum Act, Cap P10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004. See also Ogugua V.C. 
Ikpeze and Nnamdi G. Ikpeze  n 53. 
136 Wumi Iledare n 64. 
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1. The Ministry of Petroleum Resources  
The Ministry regulates the petroleum sector of Nigeria, also tasked to 
formulate sound policies for the state’s petroleum industry and to see that 
these policies are adequately implemented.137 This ministry is headed by 
the Minister of State, Petroleum Resources.138 Also at present, the Nigerian 
President in his capacity as the Minister of Petroleum Resources.139 It is 
expected that the Minister of State, petroleum resources who is viewed as 
a junior minister runs the day to day activity of the ministry.  
 
2. NNPC 
Established on April 1st 1977 as a state corporation to engage in all levels 
of petroleum activities in the state’s petroleum industry.140 According to 
Onoh, NNPC was a result of a merger between the Nigerian National Oil 
Company (NNOC) and some departments of Mines and Power.141  
 
3. Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
This government department performs the role of Nigerian petroleum 
industry regulator, by ensuring that the petroleum laws, regulations, and 
guidelines are adhered to.142 
 
In regulating the downstream sector, the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory 
Agency (PPPRA) has the mandate.143 The Federal Ministry of Environment (FMoE) 
has the mandate to ensure environmental protection, sustainable development 
and natural resources conservation.144 Finally, the mandate for industrialization 
 
137 See 'Ministry Of Petroleum Resources | Federal Republic Of Nigeria' (Petroleumresources.gov.ng, 2019) 
<https://petroleumresources.gov.ng> accessed 8 November 2019. 
138 See 'Hon. Minister Of State | Ministry Of Petroleum Resources' (Petroleumresources.gov.ng, 2019) 
<https://petroleumresources.gov.ng/about/hon-minister-of-state/> accessed 11 November 2019. 
139 See 'Nigeria's Buhari Assigns Cabinet Portfolios, Appoints New Oil Minister' (U.K., 2019) 
<https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-nigeria-politics/nigerias-buhari-assigns-cabinet-portfolios-appoints-new-oil-
minister-idUKKCN1VB1FP> accessed 12 November 2019 and Gbolahan Elias and Okechukwu J Okoro, 
‘Nigeria’ in David L. Schwartz (Ed.), The Energy Regulation And Markets Review (8th edn, Law Business 
Research Ltd 2019) 254. 
140 See Section 5 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act Chapter N123 2004. See also, 'NNPC' 
(Nnpcgroup.com, 2019) <https://www.nnpcgroup.com/Pages/Home.aspx> accessed 8 November 2019. 
141 J. K Onoh (n 58) 36. 
142 See 'DPR – Oil & Gas Regulatory Agency' (Dpr.gov.ng, 2019) <https://www.dpr.gov.ng> accessed 8 
November 2019. 
143 See 'PPPRA Nigeria' (pppra.gov.ng, 2019) <http://pppra.gov.ng> accessed 8 November 2019. 
144 See 'Federal Ministry Of Environment – Environment Is Your Life, Keep It Safe' (Environment.gov.ng, 2019) 
<https://environment.gov.ng> accessed 8 November 2019. 
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and increasing in-country capacity was delegated to the Nigerian Content 
Development and Monitoring Board (NCDMB)145 Other existing legislation that 
regulates the Nigerian petroleum industry includes Deep Offshore and Inland 
Basin Production Sharing Contracts Act; Nigeria Oil and Gas Industry Content 
Development Act 2010; Petroleum Profits Tax Act, and Associated Gas Re-
injection Act.146 In the study, the main focus is on the Petroleum Act 1969, and 
analysis of the proposed PIGB. 
  



















Figure 8: Nigeria’s Petroleum Sector 
 
145 See 'Nigerian Content Development And Monitoring Board – Building Local Capacities In The Nigerian Oil 
And Gas Industry' (Ncdmb.gov.ng, 2019) <https://ncdmb.gov.ng> accessed 8 November 2019. 
Also, with regards to local content the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010 (NOGICD) 
(Nigerian Content Act): Key Implementing Institution - Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board 
(NCDMB). 
146 See Edoabasi Udo n 61. See also, Israel Aye, Laura Alakija and others, Nigeria in Christopher B. Strong (ed.) 
(n 127) 250-251.  
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Source: author’s own based on available data.147 
 
The Nigerian petroleum sector has many organisations linked to it, in particular 
the NNPC in carrying out its statutory and commercial objectives among other 
ventures has over 13 subsidiaries.148 For this study, a full discussion of them will 
not be carried out, as the sole aim of this study is to assess how NNPC’s upstream 
activities add value to the petroleum sector and in turn create value for the people 
of Nigeria. The decision, not to discuss some of these organisation in the upstream 
sector of Nigeria in no manner or form downplays their role in the country’s 
petroleum sector.  
 
 
147 See Yinka Omorogbe n 54;  'Nigeria - Government And Society' (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019) 
<https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/Government-and-society> accessed 20 November 2019; 'Ministry Of 
Petroleum Resources | Federal Republic Of Nigeria' (Petroleumresources.gov.ng, 2019) 
<https://petroleumresources.gov.ng> accessed 8 November 2019, and Shweta Jadhav, 'Petroleum Resources 
Management: The Role Of Institutional Frameworks And Fiscal Regimes In Value Creation: A Comparative 
Analysis For Norway And Nigeria' (Double Postgraduate Degree, Norges Handelshøyskole and HEC Paris 2014). 
148 See 'NNPC' (Nnpcgroup.com, 2019) <https://www.nnpcgroup.com/Pages/Home.aspx> accessed 8 November 
2019. See also, Israel Aye, Laura Alakija and others, Nigeria in Christopher B. Strong (ed.) (n 127) 249-250. 
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6.3.3 Petroleum Sector Organisation: Comparative Analysis  
 
Following the earlier section, it can be put forward that to achieve success in a 
petroleum sector this role cannot be left to the states’ NOC alone, as different 
government organisation play vital roles as well. The state also has a vital role to 
play, in achieving economic development and value creation through the 
exploitation of petroleum resources. Petroleum resources in Norway are seen to 
belong to the people – Norwegian society. As such the state sets out to create as 
much value as possible through the exploitation of these natural resources.149 
Moses and Letnes described Norway as a ‘developmental state’150 as they evolved 
from a liberal democratic state (1884-1935) to a social democratic state after 
1935.151 Norway’s heavy dependence on professional bureaucracy and 
parliamentary committees could be suggested as contributing to the vital roles 
Norway plays as a developmental state.152 
 
According to Al-Kasim Norway strengthened the state’s involvement in the 
regulatory and business level of their petroleum industry by establishing Equinor 
and NPD in 1972.153 When a state becomes directly involved with the activities of 
the petroleum sector and takes political control for the development of the 
petroleum industry, Austvik calls this political entrepreneur.154 As a political 
entrepreneur, the state can use legal and political interventions and regulative 
measures to its set goals for the petroleum sector. The mixture of strategies that 
 
149 See Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy / Norwegian Petroleum Directorate n 27; Norwegian 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy/ Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 'Facts 2013: The Norwegian Petroleum 
Sector' (2013). 
150 A developmental state is one that uses the states natural resources to meet the needs of the people, while playing 
an active role in shepherding the economic development. See Omano Edigheji, 'A Democratic Developmental 
State In Africa ? A Concept Paper' [2005] Centre for Policy Studies 
<http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/devstate/edigheji.pdf> accessed 4 August 2019. 
See also, Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 47 and Omano Edigheji (ed.), Constructing A 
Democratic Developmental State In South Africa: Potentials And Challenges (HSRC Press 2010). 
151 Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 43. 
152 Further, Moses and Letnes, stated that there were 3 important roles the Norwegian Developmental State played:  
(1)It provides expertise to policymakers that is not overly influenced by particular and vested 
interests; (2) it divides up political authority in a way that facilitates autonomy (and makes 
capture difficult); and (3) it provides access to alternative interests and an opportunity for 
these interests to contribute to the formulation of that policy. 
See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 53-54. 
153 Farouk Al-Kasim (n 44) 66. 
154 See Richard Gordon and Thomas Stenvoll n 32 and Ole Gunnar Austvik, 'Landlord And Entrepreneur: The 
Shifting Roles Of The State In Norwegian Oil And Gas Policy' (2011) 25 Governance 315. 
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worked, and led to the success of their petroleum industry are characterised as 
political entrepreneurship.155 
 
Ingen et al. further argued that Norway is a high-income petroleum country with 
robust governance institutions, like Equinor, which has assisted the government 
to focus their petroleum earnings on reducing the budget burdens of social 
insurance.156 Setting up a NOC seems to be the first route taken by governments 
with abundant petroleum resources as suggested in chapter 3.157 Although it could 
be contended, that why then is not possible for the government to use regulatory 
measures to achieve the state’s set goals, as countries like the United States of 
America, and the United Kingdom are doing at present, rather than establish a 
NOC, with a strong resemblance to a non-profit corporation, as their goals are 
defined by the government, and not by the shareholders.158 Arguably, Equinor 
could be seen as an independent corporation, free from government interference. 
However, going by the key concepts discussed earlier in this study, as long as the 
government of Norway has over 60 per cent of Equinor shares, it can politically 
influence the corporation’s decision, as the government has the controlling shares. 
 
Norway realised the benefits of establishing a NOC, especially during the early 
stages of petroleum sector development, as this assisted the state to achieve the 
national strategic goals,159 which could be argued to be establishing its sovereign 
rights over its petroleum resources, resource nationalism – ownership and 
control.160 The establishment of Statoil now Equinor by the Norwegian state was 
to ensure that the exploitation of their petroleum resources was for the “benefit 
of the whole nation” and this was set out in the Norwegian government’s Ten Oil 
Commandments of 1972.161 Also, National management and control, the build-up 
of a Norwegian oil community and state participation were important elements in 
 
155 Ibid. 
156 Chiara van Ingen, Requier Wait and Ewert Kleynhans n 74. 
157 See Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
158 Ole Gunnar Austvik n 152. 
159  Ibid. 
160 See Chapter 4. See also Diderik Lund, 'State Participation And Taxation In Norwegian Petroleum: Lessons For 
Others?' (2014) 3 Energy Strategy Reviews 49. 
161 Arguably, these early choices explain why Norway ranks today as one of the world’s best places to live and a 
world leader in many areas of the oil industry. See Ole Gunnar Austvik n 152. See also, 'An Industry For The 
Future - Norway's Petroleum Activities' (Storting White Paper 28 (2010 -2011) Regjeringen.no, 2012) 
<https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/oed/petroleumsmeldingen_2011/oversettelse/chapter1_white_
paper_28-2010-2011.pdf> accessed 16 November 2019. 
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the country’s oil policy during the 1970s.162 Hunter claimed that the participation 
of Equinor in the petroleum sector, allowed it to amass skills, knowledge and 
experience from the IOCs, as Equinor were initially limited to participation rights 
in all petroleum licences then.163 Equally, in 1971 the ‘Ten Oil Commandments’164 
laid out the principles of Norwegian petroleum policy.165 It, therefore, became the 
priority of the state that the state participates actively in the offshore and onshore 
petroleum operations, this Al-Kasim termed ‘Norwegianisation’.166 
 
The Norwegian state, as a political entrepreneur integrated several instrument 
forms and roles, as they developed and created their petroleum sector.167 
According to Austvik, the Norwegian government opposed the liberal market 
model, whereby state participation would be reduced, and the private sector 
involvement increased, depending on the market trajectory.168 Importantly, the 
Norwegian state increased the state’s direct control over the petroleum sector.169 
This can be observed through its petroleum sector policies over the years, from 
 
162 See 'Norway's Petroleum History' (Norsk olje og gass, 2019) <https://www.norskoljeoggass.no/en/about-
us/oljehistorien/> accessed 25 July 2019. 
163 Tina Hunter n 6. 
164 Katarzyna Dośpial-Borysiak, 'Model Of State Management Of Petroleum Sector – Case Of Norway' (2017) 20 
Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal 97. See also, '10 Commanding Achievements - Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate' (Npd.no, 2018) <http://www.npd.no/en/publications/norwegian-continental-shelf/no2-
2010/10-commanding-achievements/> accessed 14 December 2018. 
165 This was a set of goals and strategies that guided Norway’s involvement in the development of petroleum 
resources throughout the value chain of the petroleum industry. Tina Hunter n 6. 
166 See Farouk Al-Kasim (n 44) 66. 
167 Ole Gunnar Austvik n 152. 
168 Section 3-6 Petroleum Act No. 72 1996. See Ole Gunnar Austvik n 152. See also, Diderik Lund n 134. 
169 According to Austvik the main policy elements of the Norwegian governments were: 
1. Providing a national ideological and visionary platform for the industrial and social 
goals of petroleum activities as per the Ten Oil commandments; 
2. Regulating and protecting the functioning of and framework for the domestic markets 
to support the Norwegian supply industry and oil companies in the build-up phase; 
3. Providing a strong state controlled industrial and resource-management system […]; 
4. Establishing its own company, Statoil, with substantial preferential treatment and 
governmental control; 
5. Engaging IOCs at an arm’s length distance to acquire capital and competence; 
6. Being engaged directly downstream in the sales of natural gas through Statoil […]; 
7. Developing a foreign policy that attempted to strike a balance between major 
international political powers, as represented by political allies in the International Energy 
Agency and economic interests in OPEC, and later with Russia; 
8. Introducing a heavy system of taxation (78% of net profits), […]; 
9. Establishing the Petroleum Fund to decouple expenditures from earnings of state oil 
and gas revenues and to protect the country against Dutch disease; 
10. Increasing state participation, when clipping Statoil’s wings in 1984, establishing the 
GFU/FU system, by establishing Petoro and Gassco and the new tariff system Gassled in 
2001. 
All these goes to support the presence of the theories of resource nationalism – ownership and control, 
rentier state theory, albeit through their high tax system. See Ole Gunnar Austvik n 152. 
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the early stages of the sector to date. A highly developed licensing system which 
permitted IOCs and NOCs to explore, develop, and produce petroleum in 
accordance with the licenses, regulations and applicable laws, allowed for Joint 
Operating Agreement (JOA), and accounting agreement between these parties.170 
Austvik argued that Norway’s policy measures were a mix of healthy interventions 
and direct involvement along with some liberal regions for some parts of the state 
NOC.171 Important to observe that Norway did not embark on the full liberalisation 
of its petroleum sector, whereby the private sector determines the petroleum 
sector and political direction, the state continued to play a leading role in the 
development of the petroleum sector.172 This is evidenced by the state selling 
some of its stake in Equinor, but most importantly, retaining the controlling 
shares.173  
 
Figure 9: Number of Licences Per Company in the NCS 
 
 
Source: culled from Rovik.174 
 
 
170 See Yngve Bustnesli, Norway in Christopher B. Strong (ed.), The Oil And Gas Law Review (7th edn, Law 
Business Research Ltd 2019) 262. 
171 See Ole Gunnar Austvik n 152. 
172 Ibid. 
173 See 'Our Shareholders - Equinor.Com' (Equinor.com, 2019) <https://www.equinor.com/en/investors/our-
dividend/our-shareholders.html> accessed 8 November 2019. 
174 Thor Magnus Rovik n 40. 
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It is clear to see that the highest number of licences are held by the two-state 
entities. One can argue that Equinor is part private and part state-owned. 
 
Although a NOC is a crucial tool to achieve value creation from petroleum 
resources, the state also has a very significant role to play. As ownership and 
control over these natural resources are usually stipulated under the laws of the 
state. This gives the government the backing to engage in productive ventures 
that would enable the state to benefit from their petroleum resources. As the oil-
rich African nations of Angola, Algeria, Nigeria and Libya continue to demand more 
significant ownership stakes in the exploration and production of their natural 
resources, what will that mean for the operations of IOCs especially in periods of 
low oil prices?175  
 
On the other hand, it can be argued that the creation of the Nigerian National Oil 
Corporation in 1971, and later the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) marked the beginning of the nationalisation of the Nigerian petroleum 
industry.176 Arguably, the move to nationalise British Petroleum assets by General 
Obasanjo had an anti-colonial element to it.177 Furthermore, long before the 
nationalisation or the expression of the right of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources by Nigeria, the country in the late 19th century had become a 
colony of Britain. Through the colonial Mineral Oil Ordinance of 1914, Britain 
stipulated that oil licences and leases be given to only British companies.178  
 
According to Bamberg, it is essential to note that Nigeria became a British colony, 
when countries like Britain, France and Germany were the then European imperial 
powers who carved up the African continent into a multitude of colonies in what 
was termed then as ‘the great scramble for Africa.179 In later years when carrying 
out exploration, British Petroleum formed a partnership with Shell which later 
became Shell-BP in 1954.180 Notwithstanding the fact that other companies like 
 
175 Robert F Buchanan and Syed Tariq Anwar, ’Resource Nationalism and the Changing Business Model for 
Global Oil’ (2009) Journal of World Investment Trade 10(2), 241-254. 
176 Stefan Andreasson n 108. 
177 Ibid. 
178 James Bamberg, British Petroleum And The Political Economy Of International Oil (Cambridge University 
Press 2000) 109.  
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid, 109 – 110. 
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Socony Mobil, Tennesee Nigeria, Amosseas and Gulf, Safrap and Agip entered into 
the exploration and production in the Nigerian upstream petroleum industry as 
competitors to Shell-BP, yet Shell-BP still accounted for three quarter of the crude 
production in Nigeria in 1970.181 
 
One can say that the Nigerian petroleum industry is transforming with some 
planned changes in regulation and the implementation of new petroleum policies, 
mainly tied to the delayed passing into law of the Petroleum Industry Governance 
Bill. As a result, Andreasson contends that in the foreseeable future IOCs role in 
the petroleum sector of the country will diminish.182 This assertion can be debated 
because at the moment Nigeria and their NOC (NNPC) cannot carry out large scale 
exploration and production; thus the reliance on IOCs for this will continue for the 
foreseeable future. One further step was taken by the government to rearrange 
the petroleum industry as stipulated in the approved National Petroleum Policy 
(NPP), and National Gas Policy (NGP) by the Federal Executive Council. A primary 
objective of these policies was to come up with ways to advance suitable 
commercial, institutional, legal and regulatory frameworks for the petroleum 
industry of the country.183 
 
As part of the resource nationalism tide sweeping Africa, some of the Sub-Saharan 
African countries looking to expand their petroleum exploration and production, 
now seek to enact stronger legislation that would give them more control over 
their petroleum industry.184 The NPP, therefore, takes centre stage in Nigeria’s 
goal to use their petroleum resources to achieve economic growth, and not only 
use these resources as a means of revenue to the country.185 
David Mares stated:  
 
181 Ibid. 
182 Stefan Andreasson n 108. 
183 See 'Nigerian National Petroleum Policy' (Petroleumindustrybill.com, 2017) 
<http://www.petroleumindustrybill.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/National-Petroleum-Policy-Approved-by-
FEC-in-July-2017.pdf> accessed 19 November 2019. See also Israel Aye, Laura Alakija and others, Nigeria in 
Christopher B. Strong (ed.) (n 127) 252. 
184 Stefan Andreasson n 108. Also, Omorogbe stated that the federal government’s control over oil and gas 
resources was achieved when Nigeria was ruled by a military regime. This regime did not invest the revenues in 
creating conditions for sustainable development, this Omorogbe considered to be a catastrophic failure of public 
policy. Instead, the oil and gas resources became an instrument of politics. See Yinka Omorogbe (n 131) 37 – 38. 
185 See 'The National Petroleum Policy (NPP)' (KPMG Assets.kpmg, 2017) 
<https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/ng/pdf/tax/ng-the-national-petroleum-policy.pdf> accessed 19 
November 2019. 
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History matters. It is impossible to keep promising “we will do 
better next time” when centuries of natural resources exploitation 
have failed to provide benefits for the majority of a country’s 
citizens.186 
 
In vast contrast to the Norwegian way, which targets broad benefits from 
petroleum resources to its citizens, the Nigerian one seems to be beneficial to the 
Nigerian elite and ruling group. An agency that is content on serving foreign capital 
is the apt description of the Nigerian elites.187 For example, PDVSA of Venezuela 
has had success over the years in exploiting the petroleum resources of 
Venezuela. However, it is evidenced that this exploitation has not benefitted the 
average citizen of the state, who in theory, the states NOC was operating for. 
Instead, the resources were only for the nations’ elites and their international 
partners.188 A similar situation can be observed in some other petroleum-rich 
developing states like Nigeria, where the benefit of its natural resource riches has 
not benefitted the average citizen.189  
 
Singh suggested that the Nigerian government and its elites are heavily dependent 
on the rents from the IOCs, therefore, helping these groups to maintain their 
power and significance in the country.190 Invariably, IOCs rents, act as a sustaining 
factor for these ruling group and elites of the country. Therefore, one wonders 
when will there be a transparent government entity like the NOC where all 
petroleum resource dealings are open to public scrutiny, would these rent-seeking 
systems then survive? The NOC would be involved in their commercial capacity in 
creating value for the people. 
 
 
186 David R. Mares, 'Resource Nationalism And Energy Security In Latin America: Implications For Global Oil 
Supplies' (James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Rice University, 2010) 
<https://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/91767/EF-pub-MaresResourceNationalismWorkPaper-
012010.pdf?sequence=1> accessed 10 April 2018. 
187 Godwin Onuoha, 'A ‘Rising Africa’ In A Resource-Rich Context: Change, Continuity And Implications For 
Development' (2015) 64 Current Sociology 277. 
188 See Charles Mcpherson and World Bank Group, 'National Oil Companies Evolution, Issues, Outlook national 
oil companies workshop current roles and future prospects' (World Bank Washington D.C. 2003); Daniel 
Hellinger, Resource Nationalism and the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela in Paul Alexander Haslam and Pablo 
Heidrich, The Political Economy Of Natural Resources And Development (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 
2016) 204 – 217; Nna Emeka J. Wokoro, 'Beyond Petroleum Production To Community Development: 
International Oil Companies As Proxy Governments' (2009) 5 Texas Journal of Oil, Gas, and Energy Law 323. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Nitya Singh, 'Nigeria’s Elusive Quest For Democracy: Multinational Corporations And Sustenance Of 
Authoritarianism' (2011) 10 African and Asian Studies 209. 
 226 
Uniquely, Smythe and Smythe’s 1960 work on Nigerian elite groups still apply as 
they suggested that during colonialism - the British power and authority over the 
Nigerian elites influenced the pace and development of this group.191 Therefore, 
this means that the Nigerian economy is still susceptible to the interests of its 
elites or political groups and because the state does not have adequate 
mechanisms that can guarantee the state’s autonomy, especially from these 
groups.192 Is it that the machinery is not used, or that the ones on the ground are 
not effective?  
 
To identify these mechanisms, the legal regime regulating the ownership and 
control of natural resources in Nigeria are; the Constitution,193 Nigerian Minerals 
and Mining Act,194 and the Petroleum Act,195 amongst others and in all, the 
ownership of all-natural resources are vested in the state.196 There is an on-going 
debate between some scholars over the meaning of the ownership of natural 
resources, whether it should be owned by the people on which these resources 
are located on their land, or it should be for the benefit of the country as a 
whole.197 This study will avoid confusing the reader by building its analysis using 
the present judicial interpretation of the above stated legal frameworks, as it is 
thus justified since it is the present judicial position in Nigeria.198 When it comes 
to the issue of ownership and control in the Nigerian petroleum industry Cyril Obi’s 
stated: 
 
[…] although the Nigerian state has continued to assert its 
ownership and access roles, actual control still resides externally 
 
191 Hugh H. Smythe and Mabel M. Smythe, The New Nigerian Elite (Stanford University Press 1960) 121-136. 
192 See Godwin Onuoha n 183. 
193 See Section 44 (3) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended, CFRN) 1999. 
194 Section 1 (1) of Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act, 2007. 
195 Section 1 Petroleum Act, Cap P10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004. 
196 See Lanre Aladeitan, ‘Ownership and Control of Oil, Gas, and Mineral Resources in Nigeria: Between Legality 
and Legitimacy’ (2012) 38 Thurgood Marshall Law Review 159. See also, Ekhator Osa Eghosa, 'Public 
Regulation Of The Oil And Gas Industry In Nigeria: An Evaluation' (2016) 21 Annual Survey of International 
and Comparative Law 43 and Theodore Okonkwo, 'Ownership And Control Of Natural Resources Under The 
Nigerian Constitution 1999 And Its Implications For Environmental Law And Practice' (2017) 6 International 
Law Research 162. 
197 See Ekhator Osa Eghosa n 192. See also, Edwin Egede, 'Who Owns The Nigerian Offshore Seabed: Federal 
Or States? An Examination Of The Attorney General Of The Federation V. Attorney General Of Abia State & 35 
Ors Case' (2005) 49 Journal of African Law 73. 
198 See Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Abia State & 35 others [2002] SC, 6 NWLR 
(pt. 764) 542. 
 227 
in the hands of the international oil companies: Shell, Chevron 
Texaco, Exxon Mobil, Total and Eni.199 
 
The above statement aligns with the claims of this study, as real control of 
petroleum resources is handed over to the IOCs. Firm control will mean the control 
of petroleum at its most critical level, which is the production phase of these 
petroleum resources.200 For example, the recent admission by the Nigerian 
Minister for Petroleum that the country lost close to $60 Billion to the non-
enforcement of the terms of the Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) it went into 
with IOCs,201 shows that the NOC or the Ministry of Petroleum, and by extension 
the government does not have full control over its resources, the same resources 
that the economy mainly relies on.202  
 
Mahdavi claimed that government intervention in the petroleum sector through 
nationalisation should not be seen as the main reason for the petroleum sector 
performing poorly.203 NOCs should adopt the Norwegian model of separation of 
powers in the petroleum sector, and most importantly a petroleum sector where 
the NOC competes with IOCs to bid for oil fields to explore and produce.204 The 
goal should be to have NNPC progress to a level where it can competently carry 
out the activities of these IOCs. In the same way, Graham and Ovadia suggested 
that the articulation of what the state wants to achieve and its vision for its 
petroleum sector by the government through a policy document should be 
paramount for the state when establishing a governance framework for the 
petroleum sector.205 Professor Steven, in his findings, affirmed the assertion that 
the petroleum sector of any country is susceptible to political interference, and 
especially a political system that can be argued as being dysfunctional.206 
 
199 Cyril I. Obi, 'The Petroleum Industry: A Paradox Or (Sp)Oiler Of Development?' (2010) 28 Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 443-457. 
200 Ibid. 
201 See Ejiofor Alike, ‘Kachikwu: Nigeria Lost $60bn to Non-enforcement of PSCs with Majors’ ThisDay (Lagos, 
7 August 2017) <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/08/07/kachikwu-nigeria-lost-60bn-to-non-
enforcement-of-pscs-with-oil-majors/> accessed 8 September 2019. 
202 See Cemre Nur Öztürk, 'Ownership And Control Of Oil: Explaining Policy Choices Across Producing 
Countries' (2016) 12 Review of International Law and Politics 219. 
203 Paasha Mahdavi, 'Institutions And The “Resource Curse”: Evidence From Cases Of Oil-Related Bribery' 
[2019] Comparative Political Studies. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Emmanuel Graham and Jesse Salah Ovadia n 111. 
206 See Paul Stevens, 'Kuwait Petroleum Corporation: Searching For Strategy In A Fragmented Oil Sector' [2008] 
PESD Stanford Working Paper 78 
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Ovadia in his work on Nigerian local content policies, and the struggle for 
petroleum resource-rich states to control their natural resources has termed 
policies of ‘Nigerianisation’ as a form of local content policy, as it encouraged the 
employment of Nigerians in the petroleum sector and indigenous ownership 
through different regulations and quotas.207 How well these policies have assisted 
the economic growth and development in Nigeria is yet to be seen. One can argue 
that the problem might be in the implementation of these policies. Furthermore, 
Jesse Ovadia asserted that the effective control of the petroleum industry that 
Nigeria sought through these policies eventually failed. Maybe the main aim all 
along was to improve the ability of the elite and ruling class in the country to 
capture more petroleum rent.208  For instance, these policies led to the practice of 
‘fronting’ where many Nigerian citizens acted as a front for IOCs or join venture 
while both control of operations and ownership of the majority of the profits 
remained with the IOCs, while the equity share given to the Nigerian was written 
off as cost of doing business.209 
 
 
6.3.3.1 Role of the State   
 
Positive remarks have been made about the Norwegian petroleum legislation 
throughout this study. These comprehensive legislations, according to Al-Kasim, 
came about as Norway carefully delayed the process until a thorough grasp of 
petroleum operations was acquired.210 Therefore, Norway’s petroleum legislations 
were not reactive but reflected. One might argue that a combination of both 
reactive and reflective responses in regulating their petroleum industry was used, 
as gleaned from the history of the Norwegian petroleum industry. In other words, 
as petroleum resources were discovered, the state reacted, first by declaring 
sovereignty over their petroleum resources.211 After that, other legislation was 
 
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.573.3180&rep=rep1&type=pdf> accessed 9 October 
2019. 
207 Jesse Salah Ovadia, 'Local Content Policies And Petro-Development In Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative 
Analysis' (2016) 49 Resources Policy 20-30. 
208 Ibid. See also Ike Oguine, 'Nigerian Content In The Nigerian Petroleum Industry: Legal And Policy Issues' 
(2011) 29 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 405-430. 
209 Ibid. 
210 He termed it the gradual legislation. See Farouk Al-Kasim (n 44) 84, 246. 
211 Farouk Al-Kasim (n 44) 160. See also Berit Kristoffersen and Stephen Young, 'Geographies Of Security And 
Statehood In Norway’s ‘Battle Of The North’' (2010) 41 Geoforum 577. 
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carefully and expertly formulated, although it came gradually. This Al-Kasim 
suggested, helped Norway master the role of being a competent operator through 
Equinor and Norsk Hydro.212 
 
Usually, regulations complement laws and contracts, as they focus mainly on 
technical and operational matters in the petroleum sector.213 Said to be inflexible, 
the ‘detailed content approach’ according to Cameron and Stanley is the regulation 
design form used by the Norwegian government in regulating their petroleum 
sector, especially the upstream sector.214 This particular approach codifies specific 
laws, regulations and most provisions that are required in carrying out petroleum 
operations in Norway.215 No matter the argument against this form of regulation, 
one might argue it has worked for Norway, as the country continues to benefit 
from their petroleum resources. The gradual legislation paid off.  
 
On the other hand, one might argue that the Nigerian government regulates its 
petroleum sector with the same approach.216 The key advantages of the detailed 
content approach, which includes transparency in the licensing regimes which 
further insures against corrupt practices, and has not been evident in the 
petroleum sector of Nigeria. Nigeria’s petroleum Minister plays a vital role in the 
petroleum sector, but on many occasions the overriding powers of the President, 
always come into play, especially if the President plays a vital role of petroleum 
minister.217 This deters the advantages that can be gained from the separation of 






212 Therefore, the gradual approach was justified. See Farouk Al-Kasim (n 44) 85-87. 
213 These technical and operational matters might include, licensing procedures, contract area, monitoring, 
inspection, and control of operations. Also, might include fiscal elements, such as royalty definitions, surface 
rents, fees, and fines. See Peter Cameron and Michael Stanley (n 107) 97-98. 
214 Ibid, 69. 
215 Usually, supplemented by highly detailed guidance notes, which offers official interpretations for key issues 
and provisions. See Peter Cameron and Michael Stanley (n 107) 69. 
216 The design options are; Detailed Content Approach, Individually Legislated Agreements and Hybrid 
Approach. See Peter Cameron and Michael Stanley (n 107) 69-70. 
217 See 'Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari To Become Oil Minister In Own Cabinet' (the Guardian, 2015) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/30/nigerian-president-muhammadu-buhari-to-become-oil-
minister-in-own-cabinet> accessed 16 November 2019. 
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6.3.3.2 Ownership and Control  
 
According to Corrigan, at the centre of most debates about resource curse sits the 
importance of the role played by the NOC or other institutions in the petroleum 
resource governance.218 The institution – NOC must be strong enough to supervise 
the ownership, resource rents and the government’s ability to exercise control 
over the exploitation of its petroleum resources.219 Norway has supported the 
private initiative, but for how long? Norway took measures to make sure they 
retained ownership of their major industries, especially the petroleum sector, 
though not immediately, but future arrangements were put in place for the 
ownership of these sectors to revert to the government.220 Today, many countries 
vest the ownership of petroleum resources in the state.221 
 
It was important for the state to retain ownership, and the results of these steps 
speak for themselves. It can be argued that the Norwegian 10 Oil Commandments 
is a guideline or framework by the government that ensured the ownership and 
control of the petroleum resources by the Norwegian government, therefore it can 
be considered a form of resource nationalism policy, going by the thesis 
arguments. Further, in an attempt to make sense of what the idea behind the 
Norwegian system, Moses and Letnes stated that: 
[…] the “Norwegian system” was that private initiatives should be 
supported by state loans, guarantees,  or capital. Infrastructure 
(e.g., railway, telephone lines, telegraph, electricity) was to be 
established through private initiative and run by private interests 
during the initial period. Over time, however, and because of the 
government loans and guarantees, the state would eventually take 
over the operation and ownership of these activities. For Example, 
the Norwegian railway system was built by private firms, but its 
ownership eventually reverted back to the state.222 
 
 
218 Caitlin C. Corrigan, 'Breaking The Resource Curse: Transparency In The Natural Resource Sector And The 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative' (2014) 40 Resources Policy 17. 
219 Ibid. 
220 See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 47-49. 
221 Peter Cameron and Michael Stanley (n 107) 58. 
222 Norway’s early concession laws (1906-1917), was calculated to ensure public ownership over natural 
resources. As these concession laws granted permission, for a period of time to companies. Known as 
hjemfallsrett, is based on two legal principles: (1) the German principle of heimfall, which means that land, or 
block, “falls” back to the state after a specific term; and (2) the common law tradition of escheat, where the 
property of someone who dies without an heir is transferred to the state. These concession laws ensured that the 
all exploitation rights return to the state, after a certain period of time, without compensation. Jonathon Wayne 
Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 46) 48, 56. 
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The practicality of the same system working in Nigeria is one that can be debated. 
However, for the petroleum sector of the state, this form of arrangement can be 
used, especially when the states’ NOC is not actively in control of the exploration 
and production of petroleum resources. The dependence on IOCs to run the 
majority of the operations of the upstream sector of the state means that the state 
cedes control to IOCs, as their NOC majorly acts as a rent collector. It raises the 
question of how can a state learn to handle these operations in the future if their 
NOC is not involved? Reliance on the private sector, cannot be the solution, as 
this has been clear since the first commercial well was drilled in Nigeria.223  
 
In 1971 an industrial committee report to the Norwegian Parliament, advised the 
government to secure government control of all petroleum activities, create a 
state oil company that could manage Norway’s economic interests in the 
extraction of the petroleum resources, and the establishment and support of 
domestic petroleum industry.224 As the advantages of democratic control and 
national sovereignty were primary elements of the Norwegian government’s policy 
over the state’s petroleum sector.225 The demands in this industrial committee 
white paper came to be known as the 10 Oil Commandments. In other words, one 
can say that  Equinor became a tool of control over the state’s petroleum 
resources. One cannot deny the importance of state control over its petroleum 
resources, as Norway deemed it an essential component in its successful 
management of their petroleum resources. Further emphasis was made in another 
report by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Finance on the need for Norway to 
maintain national control over their petroleum resources.226 Further, the Royal 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance chapter was entitled “Democracy and Control”. It 
 
223 See Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
224 See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 82. See also, The Ministry of Industry, 'St. Meld. Nr. 76 
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225 Ibid. 
226 See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 83-84 and The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 
'St. Meld. Nr. 25 (1973-74)' (The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Finance 1973) 
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was to ensure that the wealth from petroleum resources should be used to 
advance “a qualitatively better society”.227 
 
According to Moses and Letnes, the 1979 White paper – St. meld. Nr. 53 (1979-
80)228 outlined further steps in effective petroleum resource management, and 
further strengthened Norway’s approach to petroleum resource management in a 
few underlying principles.229 To elaborate, the Norwegian Labor Party took a more 
activist approach in reinforcing four fundamental principles of the white paper, 
and these were: maximise the economic gain from resources; play a part in the 
state’s social and economic development; create and uphold strong environmental 
and safety standards and a calculated slow, and careful development of these 
resources.230 
 
Local Content Policies 
According to Mckinsey studies, today, the legal requirements of local content are 
used in countries that hold about 90% of the world’s petroleum reserves.231 Local 
content provisions are now more and more being added through legislation, 
regulations, bidding practices and contracts in the legal frameworks of resource-
rich countries, especially the petroleum-rich ones.232 The fundamental goal of 
these policies is to increase the domestic private sector, job creation, transfer of 
technology, and to establish a local competitive labour force.233 Although, today, 
not all countries achieve these local content goals. According to Marcel et al., the 
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Figure 10: Local content policy steps 
 
Source: culled from Marcel et al. (Chatham House).234 
 
The 1970s and 1980s saw Norway successfully develop these policies to amplify 
the economic benefit of the exploitation of their natural resources, especially in 
their petroleum sector, thus leveraging the activities of the industry to generate 
economic opportunities for the state.235 The Mckinsey Global Institute identify the 
six areas of the resource value chain and countries that are performing well, this 
evidences Norway’s petroleum sector as an excellent example among other 
countries, but Nigeria was not identified as a well-performing country.236  
 
In Nigeria and other West African petroleum producing countries, local content 
policies and legislation have become popular amongst resource-rich developing 
countries and is regarded as an initiative for these governments to increase the 
economic benefits from the exploitation of their natural resources.237 
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<http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2017/07/Local-Content_Norway_Nov2016.pdf> accessed 24 February 2020. 
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Nevertheless, there are still debates of the claimed value-added from the adoption 
of these local content policies, especially in developing petroleum-rich 
countries.238 Local content policies were implemented to increase value through 
the exploitation of petroleum resources and advance linkages between the 
petroleum sector and the rest of the state’s economy.239 However, the historical 
evidence shows the opposite, as the countries that adopt them have failed to 
capture and retain value when exploiting their petroleum resources.240 
 
Lange and Kinyondo suggested that in today’s petroleum industry especially in 
African states, local content policies are the widespread form of resource 
nationalism and it can come in the form of quantitative or qualitative 
requirements.241 The requirements for investors to procure a stipulated 
percentage of its workforce, goods and services within the petroleum industry of 
its host country can be defined as local content policies and legislation.242 Adedeji 
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and others contended that local content in Nigeria had a positive indirect effect on 
job creation through indigenous oil firms’ participation and backward linkages.243  
 
Imposition and implementation of these local content policies by national 
government remain a controversial subject.244 While local content policies will help 
the state to address economic diversification and youth unemployment which are 
the pressing concerns for sustainable economic and social development in 
Nigeria.245 However, Kolstad and Kinyondo proffered harder taxes on IOCs 
carrying out activities in a state’s domestic petroleum industry and the use of 
taxes to promote domestic industrialisation and development in other areas of the 
economy as an alternative to local content.246 
 
Ovadia, in analysing ways of promoting in-country value, observed that most 
importantly, the idea that enhanced local elite ownership is not necessarily 
developmental - however, preferably one that is reflective of the ‘dual nature’ of 
local content policies, thus instead of enhancing economic growth and 
development, has led to the enhancement of the flow of petroleum rent into the 
pockets of the ruling class and local elites.247 To ensure that they continue to 
maintain their class power and status, the elite and ruling class ensure their 
political position by exerting a high level of direct and indirect control over the 
state and non-state institutions and economic growth and development in 
general.248 Can one then say that the state controls these natural resources, or 
 
243 Although, this local value creation from the implementation of local content policies in Nigeria were below 
average as the targets for the countries domestic petroleum industry have not been met.  
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rather a group of people control these resources, especially when the average 
citizen of the state does not benefit from the exploitation of these natural 
resources, which rightly should be for the state as a whole? 
 
It has been claimed that the ruling elites would instead pursue the most natural 
path for creating capital, rather than developing its productive sectors to a level 
of profitability. Instead, it will embark on rent-seeking ventures.249 This, in many 
ways, paints the picture of the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. The country 
resorted to local content policies as a means of ensuring the ownership and control 
of their petroleum resources. However, it seems they fall short of achieving the 
goals of making these petroleum resources beneficial to the country, rather than 
to a select group. 
 
Local content policies are usually geared towards stimulating domestic 
manufacturing and employment creation. Hence the pressure is usually on IOCs 
to make a favourable contribution to the economic development in the state 
through their operations in the petroleum-rich developing state.250 Which begs the 
question, should the state be wholly reliant on IOCs to make a positive 
contribution to the state? It has a NOC that can add positively to the growth of 
the economy if it were run and operated excellently and professionally. 
 
Arguments for and against the use of local content policies by resource-rich 
developing countries, as a form of resource nationalism can cover a considerable 
body of work. Although the arguments that local content can contribute immensely 
to the economic development of a state, are reliable, economically for that to 
happen, certain conditions need to be met, which are; clear, unambiguous 
policies; the right institutions; absorptive capacity in local industry and willingness 
on the part of IOCs to outsource.251   
 
249 Lindsay Whitfield and Lars Buur, 'The Politics Of Industrial Policy: Ruling Elites And Their Alliances' (2014) 
35 Third World Quarterly 126-144. See also, Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, 'Economic Liberalization And The Lineages 
Of The Rentier State' (1994) 27 Comparative Politics 1. 
250 It is still debatable to as to whether the business practices of IOCS actually make a difference in terms of 
economic growth and development through the carrying out of the requirements of stipulated local content 
policies. Michael Zisuh Ngoasong, 'How International Oil And Gas Companies Respond To Local Content 
Policies In Petroleum-Producing Developing Countries: A Narrative Enquiry' (2014) 73 Energy Policy 471-479; 
Rafael Emmanuel “Manny” Macatangay n 231. 
251 In summarising the debates on effectiveness of local content policies, Hansen, Buur, Kjaer and Therkildsen in 
their work stated: 
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6.3.3.3 Resource Curse 
 
Several studies have described the situation in which a country endowed with 
natural resources find themselves when these resources are poorly managed.252 
Clear reasoning suggests that when vast petroleum resource reserves are 
discovered in a state, they are valuable to the state’s economy and also to the 
global petroleum industry, and should lead to economic development in these 
states, in contrast to states that are less endowed with these resources.253 This 
has been termed the ‘resource curse’ and has been observed in some petroleum-
rich states.254 As these states discover a large amount of petroleum within their 
territory and start exporting these natural resources, it is logical to hope that, this 
would benefit the country endowed with petroleum resources, however, in reality, 
it is not always so. Instead, the petroleum-rich, and exporting state, fares poorly 
in comparison to a country that is not endowed with petroleum resources.255  
 
Today, Norway seems to be one of the exceptions to the resource curse. Many 
have argued that Norway escaped the curse, by employing different measures to 
ensure that the petroleum resource revenues are used for the benefit of the 
Norwegian people, and not for a select few.256 Whereas in Nigeria, it has been 
 
It cannot be decided in advance whether and how the pursuit of economic efficiency in local 
content can be balanced with elites’ pursuit of power. Nonetheless, one thing that is certain 
is that the tendency for local content to be politicized and driven towards what we have 
called ‘linkage patronage’, with consequences for realizing the development potential of 
extractives, is a reality that policy makers, administrators, donors and IOC executives will 
have to relate to as they in the coming decade seek to mobilize extractive FDI for industrial 
and social development. 
 
See Michael W. Hansen and others n 243; Austin Dziwornu Ablo, 'Local Content And Participation In Ghana's 
Oil And Gas Industry: Can Enterprise Development Make A Difference?' (2015) 2 The Extractive Industries and 
Society 320-327; Magnus Blomstrom and Ari Kokko, 'Foreign Direct Investment And Spillovers Of Technology' 
(2001) 22 International Journal of Technology Management 435. See also, Michael Warner, 'Do Local Content 
Regulations Drive National Competitiveness Or Create A Pathway To Protectionism' (Extractives Hub, 2011) 
<https://extractiveshub.org/servefile/getFile/id/1647> accessed 25 February 2020. 
252 See chapter 5. See also, 'The Resource Curse: The Political And Economic Challenges Of Natural Resource 
Wealth' (NRGI Resourcegovernance.org, 2015) 
<https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_Resource-Curse.pdf> accessed 28 November 2019. 
253 See Glada Lahn and Paul Stevens, ‘ The Curse of the One-Size-Fits all Fix: Re-evaluating what we Know 
about Extractives and Economic Development’ in Tony Addison and Alan Roe (eds) (n 82) 95. 
254 Albeit, debates over the roles of natural resources on an economy still abounds. Petroleum resources has proven 
over the years to be natural resource that can assist the state in achieving economic development, when managed 
effectively. See chapter 5 and Ramez Abubakr Badeeb, Hooi Hooi Lean and Jeremy Clark, 'The Evolution Of The 
Natural Resource Curse Thesis: A Critical Literature Survey' (2017) 51 Resources Policy 123. 
255 Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong, 'Combating The Resource Curse: An Alternative Solution To 
Managing Mineral Wealth' (2006) 4 Perspectives on Politics 35. See also Terry Lynn Karl (n 84). 
256 See Sections 1-2 Petroleum Act No. 72 1996. See also, Steinar Holden n 33. 
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evident that petroleum resources are not used for the more significant benefit of 
the people, instead the benefits are for the elite and ruling groups. According to 
Professor Stevens et al., weak institutions are consequences of the resource curse, 
which in turn lead to the country’s elite or ruling groups being the only ones to 
benefit from the development of these petroleum resources.257 Guichaoua 
attributed this present Nigerian reality to the institutional background the country 
inherited from the colonial era and has a mitigating impact of oil dependence by 
the state, which has not led to development.258 Consequently, this is the situation 
in Nigeria, NNPC the country’s NOC becomes a rent collector and cash cow for the 
elite and ruling groups. 
 
In the early 1970s, oil constituted more than half Nigeria’s commodity exports, 
but agriculture remained the dominant sector, which meant that the country was 
not dependent on oil.259 This was only temporary, as, by the end of the decade, 
Nigeria was widely cited as suffering from the “oil syndrome” or ‘Dutch disease’.260 
Subsequently, the countries’ petroleum policy response to their abundant 
petroleum, has not yielded any positive outcome so far, unlike the outcome in 
Norway. 
 
Gelb in articulating Nigeria’s policy response to oil windfalls stated: 
Nigeria’s strategy for managing its extraordinary windfalls cannot 
be regarded as a carefully articulated one in the sense that, say 
Algeria’s can. Nigerian policymakers do not seem to have 
resolutely set out to pursue a strategy heavily biased toward 
infrastructure and education and away from agriculture, but they 
were inclined to believe that achieving productivity gains in 
traditional small holder agriculture would be difficult.261 
 
Gelb in analysing the impact of petroleum resources in Nigeria’s economy 
observed that fundamentally the revenues from petroleum were used to support 
 
257 As observed in Nigeria’s case. See Paul Stevens, Glada Lahn and Jaako Kooroshy, 'The Resource Curse 
Revisited' [2015] The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) 
<http://www.dehai.org/archives/dehai_news_archive/2015/aug/att-0657/The_Resource_Curse_Revisited.pdf> 
accessed 31 January 2019. 
258 See Yvan Guichaoua, ‘Oil and Political Violence in Nigeria’ in  Jacques Lesourne and William C. Ramsay 
(eds), Governance Of Oil In Africa: Unfinished Business (IFRI 2009) 21. 
259 Alan H Gelb (n 53) 227. See also, Ludwig Herbert Schätzl (n 53) 152. 
260 The mineral sector’s share of the GDP went from about 1% in 1960 to more than 25% in the late 1970s. 
Furthermore, in 1979 petroleum export rose to well over 90% of the total export. See Alan H Gelb (n 53) 227-
228. See also, Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong n 249. 
261 Alan H Gelb (n 53) 256. 
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the country’s social and political structures. These revenues were not used to 
improve the agricultural sector or its productivity, in the way Indonesia put their 
oil revenue to use, Nigeria did not make any plans to adjust to an event of reduced 
inflow of oil revenues.262 Expectedly, the result was a vicious cycle of rising 
distortion, declining efficiency, falling non-oil output, fiscal deficit, inflation, and 
disruptive cuts in public spending.263 To put it differently, in the early 1970s, 
Nigeria was still considered a developing country, despite its oil.264 Then, the 
country was still dependent on agriculture as a source of food, employment, 
investable surplus, and exports. At present Nigeria is still considered a developing 
country, in the same vein rich in natural resources, especially petroleum.  
 
Deacon claimed that the natural resource curse and the resulting mismanagement 
of these windfalls led to an institutional decline in some petroleum-rich states.265 
Orihuela claimed that looking at the resource curse in the political economy would 
contribute to the explanation of the difference the institutions make.266 Arguably, 
this could be the leading problem in the Nigerian petroleum sector, which has 
evidenced corruption, government complacency, excessive borrowing/debt 
overhang, Dutch disease, neglect of education, health care facilities, violence in 
the regions where the petroleum is produced, among other things.267  
 
In combating the Dutch disease, Torvik proposed a model termed ‘learning by 
doing’ which promotes production and productivity in both traded and non-traded 
sectors of an economy, which could be applied to the petroleum sector when the 
state is involved in the production phase of the upstream industry as an operator, 
rather than leaving the production mainly to the IOCs.268 Learning by doing could 
be suggested as being part of Norway’s success in its petroleum industry. 
 
262 See Alan H Gelb (n 53) 228-230. See also R.M. Auty, 'Internal Constraints On Prudent Oil Windfall 
Deployment For Resource-Based Industrialisation: Nigeria And Cameroon' (1988) 19 Geoforum 147. 
263 Ibid. 
264 Ibid. 
265 Robert Deacon, 'The Political Economy Of The Natural Resources Curse: A Survey Of Theory And Evidence' 
(2011) 7 Foundations and Trends® in Microeconomics 111. 
266 José Carlos Orihuela, 'Institutions And Place: Bringing Context Back Into The Study Of The Resource Curse' 
(2017) 14 Journal of Institutional Economics 157. 
267 See Agwara J. Onyeukwu, 'Resource Curse In Nigeria: Perception And Challenges' [2007] Central European 
University - Center for Policy Studies / International Policy Fellowships 
<https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/11871241.pdf> accessed 8 July 2019. See also, Yvan Guichaoua, ‘Oil and 
Political Violence in Nigeria’ in  Jacques Lesourne and William C. Ramsay (eds) (n 252) 9-41. 
268 See Ragnar Torvik, 'Learning By Doing And The Dutch Disease' (2001) 45 European Economic Review 285. 
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Furthermore, Moses and Letnes argued the importance of competitiveness in the 
rest of the economy’s sectors.269 In their analysis of the Norwegian petroleum 
sector and how they combated the Dutch disease, the Norwegian government 
from using exchange rate regime adjustments changed to increased factor 
mobility, as a means of reducing inflation, and most importantly Norway stored 
their petroleum resource incomes offshore, with the view that, as petroleum 
resources are finite, when these resources run out the country can use their stored 
incomes advantageously in the international economy.270  
 
According to Paler, there is a need to understand further the decentralisation271 
and subnational resources curse, which involves ways in which the central 
government distributes or redistributes the revenues obtained from the export of 
its petroleum resources.272 The formulas for allocating petroleum revenues 
between the federal and state governments had an impact on the economy.273 
The primary objectives that are expected for every revenue allocation formula are 
expected to accomplish: national unity; economic growth; balanced development; 
self-sufficiency and high standard of living for the citizens.274 The distribution of 
petroleum rents in Nigeria has always been a problem, and it has also influenced 
the public spending patterns and their distributional effects.275 This view was also 
supported by the works of Ingen et al.276 The sharing of financial benefits from 
resource extraction with regional governments is referred to as revenue 
decentralisation.277  
 
269 See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 46) 130-147. 
270 Ibid., 147. See also, Erling Roed Larsen, 'Escaping The Resource Curse And The Dutch Disease? When And 
Why Norway Caught Up With And Forged Ahead Of Its Neighbors' (2006) 65 American Journal of Economics 
and Sociology 605. 
271 The sharing of the financial benefits of resource extraction with regional governments is referred to as revenue 
decentralisation. See Michael Lewin Ross, The Oil Curse (Princeton University Press 2013) 239. 
272 Laura Paler (Revenue Watch Institute, 2011) 
<https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/SubnationalresourcecurseliteratureDRAFT.pdf> accessed 23 
April 2019. See also Rebecca Miller, 'Natural Resource Extraction And Political Trust' (2015) 45 Resources 
Policy 165 and Osmel Manzano and Juan David Gutiérrez, 'The Subnational Resource Curse: Theory And 
Evidence' [2019] The Extractive Industries and Society 261. 
273 See Emmanuel O. Ojo, 'The Politics Of Revenue Allocation And Resource Control In Nigeria: Implications 
For Federal Stability' (2010) 7 Federal governance 15. 
274 Ibid. 
275 Alan H Gelb (n 53) 238. 
276 See Chiara van Ingen, Requier Wait and Ewert Kleynhans n 74. 
277 The effective ways to reduce the government’s windfall and ensuring that the people of the extractive regions 
will not seek independence as the case of Nigeria and the Niger Delta crisis. Although this can also lead to corrupt 
and incompetent regional governments, since they can also be as ineffective as the central government. 
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The resource curse is evident in Nigeria while absent in the Norwegian petroleum 
sector. The learning by doing model as argued here and in the previous chapter, 
seems to be vital for the petroleum sector of Nigeria. Adopting progressive 
policies, and engaging in the production and operational side of the upstream 
sector by the country’s NOC will assist the state to gain technical knowledge of 
the industry. Today the major oil fields of Nigeria are operated by IOCs, NPDC 
does not operate the significant fields. How can a country’s crown jewels be left 




6.3.3.4 The Rentier State  
 
Karl commented that loss of fiscal control, overspending, and soaring debt are 
factors that show a declining state capacity as they rely heavily on rents, especially 
rents from the petroleum sector, thus making the state a rentier state.279 In 
agreement with Karl, and other commentators on natural resource curse Larsen 
claimed that rent-seeking is the pathogen of this curse.280 According to Barma, 
rentier states vary in their experience, and to better understand them, there is a 
need to identify and understand their particular experience.281  
 
Therefore, one has to identify and understand the experience of Norway and 
Nigeria better. As suggested in chapter 5, rent-seeking can be advantageous to a 
state. However, the over-reliance on petrodollars, especially in periods of high oil 
price can deteriorate to a form of  “feeding frenzy”, where the state becomes a 
grabber state rather than a productive state.282 According to Adibe et al., the 
Nigerian government’s stance towards its petroleum industry, especially the 
 
See Michael Ross (n ) 239. See also, Michael Takim Otu, 'Resource Control And Appraising Debates On True 
Federalism In Nigeria: Critical Perspectives And Political Options' (2017) 2 Research Journal of Humanities, 
Legal Studies & International Development (RJHLSID) 95. 
278 See 'NPDC - Upstream Nigeria Oil & Gas And Energy Directory' (Upstream Nigeria Oil & Gas and Energy 
Directory, 2018) <https://upstreamnigeria.com/npdc/> accessed 27 November 2019. See also, Chapter 5.  
279 Terry Lynn Karl (n 84). See also, Andrew Williams, 'Shining A Light On The Resource Curse: An Empirical 
Analysis Of The Relationship Between Natural Resources, Transparency, And Economic Growth' (2011) 39 
World Development 490. 
280 Erling Roed Larsen n 264. 
281 Naazneen H. Barma, 'The Rentier State At Work: Comparative Experiences Of The Resource Curse In East 
Asia And The Pacific' (2014) 1 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies 257. 
282 Terry Lynn Karl (n 84). 
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upstream industry, is one that prioritises the steady flow of rent from the 
petroleum resources from the IOCs, rather than full participation in the production 
of these resources.283  
 
Further Yates in analysing the rentier mentality or psychology stated: 
 
the rentier mentality is a psychological condition with profound 
consequences for productivity: contracts are given as an 
expression of gratitude rather than as a reflection of economic 
rationale; civil servants see their principal dusty as being available 
in their offices during working hours; businessmen abandon 
industry and enter into real estate speculation or other special 
situations associated with a booming oil sector; the best and 
brightest abandon business and seek out lucrative government 
employment; manual labour and other work considered 
demeaning by the rentier is farmed out to foreign workers, whose 
remittances flood out of the rentier economy; and so on.284 
 
Reflectively, these situations, as claimed in chapter 5, show the situation in the 
Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. The over-reliance on rents from IOCs 
continues till date. Although going by the PIGB plans seem to be in place to 
establish a fully productive and operational NOC, that will engage in the upstream 
sector of the country. 
 
 
6.4 Equinor and NNPC: Comparative Analysis 
 
This study has shown that ever since the entrance of state-owned petroleum 
companies or NOCs, into the global petroleum industry, they have taken up a 
strategic position in the global petroleum industry, and thus played a vital role in 
the development of petroleum resources both domestically and internationally. 
NOCs have helped their states achieve economic development, and meet energy 
demands through their activities. At the same time, this might not be obtainable 
from all NOCs, and this section sets out to critically evaluate the roles Equinor and 
 
283 Raymond Adibe, Ejikeme Nwagwu and Okorie Albert, 'Rentierism And Security Privatisation In The Nigerian 
Petroleum Industry: Assessment Of Oil Pipeline Surveillance And Protection Contracts' (2017) 45 Review of 
African Political Economy 345. 
284 Douglas A. Yates, The Rentier State In Africa: Oil Rent Dependency And Neocolonialism In The Republic Of 
Gabon (Africa World Press 1996) 22. 
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NNPC play in their respective countries. Why are one highly rated globally for 





Identified as the second youngest NOC in Europe, but also as a small NOC 
compared to some in Europe in the early 1970s,285 Al-Kasim claimed that there 
was a political accord throughout the 1970s and early 1980s to allow Equinor to 
evolve into a powerful tool through which Norway would achieve its national 
petroleum objectives domestically and globally.286 This goal was achieved, as 
Equinor achieved the set government objective, and over the years has generated 
enormous revenues for the Norwegian government through its petroleum 
activities, domestically and globally.  
 
Today, Equinor is one of the most essential NOCs nationally, and internationally. 
This was achieved mainly due to the fact that it was the principal operator in the 
vast oil and gas field of the country. A country whose oil and gas needs were not 
vast.287  
 
In summarising the Norwegian petroleum experience Ryggvik stated: 
 
Through Equinor, strategic state ownership, a strong professional. 
Institution like a Petroleum Directorate and above all through the 
continual build-up of technological know-how, Norway has 
 
285 Leslie E Grayson, National Oil Companies (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 1981) 197 – 211. See also Helge Ryggvik 
n 65. 
286 Farouk Al-Kasim (n 44) 87-89. 
287 As significant findings were made at Ekofisk and the major gas discovery at Frigg in 1971, it became important 
that that the Norwegian government had to set up a NOC to handle and control its resources and this view was 
echoed by the proposal the government made to the Norwegian Parliament (Storting). Following the proposal, in 
September 1972 Statoil was established with the following objectives: 
To carry out, by itself or in participation or in cooperation with other companies, exploration 
and production, transportation, refining and marketing of petroleum and products derived 
therefrom, and other activities reasonably related thereto. 
The above objective handed to Statoil translate the desire of the Norwegian government not only to own its 
resources but also to control the resources and the exploitation of these resources. The NOC was mandated to be 
involved in every facet of the Norwegian oil and gas industry. Important to note, although Statoil were given the 
mandate, the government also were aware of how powerful Statoil can become, and when its influence grows it 
might start controlling the government citing the experience of Italy with Enrico Mattei and the struggle to get 
ENI controlled by the government and not ENI controlling the government the legislators had to find a way to 
limit the powers of Equinor. 
See Leslie E Grayson (n 279) 197 – 211.  
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managed to ensure that most of the economic rent from oil has 
gone to the state, hence to society.288 
 
The state’s NOC has a vital role to play, an affirmation of a state’s ownership and 
control over its natural resources, as established in chapter 4, as components of 
resource nationalism. However, Ryggvik, calls it ‘strategic state ownership’ which 
definitely assisted Norway in using their petroleum resources to add value to the 





In the Middle East and Africa, NOCs emerged mostly after the establishment of 
OPEC in 1960. The exception is the National  Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) which 
was formed in 1957 on the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian concession. Now, 
almost every developing country that has had or wishes to have exploration efforts 
undertaken in its territory has a NOC.289 Onoh claimed that NNPC was established 
as the Nigerian government needed a NOC with broader powers, as it would be 
independent in its activities, unlike NNOC, which has some restrictions imposed 
on it.290 This so-called independence of the country’s NOC is a phenomenon that 
is yet to occur. The federal government’s grip on NNPC tightens by the day, even 
in light of new reforms that will free and unbundle NNPC. 
 
Until the PIGB is fully passed and the proposed unbundling of the state’s NOC 
takes place NNPC is expected to perform specific roles, especially in the petroleum 
industry and carry out the nation's mission for the control of its petroleum 
resources. Three dimensions in achieving these goals and more can be identified: 
(i) protecting national hydrocarbon wealth, (ii) promoting economic development, 
and (iii) promoting the political interests of the state abroad.291 These duties were 
 
288 Helge Ryggvik n 65. See also Emeka Duruigbo, 'Permanent Sovereignty And Peoples' Ownership Of Natural 
Resources In International Law' (2006) 38 The George Washington International Law Review 33. 
289 Yinka Omorogbe (n 131) 37 – 38. 
290 See Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act Chapter N123 2004. See also, J. K Onoh  (n 59) 34-36. 
291 Paul Stevens, 'A Methodology for Assessing the Performance  of National Oil Companies background paper 
for a study on national oil companies and value creation' (The World Bank 2008) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/NOC_methodology_stevens.pdf> accessed 9 January 
2017. 
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detailed in sections of NNPC Act 2004,292 which outlined NNPC’s upstream, 
midstream and downstream duties in the Nigerian petroleum industry. Under the 
PIGB within six months of the bill being passed into law two companies will be 
incorporated through Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC): Nigerian Petroleum 
Assets Management Company (NPAMC) and National Petroleum Company 
(NPC).293 NPAMC manages the PSCs while NPC would be tasked to manage all 
other NNPC assets such as JVs.294 
 
Industry analysts and commentators postulated four key growth stages of a NOC 
which are; passive minority equity partner with IOCs, contributing minority equity 
partner, responsibility for a minor field to responsibility for a significant complex 
field.295 If these are parameters to assess a prosperous and progressive NOC how 
will the Nigerian NNPC be categorised? In Africa, Sonangol P&P, the subsidiary of 
Sonangol, took just three years to move from operatorship of tiny fields to 
complex fields in Angola.296 Many IOCs and smaller investors participate in the 
crude oil business in Nigeria under various forms of participation regimes since 
crude oil was discovered there. It is expected, however, that the participants will 
maximise the benefits of these participation regimes for the growth and 
continuous development of the oil and gas business in Nigeria.297 Nevertheless, 
the full benefit of these forms of participation is yet to be seen in the level of 
growth recorded in NNPC, the Nigerian NOC that goes into these arrangements 
with the IOCs.298  
 
The primary reason for the creation of these NOCs is invariably the same as that 
which led to the creation of Statoil and BNOC; to advance and promote state 
 
292 See Section 5 (1) Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act Cap N123 2004. 
293 See Section 77 (1) The Petroleum Industry Governance Bill 2018. 
294 See Section 77 (2) The Petroleum Industry Governance Bill 2018. 
295 See KPMG International, 'Unlocking the potential of Africa’s NOCs' (2014) 
<https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2014/11/unlocking-potential-africas-NOCs.pdf> accessed 8 
January 2017 
296 Ibid. 
297 Francisca E Nlerum, 'Reflections on Participation Regimes in Nigeria’s Oil Sector’ (Nigerian Current  Law 
Review 2007 - 2010 2011) 146–162 ch 5 <http://nials-nigeria.org/pub/NCLR5.pdf> accessed 11 January 2017 
298 See Aaron Sayne, Alexandria Gilles and Christina Katsouris, 'Inside NNPC Oil Sales: A Case Of Reform In 
Nigeria' (NRGI Resourcegovernance.org, 2015) 
<https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/NRGI_InsideNNPCOilSales_CompleteReport.pdf> accessed 
1 December 2019. 
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policy, mainly in these instances by affecting state participation in the oil industry, 
promoting investment in the oil sector, and encouraging exploration.299 Omorogbe 
further stressed that the major problem that this group of companies had was the 
promotion of state policy, to the detriment of all other objectives.300 
 
The observations of Vines et al. in their Chatham House report about NNPC, raises 
questions of state control over petroleum resources in Nigeria, which was argued 
in chapter 5. According to Vines et al. unlike many NOCs around the world, NNPC 
welcomes foreign equity participation under their Joint Venture (JV) arrangements 
and the Nigerian petroleum sector has always been an ‘attractive theatre’ for IOCs, 
therefore resulting in an IOC dominated petroleum sector.301 In an IOC dominated 
industry, how does the government ensure control? Concerning the thesis, the 
Nigerian Petroleum Development Company Limited (NPDC) as a subsidiary of 
NNPC was given the mandate to engage in the upstream production of 
petroleum.302 NPDC cannot boast of a commercial quantity of production, given 
the vast amount of petroleum resources within the country’s territory. For 
example, the NNPC June 2019 Report, calculated NPDC’s daily production from 
May 2018 to May 2019 to be 130,406 barrels per day, for a country that produces 
about 2 million barrels per day.303 One wonders how the country can boast of 
control when the country’s NOC or subsidiary does not produce at least 60% of 
the crude oil in the country. Instead, the major oil fields and larger productions 
are run by IOCs. 
 
 
299 Whilst many of the NOCs are quite modest in size and only nominally in control of their respective oil 
industries, some are actually involved in the direct production of their nations’ oil resources and have even 
undertaken exploration efforts in other developing countries. Examples of such companies are the Indian Oil and 
Natural Gas Commission (ONGC), YPF and Petrobras. See Yinka Omorogbe (n 131) 37 – 38. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Alex Vines and others, 'Thirst For African Oil: Asian National Oil Companies In Nigeria And Angola' [2009] 
Chatham House Report <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/r0809_africanoil.pdf> accessed 2 
August 2019. 
The Nigerian oil policy of participation in equity was first seen in its agreement with Nigerian Agip Oil Company 
(NAOC), a subsidiary of ENI the Italian oil company. See J. K Onoh (n 59) 22. 
302 See 'Welcome To NPDC' (Npdc.nnpcgroup.com, 2019) <https://npdc.nnpcgroup.com/Pages/Home.aspx> 
accessed 11 November 2019. 
303 See 'NNPC Monthly Report: Financial And Operations Report' (NNPC Nnpcgroup.com, 2019) 
<https://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPCDocuments/Performance%20Data/FullReports/Approved%20NNPC%20
Monthly%20Financial%20%20Operations%20Report%20for%20the%20Month%20of%20June%202019.pdf> 
accessed 1 December 2019. 
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Lewis remarked that NNPC operates opaque swap deals with traders under which 
it supplies consignments of crude in exchange for refined products, sourced from 
world markets.304 He continued that this scheme is attractive to traders because 
it is cashless, and crude volumes can be generous — but the arrangements are 
inefficient and, according to the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI) it could be costing the country $8bn a year.305 Further, Lewis 
stated that NNPC, with a staff of about 10,000, is a powerful force of patronage 
and is sure to resist moves to reform it.306 One might argue that the elites and 
ruling class benefiting from this particular situation will not permit any reform that 
would disrupt their revenue flow. This is, evident by the number of years it has 
taken the government to pass the PIB now PIGB that would see NNPC unbundled. 
These new companies will be expected to be commercially-driven and will be able 
to raise funding internationally.307 
 
NNPC is permitted to enforce all regulatory measures and engage in any 
commercial activities in the petroleum sector by the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation Act.308 Recently, NNPC has had plenty to worry about, according to 
some official statistics, between January and May 2016, "pipeline vandals and oil 
thieves" stole 0.56m barrels of crude and 109m litres of petroleum products.309 
 
304 Ian Lewis, 'Nigeria’s dilemma' (Petroleum Economist, 10 November 2016) <http://www.petroleum-
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regulations/nigeria> accessed 15 August 2019. 
309 In that period NNPC suffered a total 1,447 pipeline breaches of varying importance. In terms of percentages, 
gas supply is even harder hit. Instead of the 1.4bn cubic feet a day for which the corporation had budgeted, it 
pumped less than 0.7bn cf between January and May. The losses are playing havoc with NNPC's revenues and 
Nigeria's economy. Production is 0.7m b/d beneath the level needed for the government's budget for 2016. 
Unsurprisingly, the September meeting expressed alarm at the "continuing dwindling of NNPC revenue”. See 
Selwyn Parker, 'Nigeria’s oil output still hampered' (Petroleum Economist, 3 October 2016) 
<http://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/markets/outlook/2016/nigeria-s-oil-output-still-hampered> 
accessed 8 January 2019. 
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The Nigerian petroleum sector, especially the upstream sector has had a difficult 
past few years, from awaiting the enactment of new reforms, to loss of revenue 
and militant attacks in the Niger Delta. For example, in 2015, militant attacks on 
Nigerian oil pipelines have forced around 0.5m barrels a day of its oil output offline 
this year, causing the country to cede its place to Angola as Africa's biggest crude 
producer in that period.310 
 
For example, in 2014, the then PIB's revised fiscal arrangements were intended 
to raise the tax to take on joint-venture operations from 86% at present to 91%, 
according to an industry estimate, while the take from production-sharing 
contracts — introduced in 1993 when deep-water blocks were offered for the first 
time — would rise from 30% to 77%.311 The tax on gas production under joint 
ventures would rise from zero to 60%.312 The company holds interests of 55% or 
60% in the joint ventures which produce about 1.5m barrels a day (b/d) out of 
Nigeria’s total output, including condensates, of approximately 2.3m b/d.313  
 
310 In August 2015, Nigerian oil production was just 1.46m b/d, well down from 2m b/d in October 2015. 
ExxonMobil was expected to resume loading oil at the Qua Iboe terminal, Nigeria's largest field, after rerouting 
supplies. The facility has been under force majeure since July. Shell has also lifted force majeure on its Bonny 
Light exports after patching up a damaged pipeline. Combined export capacity from the facilities is about 0.5m 
b/d, though it isn't yet clear how much they will ship just yet. Furthermore, in October, 2019 the IMF said it 
expected the Nigerian economy to contract by around 1.7% this year, before expanding by just 0.6% in 2017 a 
downward revision to its previous forecast for next year's growth of 1.1%.  In September, S&P downgraded 
Nigeria's rating by a notch from B+ to B, several levels below investment grade. The credit-ratings agency said 
the shrinking economy was attributable to disrupted oil production, restrictive foreign exchange policy the naira 
was been allowed to float in June, and since then has lost about 10% of its value and a failure to implement fiscal 
stimuli fast enough. The naira's weakness has hurt Nigerian importers' ability to pay for gasoline imports, which 
are vital given the country's lack of functioning refining capacity. 
The Nigerian lower house of parliament is also investigating missing fuel exports, which it says could total 58m 
barrels of oil and 0.727m tonnes of liquefied natural gas, worth up $17bn. See Helen Robertson, 'Nigeria is no 
longer Africa’s top dog' (Petroleum Economist, 5 October 2016) <http://www.petroleum-
economist.com/articles/politics-economics/africa/2016/nigeria-is-no-longer-africas-top-dog> accessed 7 January 
2020 and Ian Lewis n 298.  
311 See Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, 'The Politics And Crisis Of The Petroleum Industry Bill In Nigeria' 
(2014) 52 The Journal of Modern African Studies 403 
312 The PIB also sets up a fund for local communities in the oil-producing areas and demands that producing 
companies pay 10% of their monthly net profits into it — a controversial measure even within Nigeria’s 
administration because the existing revenue-sharing formula already provides for the oil-producing states to share 
an additional 13% of income. The PIB gives considerably increased powers to the minister of petroleum resources, 
which could facilitate further tax and cost increases for the companies and could open another potential route for 
corruption. See Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos n 305 and Martin Quinlan, 'Nigeria sets out on oil reform to 
kerb corruption' (Petroleum Economist, 8 May 2015) <http://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/politics-
economics/africa/2015/nigeria-sets-out-on-oil-reform-to-curb-corruption> accessed 7 January 2020. 
313 Years of uncertainty over the PIB now the PIGB, together with sabotage in the delta, have led to cuts in 
exploration and development spending, with the result that Nigeria’s production capacity has declined. Output 
peaked in 2005 at 2.4m b/d (excluding condensates), according to the International Energy Agency, but then fell 
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The NNPC restructuring plan has been in design for years now, articulated in the 
proposed bill, initially PIGB, but the fact is that this restructuring plan is deemed 
necessary by an industry analyst, as one way in which NNPC will create value 
through the effective management of the nation’s petroleum resources.314 The top 
goal is to transform NNPC, so that it can be able to meet Nigeria’s needs, and 
eventually, compete in the global petroleum industry. The Bill's commercialisation 
goals, as it relates to this study, intends to unbundle the NNPC, to create an 
independent commercial NOC. The potential that the PIGB will hold is a welcome 
development, yet the bill fails to offer a clear path to the more effective 
management of Nigeria’s state-owned oil enterprises.315 The upstream industry of 
Nigeria seems to be embarking on some restructuring since the proposal of the 
new Petroleum Industry Governance Bill (PIGB).316 This restructuring has been 
pending for years, and the PIB has now been renamed the Petroleum Industry 
Governance Bill (PIGB).317 Akinola argues that the stalling to pass this Bill 
evidences the excessive power the President enjoys as he continues to withhold 
his assent to pass the bill into law.318 Recently, the President rejected the PIGB, 
citing legal issues, while some commentators raise issues that it would diminish 
the President’s power over petroleum resources.319 Although this decision of the 
President can be overruled by a 2/3rd majority of members of both houses of 
 
steadily until 2010 when the amnesty scheme is credited with allowing an increase. In recent years production has 
declined again, to only 1.9m b/d in 2014. See Martin Quinlan n 306. 
314 See Jennifer Douglas-Abubakar and Fatimah Muhammad n 302; 'Nigeria: NNPC Restructuring Plan' [2010] 
Africa Research Bulletin: Policy and Practice 18588; 'FOCUS: Nigeria Tries To Sort Out Oil And Gas Sectors' 
(2012) 37 Oil and Energy Trends 3; Punch Newspapers, 'FG To Restructure Oil Sector, NNPC' (2016) 
<https://punchng.com/fg-restructure-oil-sector-nnpc/> accessed 14 August 2019; 'Nigeria: NNPC Hits Back' 
(2017) 54 Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series 21854A and Marc-Antoine 
Pérouse de Montclos n 305. 
315 See Aaron Sayne and others, 'The petroleum industry bill and the future of NNPC' (The Revenue Watch 
Institute 2012) <http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/rwi_bp_nnpc_synth_rev2.pdf> accessed 
10 January 2017. 
316 See Ministry of Petroleum Resources, '7 Big Wins' (Ministry of Petroleum Resources Nigeria 2016) 
<http://www.7bigwins.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/7-Big-Wins-Short-and-Medium-Term-Priorities-to-
Grow-Nigerias-Oil-and-Gas-Industry-2015-2019.pdf> accessed 17 September 2017; Aaron Sayne and others n 
292. 
317 See Emmanuel Graham and Jesse Salah Ovadia n 111. See also Cyril Obi, ‘Nigeria: the Role of Civil Society 
in the Politics of Oil Governance and Revenue Management’ in Indra Øverland (ed) (n 71) 209-210 and 'The 
Petroleum Industry Governance Bill, 2017' (Templars-law.com, 2017) <https://www.templars-law.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/Petroleum-Industry-Governance-Bill.pdf> accessed 24 August 2019. 
318 Adeoye O. Akinola (n 10) 102. 
319 See Oluwatoyin Bayagbon, 'EXCLUSIVE: Buhari Rejects PIGB, Says It Whittles Down His Power - Thecable 
Petrobarometer' (TheCable Petrobarometer, 2019) <http://petrobarometer.thecable.ng/2018/08/28/exclusive-
buhari-rejects-pigb-says-it-whittles-down-his-power/> accessed 9 October 2019. See also, Adeoye Adefulu, 
'PIGB Assent: What Has Happened Since?' (Odujinrinadefulu.com, 2019) 
<http://www.odujinrinadefulu.com/content/petroleum-industry-governance-bill> accessed 9 October 2019. 
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Assembly, the primary question would be, will the members of both houses, have 
the political will to go against the President, and constitutionally overrule his 
decision.320 To put it another way, the need to retain power becomes crucial and 
has influenced the economic policies of the country.321 It is pertinent to view 
Nigeria’s upstream industry through the lenses of a structured upstream 
petroleum industry like Norway, thus bringing the NOC of both countries into focus 
and the legal framework too.322 The petroleum industry of Nigeria can claim to 
have been influenced by the movement of resource nationalism, similarly the 
phenomenon’s component’s ownership and control of their petroleum resource 
sector (upstream, midstream and downstream).323   
 
 
320 See Adeoye Adefulu, 'Buhari Rejects The PIGB' (petroleumindustrybill.com, 2019) 
<http://www.petroleumindustrybill.com/2018/08/28/buhari-rejects-the-pigb/#.XZ3MIy-ZNo4> accessed 9 
October 2019. 
Arguably, as a result of political interests, the passing of the PIB failed severally, over the past decade, and since 
then has been re-drafted and split into several parts: 
1. The Petroleum Industry Governance Bill: 
This bill, deals with the governance and institutional framework of the Nigerian petroleum industry. Under this 
bill the National Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NPRC) replaces DPR and PPPRA. NPRC is intended to be 
responsible to regulating the entire industry. Further under this bill, the Nigerian Petroleum Company (NPC) shall 
be incorporated as a company limited by shares, responsible for all assets currently being managed by the NNPC, 
other than those under PSCs, and the back-in-right provisions. 
2. The Petroleum Fiscal Framework Bill 2018: 
This bill regulates the imposition and collection of taxes, royalties and rents in the petroleum industry. 
3. The Petroleum Industry Administration Bill 2018: 
This bill administers the issuances and revocation of licences, permits for exploration, production and operations, 
in upstream, midstream and downstream. 
4. The Petroleum Host Impacted Communities Bill 2018: 
Aims to establish the rights and opportunities for host communities in terms of economic benefits restitution for 
environmental, social costs of resource extraction activities. 
See Sections 1 – 9 The Petroleum Industry Governance Bill 2018. See also,  Adeoye Adefulu, 'Breaking Down 
The Petroleum Industry Governance Bill' (Odujinrinadefulu.com, 2018) 
<http://www.odujinrinadefulu.com/sites/default/files/Unbundling%20the%20PIGB%20for%20SBL%20meeting
.pdf> accessed 13 November 2019; 'The Analysis Of The Petroleum Industry Governance Bill' (Yourbudgit.com, 
2019) <https://yourbudgit.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Petroleum-Industry-Governance-Bill-
INFOGRAPHICS.pdf> accessed 13 November 2019; 'Policy Briefs: HCB And PIGB – What You Need To Know 
- SDN' (SDN, 2019) <https://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/policy-briefs-hcb-and-pigb-what-you-need-to-
know/> accessed 13 November 2019 and  'The Petroleum Industry Governance Bill' (KPMG, 2017) 
<https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/ng/pdf/tax/ng-kpmg-newsletter-on-the-petroleum-industry-governance-
bill.pdf> accessed 13 November 2019. 
321 See Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, 'The Price Of Wealth: Business And State In Labor Remittance And Oil Economies' 
(1989) 43 International Organization 101.  
322 The federal government’s control over oil and gas resources was achieved when Nigeria was ruled by a military 
regime. This regime did not invest the revenues in creating conditions for sustainable development, which some 
writers considered to be a catastrophic failure of public policy. Instead, the oil and gas resources became an 
instrument of politics. See Yinka Omorogbe (n 131) 37 – 38. 
323 From the sections of the Petroleum Act of 1969 to the 1978 Land Use Act, the state has always been proactive 
in the actual control and ownership of its natural resources. Even the OPEC’s influence can be identified. See 
Yinka Omorogbe n 131. 
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6.4.1 Equinor and NNPC Roles in Petroleum Resource-Led Development  
 
With the earlier critical analysis of both Nigerian and Norwegian upstream 
petroleum industry, it can be gleaned that the NOC of these countries is the 
primary institution used by the government in the development of its petroleum 
resources. However, one is directly involved and the other acts as a rent collector 
on behalf of the government. In this case, the quality of institutions, according to 
Mehlum et al., becomes key to the state achieving sustainable and economic 
development through the exploration and production of its petroleum resources.324 
Van der Linde maintained that the auspicious and favourable conversion of 
petroleum resources into real and sustainable growth usually becomes the 
problem of petroleum-rich producing states.325  
 
This study aligns its arguments with the Natural Resource Charter - Precept 6 of 
the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) which states:  
 
NOCs should be accountable, with well-defined mandates and 
an objective of commercial efficiency.326  
 
The NRGI argues that these will assist the state to convert their petroleum 
resources into development. The NOC will build capacity to participate in any 
lucrative field of petroleum extraction.327 Therefore the importance of an efficient 
commercial NOC cannot be over-emphasised as it would assist a petroleum-rich 
state’s citizen to benefit from their resource wealth. According to Cameron and 
Stanley, for an increase in value creation through petroleum resources, each 
government must be prepared to contemplate a change in policy framework and 
principles, when the subsisting ones are not helping the state reap the benefits 
 
324 Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene and Ragnar Torvik, 'Cursed By Resources Or Institutions?' (2006) 29 The World 
Economy 1117. 
Also, the proposed change by the PIGB created 7 institutions: the Minister; the Ministry of Petroleum 
Incorporated; the Nigerian Petroleum Regulatory Commission; the Nigerian Petroleum Assets Management 
Company; The National Petroleum Company and Petroleum Equalisation Fund. See The Petroleum Industry 
Governance Bill, 2018. 
325 Coby Van der Linde, The State And The International Oil Market: Competition And The Changing Ownership 
Of Crude Oil Assets (Kluwer Academic 2000) 85. 
326  See 'The Natural Resource Charter Decision Chain: Converting Resources Into Development' (NRGI 
Resourcegovernance.org, 2018) <https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_primer_nrc-
decision-chain.pdf> accessed 28 November 2019. 
327 See 'State Participation And State-Owned Enterprises: Roles, Benefits And Challenges' (NRGI 
Resourcegovernance.org, 2015) <https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_State-Participation-and-
SOEs.pdf> accessed 28 November 2019. 
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from their petroleum resources.328 Arguably, laws, contract, and regulations are 
the cornerstones of a legal framework in governing petroleum resources.329 A 
sound legal framework would thus assist the NOC of the state to achieve the 
objectives of enhanced value creation, through the management of the petroleum 
resources. 
 
According to McPherson, NOCs are here to stay, and it has been visible amidst 
periods of criticism and popularity, the NOC model of petroleum resource 
development has been resilient in the global petroleum industry.330 Today, the 
question is, how can a NOC create value for the state through its petroleum 
activities? What parameters are available to assess the progress and success of 
any NOC? Heller et al. in their study, used a range of standards to judge NOCs on 
their value creation abilities: production profile, region, share listing, operator 
status, and audit status.331 Further in their analysis on NOC value creation, they 
proffered three goals that ultimately define the NOC performance within the 
confine of their government petroleum policies: cash cow NOC, profit seeker NOC, 
and state supplement NOC.332  
 
According to Heller et al., the cash cow NOC exists to mainly assist the state obtain 
income from their petroleum resources, and transfer these revenues to the 
government.333 Van der Linde claimed that this has been the primary complaint of 
some NOC executives of petroleum-producing states, whereby the revenues are 
taken away from the NOCs once its generated, and little or nothing is put back 
into the NOC for the maintenance, development and expansion of the national 
petroleum industry.334 Following the argument of this study, it can be said that 
NNPC falls under this category of NOC. 
 
 
328 Peter Cameron and Michael Stanley (n 107) 61. 
329 Ibid., 66-67. 
330 Charles McPherson, National Oil Companies: Ensuring Benefits and Avoiding Systemic Risks, in Andreas 
Goldthau (ed), The Handbook Of Global Energy Policy (Wiley-Blackwell 2013) 146-153. 
331 Patrick R.P. Heller and David Mihalyi, 'Massive And Misunderstood: Data-Driven Insights Into National Oil 
Companies' (Resourcegovernance.org, 2019) 
<https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/massive_and_misunderstood_data_driven_insight
s_into_national_oil_companies.pdf> accessed 27 August 2019. 
332 Ibid. 
333 For example, SNPC of the Republic of Congo. Although, one can argue that NNPC of Nigeria falls into the 
same category. See Patrick R.P. Heller and David Mihalyi n 325. 
334 Coby Van der Linde (n 319)108. 
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On the other hand, the profit seeking NOC, mainly are the commercial NOCs, with 
commercial competence, skills and efficiency.335 Equinor falls into this category. 
While the state supplements NOC rather than play a commercial role, they engage 
in delivering public services to the state, thereby playing the conventional roles of 
the government ministries.336 It is broadly accepted that when it comes to 
effective petroleum resource governance, strict separation of functions is 
necessary, and the three primary tasks for every state are policymaking, 
regulation, and developing operational competence needed for the extraction of 
petroleum resources.337 The third one usually falls under the portfolio of the state’s 
NOC. Van der Linde claimed that the government policy choices are the first step 
to formulate and execute a coherent strategy that would enable the state to 
benefit from their petroleum resources.338 According to Gordon and Stenvoll, 
economic and political factors are the driving factors for a NOC to carry out its 
vital functional roles.339 These functional roles of the NOC, according to Gordon 
and Stenvoll can fall under the categories of national policy tool, social and political 
tool, development catalyst and commercial enterprise.340 In their analysis of 
Equinor, they put forward vital functional roles of the NOC: Wealth re-distribution; 
Social welfare; National energy policy; Foreign policy; economic development; 
Regulation and management and wealth creation.341  
 
 
335 For example, Equinor of Norway. See Patrick R.P. Heller and David Mihalyi n 325. 
336 For example, SOCAR of Azerbaijan. See Patrick R.P. Heller and David Mihalyi n 325. 
337 Getting a balance of these by the government is very important. As a balance between the regulatory, 
policymaking, and operational tasks are usually difficult for governments to achieve. Does the state have a fully 
developed administrative capacity, becomes the important question? See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn 
Letnes, (n 47) 66. See also, Coby Van der Linde (n 319) 86-87. 
338 Coby Van der Linde (n 319) 86. 
339 Richard Gordon and Thomas Stenvoll n 32. 
340 Ibid. 
341 Gordon and Stenvoll further articulated these roles of the NOC: 
1) Wealth Re-distribution: collect and distribute rents via fuel subsidies and other paybacks to the broader 
populace such as pensions, jobs, etc. 
2) Social welfare: job creation, education, scholarships, schools, infrastructure. 
3) National energy policy: guarantee supply to domestic economy; subsidize other energy projects 
4) Foreign policy: oil diplomacy, alliance formation, developing regional or super power ties 
5) Economic development: technology transfer, industrialization, foreign investment, economic 
diversification(local content requirements and service industry) 
6) Regulation and management: participation in direct government share of discoveries; licensing 
awards; regulatory functions. 
7) Wealth creation: financial return and profitability; return to shareholders i.e. government and private 
investors.  
See Richard Gordon and Thomas Stenvoll n 32. 
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Therefore, in looking at the policies and regulations of Norway and Nigeria, the 
third part of the role of their NOC in achieving operational competence can then 
come into play, because for a state to effectively manage their petroleum 
resources, the NOC is expected to play a dominant role. As already observed in 
chapter 3, this applies to countries that have established NOCs, and the state 
retains the right of ownership over their natural resources. This study looked at 
how these policies and regulations have guided Equinor and NNPC to what they 
are today, and what could be done for effective petroleum resource management 
by these NOCs, especially NNPC. Granted that the successful management of a 
petroleum resource is a complex task and involves many variables, whether at 
management or operational level, the fact that some NOC - Equinor has some 
form of success in achieving this, makes successful petroleum resource 
management attainable.342 
 
Corrigan argued the importance of quality and strong institutions and also a NOC 
that can assist the state in avoiding the much-theorised resource curse, citing 
Norway as an example of a country that has avoided this resource curse.343 
Cameron and Stanley argued that for there to be a petroleum resource-led 
development, there needs to be the presence of good institutions, good laws, and 
regulatory systems.344 The yardstick for determining what are good laws and 
regulatory systems are there, but it should be assumed that a system that 
promotes social and economic growth can be suggested as a good one. With all 
the Norwegian government achievement in the management of their petroleum 
resources, Listhaug claimed that there exists a mild form of the resource curse, 
where some of the Norwegian populace are frustrated that the ever-growing oil 
fund cannot be touched and spent presently.345 Although described as a mild form 
of the resource curse, this study will not consider this form as an impediment to 
economic growth and sustainable development. 
 
 
342 See Farouk Al-Kasim (n 44) 121-135.  
343 Caitlin C. Corrigan n 212. 
344 Peter Cameron and Michael Stanley (n 107) 29. See also, Lisa Sachs, 'On Solid Ground: Toward Effective 
Resource-Based Development' (WPR Worldpoliticsreview.com, 2013) 
<https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13140/on-solid-ground-toward-effective-resource-based-
development> accessed 28 November 2019. 
345 Ola Listhaug, 'Oil Wealth Dissatisfaction And Political Trust In Norway: A Resource Curse?' (2005) 28 West 
European Politics 834. 
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Mahdavi further stated that when it comes to the relevance of institutions in the 
petroleum resource management, and the effective tackling of issues like 
corruption, transparency and resource curse, NOCs are essential, and a specific 
institution when strengthened can assist a state in achieving social and economic 
development through the effective management of their petroleum resource.346 
Likewise, Engen supported this view by expressing the measures Norway 
undertook to ensure that their institutions were strengthened.347 Thurber et al. 
argued that countries like Angola and Nigeria, who have not successfully 
implemented the separation of functions in the administration of their petroleum 
resources, coupled with low institutional capacity fall into the category of countries 
who have not taken advantage of their natural resources to advance their 
economy. In contrast, Norway’s petroleum sector is an exemplary one.348 They 
argue that Norway and Nigerian both established a tripartite division of policy, 
commercial and regulatory functions, albeit Norway’s more competent and 
established bureaucracy enabled growth in the regulatory and policy bodies, while 
Nigeria’s counterpart did not grow.349 
 
Al-Kasim et al. claimed the importance of regulations and formal rules as effective 
procedures to regulate a petroleum industry, regardless of the political will to 
reform in incidents of violation of these regulations, as they provide a point of 
reference for assessment.350 According to Moses and Letnes, Norway was very 
developed, economically and politically, before the discovery of petroleum, and 
the discovery only induced essential changes in the manner in which her economy 
was managed.351 Norway had already developed some competency in the 
management of their fish, forestry, and hydroelectricity before petroleum 
resources, therefore their institutions were already efficient, which made it easy 
 
346 Paasha Mahdavi n 199. See also, Farouk Al-Kasim, Tina Søreide and Aled Williams, 'Grand Corruption In 
The Regulation Of Oil' [2008] U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre 
<https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2474801/Grand%20Corruption%20in%20the%20Regula
tion%20of%20Oil?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed 31 January 2019 and D. Boldbaatar, N.C. Kunz and E. 
Werker, 'Improved Resource Governance Through Transparency: Evidence From Mongolia' (2019) 6 The 
Extractive Industries and Society 775. 
347 Ole Andreas H. Engen, ‘The Development of the Norwegian Petroleum Innovation System: A Historical 
Overview’ in Jan Fagerberg, David C Mowery and Bart Verspagen (eds.), Innovation, Path Dependency And 
Policy: The Norwegian Case (Oxford University Press 2009 ) 180-181. 
348 Mark C. Thurber, David R. Hults and Patrick R.P. Heller n 21. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Farouk Al-Kasim, Tina Søreide and Aled Williams n 340. 
351 Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 47. 
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for the management of petroleum resources.352 Ingen et al. further claimed that 
how Norway’s administration managed their petroleum resources, led to 
sustainable development and economic growth for an extended period, and this 
structured approach to petroleum policies should be emulated, especially by 
Nigeria.353  
 
According to Ramírez-Cendrero and Wirth, the comprehensive separation between 
policy, commercial, and technical supervisory roles among different administrative 
bodies; state ownership, operatorship of the petroleum resources, and the 
eventual dominance of the state NOC – Equinor, and finally the careful 
arrangement that ensured the revenues received from petroleum resources did 
not enter the fiscal budget.354 However, that they were delegated to be handled 
by an independent institution are the critical characteristics of the Norwegian 
Model.355 These features they suggested led to the success story of the Norwegian 
petroleum sector, and they believed that other petroleum resource-rich countries 
could learn some lessons from the Norwegian Model. Trojbicz and Loureiro 
emphasise the importance of strong institutions highlighting the technical 
knowledge which Petrobras gathered over the years, which eventually led to its 
dominance in the Brazilian petroleum industry.356 On the other hand, Heller et al. 
observed that the NNPC of Nigeria has not achieved this, as it has never developed 
any sound set of commercial priorities.357 However, it is expected to start 
developing these commercial abilities once the PIGB is passed.358 
 
Petroleum policies and statutory provisions assist any petroleum-rich state to 
ensure that petroleum exploitation leads to economic development. These 
provisions can vary from state to state, as it can be predicated on each country’s 
 
352 Ibid. 63-64. See also, Ole Andreas H. Engen, ‘The Development of the Norwegian Petroleum Innovation 
System: A Historical Overview’ in Jan Fagerberg, David C Mowery and Bart Verspagen (eds.) (n 341 ) 181-183. 
353 Chiara van Ingen, Requier Wait and Ewert Kleynhans n 74. 
354 Juan M. Ramírez-Cendrero and Eszter Wirth n 81. 
355 Ibid. 
356 Beni Trojbicz and Maria Rita Loureiro, 'Brazilian Oil Sector Reforms: The Role Of Technical Know-How And 
Corporate Ethos In Petrobras's Dominance' (2018) 118 Energy Policy 588. 
357 Patrick R.P. Heller, Paasha Mahdavi and Johannes Schreuder, 'Reforming National Oil Companies: Nine 
Recommendations' [2014] Natural Resource Governance Institute 
<https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_9recs_eng_v3.pdf> accessed 8 November 
2018. 
358 See The Petroleum Industry Governance Bill 2018. See also, 'Analysis Of The Petroleum Industry Governance 
Bill' (Yourbudgit.com, 2019) <https://yourbudgit.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Petroleum-Industry-
Governance-Bill-INFOGRAPHICS.pdf> accessed 27 November 2019. 
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social desire, economy, and political economy.359 Heller et al. suggested that clear 
goals and objectives should be set by the state, to properly shepherd the NOC in 
achieving success in the management of the country’s petroleum resources.360 
These policies and statutory provisions give guidelines in protecting the national 
interest over their petroleum resources. For instance, ownership, control, 
petroleum revenues and national sovereignty over the nation’s petroleum 
resources.361 
 
Successful attempts to effectively harness the benefits from petroleum resources 
has been achieved by some NOCs. At the same time, some NOCs are not adequate 
managers of their country’s petroleum resources, thus becoming sources of 
patronage, corruption, and drains on the public treasure chest.362 Examples of this 
abound in the Nigerian petroleum sector.  
 
Nonetheless, as earlier expressed in this study, development through petroleum 
resources can be achieved, and the vital role of a state’s NOC cannot be 
overemphasised.363 Enhanced economic growth, creation of jobs, increased 
government revenues, technology transfer, infrastructure improvement and 
advancement of related sectors are some of the potential benefits put forward by 
supporters of petroleum-led development.364 In line with the preceding, Ajakaiye 
et al. in their work, concluded that Nigeria’s use of their petroleum resources to 
achieve development has not been successful, as one would expect from a 
petroleum-rich nation, although there are signs of encouragement.365 For 
instance, Graham and Ovadia suggested that the use of local content policies in 
the Nigerian petroleum sector is a positive step on the part of the government. 
However, problems of effective implementation and institutional capacity 
abound.366 
 
359 Martin M. Olisa, 'Comparison Of Legislation Affecting Foreign Exploitation Of Oil And Gas Resources In Oil 
Producing Countries' (1972) 10 Alberta Law Review 487. 
360 Patrick R.P. Heller and David Mihalyi n 325. 
361 Martin M. Olisa n 352. 
362 Patrick R.P. Heller, Paasha Mahdavi and Johannes Schreuder n 350. 
363 See Patrick R.P. Heller and David Mihalyi n 325. 
364 Terry Lynn Karl (n 84). See also Peter Cameron and Michael Stanley (n 107) 20-21. 
365 Olu Ajakaiye, Paul Collier and Akpan H. Ekpo, ‘Management of Resource Revenue Nigeria’ in Paul Collier 
and Anthony J. Venables (eds), Plundered Nations? Successes And Failures In Natural Resource 
Extraction (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 257. 
366 Emmanuel Graham and Jesse Salah Ovadia n 111. 
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Further claims that the shift from a military regime to a democratic government 
has helped in some ways, in reducing the influence of the military elites, that had 
little interest in economic development, to economic reform has been a positive 
step.367 Arguments, against this perception abound, as these so-called military 
elites are still very influential in the country. This is evident in the Presidents that 
have been elected since 1999 when the country moved to a democratic 
government.368 Most of the Presidents were former military Generals or former 
military rulers of the country.369 The present Nigerian President was a former 
military ruler, now a democratic president of the country.370 Vines et al. 
commented that NNPC has been treated like a ‘cash cow’ by the government and 
leaders as it accounts for the majority of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings, and 
this has been evidenced throughout the military and civilian governments.371 
 
In making a case for strong recommendations or answering the question for a 
best regulatory framework for petroleum exploitation, Antolín et al. expressed:  
 
[…] given the historical and structural differences across 
economies, we consider it impossible to provide a “universal 
answer” to questions raised about the type of ownership structure 
model or regulatory framework most appropriate to the 
exploitation of oil and gas reserves.372 
 
Scholars or economists that have observed petroleum-rich developing countries, 
and especially the Nigerian economy in recent times, would agree that this 
statement is not far from the truth of what is presently obtainable in the 
country.373 Today as many developing countries discover vast deposits of crude 
oil and become petroleum producers, it becomes necessary for these countries to 
know how to manage these natural resources to benefit the people of the country. 
As a result, it is possible to say that economic growth can be tied to petroleum 
 
367 See Theodore Okonkwo n 192. 
368 See Justin Findlay, 'Presidents And Military Leaders Of Nigeria Since Independence' (WorldAtlas, 2019) 
<https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/nigerian-presidents-and-military-leaders-since-independence.html> 
accessed 16 November 2019. See also, Nitya Singh n 186. 
369 Wole Soyinka, 'Opinion | Lessons From Nigeria’s Militarized Democratic Experiment' (The New York Times 
Nytimes.com, 2019) <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/opinion/nigeria-militarized-democratic-
experiment.html> accessed 16 November 2019. 
370 Ibid. 
371 See Alex Vines and others n 295. 
372 María José Paz Antolín and Juan Manuel Ramírez Cendrero n 13. 
373 See Emmanuel Graham and Jesse Salah Ovadia n 111.  
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resources. As is well known today, petroleum development connects and cuts 
across different levels of development in a country. From access to energy, energy 
security, food, water, policies, the list can be lengthy, but the point is that energy 
importance in the development of a country is inestimable and even critical for a 
petroleum resource-rich developing country.374  
 
Equinor has developed a commercial capacity, home and abroad, while NNPC on 
the other hand, has never developed a coherent set of commercial priorities, and 
seems to lack a strategy that can lead to a profitable portfolio for the state 
company.375 As stated in the previous chapters, when it comes to petroleum 
resource management, the institution that matters is the NOC. Although looking 
at a petroleum industry holistically, specific institute roles come into focus. By the 
preceding analysis, petroleum became a “prize” for controlling the government, 
and also provided the means of sustaining this control, and mostly the ruling class 
or elite group.376 One can argue that this scenario will be more revealed in Nigeria 
than in Norway. 
 
A point often overlooked when comparing Norway to another petroleum-rich state, 
is that the global context of petroleum exploration and production has changed 
dramatically, from what it is today, as Moses and Letnes have argued the options 
that were available to Norway that are no longer available today.377 Hence the 
narrow arguments put forward for the progress of NOCs, or the use of NOC by a 
petroleum-rich state to achieve development, value creation and proper 
management of a states petroleum resources. The question of what can be learnt 
from a country that has used their NOC to achieve, and most importantly, what 
was learnt, are the lessons applicable to the said country and finally how can the 
lessons be put into action. Gordon and Stenvoll, in their paper, argued the need 
 
374 Gilles Carbonnier and Fritz Brugger in Andreas Goldthau, The Handbook of Global Energy Policy (n 324) 65. 
375 Patrick R.P. Heller, Paasha Mahdavi and Johannes Schreuder n 350. 
376 See Inge Amundsen, 'Drowning In Oil: Angola's Institutions And The “Resource Curse”' (2014) 46 
Comparative Politics 169. 
377 They argued further that it has become complex for states to govern their economies, as the global trade and 
investment landscape are now shrinking and putting constrains on the extent of any states sovereignty. 
Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 46) 17, 39. 
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for competition, as it is a powerful tool in advancing a progressive evolution of a 
state’s NOC, concerning Equinor.378  
 
 
6.4.2 Equinor and NNPC Commercial Frameworks 
 
Analysis majored on of the upstream petroleum industry of the two states, as that 
is where the highest revenue is generated by a state’s NOC. According to Moses 
and Letnes, one of Norway’s steps to autonomy in its petroleum sector was the 
creation of its NOC, and this helped the state to develop national competence in 
the petroleum sector, which could compete and in due course challenge the IOCs 
in the petroleum sector.379 Today, the evidence of the competence of Equinor, 
Norway’s state-owned petroleum company, is there for all to see.380 Equinor has 
a strong presence in Norway’s domestic petroleum industry, and also in the global 
petroleum industry.381 These should be the ultimate goals of every NOC in a 
petroleum-rich state. The Chinese NOCs in recent times have shown competence 
in the global petroleum sector, although China is not considered a petroleum-rich 
country.382 In line with these arguments, Van der Linde tied the success of any 
NOC, to the level of autonomy given by the government, as this independence will 
give the NOC the aptitude to adopt and implement suitable management methods 
and market strategies.383 The freedom to operate in the major parts of the 
petroleum industry value chain is critical. Some governments limit their NOCs with 
regard to their operations in the value chain of the industry – exploration, 
 
378 They proposed the evolution of a state’s NOC, in tandem with the petroleum sector, and as the petroleum sector 
matures. Which raises the question, can one consider the Nigerian petroleum sector a mature sector? See Richard 
Gordon and Thomas Stenvoll n 32. 
379 Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 78. 
380 Albeit, the Norwegian government holds over 65% of its shares. Also, contrary to Van der Linde’s assertion 
that when a government is the major shareholder in an NOC, this limits the ability of the NOC to expand 
internationally. See Coby Van der Linde (n 319) 154. 
381 See 'Where We Are - Present In More Than 30 Countries - Equinor.Com' (Equinor.com, 2019) 
<https://www.equinor.com/en/where-we-are.html> accessed 16 November 2019. 
382 See Jilles Beukel, John V. Mitchell and Katie Treadwell, 'Chinese National Oil Companies: Giants Built On 
Quicksand' (Energy Post, 2016) <https://energypost.eu/chinese-national-oil-companies-giants-built-shaky-
foundations/> accessed 16 November 2019; 'Chinese Nocs' Expansion' (Oil & Gas Journal, 2013) 
<https://www.ogj.com/general-interest/companies/article/17240785/chinese-nocs-expansion> accessed 16 
November 2019, and Nicholas Woodroof, 'China’s Nocs To Be Fourth Highest Upstream Investors In Africa Over 
Next Five Years, According To Globaldata' (Oilfield Technology, 2019) 
<https://www.oilfieldtechnology.com/special-reports/24062019/chinas-nocs-to-be-fourth-highest-upstream-
investors-in-africa-over-next-five-years-according-to-globaldata/> accessed 16 November 2019. 
383 Coby Van der Linde (n 319)105. 
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production, refining, marketing and petrochemicals all fall under the value 
chain.384 For instance, according to Carvalho and Goldstein the international 
expansion and growth strategy of Brazil and China’s NOCs is an outcome of several 
economic and political conditions which assisted their NOC internationalisation, 




The petroleum industry is no stranger to governments reviewing their fiscal terms, 
and this is not usually limited to developing countries, but also developed 
countries. Moses and Letnes summed up the primary objective of every 
government’s fiscal system, as one that should employ suitable contracts and 
fiscal tools that are attractive to IOCs, which leads to inflow of foreign capital and 
expertise, and at the same time is firm enough to keep safe and deliver the 
petroleum resource rent to the people of the country as the petroleum resources 
belong to the people.386 According to them, Norway managed to achieve this, 
albeit to what degree?387 What is the yardstick to ascertain this, as the commercial 
frameworks in the petroleum industry are complex, and not easily assessable to 
the general public? Le Leuch argued that a balance of interests between the host 
country and investors are what these frameworks attempt to achieve.388  
 
Therefore, in ensuring that adequate petroleum resource rent accrues to 
government, and securing the state’s share of the petroleum resource wealth, 
efficient commercial frameworks are very vital, because it is through these 
frameworks that the petroleum resource rent is delivered to the people, thus 
creating value, and supporting the social and economic development of the 
 
384 Ibid, 105-106. 
385 Flavia Carvalho and Andrea Goldstein, ‘The ‘Making of’ National Giants: the International Expansion of Oil 
Companies from Brazil and China in Wilfred Dolfsma, Geert Duysters and Ionara Costa (eds.), Multinationals 
And Emerging Economies :The Quest For Innovation And Sustainability (Edward Elgar 2009) 122-123. 
386 Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 46) 125. 
387 Ibid. 
388 Honoré Le Leuch, Recent Trends in Upstream Petroleum Agreements: Policy, Contractual, Fiscal, and Legal 
issues, in Andreas Goldthau (ed) (n 324) 128. See also, Alexander Huurdeman and Anastasiya Rozhkova 
(eds.), Balancing Petroleum Policy (The World Bank 2019) and See Lisa E. Sachs and others, ‘Impacts of Fiscal 
Reforms on Country Attractiveness: Learning from the facts’ in Karl P. Sauvant (ed), Yearbook On International 
Investment Law & Policy 2011-2012 (Oxford University Press 2013). 
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country.389 In determining the government share of the extraction of petroleum 
resources, one must ascertain the type of contractual or licensing regime, and the 
type of government’s fiscal system in place.390 Poplawski-Ribeiro et al. in their 
paper suggested that as a guiding principle in designing fiscal policies, these 
policies must take into account country-specific economic and institutional 
circumstances, such as petroleum resource dependency, as observed in Nigeria, 
the developmental needs of the state and the petroleum reserves outlook.391 
Therefore, the goal for any petroleum resource-rich country is to achieve a more 
flexible fiscal framework, to allow the state to promote economic and social 
development through petroleum resources.392 
 
Licensing arrangements mainly determine how petroleum rent and cost will be 
allocated between the host government (and its NOC) and IOCs.393 Notably, the 
‘carrying’ clause, that can be seen in many licensing arrangements today, seeks 
to promote a commercial NOC cause in the host country as a means of reducing 
the nation’s risk.394 As evidenced through the history of the global petroleum 
industry, when it comes to the petroleum resource extraction, countries usually 
draw on four significant types of contract: Concessions (royalty/tax) agreements 
(CAs), joint ventures (JVs), production sharing contracts (PSCs), and service 
contracts (SCs). These various types of contract usually offer different levels of 
risk, reward, and control to the host country. However, today within these types 
 
389 Moses and Letnes stated that petroleum resource rents are gifts to the people of the country, therefore the 
maximisation of the size of this gift to the people is what the government embarks on in each of its contract types. 
See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 46) 101, 106, 125. 
390 Furthermore, according to Moses et al. the flawed assertion that the choice of the contracting regime determines 
the government take, is usually not obtainable as it is well known to petroleum industry practitioners and analysts, 
that as always “the devil, lies in the detail”, as there are so many types contractual arrangements and revenue 
system, which makes it difficult to infer from a particular case or country commercial frameworks. See Jonathon 
Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 101. See also Honoré Le Leuch, Recent Trends in Upstream Petroleum 
Agreements: Policy, Contractual, Fiscal, and Legal issues, in Andreas Goldthau (ed) (n 324) 135-136. 
391 Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro and others, 'Fiscal Frameworks For Resource Rich Developing Countries' (2012) 
12 IMF Staff Discussion Notes. 
392 Ibid. 
393 Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 103. 
394 Carrying Clauses supports an NOC with the revenue and experience to develop the state’s petroleum resources, 
while reducing its exposure to risk. Usually, these NOCs are carried through the exploration phase as a working 
partner, although it does not pay any exploration costs, as a means of reducing the NOCs financial risk, but when 
the well is ascertained commercial, then the NOC has the option to partner with the IOC, and would then be 
expected to pay its fair share of the development and operation costs. Then the government would be said to have 
taken up a “working interest” or “backs in”. See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 103,126. See 
also, Peter Cameron and Michael Stanley (n 107) 73-81. See also, A Timothy Martin, 'Model Contracts: A Survey 
Of The Global Petroleum Industry' (2004) 22 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 281. 
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of contracts, there have been subtle distinctions and evident overlap among these 
contract types.395 
 
Concessions (Royalty/Tax) Agreements 
Under the concession, the government concedes ownership of petroleum 
resources for a stipulated period, and receives royalties and taxes as payment.396  
 
Joint Ventures (JVs) 
There are many forms and variations of JVs. However, fundamentally they are a 
form of partnership between two or more parties, usually between IOCs and a 
NOC, but can also include several IOCs, or even a mix of NOCs and IOCs.397 JVs 
allow partners to share in the high levels of risk and capital, which the petroleum 
industry is known for, that is the JVs are considered attractive.398 
 
Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) 
Under PSCs, the state retains its ownership of the petroleum resources, and upon 
invitation, the IOCs develop the petroleum sector of the state.399 
 
Service Contracts (SCs) 
As in PSCs, the government retains ownership of the petroleum resources in the 
ground, and the IOCs are usually hired as a subcontractor and paid a fee for their 
services.400 How a government employs securing petroleum resource rents for the 
 
395 Often reliant in the part of the world were any of these contract types are used, there structure has gradually 
been altered to indicate the bigger state influence and power over their petroleum resources. See Jonathon Wayne 
Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 105. 
396 Sometimes referred to as Royalty or Tax system. See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 104. 
See also Honoré Le Leuch, Recent Trends in Upstream Petroleum Agreements: Policy, Contractual, Fiscal, and 
Legal issues, in Andreas Goldthau (ed) (n 324) 132-133. 
397 Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 104. 
398 Considered to be a useful tool for transfer of competence across partners, usually from IOCs to NOCs, and in 
the present global petroleum industry, where there are commercial NOCs, there can be a transfer of competence 
from NOCs to NOCs. Also, it is usually seen as a partnership, than as a contract type, as JV arrangements can be 
located within other forms of contract arrangement, for example, in CAs and PSCs. Ibid. 104. 
399 In the global petroleum industry, this form of contract is the most common one. The responsibility for 
exploration and production is borne by the IOCs, in extension the investment risk. Although, the IOCs are usually 
reimbursed for the cost of production in form of oil (cost oil), when the E&P is successful or commercially viable. 
See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 104. See also Honoré Le Leuch, Recent Trends in Upstream 
Petroleum Agreements: Policy, Contractual, Fiscal, and Legal issues, in Andreas Goldthau (ed) (n 324) 133-134. 
400 Usually, the service contractors were limited to different stages of the production, like the exploration, drilling, 
development, but today hybrids are more common. From technical assistance contracts to pure service contracts 
with little or no risks involved, to risk service contracts, with levels of risks, shows the various scope and degree 
of risks involved. See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 105. 
 264 
state, is what the fiscal systems are about, although these fiscal particulars can 
be obtained in the contract arrangement the state agrees with IOCs or NOCs as 
the case may be.401 State participation in a petroleum development project might 
be motivated by non-fiscal objectives, such as knowledge transfer. However, 
these projects will always have a tax or fiscal dimension too.402 
 
In securing the more significant amount of petroleum resource rent, Moses and 
Letnes put forward four primary forms of fiscal tools used by the government to 
achieve these.403 They are participation/equity, royalties, taxes/fees/bonuses and 
investment incentives.404 It is difficult to generalise the particular fiscal tool a 
country uses, as these tools vary from country to country and these countries use 
a plethora of fiscal tools to secure the state’s share of the petroleum resource 
rent.405 Norway employed a concessionary system in its petroleum sector, 
although it is different from the concession system obtainable in the global 
 
401 Ibid 106-107. 
402 Participation in production and profits is the major motivation. See Peter Cameron and Michael Stanley (n 
107) 160. 
403 Also, the manner in which these tools are used by the government, usually differs depending on the contract 
type. See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 46) 107. 
404 Participation/Equity: NOC of the host nation usually plays a role, as through it the state secures its share of 
revenue, and also ensures that the petroleum resources reach the market. NOCs are able to participate directly in 
the economic activity, and earn its proportionate share of the return, and the PSCs, JVs, carried interest clauses, 
and other various profit-sharing measures enable the state, usually through its NOC to achieve that. 
Royalties: There are various forms of royalty arrangements, and also what particular time the royalties are 
determined. For example, would the royalties be determined at the wellhead, at/in the field, block boundary, export 
terminal, and so on. Royalty arrangements are usually distinguished between a fixed percentage arrangement and 
the ones with sliding scale.  
Taxes/Fees/Bonuses: often used by governments, as the use of revenue instruments, and a number of other 
instruments at its disposal. The use of taxes, like the corporate income, dividend withholding, transfer, transit, 
environmental, and so on. Furthermore, the government can implement fees, levies and also ask for bonus 
payments. For example, signing bonuses, discovery bonus, and production bonus. 
Investment Incentives: this instruments are usually agreed upon during the contract negotiation, as these 
instruments are beneficial to the IOC, and assist them in reducing the cost of production. Both parties (government 
and IOC) agree over what would be regarded as a legitimate cost of production. These incentives are numerous, 
from tax credits; tax holidays; accelerated depreciation; exempting duties on imported equipment and capital 
goods, and so on. Albeit, that is why the host government and the IOCs have to decide on which of the investment 
incentives will be applicable the contract arrangement. 
See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 46) 108-109. See also, Peter Cameron and Michael Stanley (n 
107) 149-160. 
405 Possibilities of differentiating between a tax-based and production-based systems, but for the state to secure 
larger share of the petroleum resources rent is usually contingent on the skill of the host nation’s skill in 
negotiating a beneficial deal for the state, and the manner of assemblance of the fiscal tool menu. See Jonathon 
Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 46) 110. 
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petroleum industry, as Norway did not give up their ownership of their petroleum 
resources.406 
 
According to Moses and Letnes, Norway’s concession system differed from the 
standard concession system and was often changed as time went on, which makes 
it challenging to encapsulated.407 Central to the difference between the Norwegian 
concessions system lie several characteristics. First, the concession was 
negotiated, the MPE examined and negotiated with the applicants, and created a 
JV.408 The second characteristic of this concession system was the need for Norway 
to build competence and expertise in the petroleum sector through local content 
policies, and other government requirements that encouraged Norwegian 
participation in the sector.409 The ever-evolving Norway concession system, as 
some states are blessed with petroleum resources, set out to attract IOCs, and 
later the concession system sought to increase government participation, the 
establishment of their NOC, and through this process and more, the state gained 
expertise and competence in the petroleum sector.410 The use of NOCs or NRCs 
as Cameron and Stanley term it are is the most common vehicle in which the state 
ensures its participation in the petroleum sector, and they argued that active 
participation can still be achieved without the use of NOCs or NRCs as a 
government tool to achieve this.411 
 
According to Moses and Letnes, the Norwegian government use many instruments 
to secure its petroleum resource rent, and these instruments have changed over 
time, thus making it difficult for a critical analysis of these instruments without 
deviating from the central theme of the thesis.412 There is no doubt that the use 
of taxes on the petroleum sector and the SDFI are the primary source of the 
 
406 Based on the country’s earlier experience in effectively regulating their hydroelectric industry, Norway ensured 
it secured her sovereignty and ownership over her natural resources. See Ibid 111. See also, Peter Cameron and 
Michael Stanley (n 107) 59. 
407 Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 111, 113. 
408 This JV could be a group of companies or a license group. Further, as already established the state needed to 
exert its ownership over its petroleum resources, thus the MPE had a large control over the decisions, and the 
constitution of this group of companies. See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 111. 
409 Ibid 113. 
410 Use of carried interest clauses assisted Norway to launch their NOC and their petroleum industry. See Ibid 
114. 
411 Peter Cameron and Michael Stanley (n 107) 121-122. 
412 See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 119. 
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Norwegian government petroleum resources revenues.413 Important to note, that 
Petoro and Equinor continue to add to the Norwegian governments take, as well 
as licence holders and operators.414  
 
It has been established that most reserves in the world are state-owned and 
controlled. In some countries, reserves are exclusively owned and operated by 
state-owned oil and gas companies; in others, the state or state company 
contracts with IOCs to carry out development projects and exploration.415 The 
process of licensing in the Nigerian petroleum industry is an essential factor in 
sector governance. Nigeria uses the PSC and Service contract in its upstream 
petroleum sector. The use of a mixed regime is usually tied to the political system 
in the country.  
 
Hammerson claimed that this could be a reason for Shell’s initial involvement in 
the sector before the country’s independence.416 Before the President Obasanjo’s 
administration (1999 – 2007) introduced an open competitive bidding system in 
2000, the Head of state or Minister awarded oil blocks to be charged less than 
their value to resell at a margin.417 Today, the Petroleum Act (Laws of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria (LFN)) 2004 governs and regulates the exploration, production 
and distribution of petroleum products in Nigeria.418 Further, mineral rights to 
develop petroleum reserves are transferred through statutory instruments of Oil 
Exploration Licences (OELs), Oil Prospecting Licences (OPLs), and Oil Mining 
Licences (OMLs) by the Ministry of Petroleum Resources through DPR.419 Under 
statutory provisions, OEL holders have no exclusive rights over the area of the 
 
413 Ibid 119-124. 
414 Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 47) 124. 
415 John Mitchell, Valérie Marcel, and Beth Mitchell, 'Oil and Gas Mismatches: Finance, Investment and Climate 
Policy' (Chatham House 2015) 
<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150709OilGasMismatchesMi
tchellMarcelMitchellUpdate.pdf> accessed 11 January 2017. 
416 See Marc Hammerson, 'Legal Concepts: Introduction To Oil And Gas As An Asset Class', Three-day 
Workshop for National Oil Companies (Stephenson Harwood LLP 2020). 
417 Alex Gboyega and others, 'Political Economy Of The Petroleum Sector In Nigeria' [2011] World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 5779 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228119351_Political_Economy_of_the_Petroleum_Sector_in_Nigeri
a> accessed 14 August 2019. See also Gbolahan Elias and Okechukwu J Okoro, ‘Nigeria’ in David L. Schwartz 
(ed) (n 137) 244-246. 
418 Petroleum Act, Cap P10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004. 
419 See First Schedule to the Petroleum Act.  
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granted licence, and this granted right does not preclude the grant of another OEL 
or an OPL or an OML over the same area.420  
 
OEL, OML and OPL are held by the companies under the agreement and operating 
structure of PSCs with NNPC, the state’s NOC.421 Since its introduction in 1993, 
PSCs have been seen to be convenient for the Nigerian government as it offers a 
revenue-stream while removing the burden of cash calls, in the earlier 
arrangement of joint venture agreement regime, as the Nigerian government – 
NNPC, did not meet its obligations of cash calls.422 The upstream industry in 
Nigeria is subject to the Petroleum Profits Tax Act (PPTA) of 2004, which applies 
exclusively to the oil sector.423 Upstream companies are also subjected to royalty, 
signature and production bonuses.  
 
The oil producers pay royalties on the value of oil extracted.424 The rates of royalty 
vary by the nature of contractual arrangement (PSC or JV), the type of drilling 
(onshore or offshore), and the depth at which petroleum is available.425 The 
Petroleum Act (1969) requires the holder of an Oil Prospecting Licence (OPL), or 
an Oil Mining Lease (OML), to pay royalties to the Federal Government of Nigeria 
as soon as production starts.426 This tax is applied to profits minus expenses and 
allowable deductions (interest and royalty payments, depreciation of capital, and 
others).427 The statutory tax rate is 85 per cent, which is quite high.  Accordingly, 
individual tax rates, apply to new companies and PSCs.428 For JVs, a series of 




422 See Israel Aye and others, ‘Nigeria’ in Christopher B. Strong (ed.), The Oil And Gas Law Review (6th edn, 
Law Business Research Ltd 2018) 233. 
423 The Petroleum Profits Tax Act Cap P 13 LFN 2004. 
424 Alex Gboyega and others n 410. 
425 Ibid. 
426 The royalty rates currently applicable are as follows: on-shore production – 20%; offshore production up to 
100metres water depth 18 ½%; offshore productions between 100 to 200 metres water depth 16 2/3%; in areas 
from 201 to 500 metres water depth 12%; in areas from 501 to 800 metres water depth 8%; in areas from 801 to 
1, 000 metres water depth 4%; in areas in excess of 1, 000 metres water depth 0%. 
KPMG Advisory, 'Nigeria’s oil and gas industry brief KPMG professional services' (2014) 
<http://www.blog.kpmgafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Nigerias-oil-and-gas-Industry-brief.pdf> 
accessed 8 January 2019. 
427 See Alex Gboyega and others n 410. 
428 Ibid. 
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Consequently, while the law provides for a high tax rate, this rate is combined 
with a series of concessions and incentives depending on the nature of the contract 
and the stage of production.429 The pending PIGB is supposed to replace the 
existing laws governing the petroleum sector. When compared with its peers in 
west Africa and practices in other oil-producing countries, Nigeria’s royalty and 
profits tax rates are high. However, at the same time, Nigeria gives substantial 
incentives and allowances.430 For instance, it makes the fiscal regime competitive 
by giving a 50 per cent tax allowance, and it provides for a sliding scale royalty, 
depending on water depth and differences in production costs.431  
 
Finally, it is not new that the absolute success of a fiscal framework will depend 
on the political commitment to implement these policies assets.432 For examples 
of proposed fiscal framework guidelines for a petroleum resource-rich country, see 
Appendix 2, 3, and 4. Significant also is the government wealth funds: 
Government Pension Fund Global – Norway; Excess Crude Account - Nigeria 
/Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority – Nigeria – Both funds objectives are for 
stabilization and saving.433 The proposed PIGB did not detail fiscal arrangements 
like taxes and royalties. Hence the study relied on the subsisting arrangements 
for analysis.  
 
 
6.5 Conclusion: NOC for the Future  
 
A vital factor to consider according to Cameron and Stanley is the legal standing 
of a NOC, and they further argued that a NOC should be a separate legal entity, 
established under the country’s corporate laws and not part of the government 
department or Ministry of petroleum.434 This leads to a profit-driven and 
productive enterprise, not one that would be used for political purposes or social 





432 See Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro and others n 384. 
433 See Peter Cameron and Michael Stanley (n 107) 191. 
434 Ibid., 125. 
435 Ibid. 
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promotion of transparency and accountability; to establish a framework for the 
creation of commercially viable petroleum entities; to create governing institutions 
with clear and separate roles and finally to foster a conducive environment for 
petroleum industry operations were the main objectives of the bill.436 Achieving 
these would go a long way to redressing some of the defects in the Nigerian 
petroleum industry. Although there are still a few reservations on the possibilities 
of attaining these goals. 
 
Aligning with the arguments of this study, the NOC role is an ever-changing one 
and can be seen with the evolution of Equinor. For NNPC there is an inherent need 
for improvement, but this cannot be a fast-tracked improvement or quick-fix, as 
“one must learn to crawl before one can walk”. Important to note the enormous 
difference between the Norwegian and Nigerian population. Must be noted Equinor 
serves over 5 million people, while NNPC is expected to serve over 180 million 
people.437 Thus the case for a genuinely independent NOC grows. For Nigeria, that 
is what the PIGB intends to accomplish. The creation of a NOC independent of 
government interference and a body corporate, registered under the companies 
affairs commission becomes paramount if the state has to achieve development 
through petroleum resources. 
 
Today, the level of state guidance over the petroleum sector of Norway has 
somewhat reduced, probably because Norway is now internationally competitive. 
With the declining natural resources, the state has started to see its future after 
petroleum resources.438 This was evident in the thinking behind the rebrand, and 
renaming of Statoil to Equinor.439 Moses and Letnes argued that the Norwegian 
Model was the only practical model that safeguarded Norway’s infant petroleum 
industry, and this model today is becoming less necessary.440 Al-Kasim asserted 
 
436 See Section 1 The Petroleum Industry Governance Bill 2018. 
437 See 'Nigeria Population (2019) - Worldometers' (Worldometers.info, 2019) 
<https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeria-population/> accessed 20 November 2019 and 
'Norway Population (2019) - Worldometers' (Worldometers.info, 2019) <https://www.worldometers.info/world-
population/norway-population/> accessed 20 November 2019. 
438 Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 46) 94. 
439 See Jonas Cho Walsgard and Mikael Holter, 'Statoil No Longer Wants 'Oil' In Its Name' (Bloomberg.com, 
2018) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-15/statoil-changes-name-to-remove-oil-in-
renewable-energy-push> accessed 20 November 2019. See further, '‘Thank You Statoil! It’s Been A Pleasure’: 
Oil Major Changes Name | Financial Times' (Ft.com, 2018) <https://www.ft.com/content/071bba1a-282e-11e8-
b27e-cc62a39d57a0> accessed 20 November 2019. 
440 Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 46) 94. 
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that the unambiguous organisation separation between Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate (NPD) - Ministry and Equinor is fundamentally the Norwegian Model.441 
The global petroleum landscape has evolved from what it used to be in the 1970s, 
as today the push for energy mix and diversification is the central theme in the 
industry, for countries have started looking at life beyond petroleum resources.442  
 
The views on the continued importance of petroleum resources continue to be 
divided, as more reserves continue to be discovered, although in developing 
countries.443 The underlying question becomes if a developing country has 
abundant petroleum resources, why should they not leverage it for social and 
economic development? In reiterating the arguments in chapter 2 of this study, 
petroleum is and will still be an essential natural resource for the foreseeable 
future. Any country that has an abundance of it can leverage these resources as 
a ladder towards economic development, especially if the country is a developing 
one like Nigeria. According to Al-Kasim, the slogan of petroleum resource 
development ‘for the benefit of all the people’ should be the foremost objective of 
any petroleum-producing state and government.444 
 
According to Onoh, Nigeria was ill-experienced and ill-equipped for the petroleum 
business during the early stages of their petroleum industry.445 However, it is still 
arguably relevant to the present day Nigerian petroleum industry, as the country’s 
petroleum sector is synonymous with the natural resource curse, rent-seeking, 
and corruption, amongst other things.446 The clear and transparent performance 
 
441 Farouk Al-Kasim (n 44) 248. 
442 See Anjli Raval and Andrew Ward, 'Saudi Aramco Plans For A Life After Oil | Financial Times' (Ft.com, 
2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/e46162ca-d9a6-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482> accessed 20 November 2019; 
'Saudi Arabia’s Grand Plan To Move Beyond Oil: Big Goals, Bigger Hurdles' (Nytimes.com, 2017) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/world/middleeast/saudi-arabias-grand-plan-to-move-beyond-oil-big-
goals-bigger-hurdles.html> accessed 20 November 2019 and Adam Vaughan, 'BP Aims To Invest More In 
Renewables And Clean Energy' (the Guardian, 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/feb/06/bp-
aims-to-invest-more-in-renewables-and-clean-energy> accessed 20 November 2019. 
443 See Julianne Geiger, 'The Biggest Oil & Gas Discoveries Of 2019 | Oilprice.Com' (OilPrice.com, 2019) 
<https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/The-Biggest-Oil-Gas-Discoveries-Of-2019.html> accessed 20 
November 2019; 'New Oil And Gas Discoveries In 2018 | IFPEN' (Ifpenergiesnouvelles.com, 2019) 
<https://www.ifpenergiesnouvelles.com/article/new-oil-and-gas-discoveries-2018> accessed 20 November 2019, 
and 'Namibia Sees 11 Billion Barrels In Offshore Oil Reserves - Eco (Atlantic) Oil & Gas Plc' (Eco (Atlantic) Oil 
& Gas Plc, 2019) <https://www.ecooilandgas.com/namibia-sees-11-billion-barrels-in-offshore-oil-reserves/> 
accessed 20 November 2019. 
444 Farouk Al-Kasim (n 44) 241. 
445 See J. K Onoh (n 58) 22-23. 
446 Ibid. 
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benchmarks suggested by NRGI are solutions for ensuring that governments 
maximise their prospects of success.447 The debate about transparency as a critical 
solution on its own cannot possibly lead to a valid NOC, or create a NOC that is a 
success story based on its high level of transparency.448 According to Westenberg, 
transparency is only a starting point.449 According to Manley et al., NOCs remain 
non-transparent, and they suggest that for the successful management of a 
nation’s petroleum resources, there has to be more transparency in the 
governance and management of the states’ NOC to begin with.450 Indeed 
transparency is a significant factor in ensuring NOC success, but it cannot be 
viewed as the bedrock or benchmark for a valid NOC. Many NOCs have achieved 
some form of success without being fully transparent, as the petroleum industry 
prides itself in holding back information, and industrial secrets are a means of 
advancing each company’s cause in every region.451  
 
Company expenditure; the distribution of transfers to government across fiscal 
vehicles and jurisdiction; and the composition of NOC production are the indicators 
NRGI identified as essential markers for strong citizen oversight of their NOCs.452 
Stiglitz proposed democracy, consensual and transparent processes as ways to 
 
447 See 'The National Oil Company Database' (Resource Governance, 2019) 
<https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/national_oil_company_database.pdf> accessed 22 
July 2019. See also, D. Boldbaatar, N.C. Kunz and E. Werker n 340. 
448 Jones of Energyx Partners stated:  
It is essential to have transparency, openness and trust, and that is not easy […] 
Furthermore, achieving the right balance and a sense that each side is getting a fair share of the value created is 
tricky, particularly on the NOC side, where there are often suspicions over being taken advantage of. See Peter 
Ramsay, 'ADNOC Joins The Trading Party' (Petroleum-economist.com, 2019) <https://www.petroleum-
economist.com/articles/corporate/finance/2019/adnoc-joins-the-trading-party> accessed 28 March 2019. See 
also, Alexander Malden n 62; Peter Cameron and Michael Stanley (n 107) 222-224. 
449 Erica Westenberg, 'Leveraging Beneficial Ownership Information In The Extractive Sector' 
(Resourcegovernance.org, 2018) <https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/leveraging-
beneficial-ownership-information-in-the-extractive-sector.pdf> accessed 26 August 2019. 
450 David Manley, David Mihalyi and Patrick R.P. Heller, 'Hidden Giants: It's Time For More Transparency In 
Management And Governance Of National Oil Companies' (2019) 56 Finance and Development 56. 
451 There are frameworks in place in Norway but the extent of their commitment to them by their NOC is another 
argument. See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes (n 46) 222-227.  
452 See 'The National Oil Company Database' (Resource Governance, 2019) 
<https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/national_oil_company_database.pdf> accessed 22 
July 2019. See also, 'Guide To Extractive Sector State-Owned Enterprise Disclosure' (Resource Governance, 
2019) <https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/guide-to-extractive-sector-state-owned-
enterprise-disclosures_0.pdf> accessed 22 July 2019. See also Rob Pitman and Anne Chinweze, 'The Case For 
Publishing Petroleum Contracts In Nigeria' (NRGI Resourcegovernance.org, 2018) 
<https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/the-case-for-publishing-petroleum-contracts-in-
nigeria.pdf> accessed 1 December 2019. 
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ensure that the petroleum wealth of a state is equitably distributed.453 
Correspondingly, in all the literature on the Norwegian petroleum industry 
experience, Ryggvik claimed that the success of the Norwegian model is a product 
of an active democracy.454 This draws on the argument on transparency, and the 
ultimate goal to use the petroleum resources for the general benefit of the country 
and not for a select group. The general idea is that these resources be of benefit 
to the society, and a functional democracy is one that will assist the state in 
achieving this, going by the Norwegian Model. Therefore, this would mean that 
even the democratic petroleum-rich developing countries lack some democratic 
factors, as transparent processes can be argued to be a significant factor of an 







453 Joseph Stiglitz, 'We Can Now Cure Dutch Disease' The Guardian (2004) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2004/aug/18/comment.oilandpetrol> accessed 20 March 2019. 
454 See Helge Ryggvik n 65. 
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It can be concluded that NOCs will be crucial for countries with petroleum 
resources and the global petroleum resource industry for the foreseeable future. 
The overall critical analysis of this thesis on NOCs in today’s international 
petroleum industry, were advanced through the lenses of two established 
petroleum industries: Norwegian and Nigerian. Though, as the thesis 
demonstrated, there are considerable similarities and differences between the 
two. The thesis set out to examine the role of NOCs and highlighted the 
importance of NOCs to a petroleum-rich state and especially a developing country, 
and in the global petroleum industry. Arguably, the establishment of the first NOCs 
in general went against the neo-liberal views, Washington Consensus and the 
drive at liberalisation of the global petroleum industry.1 Although the extent of the 
benefits of an NOC model in some countries is yet to be evidenced such as Nigeria, 
some countries have been reasonably successful with their NOC such as Norway. 
 
There are many arguments against the maintenance of NOCs as a means for a 
state to own and control their petroleum resources, however this is one viewpoint 
this thesis did not take. Instead, the study supports the NOC model, with 
arguments that a petroleum-rich developing country can achieve economic 
development through the effective management of its petroleum resources, thus 
leading to significant benefits for the people of the country. Therefore, this makes 
the NOC more effective and a very significant tool in value creation through active 
management and engaging in the upstream activities of the petroleum sector of 
the country. 
 
On the grounds of this research's outcomes and preceding chapters of this study, 
this chapter proffers a conclusion to the thesis and recommendations for further 
research. These were guided by the research questions, scope and aims which the 
research set down in chapter 1, to examine the roles played by NOCs in the global 
 
1 See Chapter 3.3,  Chapter 4.2 and 4.4. 
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petroleum industry, and most importantly in their domestic or home countries 
where they seek to achieve economic development and value creation through the 
effective management of the petroleum resources of the state. These were 
highlighted in chapter 2 and 3. In chapter 4, an examination was made of the 
concept of resource nationalism as a driver for some countries to establish their 
own NOCs, and other concepts that come to bear in this study. In chapter 5 the 
rentier state theory and the resource curse, assisted the research in answering 
the research questions and making the salient points that emerged as the research 
progressed. This critical examination of NOCs was mainly focused on two NOCs: 
Equinor of Norway and NNPC of Nigeria. 
 
It was determined in the chapter 4 that the two key concepts of resource 
nationalism are ownership and control, and these concepts are relatively different, 
as the evidence from each of them leads to a different outcome for a petroleum-
rich developing state. A petroleum-rich country might own their petroleum 
resources, but they will not have control over these resources. Instead, they take 
a backseat and collect rent from the IOCs, who have control over these petroleum 
resources. This outcome was further explained in the examination of the rentier 
state theory in chapter 5. Following the history of the global petroleum industry, 
control of petroleum resources has always been pivotal in the development of 
these resources and who benefits or profits from the exploitation of these 
petroleum resources. This concluding chapter provides a number of general and 
specific conclusions and seeks to make a recommendation on petroleum resource 
reforms for a developing petroleum-rich country, in essence, Nigeria. It proposes 
ways for further research and as well highlights the limitations of the study.  
 
 
7.2 Summary of Findings 
 
This study examines the various claims that sustainable economic development 
can be achieved through petroleum resources. This is predicated on the arguments 
for effective management of these resources. Accordingly, in answering the 
research questions this study acknowledges the complexity of the effective 
management of petroleum resources, especially in a developing country, as many 
factors impact the achievement of the goal of value creation through petroleum 
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resources. As highlighted, many academic commentators including Lahn and 
Stevens support the view that petroleum-led development can be impacted by 
political history, power relations, demographic structures, culture, economic 
structure, geography and level of education.2 In promoting the use of petroleum 
resources as a means of achieving economic development and the NOC as the 
champion for this, it takes a positive stance on resource nationalism, and its 
components – ownership and control, for a developing petroleum-rich state – 
Nigeria, at the same time critically looking at the experience of Norway and her 
NOC. Precept 1, of the Natural Resource Charter, puts the question of ownership 
as one of the fundamentals of resource endowment, notably this was addressed 
in chapter 4 of this thesis.3  
 
Precept 1: Strategy, Legal Framework and Institutions.  
Resource management should secure the greatest benefit for 
citizen through an inclusive and comprehensive national strategy, 
clear legal framework and competent institutions.4 
 
Therefore, in line with this study's arguments, ownership is vital to the broader 
goal of value creation through the effective management of petroleum resources. 
This argument can be attributed to different sectors of the state, as the positive 
outlook of nationalisation established in this study. For example, in the United 
Kingdom, the recent nationalisation of British Northern Rail goes to support this, 
as the goal is for utmost value creation for the people by this strategy.5 In addition 
to ownership arguments, this study included control as a significant factor, 
especially for a developing petroleum-rich state, as laid out in the arguments of 
learning-by-doing in chapter 6.6 It was necessary in the course of the research, 
to establish that in tackling the objectives of the study, when a state embarks on 
 
2 Glada Lahn and Paul Stevens, ‘The Curse of the One-Size-Fits all Fix: Re-evaluating what we Know about 
Extractives and Economic Development’ in Tony Addison and Alan Roe (eds), Extractive Industries: The 
Management Of Resources As A Driver Of Sustainable Development (Oxford University Press 2018) 102. 
3 See David Manley and Rob Pitman, 'Natural Resource Charter Benchmarking Framework' 
(Resourcegovernance.org, 2017) <https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/natural-resource-
charter-benchmarking-framework-report-2017-web_0.pdf> accessed 23 January 2020. 
4 Ibid. 
5 See Tanya Powley and Jim Pickard, 'Northern Rail Franchise To Be Nationalised, Says UK Government' 
(Financial Times, 2020) <https://www.ft.com/content/42a20344-429b-11ea-abea-0c7a29cd66fe> accessed 20 
March 2020. See also, Gwyn Topham and Lucy Campbell, 'Northern Rail Franchise To Be Renationalised' (The 
Guardian, 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jan/29/northern-rail-franchise-to-be-
renationalised> accessed 20 March 2020. 
6 See Section 6.3.3.3 of Chapter 6. 
 276 
petroleum reforms, especially fiscal reforms that would assist the state, and gains 
more revenue from petroleum resources, it should not be viewed immediately as 
resource nationalism because the fiscal terms favour the state over the IOCs.7 
 
As evidenced by the research findings relevant to most petroleum-rich states, the 
poverty level in Nigeria is on the rise, as indicated by some that over 90 million 
Nigerians live in abject poverty.8 In addition, the level of distrust by people 
towards the government is believed to be at an all-time high, for example, among 
the people of the Niger Delta region, where vigorous debates and actions over the 
ownership of the petroleum resources are raised daily.9 This study highlights some 
of the key challenges which a developing petroleum-rich state would face, such 
as avoiding the natural resource curse (Dutch disease) and becoming a rentier 
state; corruption and transparency issues which usually go hand in hand with the 
petroleum industry.  
 
Further, in answering the research questions the study acknowledges that there 
cannot be a one approach that fits all situations. However, it recognises the vital 
role a reliable and efficient NOC can play in helping the nation achieve economic 
development through its petroleum resources, and in some way, improve 
governance. The problem is a complex one, and this lies at a number of factors 
including human and technical competence, regulatory, legal and policy challenges 
which should not be ignored. Today several NOCs have made remarkable progress 
in the development of petroleum resources domestically and internationally, 
therefore competing with IOCs.10 Academic commentators including Bagheri and 
Di Minin described these NOCs as Global NOCS, International NOCs, NOC Tigers, 
 
7 See Lisa E. Sachs and others, ‘Impacts of Fiscal Reforms on Country Attractiveness: Learning from the facts’ 
in Karl P. Sauvant (ed), Yearbook On International Investment Law & Policy 2011-2012 (Oxford University Press 
2013) 346. 
8 See Sandra Gathmann, 'Nigerian Oil And The Disappearing Money | Start Here' (Aljazeera.com, 2020) 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/start-here/2020/01/nigerian-oil-disappearing-money-
200105132143587.html> accessed 23 January 2020. 
9 See Jimitota Onoyume, 'Lord Lugard Will Never Make Heaven – Prof Darah' (Vanguard, 2020) 
<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/03/lord-lugard-will-never-make-heaven-prof-darah/> accessed 7 April 
2020. 
10 See Vasanthi Vara, 'Largest Oil And Gas Companies: Ranking The Top 10' (Offshore Technology | Oil and 
Gas News and Market Analysis, 2019) <https://www.offshore-technology.com/features/largest-oil-and-gas-
companies-in-2018/> accessed 24 January 2020. See also, Gaurav Agnihotri, 'A Closer Look At The World’s 5 
Biggest Oil Companies' (Oil Price, 2015) <https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/A-Closer-Look-At-The-
Worlds-5-Biggest-Oil-Companies.html> accessed 24 January 2020. 
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and super NOCs.11 The claims laid out in this study mainly subscribe and follow 
the stages of NOC growth, and envisage a situation whereby a NOC from a 
petroleum-rich developing country could evolve into a Global NOC, and 
comfortably compete with IOCs and other NOCs with some ease. This study 
acknowledges this to be one of the ultimate goals for a NOC, especially in the 
current global petroleum industry. Also, appendix 5 illustrates the power pillars 
and synergetic effects of NOCs. 
 
Therefore, for those petroleum reform goals as mentioned earlier to be achieved 
by Nigeria, the support from the provisions stated in the PIGB, which advocate 
that a truly commercial and company house incorporated state-own petroleum 
company should be reached.12 This new NOC under the PIGB should be actively 
involved in the upstream sector of the Nigerian petroleum industry, individually 
as an operator. It is worth mentioning that after a long delay, the Nigerian 
President has sent back the PIGB to the House for consideration. This has carried 
with it numerous speculations but at the moment the Bill has not been made 
available to the public.13 
 
According to Wegenast et al., the state retains higher petroleum incomes when 
the extraction is carried out by the NOC of the state, as opposed to reliance on 
IOCs to carry out the extraction.14 In this regard, the thesis highlighted the key 
developments in the Nigerian petroleum sector; under the PIGB, NPRC becomes 
the new regulator, thereby replacing DPR; while as stated in chapter 6, NNPC will 
be broken up into two companies – NPC and AMC, both entities commercial and 
registered under CAMA. Forthwith, if these objectives are carried out, and 
therefore the state ushers in a truly commercial NOC involved in the upstream 
 
11 See Seyed K. Bagheri and Alberto Di Minin, 'The Changing Competitive Landscape Of The Global Upstream 
Petroleum Industry' (2015) 8 The Journal of World Energy Law & Business 1. 
12 See Chapter 6: 6.4. 
13 See Ed Reed, 'Nigeria’s PIB Heads To Legislature Once More - News For The Oil And Gas Sector' (Energy 
Voice, 2020) <https://www.energyvoice.com/oilandgas/africa/268339/nigeria-pib-legislature-reform/> accessed 
5 October 2020, and Eniola Akinkuoto, 'Buhari Submits PIB To National Assembly, Scraps NNPC, PPPRA In 
New Bill' (Punch Newspapers, 2020) <https://punchng.com/buhari-submits-pib-to-national-assembly-scraps-
nnpc-pppra-in-new-bill/> accessed 5 October 2020. 
14 See Tim Wegenast, Arpita Khanna and Gerald Schneier, 'The Micro-Foundations Of The Resource Curse: 
Ownership And Local Economic Well-Being In Sub-Saharan Africa' [2018] GSDS Working Paper No. 2 
<https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/handle/123456789/41571/Wegenast_2-
fofaixjy8n8a4.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y> accessed 20 March 2020. 
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petroleum operations, then the following strategies could form part of the guiding 
principles of this commercial NOC:  
 
1. Efficiency and cost reduction: Important that the NOC carry out their 
operational duties with efficiency and cost reduction as the focal point of 
their operation; 
2. Technology: The never-ending demand for high technological quality in 
carrying out their operations whether onshore or offshore; 
3. Global and domestic presence: Strategic plans to leave their borders and 
gain access into new markets, thus having a global presence in the 
petroleum industry, as well as domestic presence, and  
4. Diversification of investment portfolio: Finally, following the recent trend in 
the global petroleum resource market, the need for NOCs and IOCs alike to 
diversify their portfolio from petroleum to renewable energy seems to be 
the trajectory of the industry.15 Although, 'looking beyond petroleum' 
seems to be the new campaign, the timeline for achieving these goals is 
very uncertain at the moment for both IOCs and NOCs. 
 
This thesis examined the Norwegian model NOC and identified valuable lessons 
for developing petroleum-rich states. Therefore, the analysis and study of these 
two different countries, their petroleum industry and their NOCs enable a better 
understanding of the performance of NOCs in the ownership and control context. 
Thus, the existence of a NOC does not guarantee the same results in effective 
control of a nation's petroleum resources, as not all countries producing petroleum 
resources exhibit the conditions in which their NOCs may play a vital role in the 
petroleum industry, by extension a source of economic development. Therefore it 
should be beneficial to the average citizen of the petroleum-rich state, as the 
question will always be, 'how can a petroleum resource-rich state benefit from the 
exploitation of their petroleum resources? This benefit is therefore achieved when 
the value is created for the citizens of the state. 
 
 
15 See Anton Oussov, 'Are National Oil Companies The New International Oil Companies?' (KPMG, 2018) 
<https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2018/08/are-national-oil-companies-the-new-international-oil-
companies.pdf> accessed 29 February 2020. 
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Be that as it may, according to the study, the NOC alone cannot assist a 
petroleum-rich state in achieving economic development through the abundance 
of petroleum resources. However, a collective effort has to be made by different 
sectors and arms of government, although the main focus of this study was on 




7.3 Recommendations for NNPC and Nigerian Petroleum Sector 
 
The passing of the PIGB could go a long way to restructure the upstream 
petroleum industry of Nigeria. Importantly, there needs to be a form of shield or 
protection of the upstream petroleum industry from political cycles. So far, there 
seems to be no continuity from past governments. This could be a case of party 
politics or a case of crony mentality. Occasions arise when a new party gets into 
government and there tends to be a move to tweak the petroleum regulations to 
suit the political party. Petroleum regulations should be tailored to the progress of 
the industry and not the political parties. Thus, the aim will be for the overall 
benefit of the entire country and not for a select group or the elites of the country. 
 
Furthermore, Okonkwo claimed that these delays by the Nigerian government to 
restructure the petroleum industry as proposed have hindered the growth of the 
state's industry especially the gas (LNG) sector, as some statistics show that 
Nigeria has the most abundant gas resources in the continent.16 Although open to 
debate, the stalling of petroleum industry reform has hindered the growth of this 
sector and the ability of the state to capture high value from these petroleum 
resources. 
 
As discussed in the thesis, there need to be specific steps the state has to take 
concerning NOCs, these are: 
1. Strengthen the NOC capacity (institutional) and ensure the vigorous 
enforcement of the rule of law; 
 
16 See Omono Okonkwo, 'Nigeria: Gas Is The New Oil [NGW Magazine]' (Natural Gas World, 2020) 
<https://www.naturalgasworld.com/nigeria-gas-is-the-new-oil-ngw-magazine-76629> accessed 24 February 
2020. 
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2. Reduce state intervention in the upstream petroleum sector and adhere to 
strict budget discipline during the (exploration and production) oil boom; 
3. Accumulation of the petroleum revenues in 'fiscal stability fund' or 
'sovereign wealth funds' to respond to future oil price fluctuations.17  
 
That being said, there also needs to be a high level of autonomy and independence 
of NOC from government. Separate and prohibit state interference in the 
operations of NOCs, thus allowing the NOC more authority to engage in resource 
projects and provide an environment in which they can act independently and 
commercially. Separating the NOC from internal politics and political party 
influence can go a very long way in the efficient management of the states' 
petroleum resources. Until the NOC is free from interim government manipulations 
the objectives of the NOC from a resource-rich developing country will never be 
reached. Although it can be argued that a NOC cannot be entirely free from 
government interference, the degree is what matters. Accordingly, Brogan 
acknowledged that in order for the NOC to maintain their critical role within their 
petroleum industry and the global petroleum sector, the NOC must change their 
relationship with the government.18 Although this can be awkward to achieve as 
has been evidenced since the petroleum boom in Nigeria, petroleum has been the 
prize of controlling the government, also evidenced in Angola as it provided the 
means to safeguard and extend control.19  
 
Another critical point to make is for a developing country like Nigeria to take into 
account that the present petroleum market is different from what it used to be a 
couple of years ago, and therefore adapt petroleum policy options that will assist 
the state in gaining economic development through these resources.20 That been 
said, this study suggests the evolution of the NOCs as well as the government 
petroleum policies, because the global petroleum industry is an ever-evolving one, 
 
17 See Misheelt Ganbold and Saleem H. Ali, 'The Peril And Promise Of Resource Nationalism: A Case Analysis 
Of Mongolia's Mining Development' (2017) 53 Resources Policy 1. 
18 Andy Brogan, 'Why National Oil Companies Need To Transform' (EY, 2019) <https://www.ey.com/en_gl/oil-
gas/why-national-oil-companies-need-to-transform> accessed 3 June 2020. 
19 See Inge Amundsen, 'Drowning In Oil: Angola's Institutions And The “Resource Curse”' (2014) 46 
Comparative Politics 169. 
20 See Paul Stevens, ‘Role of Oil and Gas in Global Economic Development’ in Tony Addison and Alan Roe 
(eds), Extractive Industries: The Management Of Resources As A Driver Of Sustainable Development (Oxford 
University Press 2018) 88. 
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as shown in chapter 2. The global petroleum industry is an ever-changing one, as 
evidenced by her history. For instance, Gong commented that the shale 
revolution, which took place over the past two decades, has reshaped the global 
petroleum industry.21  
 
These NOCs that have enhanced their efficiency in their domestic petroleum 
sectors and also in the international petroleum industry have been termed Global 
NOCs (GNOC), International NOCs (INOC), NOC Tigers, and Super NOCs by 
Bagheri and Di Minin.22 Equally, what enabled these NOCs to expand their 
petroleum resource base beyond their national borders was a result of amassed 
experience and competitiveness over time.23 Thus, the proposal by this study 
relies on the evidence of some NOCs that have achieved the above, especially 
Equinor to demonstrate that a NOC with the right petroleum laws, policies, 
regulations and political-will, these goals can be reached. To put it differently, 
Bagheri and Di Minin suggested that these GNOCs will take control of the global 
petroleum industry if these GNOCs vertically integrate and coordinate their output 
commitments.24 Under those circumstances, they will influence the global 
petroleum industry and other players in it, like IOCs and other NOCs, therefore 
relegating them to secondary players.25 Needless to say that for the other industry 
stakeholders such change in the competitive scenery will have an extensive 
outcome.26 See Appendix 6 for a view of how the power pillars of the global 
petroleum industry favour NOCs or GNOCs.  
 
Accordingly, a state's petroleum policies and NOCs have to evolve with the 
industry. The proposed stages of evolution of a NOC by this study are Full 
 
21 Binlei Gong, 'Effects Of Ownership And Business Portfolio On Production In The Oil And Gas Industry' (2020) 
41 The Energy Journal 33. 
22 Seyed Kamran Bagheri and Alberto Di Minin n 22. See also, 'The Oil And Gas Industry In Energy Transition' 
(IEA - World Energy Outlook Special Report, 2020) <https://www.iea.org/reports/the-oil-and-gas-industry-in-
energy-transitions> accessed 5 March 2020. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. See also, Anton Oussov n 14. 
25 Ibid. See also, Ben Thuriaux-Aleman, Sam Salisbury and Paolo R. Dutto, 'R&D Investment Trends And The 
Rise Of NOCs' (2010) 62 Journal of Petroleum Technology 30. 
26 Ibid. See also, Flavia Pereira de Carvalho and Andrea Goldstein, 'The Making Of National Giants: Technology 
And Governments Shaping The International Expansion Of Oil Companies From Brazil And China' [2008] UNU-
MERIT Working Papers 021. 
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ownership to Part-ownership and then Private ownership.27 For example, Norway, 
Brazil, the United Kingdom and the planned part-privatisation of Saudi Aramco. 
 
Embarking on this study's proposed evolution of NOC, certain factors must be 
identified. For instance, the petroleum framework should reflect different stages, 
times, periods, targets for the evolution of the NOC. Thus a guideline should be 
stipulated on the structural change of the NOC. Further, none of these will 
independently fix the petroleum sector, economy or poverty level. However, the 
desire is that these reforms would go some way to achieving the creation of value 
for many Nigerians.  
 
 
7.4 NOC Reforms 
 
Some of the proposed reforms in the Nigerian PIGB could assist the state in 
benefitting from the exploration and production of their petroleum resources. 
These reforms have lingered for ages, with arguments that the Nigerian President 
is not willing to make these changes as earlier promised.28 By this study's 
arguments, it is gleaned that countries usually need to see their NOC play a very 
vital role in the states' upstream sector, as the goal when analysing Equinor, is to 
one day have the NOCs present in other countries, which will lead to these NOCs 
competing with IOCs, domestically and globally.29 Therefore, as claimed by the 
thesis, the role of the NOC must bring value to the country as a whole, and not to 
a select group of the country's elite. To further stress the importance of a NOC, 
NNPC remains at the centre of the ongoing petroleum sector reforms in the 
country.30  
 
According to this study, the commercial and non-commercial objectives of the 
NOC should be well defined, and as well other mandates of the NOC, supported 
 
27 Here privately owned NOCs are seen as public entities as they are publicly listed in the Stock Exchange Market. 
28 See Nick Branson and Ed Hobey-Hamsher, 'The Diverging Fortunes Of Africa’s Crude Kings' (Petroleum-
economist.com, 2019) <https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/politics-economics/africa/2019/the-
diverging-fortunes-of-africa-s-crude-kings> accessed 30 December 2019. 
29  See Valérie Marcel, 'The Cost Of An Emerging National Oil Company' [2016] Chatham House - The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs. 
30 See Appendix 7. 
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by precept 6, of the Natural Resource Charter.31 It is always crucial for the 
development of the petroleum resources that the government should have a clear 
vision, because in so doing the role of the NOC and other institutions in the 
petroleum sector will be well defined.32 Accordingly, the study proposes critical 
stages of the evolution of a NOC, and in all these stages the NOC must be active 
in the upstream petroleum sector, meaning that the NOC must be involved in the 
exploration and production phase; therefore the NOC must be an operator: 
1. Fully Government-Owned and Controlled Operator - NOC 
2. Part Government-owned and controlled Operator - NOC, i.e. partly public 
owned by share listing in the stock markets. 
 
These should be covered in the Short and Long-term measures of petroleum 
sector restructuring. (Short term policies et al.) It is noteworthy to realise that 
the proposed stages of evolution of NOC come from the observation and analysis 
of the trajectory Equinor has taken over the years. For example, today, Equinor 
has set out plans to invest in renewable energy and has targets set.33 This 
proposed evolution of a NOC today could be another way for NOCs to attract FDI 
into their petroleum sector, and growing the NOC. For example, Saudi Aramco's 
planned IPO and recently the plan of Angola to part-privatise the NOC Sonangol 
by 2022 as a significant means for the country to attract investment to their 
petroleum sector.34 This says much about where the future of NOCs will lie.  
 
Therefore, the need to expand and diversify its portfolio is becoming vital by the 
day. The NOC should have the capacity to diversify, as this is important in 
 
31 Precept 6: State-owned enterprises. See David Manley and Rob Pitman n 3. 
32 Valérie Marcel, 'Guidelines For Good Governance In Emerging Oil And Gas Producers 2016' [2016] Chatham 
House <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-07-13-guidelines-good-
governance-2016-marcel.pdf> accessed 24 January 2020. 
33 See Peter Ramsay, 'Equinor Sets Out Its Renewables Vision' (Petroleum-economist.com, 2020) 
<https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/low-carbon-energy/energy-transition/2020/equinor-sets-out-its-
renewables-vision> accessed 8 February 2020. 
34 See 'Angola Set To Attract More FDI Into Oil And Gas; Part-Privatization of Sonangol By 2022 A Key Measure' 
(Africa Oil & Power, 2020) <https://www.africaoilandpower.com/2020/02/04/angola-set-to-attract-more-fdi-
into-oil-and-gas-part-privatization-of-sonangol-by-2022-a-key-measure/> accessed 19 February 2020; Candido 
Mendes, 'Angola's Sonangol Plans Share Sale For 30% Of Business In Broad Shakeup' (Bloomberg, 2020) 
<https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles/2020-02-27/angola-s-sonangol-plans-share-sale-for-30-of-
business-by-2027?__twitter_impression=true> accessed 27 February 2020; See also, Ariel Cohen, 'Saudi Aramco 
IPO Hits $2 Trillion Mark Amid Guarded Forecast' (Forbes.com, 2019) 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/12/18/saudi-aramco-ipo-hits-2-trillion-mark-but-forecast-still-
guarded/> accessed 19 February 2020. 
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achieving sustainable economic development through petroleum resources. 
Therefore, for sustainable diversification to be achieved there should be no 
illusions of what is expected from the petroleum reserves, that is knowing what 
level of economic contribution are expected from the petroleum reserves.35 It is 
also crucial that the NOC and government channel the petroleum revenues into 
investment that promotes self-sustained growth in other sectors of the economy.36 
Looking ahead with the absence of astronomical petroleum rent in mind, 
developing countries should view the diversification of the economy and 
strengthening of governance as a way to prepare themselves for a post-petroleum 
future.37 
 
Accordingly, the evolution, as mentioned earlier, the following graph shows the 
proposed stages and period of evolution: 
 
Figure 11 : Suggested Path of NOC Evolution  
 
Source: author’s own based on thesis data and analysis. 
 
This tentative 30 years NOC progressive evolution proposal is based on the 
analysis of Norway's petroleum industry and her NOC-Equinor. Firstly, this 30 year 
plan can be adjusted accordingly. These stages can be achieved in an earlier 
 
35 See Glada Lahn and Paul Stevens, ‘ The Curse of the One-Size-Fits all Fix: Re-evaluating what we Know about 
Extractives and Economic Development’ in Tony Addison and Alan Roe (eds) (n 19) 110. 
36 Ibid. 
37 See James Cust, ‘The Role of Governance and International Norms in Managing Natural Resources’ in Tony 
Addison and Alan Roe (eds), Extractive Industries: The Management Of Resources As A Driver Of Sustainable 
Development (Oxford University Press 2018) 418. 
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timeframe or a later one, it all depends on the momentum given to the transition 
from one stage to the other by the government. The evolutionary year's target 
can be adjusted with the global petroleum industry trends and market 
movements. This suggestion realises that no two countries are the same. 
 
Secondly, this NOC evolution proposal supports the control arguments of this 
study, as the NOC at some point, would have to take control of the upstream, 
production of the petroleum resources. The argument is that the NOC carries out 
at least the majority of the upstream production as it could be impossible to carry 
out all the upstream activities. For example, see Norwegian Petroleum sector 
activity in Figure 7, which shows Equinor with the highest number of licences in 
the NCS. 
 
Thirdly, as indicated in chapter 6, it took Norway 18 years to carry out her first 
overseas venture, and 29 years for the privatisation (listing) process to 
commence. It allowed the state ample time to gain knowledge and experience in 
the global petroleum industry. Somehow different, Nigeria's NOC with no 
international exposure, has been around for over 45 years, and her production 
arm, which is NPDC has been around for over 30 years, yet this producing arm of 
the state NOC cannot boast of production of 300 tb/d (thousand barrel per day). 
Therefore, the proposed evolution trajectory calls for a highly technically sound 
NOC that can carry out a more significant upstream production, and also be able 
to engage with the global petroleum industry competently.  
 
According to the suggested path of evolution (figure 11), the first period would be 
the technical learning period for the NOC, while the government maintains full 
ownership and control of the NOC. The second period, sees the NOC evolve into a 
full competent commercial entity, that can carry out upstream operations within 
the state and also abroad. In this period the government still wholly owns and 
controls the NOC. Finally, the last period sees the NOC partly government-owned 
listed in any suitable stock market. In line with this thesis's claims, the 
government retains the controlling shares as evidenced with Equinor of Norway.   
 
Finally, this listed commercially competent NOC can then evolve with the global 
petroleum industry, as it would be regarded as a genuine GNOC. Therefore, it can 
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be advanced that this GNOC can be in a better position to engage with the global 
energy industry when the energy transition period kicks in, and more easily attract 
global investment than a non-global NOC.  
 
By focusing on NOC, this proposed evolution did not account for many other 
factors and variables that can impact this transition, of a NOC to a GNOC, as there 
are other petroleum resource-related determinants of economic development. 
This proposal was put forward following the analysis of Equinor and NNPC on the 
back of the ownership and control claims of the study. 
 
7.5 Key Challenges in the Petroleum Sector  
 
Usually, in a developing country, challenges to change in a sector, especially 
petroleum sector can range from; political instability, transparency, corruption, 
enforcement and elite or class influence. Here, some of these challenges are 
grouped into general petroleum sector challenges and NOC specific challenges. 
 
7.5.1 General Petroleum Sector Challenges 
 
As with any country, particularly a developing one, political stability is a 
fundamental necessity for positive outcomes from the country’s petroleum 
resources.38 To ensure this stability, several factors impact the petroleum industry 
in a country. For example, the political system, political parties, number of political 
parties, political parties in power, political parties in the opposition, the maturity 
of the political parties in the country, and the political awareness of the people of 
the state.39 It is known that one or more of the above lead to political instability 
in Nigeria and therefore affect the primary industry of the country, which is the 
petroleum industry. 
 
Transparency in the petroleum industry has been a factor that has an overarching 
result on the industry in terms that so many issues are believed to be the existing 
 
38 Ari Aisen and Francisco José Veiga, 'How Does Political Instability Affect Economic Growth?' (2013) 29 
European Journal of Political Economy 151. 
39 Mary N. Mbuguah, Mary Kibuine and Juluis Kahuthia, 'Effect Of Political Violence Disruptions On 
Performance Of The Petroleum Industry During Electioneering Period' (2019) 3 International Academic Journal 
of Human Resources and Business Administration 320. 
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problems of the petroleum industry. Boldbaatar et al. believe that the widespread 
corruption in transactions, contracts and compliances in the petroleum industry 
can be changed with transparency, or by shining a light on these, thus leading to 
government accountability.40 Disclosure of all dealings that go on in the industry 
is assumed to be the target of implementing transparency measures. Therefore, 
achieving transparency becomes a challenge to a petroleum-rich state, as 
previously argued in earlier chapters, the petroleum industry has always been 
shrouded in secrecy and secret dealings, and as a result, hidden from scrutiny.41  
 
Collier further asserted that for a state to achieve the goal of effective 
management of their petroleum resources, the government has to be informed 
and also, such informed citizens as these are vital.42 As a result, some disclosure 
frameworks have been developed, for instance, EITI, to which Nigeria is a 
signatory,43 but for a recent disclosure framework developed to improve resource 
governance by Boldbaatar et al. for Mongolia see appendix 7, bearing in mind that 
it is a sample of how this disclosure process works and the stages involved. The 
possibility of this framework being achievable in Nigeria is one that has to be 
assessed. Although the country is signed up to EITI, cases of undisclosed 
payments still abound.44 Promising more than it can deliver is a criticism levelled 
against EITI.45 This also can be predicated on the metrics of analysis of the impact 
of EITI in a particular state. 
 
 
40 D. Boldbaatar, N.C. Kunz and E. Werker, 'Improved Resource Governance Through Transparency: Evidence 
From Mongolia' [2019] The Extractive Industries and Society. See also, 'Borrowers And Lenders Must Come 
Clean On Terms Of Controversial, High-Value Resource-Backed Loans' (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 
2020) <https://resourcegovernance.org/news/controversial-high-value-resource-backed-loans> accessed 27 
February 2020 and 'USA: Publish What You Pay Calls On Extractive Companies To Comment On Latest SEC 
Payment Disclosure Rules; Including Company Responses | Business & Human Rights Resource Centre' 
(Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 2020) <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/usa-publish-
what-you-pay-calls-on-extractive-companies-to-comment-on-latest-sec-payment-disclosure-rules-including-
company-responses> accessed 12 March 2020. 
41 For Instance, See 'African Leaders Must Come Clean On Terms Of Controversial, High-Value Resource-
Backed Loans' (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2020) <https://resourcegovernance.org/news/africa-high-
value-resource-backed-loans> accessed 29 February 2020. 
42 Paul Collier, 'Under Pressure' (2013) 50 Finance and Development 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/12/pdf/collier.pdf> accessed 29 February 2020. 
43 See Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative  'NEITI' (2020) <https://www.neiti.gov.ng/index.php> 
accessed 27 February 2020. 
44 See Paul Adeyeye, 'President Buhari Fails To Disclose ₦11.4 Trillion Oil Remittances' (Dataphyte, 2020) 
<https://www.story.dataphyte.com/extractive/president-buhari-fails-to-disclose-₦11-4-trillion-oil-remittances/> 
accessed 27 February 2020. 
45 See Glada Lahn and Paul Stevens, ‘ The Curse of the One-Size-Fits all Fix: Re-evaluating what we Know about 
Extractives and Economic Development’ in Tony Addison and Alan Roe (eds) (n 19) 101. 
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Corruption and bribery in the global petroleum industry has made the news so 
many times for corruption and bribery and these practices are witnessed at both 
international and national levels. As earlier highlighted, these corrupt actors make 
sure these deals are hidden, which makes the call for disclosure and transparency 
in the global and state petroleum industries significant.46 
 
Enforcement and implementation is another challenge that a petroleum-rich state 
will face in achieving value creation through their petroleum resources, when new 
and progressive petroleum legal frameworks are proposed, and the state accepts 
these changes. Passing them into laws, or adopting these policies in the petroleum 
sector, does not automatically mean that these policies will be adhered to. 
Enforcement and implementation becomes key. Accordingly, in a democratic 
state, this depends on the effectiveness of the arms of government and the 
government institutions as legislation means nothing without proper enforcement. 
It has been argued in this study that the strengthening of an institution can assist 
the state in achieving economic development through its petroleum resources. 
Therefore in a more reliable institution, it can be said there will be institutional 
constraints present, that would further make it difficult for the revenues from 
petroleum to be diverted for personal use, or into the pockets of the ruling group 
or elites of the state, thereby diminishing the influence of the elites of the country 
in the management of the petroleum resources.47  
 
 
7.5.2 NOC Specific Challenge 
 
Overall this research acknowledges the government influence on their NOCs, and 
this influence can be a blessing or a curse for the NOC. Regardless, support from 
the government is required, while the NOC maintains its independence in carrying 
 
46 See Aaron Sayne and Melanie D. Reed, 'In Foreign Corruption Cases, Transparency Creates Accountability 
(The FCPA Blog, 2020) <https://fcpablog.com/2020/02/26/in-foreign-corruption-cases-transparency-creates-
accountability/> accessed 27 February 2020. See also, Melanie D. Reed and Aaron Sayne, 'Holding To Account: 
How Publishing Facts About Foreign Corruption Creates Accountability' (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 
2020) <https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/holding-to-account-how-publishing-facts-
about-foreign-corruption-creates-accountability.pdf> accessed 27 February 2020. 
47 See Evelyn Dietsche, ‘Political Economy and Governance’ in Tony Addison and Alan Roe (eds), Extractive 
Industries: The Management Of Resources As A Driver Of Sustainable Development (Oxford University Press 
2018) 125 - 132. 
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out its objectives. Notwithstanding the recommendations, the inquiry that remains 
is whether the NOC can be given their independence to operate without 
government interference, party politics and ruling group. This situation is usually 
obtainable in a country where the petroleum resources and sector are the 
mainstay of the economy. Therefore, the control of this resource and sector 
becomes of uppermost importance to some of the aforementioned groups. 
Therefore, NOC global expansion can be somewhat predicated on the state’s 
political willingness to ensure that the goals of the NOCs are reached, as has been 
observed national political party competition restrains democratic tolerance for 
NOCs lack of success.48 
 
Given that a truly independent NOC would bring efficiency, productivity and many 
more positive outcomes for the petroleum sector of the state, and by extension 
creation of value through effective management of the petroleum resources as 
earlier stated in this study for the people of the country. Achieving a truly 
independent NOC could be argued to be a myth, but as long as the government 
continues to own shares in the corporation but on the other hand achieves some 
level of independence it has been seen to be obtainable. 
 
Most petroleum-rich developing countries have their own NOC, also corruption can 
be a huge challenge in the petroleum sector, and NOCs are often infamous for 
waste and corruption.49 It is usually commercial, through influence on 
procurement, also playing a role in administrative corruption, is the weak capacity 
of the other government institutions.50 These can be a challenge in implementing 






48 See Andrew Cheon, 'Developing Global Champions: Why National Oil Companies Expand Abroad' (2019) 31 
Economics & Politics 403. 
49 See Charles McPherson and Stephen  MacSearraigh, ‘Corruption in the Petroleum Sector’ in J. Edgardo Campos 
and Sanjay Pradhan (eds), The Many Faces Of Corruption: Tracking Vulnerabilities At The Sector Level (The 
World Bank 2007) 200 - 205. 
50 Ibid. 
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7.6 Limitations and Areas of Future Research  
 
In the cause of carrying out this research, certain limitations and areas for future 
research arose.  
 
7.6.1 Study Limitations 
 
There is a need for a new research agenda for Nigeria, especially in view of the 
recent changes in the international oil and gas industry, and the evaluation of the 
petroleum resource curse. The complexity of different factors that determine 
corruption, petroleum violence, bribery, authoritarianism calls for a multi-
disciplinary investigation. Further, the financial implications for when a NOC is 
fully involved in the upstream operation – Exploration and Production (E&P), have 
to be considered. 
 
The study did not look at other unique factors that can affect the economic 
production or value creation through petroleum resources as many factors affect 
the value creation through the management of petroleum resources. For example, 
land, labour, and capital markets also, as the thesis is concerned with NOC as a 
state institution for successful value creation through the effective management 
of petroleum resources, for complete support by the ownership and control of 
these petroleum resources. 
 
The Norwegian model is usually cited as a set of vital reforms that a country’s 
NOC can adopt to improve performance, efficiency and transparency.51 There is 
no scientific basis for this assertion and some claim that it is hard to operationalise 
NOC independence and hard to apply the Norwegian model in a developing 
country. The role of an independent NOC has been the focus of most pieces of 
literature, although the lessons from some of these studies are unclear. Some of 
 
51 See Barbara Doric and Vlado Dimovski, 'Managing Petroleum Sector Performance – A Sustainable 
Administrative Design' (2018) 31 Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja 119. See also, Jonathon Wayne 
Moses and Bjørn Letnes, Managing Resource Abundance And Wealth: The Norwegian Experience (Oxford 
University Press 2017). 
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these studies show the role the Norwegian model can play in enhancing a NOC 
performance.52 
 
In assessing whether the Norwegian model is or is not a good idea, Thurber et al. 
stressed that "reformers in the petroleum sector of a state require context-specific 
guidance" to make this judgement.53 Therefore, it is difficult to come up with a 
political and economic indicator, that examines how the decision-making body in 
an institution or NOC (policymaking, regulatory and operational) are elected or 
appointed, and also how the NOC gets funding as many other NOC/institutional 
elements differ across contexts. For example, some countries have sundry NOCs 
like China, and some countries open their petroleum sector up to global and 
domestic competition like Norway and Brazil; privatising the NOC (Norway and 
Argentina). There is still much work to be done in developing remarkable cross-
national indicators and tests.54 
 
 
7.6.2 Areas of Future Research 
 
The study deliberately did not consider the effects that global petroleum market 
factors would have on the performance of a NOC, against the proposed changes 
promulgated in this study. Future studies can take the domestic and international 
petroleum market factors into consideration, as the productivity of a NOC could 
be constrained by these variables in the future, especially after specific policy 
changes or fiscal reforms have been made in a petroleum-rich developing state. 
 
It is suggested that future studies could consider the impacts of investment on 
upstream activities, amidst the increase in climate and renewable energy 
campaigns.55 Some arguments have been put forward on the possible impact of 
 
52 For example, See Valérie Marcel, 'National Oil Companies Of The Future' (2019) 95 Annales des Mines-
Responsabilité et Environnement <https://www.cairn.info/revue-responsabilite-et-environnement-2019-3-page-
133.htm.> accessed 27 August 2019. 
53 See Mark C. Thurber, David R. Hults and Patrick R.P. Heller, 'Exporting The “Norwegian Model”: The Effect 
of Administrative Design On Oil Sector Performance' (2011) 39 Energy Policy 5367. 
54 See Jonathon Wayne Moses and Bjørn Letnes, Managing Resource Abundance And Wealth: The Norwegian 
Experience (Oxford University Press 2017) 
55 See Anna Kachkova, 'Major Trend Emerges For Net-Zero Targets' (Petroleum Economist, 2020) 
<https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/low-carbon-energy/energy-transition/2020/major-trend-
emerges-for-net-zero-targets> accessed 28 February 2020, and 'Reporting For A Secure Climate: A Model 
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climate change on petroleum resource production.56 Especially for petroleum-rich 
developing countries in Africa, there arises a need to plan, so that they will not 
end up having resources that are worthless, hence stranded assets.57 Today, some 
NOCs and IOCs have set renewable energy targets and also, embarked on some 
climate or green initiatives.58 For example, Equinor, Shell, Total, Repsol, Eni and 
BP have all made public commitments to meet the net-zero carbon emissions 
target for 2050.59 
 
What will this mean for the future of the upstream petroleum industry, especially 
in a petroleum-rich developing state? How will the investment landscape look, and 
what will it mean for some NOCs? Future studies must concern NOCs transitioning 
to a renewable energy company or having an arm of the company involved in 
renewable energy, to mitigate for the energy transition that is on the horizon, so 
as not to be caught unawares or left behind.60 As much as the state might have 
an abundance of petroleum resources, the need to attract investment into the 
state's energy sector is vital to the growth of that sector. 
 
As discussed corruption issues that plague state institutions and NOCs should be 
an area of further research, as corruption is a complex concept, and also the 
 
Disclosure For Upstream Oil And Gas - Carbon Tracker Initiative' (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2020) 
<https://www.carbontracker.org/reports/reporting-for-a-secure-climate-a-model-disclosure-for-upstream-oil-
and-gas/> accessed 24 February 2020.   
See also, 'The Carbon Bubble Reality Check' (Shell Climate Change, 2020) 
<https://blogs.shell.com/2013/05/03/bubble/> accessed 24 February 2020. 
56 See Bernice Lee and others, 'Resources Futures' (2012) 1 Chatham House. 
57 See 'Africa's Development In Age Of Stranded Assets' (UNU-INRA, 2019) 
<https://i.unu.edu/media/inra.unu.edu/publication/5247/DIscussion-paper-Africas-Development-in-the-age-of-
stranded-Assets_INRAReport2019.pdf> accessed 27 February 2020. 
58 See Harry Dempsey and Anjli Raval, 'Equinor To Slash Emissions In ‘Major’ Wind Push' (Financial Times, 
2020) <https://www.ft.com/content/65329980-48ba-11ea-aeb3-955839e06441> accessed 24 February 2020; 
Andrew Lee, 'Equinor Sets 2035 Renewables Target To Become 'Offshore Wind Major' | Recharge' (Recharge | 
Latest renewable energy news, 2020) <https://www.rechargenews.com/wind/equinor-sets-2035-renewables-
target-to-become-offshore-wind-major/2-1-751375> accessed 24 February 2020; Jillian Ambrose, 'BP Sets Net 
Zero Carbon Target For 2050' (the Guardian, 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/feb/12/bp-
sets-net-zero-carbon-target-for-2050> accessed 24 February 2020, and Julia Horowitz, 'BP's New CEO Pledges 
Net Zero Emissions By 2050' (CNN Business, 2020) <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/02/12/business/bp-net-
zero/index.html> accessed 24 February 2020. 
59 Nick Butler, 'Look Beyond European Oil Majors’ Steps To Net Zero' (Financial Times, 2020) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/7571fadc-5889-11ea-abe5-8e03987b7b20> accessed 5 March 2020. 
60 See Alastair O'Dell, 'Investors And NGOs Take Tougher Line On Climate Change' (Petroleum Economist, 
2020) <https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/low-carbon-energy/energy-transition/2020/investors-
and-ngos-take-tougher-line-on-climate-change> accessed 28 February 2020. See also, 'The Oil And Gas Industry 
In Energy Transition' (IEA - World Energy Outlook Special Report, 2020) <https://www.iea.org/reports/the-oil-
and-gas-industry-in-energy-transitions> accessed 5 March 2020. 
 293 
schemes are opaque as well as complex, and evidence of corruption has been 
proven to exist in petroleum resource-rich states.61 
It is important to highlight the study's caveats and plea. It is somewhat agreed 
upon the negative impact of petroleum activities – pollution; environmental; 
fishery – employment and livelihood—also, corporate Social Responsibility: 
political and ethical problems—furthermore, in-depth analysis of the financial 
instruments used by these NOCs. There was no critical analysis of the fiscal 




7.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
The significance of this study is to buttress the claims for establishing and 
maintaining a NOC, especially in a petroleum-rich developing state. In chapter 2 
NOCs were introduced as champions of a petroleum-rich state, as suggested by 
the history of the global petroleum industry, when both petroleum exporting and 
importing countries started establishing these government entities to hold the 
torch for the development of their petroleum resources. In chapter 2, this thesis 
claimed the continued importance of petroleum resources in the global energy 
mix, as predicted by the trajectory of the global petroleum industry. In addition, 
the reasons why a state should maintain a NOC were expounded in chapter 3. 
 
Further, in the chapter, the study evidenced some rationale why some states have 
established their NOCs, with a closer historical view of Nigeria and Norway. Finally, 
in chapter 3, the grand claim was that NOC is still a relevant player in the global 
petroleum industry, if not the most relevant at the moment, and would continue 
to play a vital role in the global petroleum industry, for the foreseeable future of 
the industry.  
 
 
61 See Aaron Sayne, Alexandra Gillies and Andrew Watkins, 'Twelve Red Flags: Corruption Risks In The Award 
Of Extractive Sector Licences And Contracts' (Resourcegovernance.org, 2017) 
<https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/corruption-risks-in-the-award-of-extractive-
sector-licenses-and-contracts.pdf> accessed 25 February 2020. See also, Alexandra Gillies, Crude Intentions: 
How Oil Corruption Contaminates The World (Oxford University Press 2020). 
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Furthermore, chapter 4 connected the establishment of NOCs to resource 
nationalism and claimed that resource nationalism could lead to a positive 
outcome for the petroleum-rich state, especially a developing state. The chapter 
expanded on the core concepts of resource nationalism, which are ownership and 
control. There are further claims that ownership and control outcomes are 
different, as these concepts usually lead to different outcomes in the petroleum 
sector where it is expressed. In chapter 4, the role a NOC has to play in effectively 
asserting the state's ownership and control over their petroleum resources. This 
then led the research to critically analyse the natural resource curse, and rentier 
state theories, while further expanding on the vital role an NOC plays in assisting 
the state in escaping the petroleum resource curse. Finally, all these concepts 
were brought together in the comparative analysis of both Norway and Nigeria's 
upstream petroleum sector and their NOCs. This critical analysis thus leads to 
recommendations, NOC reforms and regulatory reforms in chapter 6 and mainly 
in this chapter. 
 
The central thesis that emerges from the work is that although the global 
petroleum industry relies on IOCs for progress and delivery of petroleum as a 
source of energy, this does not diminish the importance of NOCs. However, it 
seems that the industry is moving towards a free-market model, where the IOCs 
or private oil companies control the industry. Further, some of the theories that 
have been expounded in this study have assisted in proving the importance of 
NOC in the global petroleum industry. It is believed that today the NOCs can be 
as effective as the IOCs, albeit with the right petroleum regulations and guidance 
from the government. Fundamentally, the main goal of a NOC continues to be the 
creation of value for the people of the state through the effective management of 
their petroleum resources. The best path would be for the strategic involvement 
of these NOCs in the upstream petroleum sector of their various states. As a result, 
the concepts of ownership and control can be exhibited without harming the state, 
for there to be full control of these petroleum resources the NOC of the state must 
be involved in the production phase of the upstream industry. Another point to 
bear in mind for a petroleum-rich developing state is the global energy transition, 
as consideration has to be given to this in the strategic planning and objectives of 
the NOC.  
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Furthermore, this study has expressed the vital role a NOC plays in their domestic 
petroleum sector, likewise in the global petroleum sector for those NOCs that have 
expanded their activities abroad. This NOC expansion, outside their domestic 
petroleum sector into the global petroleum sector, is what this study pointed out 
as being one of critical evolution for a NOC. Equinor of Norway's progress in the 
global petroleum industry was used in the critical analysis of a NOC from a 
developed country, in contrast to NNPC of Nigeria's progress. Critically mirroring 
Norway's petroleum industry against Nigeria's, assisted the study to highlight 
some of the problems in the Nigerian petroleum sector, and by extension, some 
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In line with the IMF discussion notes this study adopts and proposes the following 
principles to guide the formulation of fiscal policy frameworks in petroleum resource-
rich developing countries:  
1. The fiscal policy framework should reflect country-specific characteristics like 
revenue dependency and volatility as well as the resource revenue horizon, which 
may change over time.  
2. The framework should ensure the sustainability of fiscal policy. Benchmarks of 
sustainability can be derived from a Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) 
framework or from a broader focus on stabilizing government net wealth (in some 
cases at a level below today’s net wealth).  
3. Policymakers can choose alternative fiscal anchors, either primarily addressing 
fiscal sustainability concerns (e.g., PIH-based rules) or focusing more on short-
term demand management (e.g., a price-based or structural balance rule). 
Country characteristics should guide the choice of the appropriate fiscal anchor 
(Appendix 2).  
4. Fiscal frameworks should be sufficiently flexible to enable the scaling-up of 
growth- enhancing expenditure, especially in Low-Income Countries (LICs).  
5. In countries with large absorption constraints, the pace of scaling-up may have to 
be gradual, while public financial management systems are reinforced and 
domestic supply constraints softened.  
6. The volatility and uncertainty of resource revenue is critical for the design of fiscal 
frameworks, and having sufficient precautionary fiscal buffers is critical. 
Technically, a strong revenue forecasting framework needs to be developed and 
spending plans framed in a medium-term perspective.  
7. The credibility and transparency of the fiscal policy framework can be supported 
by a well-designed resource fund, but the latter cannot be a substitute for an 
appropriate policy framework nor a panacea that obviates the need to strengthen 
overall fiscal management capacity. Funds need to be fully integrated with the 
budget and the fiscal framework.  
 
















APPENDIX 5 - NOC Power Pillars and Synergetic Effects 
 
Power Pillars Synergetic Effects 
1. Easy access to 
petroleum 
resources 
 It gives NOCs more leverage in technology transfer 
negotiations with IOCs. For instance, Statoil’s technology 
learning process was accelerated by the establishment of 
‘‘Goodwill agreements’’ with IOCs, under which IOCs had 
to contract oil and gas-related R&D to Norwegian 
companies in order to be regarded as a serious candidate 
for obtaining contracts on offshore oil and gas E&P on 
the Norwegian continental shelf. 
 It also provides opportunities for testing and evaluating 
new technologies, and in providing a certain market for 
viable solutions.  
 In combination with high oil prices, it has given GNOCs 
an over-supply of funds and unprecedented financial 
power.  
 The more access to oil and gas resources and 
operatorship projects, the better the chance to develop 
the expertise and experience in the up- stream oil and 
gas industry. As GNOCs increasingly become global 
players, their managerial competencies are getting up to 
par with the leading IOCs.  
2. Financial 
Strength  
 It allows GNOCs to invest heavily in R&D and innovative 
capacities. The R&D investment of CNPC, for instance, 
was around one billion Euros in 2009, which shows a 
dramatic 27.4 percent increase over the preceding year. 
CNPC has established 76 scientific research institutions 
with 28,486 scientific research personnel and engaged in 
various long-term partnerships with the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, universities and research 
organizations. 
 Backed by a strong financial base, GNOCs have the 
option of acquiring technology from service companies 
to challenge IOCs traditional advantage. 
 At a time when most IOCs have cut back on their 
investment spending, GNOCs have used their financial 
strength in order to acquire better quality assets. The 
Chinese GNOCs, in particular, have done substantial 
investments in resource-rich countries. Only in 2009, 
Chinese GNOCs, along with other Chinese companies, 
 391 
invested in 10 overseas acquisitions for a total of USD 
18.2 billion.  
 It gives GNOCs the ability to tap into the industry’s 





 It puts GNOCs in a better position to develop and 
effectively orchestrate innovation networks and 
reinforce their technological learning processes. The 
successful case of the PETRORS Network, a multi-
sectoral innovation network which helps boost the 
competitiveness of Petrobras, is an apt case in point. By 
early 2005, one hundred and ninety companies 
(suppliers and sub-suppliers) and over 90 research labs 
were members of the network, besides the Petrobras 
and the financial agents. 
 It has led GNOCs to advanced financial and treasury 
management operations; improved international tax 
planning; and better compliance with international 
institutional and accounting standards. These 
achievements not only improved their profitability but 
also their financial transparency and accountability. 
These have enabled GNOCs to have more of a chance 
of financing their activities through international capital 
markets. 
 It has always been a key factor in the decisions made 
by major resource owners to grant operating licences to 




 It has been a key factor in the decisions made by major 
resource-owners to grant operating licences to foreign 
operators. It, for example, has been a key enabler in 
Petrobras’ access to the oil and gas resources of other 
countries, since the company expanded primarily 
towards other areas where it could rely on its own 
technical leadership in deep-water operations.  
 Technology transfer and licensing has become 
increasingly important as a source of revenue to GNOCs. 
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Top Row depicts the Stages of disclosure. Second row shows the Drivers, and 
the bottom row shows the drivers. 
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